

No. [★] UA27. P54 1903



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ANNUAL REPORT ⁴

OF

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE W. DAVIS,
UNITED STATES ARMY,

COMMANDING

DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

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(1902)*

FROM OCTOBER 1, 1902 TO JULY 26, 1903.

MANILA, P. I.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

U.S. Year Dept. - Division of the Philippines.

Jan. 11, 1903.

2111/37

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HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila, P. I., July 26, 1903.

To the

Adjutant General,

United States Army,

Washington, D. C.

SIR:

The date of the last annual report of the Commanding General, Division of the Philippines, was September 30, 1902. On the date when the undersigned retired from active service, in pursuance of law, the time for the preparation of an Annual Report had not yet arrived, but it was so close at hand, and as it would not be easy for the General Officer succeeding to the command, to review the events of the past ten months, the undersigned has undertaken such a review and has mentioned some suggestions in way of reform and improvement.

In what is now submitted there in no other reference to Civil Officials and Government than is required in order that the observations of the writer, respecting what was committed to his jurisdiction by the assignment he had the honor to hold by the President's order, might be explained and understandingly presented.

The service of the undersigned in the Philippines has been continuous since January, 1901, and he has not failed to study the problems presented to American occupancy of these Islands, for American solution, specially those of a military character.

The government was wholly Military until September 1, 1900, on which date the Military Governor was relieved of authority to legislate, and to some extent of the power to

name the individuals whose services were needed to aid him in executing the laws that were then in force or that might thereafter be enacted by the Philippine Commission.

On July 4, 1901, there was transferred to the Commission, by the Military Governor, all civil executive authority previously exercised by him with respect to those Provinces in which Civil Government had been established by the Commission. Within those provinces the Civil power was supreme and the President of the Commission became Governor of the Islands. The General Officer commanding the troops stationed in the Philippines had complete control over the discipline, instruction and administration of the Military force, but in the Civil Government Provinces this military force could not be aggressively employed save in those cases of disturbance of the peace respecting which the Commission should request armed intervention. Over all other provinces, the authority of the General Commanding in the capacity of Military Governor still continued; but during the ensuing twelve months, all the territory in the Philippines, save what is now called the Moro Province, was brought under Civil Government, and removed from Military control.

On July 4, 1902, the office of the Military Governor was abolished and the President of the Philippine Commission was announced by the President of the United States as the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. The Commander of the forces was ordered to assist with his troops the enforcement of law and order when called upon to do so by the Philippine Commission.

On January 30, 1903, the Civil Governor was authorized by Congressional Enactment to call upon the Military Commander for the use of a certain class or Corps of his Army, to assist the Philippine Constabulary, the same to be commanded by the nominees in the Civil Government.

All Americans who have been as cognizant, as the undersigned has been, of the magnitude of the task committed to the Philippine Commission and who have noticed the great progress that has been made in establishing a just Government of regulated liberty for the Filipinos, can but feel that the highest ideals of our best statesmen and publicists are being incorporated into the code of laws that is being developed here, wholly and entirely for the good of the people; and the members of the Commission and their associates deserve the cordial support of all. Such support by the Military has been accorded not only as a matter of duty, but also as a privilege and honor. The relations between the Military and the Civil officials result in cordial cooperation, and the personal and official relations between the Military Commander and the Civil Governor have been close and intimate and most satisfactory to the writer.

In respect to one official subject there was a difference of opinion as to the expediency of a course touching the Army that was adopted by the Philippine Commission, and which the undersigned has felt that he should not fail to call special attention to; for the result of the action taken was to put upon the Army a slight, to say the least, that could have been avoided. The matter referred to is fully presented below under the caption of "Native Scouts".

THE ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES

The following tabulated statement of numbers present of the different arms of service, and of military officials serving in the Division, will serve as a graphic presentment of the numbers in these islands on June 30, 1903, as compared with September 30, 1902, the date of the last Annual Report of the Division Commander. The number of organizations has undergone no change during the ten months covered by this report, but the number of enlisted men have decreased by nearly five thousand, and the number of officers serving with the four arms of service is now greater by 120 than at the earlier date.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT.

	October 1, 1902			June 30, 1903		
	Off.	Men	Total	Off.	Men	Total
Division Headquarters	32	0	32	35	0	35
The Department Headquarters	56	0	56	51	0	51
Engineers	19	386	405	13	385	398
Cavalry	191	4756	4947	200	3864	4064
Artillery { Field	11	360	371	12	350	362
{ Coast	13	429	442	13	439	452
Infantry	339	13481	13820	448	10326	10774
Philippine Scouts	94	4841	4935	97	4771	4868
Signal Corps	7	415	422	7	421	428
Medical Dept. and Hosp. Corps	82	1659	1741	89	951	1040
Cont. and Cont. Dent. Surgeons	123	0	123	121	0	121
Surgeons, U. S. Volunteers	152	0	152	0	0	0
Post Non-Com. Staff	0	102	102	0	109	109
Attached	4	0	4	9	0	9
Civil Duty	12	0	12	15	0	15
Total	1135	29429	27564	1110	21616	22726

The arrivals of Military Organizations from October 1, 1902, to July 26, 1903 have been the following:

Three Batteries, Field Artillery	Feb. 25, 1903
Four Companies, Coast Artillery	Feb. 25, 1903
Hdqrs. and Three Battalions, 14th Infantry ...	Mch. 26, 1903
Hdqrs. and One Squadron, 13th Cavalry	Mch. 26, 1903
One Squadron, 13th Cavalry	Apr. 26, 1903
Hdqrs. and Three Battalions, 18th Infantry ...	Apr. 26, 1903
Two Companies Engineers	May 27, 1903
One Squadron, 12th Cavalry	May 27, 1903
Hdqrs. and Three Battalions, 23rd Infantry	May 27, 1903
One Squadron, 13th Cavalry	June 26, 1903
Hdqrs. and Three Battalions, 4th Infantry	June 26, 1903
One Squadron, 12th Cavalry	July 26, 1903
Hdqrs. and Three Battalions, 17th Infantry	July 26, 1903

The departures have been:

Two Batteries, Field Artillery	Mch. 6, 1903
Four Companies, Coast Artillery	Mch. 6, 1903
Hdqrs. and One Squadron, 6th Cavalry	Apr. 6, 1903
Hdqrs. and Three Battalions, 1st Infantry....	Apr. 6, 1903
Hdqrs. and One Squadron, 1st Cavalry	May 12, 1903
One Battery Field Artillery	May 12, 1903
Hdqrs. and Three Battalions, 2nd Infantry..	May 12, 1903
Two Companies Engineers	June 14, 1903
Hdqrs. and One Squadron, 5th Cavalry	June 14, 1903
Hdqrs. and Two Battalions, 5th Infantry.....	July 2, 1903

The troops serving in the Division of the Philippines on July 26, 1903 comprised the following:

Engineers	One Battalion
Field Artillery	Three Batteries
Coast Artillery	Four Companies
1st Cavalry	Two Squadrons
5th Cavalry	Two Squadrons
6th Cavalry	One Squadron
11th Cavalry	Hdqrs. and Three Squadrons
12th Cavalry	Two Squadrons
13th Cavalry	Hdqrs. and Three Squadrons
15th Cavalry	Hdqrs. and Three Squadrons
4th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
5th Infantry	One Battalion
10th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
11th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
14th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
17th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
18th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
23rd Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
26th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
27th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
28th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
29th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
30th Infantry	Hdqrs. and Three Battalions
Native	{ Under Civil Government Thirty Companies
	{ Under Military Government Twenty Companies
General Officers	7
Officers of Staff Department	64
Medical Department	Officers 90, Hospital Corps 951
Contract Surgeons	Medical 104, Dental 17
Ordnance Department	Officers 3, detachment 38
Signal Corps	Officers 9, Three Companies 426

Total strength present and absent 1241 officers and 21,817 enlisted.

In the Department of Luzon, two of the six Brigade organizations established in 1901, the 2nd and 3rd, have been continued for tactical and inspection purposes. The former 1st Brigade was merged into the 2nd, and the 4th was merged into the 3rd. The former 5th and 6th Brigades have been discontinued and the troops serving in the regions formerly controlled by these organizations now report direct to the Commanding General, Department of the Visayas,—while in the Department of Mindanao the troops are serving who composed the former 7th Brigade.

The reduction of the number of men in each company or troop organization to 65 in the Cavalry and Infantry, has been attained with favorable results in that it has reduced the force in the Philippines and the expense of the Military service; it has embarrassed company and regimental commanders, in that the men required in each organization for administrative purposes in a company of 65 is but very slightly less than the number required in a company of 100, yet the number available for field work, guards, drills, etc., is very materially diminished. Stated in another way, two companies of sixty men will never be able to turn out as many men for duty as will one company of a hundred, but the reasons why the numbers of each have been diminished are recognized as cogent and necessary.

The Cavalry force that has been maintained here for the past year is less than half that of the Infantry; the proportion of the two arms as represented by regiments, has been the same as the ratio existing between the total force of Cavalry and Infantry maintained in the permanent establishment.

During the active campaigning while the insurrection in these Islands continued, all the regiments of the regular army, both foot and mounted troops, that could be spared from the United States, Cuba and Porto Rico, were sent to the Philippines. The largest number of cavalry regiments serving here in whole or in part at any date was seven, with an aggregate strength of about 7500.

While active operations were at their most strenuous stage, the impression prevailed with some military men that the insurrection could be suppressed with greater facility by mounted troops than by Infantry, since it was considered that the mounted men could march more readily and occupy and control the disaffected localities better than foot men. The fact that the horsemen were available, and that they were by some deemed to be more effective than men on foot, is probably the reason why so large a proportion of mounted to foot men was detailed for service here; for it is now the generally accepted belief of those most experienced in Philippine campaigns, that Infantry will be more effective against a native enemy, in this country of jungle and swamp, than the same number of mounted men, and will also be far less expensive. A terrain favorable to horsemen is very seldom found save for two or three months in the dry season.

The losses among Cavalry horses have been very great indeed, and there has not yet been discovered any means of preventing the ravages of some of these tropical animal diseases. For this reason it is recommended that mounted troops serving here, as their time expires, be largely replaced by Infantrymen, and that the enlisted men of about one half the organizations be natives of these Islands.

As to the time of Philippine Service to be required of white troops it is understood to be now the policy of the Government to limit the tropical tour to a period of two years. If the cost of maintenance of troops in the antipodes and the cost of their transportation both ways be regarded as important, there is another reason why the service should be of greater duration; and it is the fact, which none can dispute, that the officers and men can be more efficient the third than the second year and the fifth than the third. The worst feature of military service in this tropical country is of course the climate, but take it all in all, the liability of our race to sickness and disability here is not greater than it is for those serving in many

parts of India—Java—Cochin China—Madagascar—Mauritius—Jamaica—Hawaii. All the countries named were conquered by white men and have been largely governed and civilized through the instrumentality of military men of the Caucasian race. If England, Holland and France had adopted the policy of shipping their troops home every two years, there is little hazard in saying they would never have effected the conquest of those vast tropical regions they now govern with so much advantage to the governed.

The Governor of a province, or any official charged with duties that bring him into close relations with these strange people, either in a hostile or peaceful way, does not really become proficient, no matter what his aptitude or intelligence, until he has had a year for observation and study, and it is true of the enlisted men that they must learn by experience how to take care of themselves in the tropics. The tour of duty for officers and men should be four or five years instead of two or three, for the work will be far better done by a trained army than by new men or recruits. The health of some will fail of course, but with better quarters and a resort to hill stations, the jeopardy is slight. When one remembers that there is no such thing as an exchange or repatriation of the troops of Holland serving in the Netherlands, for that Army is exclusively colonial; that there are ten thousand Europeans serving in the Dutch East Indies constantly for about half the pay our troops receive; that a very large proportion of the British Officers in India were born in India; that hundreds and hundreds of Indian officers have reached retiring age on Indian Army Service alone; that the white officers of the British West India Regiment (enlisted men are negroes) have a service with it averaging ten years; that the French Troops in French-Indo-China go out for tours of ten years, and that many apply to stay longer; that the overthrow of native rule in Hawaii was effected principally by American residents and missionaries who were born in Hawaii; with these as prece-

dents, it would seem to be well to revise the rules respecting the length of the tour of duty for American troops in these islands.

During the year five regiments of Infantry and three of Cavalry, in whole or in part, have returned to the United States, while the completion of the repatriation of the eight regiments will be accomplished by October.

In pursuance with the recommendation of the undersigned the force serving in the Philippines will be soon further reduced by the withdrawal of two regiments of Cavalry and two of Infantry. If certain changes are made in the organization of the troops, which have been proposed to the Department, and are referred to in the closing caption of this report, the numbers of white troops may be still further decreased.

PUBLIC ORDER.

The following is submitted as indicating the conditions as to disorders, etc., that existed during the twelve months ending, August 31, 1902. It is taken from the report of the Philippine Constabulary to the head of his Department, dated August 31, 1902. He summarizes the result of Military operation coming under his own observation, and the following embodies the principal statistics furnished:

Insurgents and ladrones killed	674
Captured	2837
Surrendered	1067
Arms captured and surrendered	2089
Losses by the Constabulary, killed.....	22
“ “ “ wounded	41
Strength of force July 1st (officers and men)...	5510
Ponies on hand	750
Estimated number of unserviceable arms in the Archipelago	1000

Estimated Military Force required in the Philippines after July, 1903,—Constabulary, 5,500 and Scouts 5,000, working in cordial co-operation under the Chief Executive, and also a regular force of American white troops, for moral effect, of 10,000.

Of course it will be understood that during a part of the period covered by this report active military operations were in progress in Batangas, Laguna and Tayabas Provinces, and in the Island of Samar, while the scenes of the most active Constabulary campaigns were the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Tayabas, Sorsogon, Islands of Negros and Leyte and the Province of Misamis, Island of Mindanao.

During the period covered by this report the military activities controlled by the Division Commander in the christian provinces were confined to two, and the period of such activity was less than four months.

A copy of the report dated June 30, 1903, made to the Chief of Constabulary, by Colonel Wm. S. Scott, Assistant Chief of Constabulary for Northern Luzon, was kindly loaned to the undersigned, and such data herein as relates to the operations of the native troops in their character of assistants to the Constabulary were gleaned from the report cited.

In Luzon, North of Tayabas, it appears that since February 11, 1903, one hundred and one ladrones were captured; seventy-eight killed; twenty-two wounded; sixty-nine fire arms and 1700 rounds of metallic ammunition captured. In the operations which produced these results, 1800 scouts participated in the character of assistants to the Constabulary, but the number of the latter employed is not given.

In all the cities and large towns throughout the Archipelago and throughout a very large part of the rural districts, inhabited by Christian Filipinos, life and property have been secure and the inhabitants have pursued their ordinary avocations without annoyance by the law breakers. There have been a few cases of serious disturbance of the peace in the smaller towns and rural districts which have resulted in some loss of life and property; such disturbances of the peace have had the effect of discouraging industrial efforts, and in many extensive regions little attention to agriculture, the mainstay of the islands, has been practicable.

The lawless element generally consists of roving bands whose members are descendants of former generations of men engaged in the same avocation—law breakers and robbers—by occupation. They sometimes call themselves *insurrectos*, and resent the characterization of “*ladrones*,” but the real motive of almost all of these outlaws is loot pure and simple, and to be supported by the peaceful and industrious inhabitants.

The more important instances of disturbance of the peace in the provinces inhabited by Christians are the following:

In the latter part of January and early in February, 1903, an *insurrecto* chief styling himself “General in Chief” raided the Province of Rizal, defeating and disarming municipal police and small detachments of Constabulary. Under the law requiring native troops to assist in police work, six hundred well trained men quartered nearby were thrown into the region of disorder. They operated under an Assistant Chief of Constabulary. By March 27th, General San Miguel had been killed together with about 100 of his followers and the remainder of the gang was captured or dispersed.

On February 21st, a detachment of 11 men of the 16th company of Scouts, without an officer, were attacked at Cainta; one man was mortally wounded and the detachment gave up their arms to the attacking party, which was said to have numbered from 60 to 100.

On the 31st day of May, a robber band raided the town of Bay and looted the place, capturing some arms and maltreating the inhabitants. This occurred the day following the departure of a detachment of one officer and a few men of the Engineer Battalion, who had just finished making a road from Bay to the neighboring town.

On the 11th day of February, 1903, a band of *ladrones* raided the town of Naujan, Mindoro, killed some of the inhabitants and robbed them of their property.

On March 23rd, a chief named Concepcion, who was an escaped convict, at the head of a band of forty of his kind

entered the town of Surigao, Province of same name, and killed an American Constabulary Officer, captured the remainder of the party of Constabulary and disarmed them, thus securing about 140 fire arms, several thousand rounds of ammunition, all the Constabulary supplies, and the sum of about seven thousand pesos. The inhabitants of the place were either neutral or favored the robbers. When the facts were known to the Civil Governor, he requested the Division Commander to take charge of the disaffected region and ordered the Constabulary serving there to act under the order of the Military Officer in command, who was Brigadier General Jesse M. Lee, U. S. A. He at once sent troops to the scene and personally organized and directed operations, until the arrival of Colonel Myer, 11th Infantry, who carried on the work. Five companies of white troops, two of Scouts and about 160 Constabulary took part in these operations. The Civil Governor intimated that the writ of Habeas Corpus might be suspended in this province if the necessity for so doing existed, but as criminal judicial proceedings could be promptly had in every case of those who were charged with participation in the law breaking, it was not necessary to invoke the more summary methods of military law. Almost all the participants in the attack were arrested and tried; four are under death sentence, twenty for life, and most of the others received sentences reaching to twenty years at hard labor. The leader Concepcion has not been caught, but an unconfirmed report says that he was wounded and has died, while his band are all in jail as are many of his confederates. The American troops were withdrawn early in July, and peace and quiet in the Province has been restored; but two companies of native troops still remain for moral effect.

It is a note-worthy fact that since American occupation in March, 1900, there had been no trouble in this province, neither did the Filipino Republican forces resist the American troops when they landed at Surigao in 1899.

About the 1st of April there was an outbreak in Misamis under a leader named Flores; with a following of one or two hundred very ignorant people, armed with a few rifles and many bolos and spears, this outlaw was able to raid the pueblos, rob the inhabitants of their property and set the Province in a turmoil. The Provincial Governor, who is a Filipino, described the uprising as an insurrection, and Governor Taft having given directions that all Military operations in Misamis be under the orders of the Military Commander, General Lee, and afterwards General Wint, was placed in charge of the restoration of order.

About April 1st, a company of native troops was sent to Cagayan de Misamis and on the 13th of the same month this command encountered the insurgents at Agusan, causing them some loss.

On May 11th, there was an outbreak on the island of Camaguin which pertains to the Province of Misamis, where before this for four years there had been absolute peace. The Provincial Governor asked for help and a company of native troops arrived at the scene of the trouble the next day. A sharp fight ensued and the trouble was ended immediatly.

About May 1st, a troop of the 15th Cavalry from Iligan had been sent into Misamis Province with the hope that the moral effect of its presence would be beneficial. On May 16th, the troop commander with a small detachment arrested and disarmed a number of Flores' adherents in Suclutan, but in some manner the natives recovered their bolos, set upon the detachment and killed Captain Overton and one man of the 15th Cavalry and wounded another soldier.

The uprisings in this province were ended by the 1st of July, the Chief Flores was a prisoner, and the white troops returned to their former stations.

In response to a call from the Adjutant General of the Army for report respecting any practicable reduction in numbers of the troops serving in the Archipelago, the undersigned on July 5th cabled a recommendation outlining a change in

the organizations and numbers of soldiers which had in view the settlement and legalizing on a permanent practical basis the provisional organization which now exists for the native troops. Briefly the project is: The Civil Government to maintain such number of Constabulary as may be thought necessary, the same to be commanded by a regular army officer and aided by a few regular officers of the grades of Major and Captain, all under the Civil Governor. This force to maintain the peace, if possible, and when unable to do so, the regular troops to be called in and take charge of the disaffected region or province. The regular force to be reduced to twelve regiments of Infantry and three of Cavalry, the white enlisted men of six Infantry regiments and one Cavalry regiment to be replaced gradually by natives, and the Natives Scouts enlisted and absorbed in place of the whites. This regular force which would still contain more whites than natives, to be supplemented by such number of American Engineers, Artillery and Telegraphers as should be required. The aggregate to be about 13,000 of all arms, of which considerably less than half would be natives of the Islands. The desirable scout officers, after examination, to be taken over by transfer into the regular establishment with present dates of commission. All officers of native regular regiments to be officers of the regular army.

The project outlined above contemplate the continuous service in the Philippines of six regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry, whose enlisted men would be exclusively natives of these islands. The same desiderata; i.e., efficiency and economy, could be secured in another way and perhaps it would be found to better serve the purpose. It consists in substituting natives of these Islands for enlisted Americans in the third battalion of a certain number of Cavalry and Infantry regiments, aggregating in all, say twenty or twenty-five battalions, etc.; these to be assigned to permanent Philippine service and officered by details from those commissioned in the regiment.

The regimental Headquarters with the remainder of the Companies would be available for service in the United States or in our exterior possessions, just as now.

The theory of this proposition is that whenever the disorder in any locality or province should become so great as to make the intervention of the regular forces desirable, the Governor would call upon the Commanding General for help, specifying the locality. It is supposed that he would observe in his call for the army the rules laid down in Sec. 14 of the organic Act for creating the Philippine Constabulary, where it is specified that when the peace of any municipality shall be so disturbed that the local police was unable to restore it, the Presidente would report the fact to the Constabulary representative in charge who thereupon would temporarily take command and direct the operations of the police force of said municipality in conjunction with the Constabulary. In framing General Orders No. 152, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, wherein are laid down the conditions that had to be observed before troops could respond to a call for assistance, it seems probable that Sec. 14 of the Constabulary Law (Act 175) furnished the guiding thought, yet the phrase of G. O. No. 152, that required the Civil Authority, asking for troops, to state his inability to cope with the emergency, just as the Municipal Presidente was required to report his inability to do the same thing, in order to secure armed assistance, was not acceptable to the Governor and the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary; a dissent which in view of the precedent established by the Commission, seems to be without justification, as the cases are parallel.

It was supposed that when troops, at the instance of the Civil Authority, should intervene in any scene of disorder, the Constabulary serving there would fall under the control of the Army Commander for the time being; just as was done in the remote Surigao and Misamis Provinces in March and April last, where native troops, Constabulary, and the Regular Army troops all worked with the utmost harmony for a common purpose and accomplished it speedily.

On a previous page a quotation has been made from the Governor's report dated November 1, 1902, wherein he mentions that in a certain contingency it might be necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in a disorderly province to turn it over for the Army to deal with. It is certain that this disposition of troops under all ordinary conditions would attain the desired result, that is, peace and good order, in the most speedy and least expensive manner.

It is respectfully suggested that a very great advantage to the service would result from longer tours of duty in the Philippines and as an inducement and incentive to such stay here, it is suggested that Congress allow a continuous service increase of pay to officers who should remain on duty here for more than the stated customary tour of duty. If an 8% or a 10% increase were allowed for the third and each subsequent year of continuous Philippine Service, but not to extend beyond a 25% increase in all, the result would be that fully half of the officers ordered to these Islands would be glad to remain. The transitory stay of officers which is now the rule is a very great detriment to efficient Insular service and besides is a cause of constant expense to the Government.

NATIVE SCOUTS.

The employment of natives of the Philippines in a military capacity and for combatant purposes by the United States authorities, appears to date from September 16, 1899, when General Otis authorized Lieutenant Batson, 4th Cavalry, to raise one hundred Macabebe Scouts, and on October 18, 1899, when General Lawton was authorized to organize two additional companies, each 128 strong, and to employ them in clearing the swamps and esteros about the head of Manila Bay of robbers and insurgents, and as scouts, guides and detectives for General Lawton's column.

Lieutenant Batson, 4th Cavalry, commanded the Battalion. Subsequently this force was increased to 478 officers and men. Its organization was completed on June 1, 1900,

and was styled "The Squadron of Philippine Cavalry, U. S. Vols.," with Major Matthew A. Batson, squadron commander. The officers were United States Volunteers and paid from Army appropriations, while the men were contract employees and paid from revenues of the Islands.

General Otis in his report to the Adjutant General on May 14, 1900, mentions the circumstance of the recall of a detachment of Macabebes from Tayabas Province, because "their methods of dealing with rebellious subjects or with natives from whom they wished to extract information, were in most instances attended with inexcusable harshness."

The raising of the scouts was not limited to the one tribe of Macabebes; in the Division Roster of July 15, 1900, there is mention of "Ilocos Scouts" and "Ilocano Scouts." The Adjutant General of the Division, on June 30, 1901, reported that the number of native scouts in service on January 1, 1901, reached an aggregate of 1402, while by the date of his report, these numbers had grown to 5500 and were organized into fifty-three companies. The pay of the men was fixed at \$15 per month for the first sergeants; while the duty sergeants received \$10.80, the corporals \$9, and the privates and musicians \$7.80, and all received a uniform allowance of \$1.50 per month for clothing.

The Subsistence of the Native Cavalry, was the same as that issued to white troops, while the ration of the other scouts was the same as the native ration issued in Manila; but on the 12th of April, 1901, the ration for all native troops, scouts and employees, was fixed by the Commanding General, Division of the Philippines, (G. O. No. 70, series 1901, Div. Philippines) and this ration with very slight modification was subsequently approved by the Secretary of War. (G. O. 12, A. G. O., series 1902.) The clothing allowance for all grades of \$1.50 per month was continued until the publication of the order last cited, when it was fixed for all enlisted men at \$2.70 per month,—while the rates of pay fixed in 1901, still prevail.

On the 27th of September, 1901, the Commanding General, Division of the Philippines, ordered that all classes of native scouts be re-organized into fifty companies, each to conform as respects numbers of the different ratings to a company of Infantry of 104 men, and one or two officers, preferably Lieutenants who had belonged to the former organizations; but Department Commanders could in cases of necessity, assign subaltern officers for duty with these companies. The soldiers were not enlisted, but were to all intents and purposes civilian employees, and they were armed with the Springfield carbine and wore khaki uniform of the regular infantry. The companies were numbered from one to fifty, of which eleven were composed of Macabebes, thirteen of Ilocanos, four of Cagayans, four of Tagalogs, two of Bicol, and sixteen of Visayans; all were paid from Insular Funds.

On September 28th, the War Department ordered that all scouts then employed and theretofore paid from Insular Revenues be discharged as such and enlisted and paid, from October 1st, with funds appropriated for the support of the Army. Effect to these telegraphic orders of the Secretary of War was given by G. O. 310, Division of the Philippines, series of 1901. By that order the regular army ration was restored to the scouts and so continued until the receipt of G. O. No. 12, 1902, above cited, which with very slight modification restored the ration fixed by General Orders No. 70, Hdqrs. Division of the Philippines, series 1901, its money value being about six cents less than that of the regular Army ration.

In pursuance of this order the 50 companies of scouts were fully organized, and all of the officers were commissioned provisionally for four years, while the soldiers were all enlisted for three years. Three natives of the Philippine Islands were appointed second lieutenants, but one of them has recently resigned, and his place has been filled by an American. The aggregate strength of the Scouts on October 1, 1902, officers and men, was 4935, while the present strength is 4868.

From October 1, 1902, to February 1, 1903, the scouts were all performing the same duties as the regular troops; namely, guards, fatigues, etc., etc., but it was very seldom that two or more companies were assembled at the same station. There has been an effort made to concentrate the troops, and with respect to the regulars, there has been considerable progress, but beyond the assembling of a battalion of scouts at Caloocan and another at Camp Jossman near Iloilo, the native troops have generally occupied one-company stations.

On the 30th of January, 1903, the following Act of Congress was approved by the President.

I....An Act To promote the efficiency of the Philippine constabulary, to establish the rank and pay of its commanding officers, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That officers of the Army of the United States may be detailed for service as chief and assistant chiefs, the said assistant chiefs not to exceed in number four, of the Philippine constabulary, and that during the continuance of such details the officers serving as chief shall have the rank, pay and allowances of brigadier general, and the officers serving as assistant chiefs shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of colonel: *Provided,* That the difference between the pay and allowances of brigadier general and colonel, as herein provided, and the pay and allowances of the officers so detailed in the grades from which they are detailed shall be paid out of the Philippine treasury.

SEC. 2. That any companies of Philippine scouts ordered to assist the Philippine constabulary in the maintenance of order in the Philippine Islands may be placed under the command of officers serving as chief or assistant chiefs of the Philippine constabulary, as herein provided: *Provided,* That when the Philippine scouts shall be ordered to assist the Philippine constabulary, said scouts shall not at any time be placed under the command of inspectors or other officers of the constabulary below the grade of assistant chief of constabulary.

Approved, January 30, 1903.

At the date of this legislation the status of the portion of the Army of the United States serving in this Archipelago was fixed by the instructions of the President, dated July 3, 1902, as follows:

"WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, D. C., July 3, 1902.

The insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippine Archipelago having ended and Provincial Civil Governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the Archipelago, not inhabited by Moro tribes, under instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900, now ratified and confirmed by Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, entitled, "An Act Temporarily to provide for the administration of Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," the General Commanding the Division of the Philippines is hereby relieved from further performance of the duties of Military Governor and the office of the Military Governor in said Archipelago is terminated. The General Commanding the Division of the Philippines and all military officers in authority therein will continue to observe directions contained in the aforesaid instructions of the President, that the military forces in the Division of the Philippines, shall be at all times subject, under the orders of the Military Commander, to the call of the Civil Authorities for maintenance of law and order, and the enforcement of their authority.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

ELIHU ROOT,

Secretary of War."

It will be observed that these instructions are in effect but a reiteration of the earlier instructions of the President to the Secretary of War of April 7, 1900, that were ratified and confirmed by Act of Congress, approved, July 1, 1902, providing for the administration of the affairs of Civil Government in the Philippines.

At this time no request had been presented for military intervention in respect to disorders.

During the period of four months, ending Feb. 1, 1903, there were a few changes of stations of Scouts made at the request of the Civil Officials, for the reason that the presence of the troops in certain named places was considered to be desirable on account of the beneficial influence upon the good order and peace of the neighborhood their presence would have.

The Division Commander was inquired of once or twice by officials of the Civil Government as to the practicability of placing one or more companies of Scouts, at the disposition of the Chief of Constabulary for field operations against disturbers of the place. The reply was that troops would be sent to any scene of disorder immediately upon receipt of request therefor, when such request conformed with the requirements of G. O. No. 152, Division of the Philippines, series of 1902, wherein were laid down certain conditions to govern the call for troops in aid of the Civil Authorities. The Governor was told that if the last clause of General Chaffee's order, defining the conditions to be fulfilled, was deemed objectionable by the Philippine Commission as requiring too sweeping an admission, the Division Commander was quite ready and entirely willing to revoke so much of the paragraph as required that the request for assistance of the troops contain the declaration "that the Civil authorities are unable to cope with the emergency at the scene of the disorder."

It is understood that this legislation was asked for by the officials of the Civil Government, but at this time no mention had ever been made to the Military Commander of a desire that the troops be used in any disturbed district, although they were at all times entirely ready to move at a moment's notice;—nor had any member of the Philippine Commission made any allusion to the inadequacy or narrow scope of the instructions of the President that enjoined the subjection of the Military forces under the Commanding General to the call of the Civil Authorities for maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority.

The first section of the law to increase the efficiency of the Constabulary authorized the doing of several things that were either being lawfully done at that time or were entirely within the capacity of the Philippine Commission to do. The second section authorized the detachment of a part of the forces serving under the orders of the General

in Chief in the Philippines, the command over such detachment to be exercised by the nominees of the Civil Government.

The Division Commander greatly regretted that political considerations seemed to require the Captains, Field Officers and Generals of the forces here to occupy the mortifying position which the execution of this law involved; viz., to be forbidden to lead into action the troops of their commands whom they had organized, instructed for years, brought to a high state of efficiency, and whose material wants, under other leadership, they must still supply.

Generals Moore and Lee lost command of one third of the troops in their respective brigades—forces which had been distributed for ready response to a call of the Civil Authorities “under the Military Commander”.

On February 10th, the following telegram dated February 9th, was received from the Adjutant General of the Army:

“Act of Congress approved January 30th, authorizes Philippine Scouts to be placed under command of Chief of Constabulary when ordered to assist in maintenance of order. The Secretary of War directs you to give assistance necessary to dispose of ladrones in Bulacan as required by William H. Taft.”

On the date of receipt, and in anticipation of the calls of the Governor for Scouts to carry on hostile operations against the lawless element, Department Commanders were instructed that whenever organizations were furnished and placed under orders of the Constabulary Chiefs, the Companies continued to be dependent upon the Army for their pay, rations, medicines and attendance, also arms and ammunition; continued to be amenable to the rules and Articles of War; and that they should be furnished with such animals and means of transportation as were available.

On the 11th of February, 1903, the first request for military assistance ever made on the Military Commander by Governor Taft was received from him. He asked for the services of eight companies of Scouts to be employed

in the Provinces near Manila, where the Constabulary had been contending with the disturbers of the peace, also in the Province of Batangas, and in the Island of Mindoro. The same day the Commanding General, Department of Luzon, was ordered to furnish the companies asked for, and on the following day they reported.

On July 25th, thirty of the fifty companies of native troops had been transferred from the command of the undersigned and his subordinate commanders, to that of the Civil Governor, and were employed in active operations in the field against the element which is variously styled "ladrones" "tulisans" or "insurrectos".

As a full and detailed report of the operations of the Native Troops, serving under the orders of the Governor, will doubtless be submitted to the War Department by him, any further mention of their operations by the undersigned will be inappropriate.

It seems certain that there must be a native contingent in the Regular Army serving in the Philippines; reasons of economy and policy both point to the wisdom of availing ourselves of the excellent native material here available. The Civil Government will need a police force, of course, but the Army contingent should be available for duty anywhere just as is now the Porto Rican regiment. Under the Caption "Public Order" is an indication of a project for organization of such a force.

At one time it was believed that the negro regiments in the regular army must not serve out of a warm country, but we have seen that those serving in Montana were as strong and stalwart as those who served in Louisiana; so it will be found with the Filipinos, for should the necessity exist to throw a large force into any Eastern Country, these Islands could furnish several regiments.

The following is submitted respecting the pay, rations, clothing, etc., of natives in the Military service:

As far as concerns pay, the present rates are ample. We would have no difficulty in recruiting a hundred thousand soldiers at the same rate. Why should more be paid? Any excess would be a bonus—a gift—and would insure no more efficient service than now.

There is but one kind of clothing ever worn by troops in the Philippines,—the cotton Khaki. The present allowance for clothing is \$2.70 per month or \$32.40 per year. The same is ample and there should be no change.

As respects subsistence, it is remarked that there has been a constant clamor to have the native soldier ration restored to what it once was, the same that is allowed to white troops.

The fact that the Philippine Cavalry scouts first organized were allowed the full army ration; that this gave place to the present native ration, and later was changed to the Army basis, and finally was again changed to the native ration first allowed, is the principal cause of these appeals to have the army allowance restored. It is always easy to increase public allowances that affect personal interests, but to decrease them is more than difficult and is always resisted. There is another fact that probably has its influence in causing these appeals. There are many ex-soldiers of the regular army holding commissions in the scouts. These are men who have been accustomed to look upon a ration as an allowance in the nature of a vested right, and they take up the cause of their men and favor their appeals to secure the same allowance these officers have themselves enjoyed while they were in the ranks. The junior officers, generally, are not concerned in any military administration beyond what affects the men under their immediate command. They know that if the subsistence allowance is increased, the savings will be greater and the funds for expenditure in messing, recreations, etc., will be abundant. The public interests are forgotten, but the family interests, so to speak, of the men under their personal command are ever before them.

If the Filipino had begun his military career in our Army with a ration such as he was accustomed to, if he had *not* luxuriated on an allowance that comprises a quantity of food far and away beyond his hygienic needs, and if the commanding officers had refused to entertain appeals for an increase; then these clamors would not have been heard at all.

It is probable, indeed, almost certain, that these scouts never in all their lives until they enlisted in our Army tasted bread or coffee. Of meats they had but very little if any at all. Their food and that of their ancestors has always consisted, almost exclusively of rice, fish when obtainable, and sweet potatoes, the same food that the thousands of Chinese in these Islands subsist on, men who perform the very hardest labor, and who thrive notwithstanding.

An American officer recently visiting the garrisons of the British and Native Army in India, said he inquired particularly as to the native ration of the Sikhs, Gurkas, Drogas, Sepoys and Pathans, men averaging as tall as Anglo-Saxons. In the commissary stores of these native regiments, he saw only rice, lentils, oil and a very little dried fish, which constituted their only food, and there were no kitchens or mess rooms. Animal food is not permitted to many of the East Indian races, and hog meat is forbidden absolutely to the Mohammedans.

The average weight of an American soldier is about 150 pounds, while the average weight of the 4th Company, Macabebes, all in excellent health, was found on July 5th to be 128 pounds; in other words the American soldier in weight stands to the Filipino as 100 to 86.6. If the Filipinos were of equal weight and physical power to the Americans, they would require for nourishment and health an equal amount of food. Considering the man as a machine and his ration as fuel, the two machines of same size, weight and power require equal amounts of fuel; but it is self-evident that the wiry little Malay does not require for his physical wellbeing as much food as the husky Anglo-

Saxon. In this respect he resembles the native ponies as compared to the American horses, the former getting fat on half or two thirds what the latter require. It seems that the quantity of food the men respectively require will be directly proportionate to their size, weight, etc.

The nature of any food, as fuel, is commonly expressed in terms of calories, and the American soldier's ration measured by its calorific value is found to be from 3956 to 4999, depending upon its components. The average of rations issued to the American troops in the Philippines measured as above will be found to be about 4300 calories. The proposed Filipino ration expressed in the same units varies from 3795 to 4511, the average being about 4000. This shows a difference of but three hundred calories, but when the two rations are measured by their money value the difference is very much greater.

The average ration issued to regulars costs 18.9 cents, while the proposed Filipino ration would cost 12.61 cents or one third less; indeed the difference is greater than this and reaches to much more than one third, because the rice component is bought in Manila and costs nothing for transportation, while nearly all the articles of which the regular ration is composed are transported at very heavy cost to the Government from the United States. Rice is the most important part of the food of all tropical people and it should be so in the ration provided for the native troops in the Philippines. The components of the native ration should be adapted to his experience and environment. When these Macabebes and other Filipinos were in the Spanish Army they received not quite two pounds of rice each man per day and nothing else from the Government, while their pay was about one fourth what the United States now allows them, and was usually far in arrears. This fact is not put forth as an argument against the issue of any food but rice, but it is cited for the purpose of illustrating a phase of character, and to show how successful we

have been in Americanizing these Malays in one respect, that of teaching them to get all they can from the Government, and there is no lack of officers of high rank to assist them. No necessity exists for conceding the demand for more food, neither should they have the same pay, the same clothing allowance, nor the same ice allowance, the white troops receive.

Americans in the Philippines have not so far been an unmixed blessing to the native inhabitants. We have raised their hopes and expectations to a level far above the possibility of realization. We have paid extravagant wages, rents, and prices for commodities, at a few places, but we have not yet succeeded in doing anything that has raised the general social, industrial and economic level. To concede pay and allowances out of all reason to a few thousand native troops, would, to a certain extent, debauch the recipients and only excite the envy and unrest of the vast mass of the population who must still depend on agriculture for their subsistence. The prices of rice, sugar, hemp and copra are still regulated, and will always be, as in the past, by supply and demand, but as yet we have done nothing that has raised the value of these staples or has increased the profits by decreasing cost of production. The Filipinos flock to the cities where Army Quartermasters hire some natives at four times the pay they formerly received. The waiting list for these jobs is always a long one, while the fields in the country remain uncultivated, public roads projected by the Government are unconstructed, and labor at living rates by industrial employers is unprocurable. If the Army could cease the employment of natives they would have to return to the fields and resume their former employments; for these people must compete with other tropical peoples in producing tropical products at Oriental prices or they must succumb.

It has been often stated that an American soldier costs a thousand dollars a year, but Native soldiers do not cost

England, Holland and France in the Orient more than about one sixth that amount. There is no reason known why they should cost *us* more. If we pay more than others, the increase is a bounty which really helps only the few and leaves the mass unhappy and discontented.

To increase the native ration would be in the opinion of the undersigned an act without reason or excuse and a waste of money. The present ration would cost in Manila stores not less than fifteen cents per day, while the "chow" of a native carpenter or cargadore, who performs the most severe labor, does not cost to exceed six cents gold, or about fifteen cents mex. per day, and there can be found nowhere in the world more vigorous and stalwart men.

The question is occasionally asked, can the natives be trusted as soldiers? The answer is that all men are usually faithful to their own interests. The native regiments were not unfaithful to Spain in the rebellion of 1896, so long as they were properly treated. One or more of these regiments were comprised of "Disciplinarios" or convicts, drafted into the Army. It is notorious that in 1896 the pay and allowances of the Native soldiers were long in arrears. These amounts allowed to the Spanish native private soldiers were: pay, 56 pesos; clothing, 3 pesos; total, 59 pesos per year; which, converted into gold, at the rates then current, would give them about \$30 per annum or \$2.50 per month. The pay and clothing allowance of a native soldier in the United States Army is \$10.50 per month.

The ration of a Spanish native soldier was very nearly two pounds of rice per day and nothing else, which cost about two and a quarter cents gold, while the ration the United States issues to our native soldier costs the U. S. delivered to the troops about fifteen cents gold. Bringing all the figures together, it results that the Native Soldier cost Spain about \$3.18 per month while the same man costs the United States about \$15 per month, both amounts being in gold.

Notwithstanding the ill treatment and abuse these troops received, some of the native regiments remained true to Spain to the last.

The Indian Mutiny has been often referred to as an event to take warning from in incorporating the natives into our local army, but the causes which led to that revolt are thoroughly understood now, but were not in 1857—8. Another mutiny in India is now as impossible as it is to believe that there ever would have been a revolt of the American Colonies in 1775 if England had governed them with the same liberality and justice which now characterizes her rule in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

The student of history of the conquest by the dominant races of countries inhabited by black, red, yellow and brown races will not fail to observe that those conquests were almost always effected by armies which were composed in part and sometimes principally of these same black, red, yellow and brown races, who had no compunction in fighting and destroying their own people. The native Filipinos under American officers will be as true and faithful as any troops could be, provided they are well treated and are paid promptly.

MORO AFFAIRS.

At the date of the last annual report of the Division Commander, the Army was still responsible for the maintenance of order in all the Moro and Pagan country in Mindanao and Sulu; this for the reason that the Army was the only police force available in all that territory. By October 1, 1903, Civil Government had been proclaimed in all parts of the Philippine Archipelago save the regions above referred to; but in this vast territory, embracing 28,000 square miles, there was but one group of inhabitants who had availed themselves of the privilege of establishing municipal government under the Municipal Code Act. This group inhabited the southern extremity of the Mindanao pan-handle where three or four villages were united in 1891 under the name of

the municipality of Zamboanga. The town governments of Dapitan, Dipolog, Davao, Mati, Baganga, Caraga and Cateel are carried on as provided in orders issued in 1901 by the Military Governor.

The total number of Christian inhabitants of the Moro country is, by the recent census, ascertained to be 65,741. They are in three principal groups; Zamboanga, with 20,982, Davao and the east coast of Mindanao south of parallel 8, with 20,458, and Dapitan with 17,331. In the island of Basilan there are 1,331 Christians; in Cottabato and vicinity, 1,716; in the Sulu group, 1,928; and at Malabang 518. The Moro population has not yet been reported upon, but the military officers who were charged with the enumeration or estimation of the Moro inhabitants reject wholly the Spanish determinations or guesses ranging from 700,000 to a million or even more.

According to General Parrado, who commanded in Mindanao for a long time under General Blanco, and who in 1898 published a work on the historical, geographical and statistical features of Mindanao, General Blanco estimated the Moro population of the Lake Lanao country at 300,000; while the American officers who have spent a year or more in military operations, campaigning and reconnoissance, do not place the lake population and that of the contiguous country at more than 100,000. General Parrado assigns 100,000 Moros to Cottabato, Sarangani, Davao and the Mati country, while American officers do not admit numbers one half as large.

Of the Pagan inhabitants we have received no reliable information in addition to that collected and reported by the Jesuit Missionaries before the Spanish-American war, nor are the results of the recent American census yet reported respecting these wild people. The Jesuits claimed that there were 262,000 of these wild hill tribesmen in Mindanao. Americans

have come into no contact with them other than that due to visits of individuals of these tribes to the sea coast towns for trading purposes.

At the breaking out of the Spanish war, the Catholic missionaries were making rapid progress in the conversion of these heathen to Christianity; but the withdrawal of Government aid to the church, which resulted from the change of sovereignty, has compelled the missionaries to discontinue their proselyting efforts, save at a few centers of Christian Filipino settlements where the priests can now secure a support. One or two protestant clergymen have visited the Moro country since the Spanish evacuation, but none has commenced any missionary work; indeed a more discouraging field of effort to christianize, could not be found. That Christianity in competition with Mohamedanism has never made any progress is a fact well known to all. The Jesuits worked for more than twenty years in the Moro country, but failed absolutely to effect any conversions save of children who at a tender age came under the complete control of the priests and sisters; nor has protestant missionary effort in any Mohammedan country been more successful.

In the appendix will be found a paper written in 1901 by the superior of the Company of Jesuits in the Philippines, the Rev. Pio Pi, who has passed twenty years of his life in missionary effort in Mindanao. This paper, which has never been published before contains a critical analysis of Moro character and a discussion of their habits, customs, traditions and aspirations. It is replete with sensible observation respecting the magnitude of the task that confronts Americans in the Moro country, and therefore deemed to be worthy of appearing in a public document. The data it contains should be valuable to representatives of other creeds who may wish to undertake the conversion of the Moros to Christianity.

The first step for the establishment of a Civil Government for the Moro Country has just been taken by the Philippine Commission and this is the enactment of a law for the organization of such a government in the Moro province.

In the past the situation of the Military in controlling Moro affairs, and as well in supervising the municipal affairs of the Native Christian Filipinos, has given rise to much embarrassment because there were no standards or rules for the guidance of the military authorities in the disposal of administrative questions, save those which related to criminal and civil prosecutions. By the terms of an agreement made with the Sultan of Sulu by General Bates in 1899, the Sultan was recognized as possessing so much of sovereign power as would permit him and his colleagues or advisers to dispose of cases of capital crime of Moros upon Moros. He was recognized as being possessed of so much sovereign power as would sanction him in compelling his own people to obey his mandates, even though they resulted in confiscation of property. The Sultan claimed the right to grant franchises for sale or lease of land, for cutting of timber, for controlling fisheries and for licensing of boats; and the American authorities have not interposed definitely or vigorously to restrain his actions or prevent his collecting their proceeds. It is hoped and believed that under the new law much can be accomplished in correcting these abuses and establishing a Government under which the Moros, the Filipino Christians, the Pagans, and the Caucasians can have free and equal opportunity to work out their future. The undersigned was consulted by Governor Taft in the drafting of the new Moro law, and such assistance as he could render was freely given in elucidation of all features of the measure.

As respects military considerations, the Moro country and the Moro people are grouped into three Sub-Divisions:

1st, the Sulu Archipelago; 2nd, the Rio Grande Valley; and 3rd, the Lake Lanao District.

Among the inhabitants of the Sulu Archipelago there has been preserved a limited and qualified respect for sovereign power. The dominion of the Sultan at the time of the conquest of Malaysia by Europeans, which included the whole of the 16th century, was a real substantial dominion. The

Sultanate of Sulu included the whole of the group of Islands of that name, and besides a considerable stretch of country extending along the coast of Northern Borneo. Sulu then included the large island of Basilan and its dependencies, while the Moro inhabitants of the Zamboanga pan-handle were also subjects of His Highness The Sultan, and as well, the inhabitants of Cagayan Sulu also owed allegiance to him.

At this time the number of Mohammedans in Mindanao and in the Visayan Islands to the north, was probably three times the number of those of Sulu, but there was not in the larger aggregation any one chief who made good his pretension to universal and effective dominion. When the first Spanish campaign commenced in Mindanao in 1578, Cachil Corralat appeared to be the principal over-lord, but his authority was not effective nor real, although there are found historic references to his claimed or pretended sovereignty in the Malanao Country. Whatever may have been the vigor or rigor of his sway, he appears to have been the last of the Maguindanaos to have received any extensive recognition as an over-lord throughout Mindanao.

There is still a so-called Sultan of Mindanao, whose seat was formerly at Buhayen, in the Rio Grande valley, but his claim has no recognition. Uto was the last claimant to chiefship of this royal line, but he died in 1902 and no successor has yet appeared; while a former slave of Uto, Piang by name, is now the most powerful datto in the Rio Grande Valley, but has no claim to royal descent. Pedro Cuavas of Basilan is a Tagalog born in Cavite, a former Spanish convict at the penal colony of San Ramon; but Pedro, so long as he can wield a kris, will be real sovereign over all the Moros in Basilan. Mandi of Zamboanga is simply a Spanish mestizo, fairly well educated and put upon his feet by the Spaniards, who favored him with their support, and gave him a trip to Madrid; but he has no royal prerogative. In the center of Moro population about Lake Lanao there is no individual datto, sultan, or over-lord who is recognized as such;

but there are hundreds of dattos and sultans, all of equal title and pedigree, but no one having conceded or pretended power over others.

The Bates agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, which it appears was advised by the Schurman Commission, is an obstacle to the establishment of good government; but there have been many instances of failure on the Sultan's part to observe the requirements of the compact, and the bargain is voidable on the part of the United States, in its discretion. The Filipino legislation by Congress of March 2, 1902, makes no mention of this agreement; although it is expressly provided in the conditional approval of it by the President, notice of which was communicated to General Otis, by the Secretary of War on October 27, 1899, that the agreement was made subject to the action of Congress under the Paris Treaty; also that the Sultan and his dattos be made to distinctly understand that this agreement was not to be understood as in any way to authorize or give the consent of the United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu archipelago. As slavery has been continually practiced there, and is now common, and as the Sulu Moros are known to have continued to purchase slaves from outside the Sulu group, and themselves to have engaged in the slave trade continuously and persistently, the United States has further justification for declaring the agreement as null and void.

It was apparently the understanding of those who favored the negotiation of this instrument that its making would probably prevent an uprising of the Moros, and so spare the United States from another war with a fanatical and savage people. The fact is that there never has been a time for three years when a force of five hundred soldiers in Jolo and two or three small gunboats could not preserve the peace or suppress any uprisings; but this was not known or not fully understood when this agreement was entered into.

With the Bates agreement out of the way, the Government will have to deal only with the chiefs or the village head men

called dattos. There should be no great difficulty in establishing a satisfactory relation with these village chiefs. Each one who is loyal and true to the General Government should be the head of his little village, which would be governed and administered according to law, and there would be no sultan over-lord to keep his people stirred up or semi-hostile.

With the Sultan out of the way, the conditions would be the same as those which exist in Mindanao. After Moros are taught trades and have some instruction in the public schools, the new generation will become useful members of the community. They have been found to be fairly good laborers and eager to gain cash wages, a means of securing money which is quite new to them; nor do the dattos interpose and appropriate the earnings of the individuals as they did formerly.

There are two courts of First Instance in the Moro Province and there is authority under the new legislation for the appointment of Justices of the Peace.

The first Governor of the Moro Province was detailed to that duty by the Division Commander of the Philippines, on request of the Civil Governor and approval of the Philippine Commission. The officer detailed was the Commanding General of the Military Department of Mindanao, and he will have the authority to name most of the subordinate Civil Officials. The Government will be Civil in all respects except that the agents for conducting it will be largely Military, and there will always be a military force close at hand to be used, if necessary, in maintaining the authority of those who are charged with the responsibility of conducting the Government. It will in fact be a form of Civil rule controlled and regulated by the Military and always in conformity to the Philippine legislation; the Governor of the Moro Province reporting to the Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, as respects all civil matters, and to the Commanding General of the Division touching civil matters that involve or require the supervisory executive action of the Commander of the Army of the Philippines.

The Governor of the Moro Province will be assisted by a Council, composed of executive administrative officers, who possess limited legislative powers. Taxation as respects customs, duties on goods landed at, and exported from, the ports of entries, forestry taxes and cedula taxes are regulated by General Philippine law, but the net proceeds of these sources of revenue as well as all the income drawn from general taxation of whatever source, inure to the Provincial Treasury; and are available for disbursement under the supervision of the Legislative Council, but must be accounted for in accordance with the general laws of the islands that govern matters of audit. The Legislative Council may establish municipal government throughout the Province in conformity with the Municipal Code of the Philippines, or that Code may be modified by the Council and adapted to meet local conditions.

The revenues of the territories will not at first be adequate to the fiscal needs, but in a few years the province should be self-supporting, if the cost of the Military and the Coast Guard vessels be excluded.

A map of Mindanao and Jolo is submitted herewith, which contains all the latest information, and shows the subdivision of the new Moro Province into districts.

The Moro inhabitants of the lake country like all others of their race in the Philippines are pure Malays, but they are taller and better formed than others of their race in these islands, such as the Tagalos, Visayans, and other Christian Filipinos. Unlike these last, the adult male Moro frequently has a very light mustache and goatee. Tradition says that these people were converted to Mohammedanism by missionary priests from Arabia and Persia, but none of them can tell anything of their early history. A few can read and write, always in Arabic characters, but they have no other books than the Koran and some genealogical records extending back a few generations, and there are no dates in such accounts. The Moros of the Sulu group of islands and Paragua, speak a different tongue to that of the Mindanao Moros; yet both are

written in Arabic characters. For a further account of these people I refer you to the monograph of the Rev. Pio Pi, Society of Jesus, who spent twenty years among them. (See Appendix V.)

The works of Spanish authors respecting the Spanish conquest of this Moro country, and its colonization, have been carefully studied in the preparation of the historical account of this conquest, etc., by Lieut. MacKinlay, 1st Cavalry, an officer of Military Information Division. As no narrative of these operations can be found in the English language that makes any pretension to completeness, and on account of the great interest which a study of these people now has for Americans; and considering also the fact that we are now brought face to face with this very important question of the future of these Malays who still adhere and probably always will, to the teachings of Mahomet: it has seemed to be highly desirable that there should be made available to English readers an account of the Spanish efforts to conquer and civilize the Moros, which lasted for more than three hundred years. (This account is presented in Appendix VII.)

In the Lake Lanao region of Mindanao, military operations were in progress at the date of the last annual report. It has been found necessary to continue the work then begun, which had taken the character of punitive measures in respect to part of the Moro population of the Lake country.

The reason why the troops were obliged to move to the region was stated in the last report of the Division Commander, and that of the Commanding General of the 7th Brigade, and the reason why the expedition had to be converted into an occupying force has also been already reported.

On the 1st of August, 1902, there were stationed at Camp Vicars, near the lake shore a battalion of Infantry, two squadrons of Cavalry, and a battery of mountain guns. Employed in road-making and guarding communications to the base at Malabang were about 600 men; and at the base were

about the same number. The wagon road was completed to Vicars by October, and the force of road workmen and guards reduced to a single company, which now affords needed protection and guards a saw-mill in the forest. The frequent attacks by parties of Moros upon the outposts and small detachments, the occasional killing and wounding of a soldier and capture of his rifle by Moro assailants forced the authorities to action. It was never difficult to ascertain whence came and who were the individual assailants and it was easy to know where to look for the criminals. In some instances the sultans and dattos were told that they must arrest and deliver over for judicial trial and punishment those of their people who were known to have attacked the camps and outposts or travelers on the road, their names having already been furnished by them as the guilty ones. In one instance the dead bodies of the two culprits were brought to Vicars and delivered. In another case the man wanted was not produced while a subordinate member of the attacking party, a slave, was brought in. He had resisted arrest and been mortally wounded in the struggle, but lived long enough to reveal the fact that he was not what the sultan had represented him to be, the leader of the robber band, but simply a member of the party and a slave of the Sultan's. He survived only a few hours. The Sultan, himself was taken into custody but a few days later made a struggle to escape and was shot in the mêlée.

In September, 1902, the rancherias and forts of the Moro dattos, who had made many attacks upon the outposts, were taken and destroyed and thereafter those villages gave no more trouble.

During the autumn and early winter there was comparative quiet at Vicars, but the strong cotta of Bacolod on the north-west shore of the lake and about 10 miles from Vicars still continued to fly war flags and frequently replied by defiant letters to messages of peace and good-will. It was not believed by many Moros that this place could be taken by the

Americans, and so long as this sentiment prevailed it was evident that there could be no general acceptance of our control and consent to our presence in the Lanao country; and therefore that this challenge of long standing be noticed was incumbent on us.

All rancherias on the west shore of the lake and all on the north end were peaceable except the followers of the Chiefs of Bacolod. There were a dozen friendly villages and two hostile, but these two barred the way to an acceptance of an invitation by the well disposed for the troops to visit them. The Division Commander ordered the west shore of the lake explored and mapped and that if hostile Moros barred the way to overcome the opposition. These instructions were followed and the Bacolod fort was captured together with another at Calahui, about a mile further north. (Plans and sections of these two cottas are forwarded herewith).

On the east shore was another strong place, the seat of a Moro Chief, who was also defiant. His home had never been visited by white men and he resented our presence in the lake country. On the 4th of May, the Vicars column started, and on the 6th was fired on as it attempted to traverse the east shore; an action resulted and the Taraca forts were reduced, the resistance crushed, and the pride of the Sultan humbled.

Under date of May 11th, the Division Commander received the following telegram from the Secretary of War:

"I congratulate you and Brigadier General S.S. Sumner on the work done in Mindanao. Express to Captain John J. Pershing and the officers and men under his command the thanks of the War Department for their able and effective accomplishment of a difficult and important task."

It will be remembered that the date of the action which resulted in the subjugation of Bayang was May 2, 1902, while the last hostile combat was at Taraca almost exactly one year later; to-wit, on May 6, 1903; but there was no time during this year when the Commander of the forces would not have gladly avoided hostilities, if only the Moros would have

accepted peace and recognized our right as a sovereign nation to explore and survey the country and make a census of the inhabitants. (A map of the Lanao Country, from Malabang to Iligan, is submitted herewith.)

A Spanish priest and some soldiers of Spain visited Lake Lanao as early as 1639, but were driven away. Spanish forces returned to the Lake in 1894, and remained there until the war came on with the United States, but they only occupied one point on the lake shore, relying on steam launches to control the military situation. The United States after one year's operations and without use of launches has occupied the Malanao country on both sides of the lakes, has constructed practical wagon roads to the lake both from the north and south, has visited every important village, has punished twenty or thirty hostile groups and destroyed their forts, and has made such progress with these same Moros in an industrial way that they now do all the work about the camps, they build and repair all roads, cut timber, fetch green forage, and relieve the draft animals of much of the work of hauling supplies.

It now remains for the new Politico-Military Government to start these same people, who a little more than a year ago were hostile, in the ways of civilization; and to teach them by degrees that the kris, rifle and spear are not necessarily the only badges of manhood and respectability. In six months there should be in service on the lake two launches, for which authority of the War Department has been granted; and then it will be practicable to reduce largely the force employed in holding the Malanao region. Now, there are two regiments of Infantry, two squadrons of Cavalry, one mountain battery and a company of Engineers employed between Illana Bay and Iligan Bay. In the course of six months this force can be reduced by one regiment of Infantry and one squadron of Cavalry. Quite likely it will be practicable to give up Malabang as a base and turn over the Malabang-Vicars road to Civil control, the garrison on the Bay being reduced to a company or two.

Appendix III consists of a letter of Brigadier General S. S. Summer, recently commanding the Department of Mindanao, transmitting a report of Capt. John J. Pershing, 15th Cavalry, reviewing the Malanao operations for the past year. This officer's work as Commander at Camp Vicars and in the field deserves special mention; he has displayed rare good judgment, infinite patience in dealing with these suspicious people, wise foresight in preparing for every emergency and contingency, and finally when nothing remained but to crush the resistance, to so dispose his force as to accomplish the result with the least possible loss.

In the Rio Grande country there were no important Military operations; all the Moros continued to be well disposed and helpful in many ways to the military. Uto, the most important hereditary chief in the valley died during the year; and his ex-slave, Piang, who is a Chinese half-breed, is the most powerful and influential Moro in the valley. He has always been well disposed towards the Americans. A company of soldiers divided between Reina Regente and Pikit, supplied by a flat bottomed river steamboat, with one or two companies at Cottabato are all the troops needed in the Rio Grande country. A good wagon road now joins Cottabato and Parang, which is a fine site for a post, and a harbor which certainly must ultimately be an important seaport and center of trade. Last year a good wharf for vessels of twenty-foot draft was built there. As soon as a cable can be laid across the lake between the military posts at Marahui and Vicars, the telegraph line across the Tucuran isthmus can be given up; when the two companies stationed at Tucuran and Misamis will be no longer needed.

In the Sulu islands the Moro conditions have not been altogether satisfactory but there has been no resistance to the United States. While Mohamed Jumalul Kiram, is acknowledged by his people as the true and lawful Sultan, yet his orders to some of his dattos, if they require payment of taxes and fines, are treated with neglect and even contempt. During

the year 1902, several of the most powerful of the Sulu dattos were at war with the Sultan; at all events they arrayed their armies in close proximity to each other and discharged fire arms, but the casualties were almost nil. The Sultan's royal revenues are very small. He collects a license tax from the Chinese who trade in and among the group of Moros who constitute his personal following. He lives at Maibun but he can collect no taxes or license fees from other parts of his dominion. He imposes and collects a certain tax on boats engaged in pearl fishery. He collects from Siassi, Bongao, Cagayan-Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi some taxes, the aggregate of all may reach to ten or fifteen thousand dollars mex. a year; but he is always poor and in debt. He has anticipated for several years the annual payments of \$5,000 from the Government of North Borneo, which is given in compensation for a cession of certain royal prerogatives respecting lands and people in Borneo, that were recognized as belonging to an ancestor, sold then for the yearly payment stated. While the free entry privilege lasted, the Sultan was an interested partner in a commercial house that imported Moro goods, but now that duties must be paid before the goods are delivered to consignees, the Sultan has gone out of the business of trade.

It is apparent to everybody that the Sultan's power has departed, his ancient rights and privileges are intangible and cannot be enforced against his own people. The Civil government still pays him a monthly subsidy, but this amount must now cease unless he gives a *quid pro quo*, and that he cannot do. Very soon the Sultan of Sulu will be only a character in history and no one will regret his exit, not even his own people and race.

ADMINISTRATION.

In the reports of the Division Staff Officers is much statistical matter which is summarized and commented upon under appropriate heads in later pages.

It is the duty of the Division Commander to enforce the laws and regulations that require an honest and economical administration of the public funds. It has not been possible to accomplish a great deal in respect to economical reforms during the past year.

As the Americans are the most lavish, even the most wasteful people in the world, and as the government is the most costly of any in proportion to the population, it should not be surprising to find that the army is also much more costly, man for man, than that of any nation, and that the tendency constantly is towards a more and more costly establishment. In respect to this tendency it is admitted that an increase in the cost of armies and equipment is universal; for the constant changes in arms and equipment made necessary by the improvements and discoveries in weapons and means for attack and defense are constantly forcing the governments to make new and unusual expenditures; but the increase for the American army is not all of this character.

Since the commencement of the war with Spain, additions to pay and allowances have been many, and it would seem that a constant and persistent clamor for some concession is almost certain to be acceded to in whole or in part by the Government. If the increase stopped here, there would be no just reason to criticise, but with the lavish expenditures of public money seems to come a letting down of the bars of conscience; and it is not unusual to find officers permitting or neglecting to notice abuses in matters that affect the use of public money in a manner that is either forbidden by law or was certainly not contemplated by those who voted the appropriations. The task of those who attempt reforms in this respect is a very difficult one indeed, and it is not surprising that the results accomplished are small.

With every colonizing power it has ever been the rule to make the colony self-supporting, if possible. The cases where the sovereigns have advanced funds to assist their exterior possessions have not been frequent. During periods

of insurrections, the home governments have frequently met charges by appropriations from the central treasuries, but the rule has been in time of peace to make each colony self-sustaining. The South African war cost a vast sum, but a considerable part of it will be assumed by the inhabitants of the country, and now that peace has been secured, the whole expense of administration and of material improvements will be defrayed locally. The only colonies now recalled which are financially bankrupt are those belonging to the English, French, Danish and Dutch in the West Indies. These receive subsidies from the home Governments, but Trinidad, Demerara, and one or two others have so far been able to get along without help.

But the United States has shown the most boundless liberality in its course of imposing no limitations on the expense incurred by the local governments of Porto Rico and the Philippines, even to making up by donations, etc., any deficit that might exist in the local budgets. Besides, the United States has assisted those governments in a very material manner by the use of its army transports in carrying persons and property to and from these possessions. The United States also imposed no part of the burden on the local governments that grew out of the military and naval occupation of these countries, said forces being maintained so that means may be always at hand to uphold the authority of the Civil officials and prevent disturbances of the peace. These military and naval expenses reach a vast sum. If the share of them pertaining to the Philippines were to be assumed by the local treasury, there would be nothing left with which to carry on Civil Government. If the exterior possessions of the United States were as extensive as are those of Holland, or were equal even to those of France; and we should undertake to administer the affairs of their people in the same generous manner that prevails here; the drain upon the resources of the United States would be appalling, producing a financial crisis in our affairs.

The fact that the General Government is willing to relieve its dependency of many financial burdens, including the cost of its military and naval protection, and is willing to make very large donations for its benefit, is a most fortunate circumstance for the Filipinos; for the expenditure in their country of all these millions which are raised by taxation in the United States, may even exceed an equivalent for the money losses the Filipinos have sustained,—such as are charged to the war, rinderpest, surra, locusts, plague, cholera, and drought.

Mention has frequently been made of the fact that the value of the imports at the Custom House in the Philippines largely exceeded that of the exports, a state of affairs proving that on account of the hoarding of gold, made possible by military expenditures, it is possible for these islands to import each year some millions in value more than they export. The investment of foreign capital here has been suggested as an explanation of the sources whence came the funds to purchase these excesses of imports over exports, which amount to several million each year; but whatever these investments may have been, their aggregate will be but a bagatelle compared with the United States' expenditures for the army and navy, and the donations.

The following is derived from the reports of disbursing officers in the Philippines, and shows the extent to which Congressional appropriations have been drawn upon for expenditures in these Islands.

EXPENDITURES IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

FISCAL YEAR, 1902-1903, CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AS REPORTED BY STAFF DEPARTMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

Adjutant General.....	\$ 1,600.00
Quartermaster.....	7,412,383.14
Commissary.....	2,101,381.63
Pay.....	8,283,821.84
Medical.....	62,974.00
Engineer.....	7,193.74
Ordnance.....	75,853.09
Signal.....	23,238.28
Total.....	<u>\$17,968,445.72</u>

If to the above amounts be added the naval expenditures here and the Congressional donation, the total will probably reach \$24,000,000; and if it be granted that one third of this sum is promptly sent out of the country in payment for supplies and goods bought in foreign countries and in remittances home by officers, soldiers and employees, there yet remains a sum added to the wealth of the people, or which has gone into circulation, that is greater in amount than the entire local revenues of the Islands.

Of course the policy of the United States respecting the Civil administration of the Philippines is not a proper subject of discussion in this report, but this administration is so closely allied to that of a military character that an exposition of the latter required this reference to the former so as to show the immense importance to the Islands of the military expenditures.

The building in Manila where the Spanish general staff had its offices has since been designated as the "Estado Mayor." When the offices of the Division Commander were removed from the "Ayuntamiento" building, within the walled city, in order to make room for the Philippine Commission and the Civil Governor, they were accommodated in the Estado Mayor building, situated on the south bank of the Pasig River and adjoining the Suspension Bridge. The space was sufficient for only a part of the offices; the remainder continued in the same quarters they had occupied since the American occupation. The dispersion of offices was very inconvenient; it was nearly a mile from the office of the Commanding General to that of the Chief Commissary, Chief Paymaster, Chief Signal Officer, Chief Engineer Officer and Chief Ordnance Officer.

Fort Santiago was at one period the citadel of the Manila Fortress, and at the period when the heaviest guns of attack and defense were 32 pounders, this fort was the dominating feature of the city defenses; but its importance as a military work has long since disappeared, save as an object of curiosity, presenting a type of fortifications of the 16th century. The

Spaniards had quarters within this work, adequate for some 500 soldiers, but measured by modern American standards of necessities, we could find space for but three companies. The buildings were of masonry and in a good state of repair, roofs of earthenware tile.

In pursuance of the authority of the Secretary of War, this old fort has been adapted to the office needs of the Division Commander and his Staff. There is also a dormitory and messing facilities for most of the clerks, orderlies, messengers, etc., on duty at Division Headquarters. The change which has been effected has been a very great advantage in facilitating a quick despatch of business; any one of the staff officers can in a moment respond to a call of the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff. The rooms are of ample size, light and airy, and all are now lighted by electricity. From his office the Commanding General overlooks the business portion of the city; the Pasig river, which is as busy a water channel as any in the world; the harbor; the bay; and the coming and going of every vessel is under his observation.

As soon as the Estado Mayor was vacated by the Division, the Headquarters and offices of the Luzon Department were removed to this place from rented buildings in a remote part of the city that were occupied at a cost of \$4,200 a year.

Some of the advantages gained other than economy and better facilities for transaction of business, are the easy access to the offices of the Civil Government near by; ease of protection; cooler and more comfortable rooms; and, while a little more remote from the quarters of the officers, when the new bridge from the Malecon to Calle Principe is constructed, will be much more conveniently placed than before, respecting the Railroad station and the business houses. Besides, ample space is available for all office requirements for years to come, and with room for enlargements.

Much progress has been made and much yet remains to be done in fully installing the Military prison at Malahi

Island, in the Laguna de Bay. There are not quite two hundred convicts—all ex-soldiers—at the place. A battalion of Infantry guards these men. The quarters and storehouses are yet primitive, but they are being constantly improved, the prisoners doing all the work. The island has a hundred or more acres and is over a hundred feet high. The mass of the island is basaltic rock of considerable hardness, which supplies good concrete material and road metal. The quarters, barracks, prison pavilions, and all the buildings should be made of concrete or *beton* in moulds, the roofs of galvanized iron. The water of the lake will have to be pumped to a distributing tank, and for drinking and cooking it will have to be boiled or condensed. In four or five years this establishment should be complete and constructed at very small cost.

GENERAL SERVICE CORPS.

The number of American employees serving with the Army in the Philippines is very large, and the number of natives of these Islands employed with the troops is much larger. The following table will give a fair idea of the magnitude of this force:

CIVIL EMPLOYEES SERVING IN THE PHILIPPINES.

	Over \$150 per month.	\$150 to \$125.	\$125 to \$100.	\$100 to \$75.	\$75 to \$50.	\$50 to \$37.50.	\$37.50 to \$25.	\$25 to \$20.	\$20 to \$15.	TOTAL.	REMARKS.
Civil Service. . .	2	16	28		3					49	All clerks. Clerks, 405. Mechanics, 132 Laborers, } Packers, } 931 Teamsters }
Temporary	2	100	261	307	222	569	5	1	1	1468	
TOTAL. . .	4	116	289	307	225	569	5	1	1	1517	

NOTE. In addition to above there are 126 Civilians serving in the 3rd Brigade whose wages have not been classified.

Besides the above who are employed at monthly wages, there are several thousand native employees at day wages as laborers, stevedores, helpers, etc., etc. In the Manila Quartermaster Depot there are 3,348 employees. The total number of day laborers, temporarily employed, converted into what would be a permanent employment of say twenty-five days per month, can not be less than 5,000.

The proposition to discontinue this practice of hiring clerks, overseers, mechanics and laborers, and substituting for them a corps of trained enlisted men has often been proposed, but it has never yet received favor, except at the Military Academy, where there are a hundred or two, and in Washington, where there is a Corps of General Service Clerks, but the latter class is not enlisted. In the Philippines the course pursued in securing civil help has been to bring out men from the States who were hired for the particular work to be performed, or to secure the discharge of soldiers and employ them. At the same time the Civil Government needed employees and was not obliged to observe the limitation as to salary which controlled the employment of civilians for the Army.

The very urgent need for persons in civil capacities and the delay that was occurred in fetching them from the United States led to the adoption of a method for filling these places which was quite effective and satisfactory from the point of view of the Civil Government, and equally so to the persons employed, but it led to an abuse, and the Army was the sufferer. A soldier would apply for his discharge from the Army, and file evidence with his application or submit other proof respecting an offer of clerical employment in a civil capacity with some civil or military officer; or it would be shown that he could better himself in a civil business position. The company commander never wished to interpose an obstacle to the advancement of a good soldier and he would approve the application for discharge.

At first the War Department was quite disposed to favor these applications, and the result was that there are some hundreds of ex-soldiers serving in these Islands, who were discharged by way of favor or had purchased their discharges; but the confident expectations of quick profits in private business, or of rapid advancement in civil positions, were not realized in a great many cases, and it has resulted that many of them have failed utterly; some on account of bad habits, some on account of deficiencies, moral or mental. Some of these have taken up occupations and pursuits that reflect no credit upon them and that disgrace Americans in these Islands. Wherever there is a military camp or station in the Philippines, there is always to be found from one to a dozen Americans—very often discharged soldiers—who are saloon keepers or worse, living in the purlieus of these posts.

But another phase of this condition of affairs is the bad effect it has had on the enlisted men who remained in the companies, and the condition of general dissatisfaction that it engendered.

Discharges by purchase and by way of favor have done a great deal of harm in the Philippines to the *morale* of the Army; and we can never have any well ordered military service here until we discontinue all discharges by way of favor, save in those rare cases where a real hardship would result from a denial of the request. The Civil Government should import such employees as it needs, or take soldiers after they have completed their Army engagements. When there is a permanent corps of trained General Service men, there will be no place for these discontented, restless soldiers, and they will have no recourse but to serve their terms.

In the different Headquarters in the Division are now serving about 150 enlisted men as clerks and messengers, of whom 100 are of the former category. Many of these men are dissatisfied because along-side are civil clerks who receive from \$1,000 to \$1,800 per annum, while the enlisted clerks receive in pay, rations and clothing, only about \$35

per month. There was a practice of placing such clerks on a status of "commutation of rations" so that they could have their income supplemented by \$22.50 a month from the Subsistence Department; clearly an illegal proceeding,—but such was the practice, which has been discontinued of course. The regulations allowed seventy-five cents per day in lieu of rations at places where subsistence was not supplied. A case was reported in Manila, two or three years ago, where several soldiers who were detailed as clerks were receiving commutation of rations; but they messed with the company that was quartered in the same building where the clerks worked, and to which company they belonged. They did not draw rations, but paid \$9 per month for their board supplied in their own company mess room, which left them the substantial sum of \$13.50 per month as extra pay. Another case was more recently reported where three signal corps soldiers, stationed at a remote point and on a commutation basis, purchased their subsistence from the commissary and had it shipped to them by a special government launch sent monthly a hundred miles, for no other purpose than to deliver these groceries. Of course this launch service was stopped.

All European regiments serving in the tropics have a large number of camp followers who are really native servants. They perform all the drudgery about camp or quarters and follow the troops in campaigning. The soldiers are exclusively reserved for fighting and are relieved from all duty not tending to further that end. For all general purposes connected with laboring work around posts, such as kitchen police, scavengers, cutting grass, weeds, etc., a certain number of laborers should be allowed for American company and band organizations, either in garrison or in the field. Natives should also be employed in such numbers as the necessities of the service require, in the discretion of the Division Commander, and at rates of pay fixed by him. They would be employed in loading and unloading military

freights, except supplies actually issued to troops for immediate consumption; in packing, unpacking and moving military supplies or property in reserve or storage; in making roads, bridges, wharves, and buildings.

Extra duty pay should not be allowed here, but there should be organized and maintained a trained corps of Army Service Employees, and they should be enlisted soldiers, so that they may be controlled and disciplined. Very strict prohibition should be made in the law authorizing such Army Service Corps against their employment in any menial capacity for officers, such as personal servants, cooks, orderlies, etc.

This is a work for the General Staff to take up and carry into being. It will be of immense benefit to the Service and will stop an abuse which is a growing one.

. INSULAR DEFENSES.

Surveys and recommendations have been made, looking to the reduction of the area of the Mariveles and Kalumpan Point Military Reservations, so as to conform with the recommendations of the former Division Commander in his report of May 1, 1902; but a sufficient area has been retained for the location of all the batteries proposed by the Board on Defenses, that was appointed in pursuance to Par. 24, Special Orders, No. 223, series 1901, Headquarters of the Army. As a result there will be many thousand acres restored to the public domain, and several considerable towns and villages will revert to civil administration and control.

Sites for the location of all needed batteries at the entrance to Manila Bay and for the protection of Cebú have been surveyed and projects for emplacements prepared, while the surveys at Iloilo for defensive sites will soon be completed. So far as is known to the undersigned everything has been done that is needed to permit a beginning of the work, but of course nothing can be done in installing the defenses until funds have been made available for the purpose. Full

reports with estimates have been forwarded and the Department is in possession of all requisite data. A considerable number of siege guns and howitzers, that will be useful adjuncts for defense, are now en route to Manila.

The carrying out of any extensive plan for the construction of defensive works will require a large number of laborers in building emplacements and their accessories. The unfortunate results that have attended efforts to secure efficient labor for construction of roads is not tended to encourage the belief that it will be easy to find here suitable labor in sufficient abundance for the installation of these batteries.

The Division Commander visited Olongapo and Subig during the year. No naval establishment of importance now exists or is being installed in Subig Bay that requires land defense. The fortification of this point should not be undertaken until Manila is well protected, for if this port is captured, the Philippines are lost. The defense of Manila against a Naval attack will be a very serious proposition as the entrances are broad and the water deep, and heavy batteries will be required with accessory means of defense. To the undersigned it seems manifest that Cavite, where is now property of considerable value to the Navy, is a very important strategic point for a naval base; certainly this will be the most important naval arsenal in the Philippines until Olongapo is thoroughly fortified.

During the present situation of affairs in the defense of Manila and the Philippines, the Army should be principally relied upon, for a naval force adequate for the defense of the Islands against a strong power, would require a very large number of vessels, a greater number it may be than could be spared without neglecting home defense and fleets needed to take the offensive.

The land defenses should be begun and rapidly pressed at Manila, Iloilo and Cebú.

SHELTER OF TROOPS.

On October 1st there had been a good deal accomplished in the way of concentration of the small garrisons, but the number of occupied stations on that date was more than 200; while on June 30th, the number had been reduced to 128, but some thirty of these were only temporary halting places of a few troops who were engaged in field service. On the date of this report, property accessory to the Churches and buildings belonging to the religious orders are being used, without payment of rent, at thirty stations. At some places this occupation was limited to a single room in a convent, while at other places the buildings in use were of considerable extent. In no case is a church edifice now occupied by troops.

The appropriation of \$1,500,000 for shelter of troops and acquiring sites in the Philippines became a law on the 30th of June, 1902. On October 1st, work had been commenced at San Fernando, Union, and at Salomague, in providing shelter for a squadron and two companies of native troops at each place. Considerable work had been done in the Cagayan Valley in providing shelter for native troops. In Mindanao, shelter made with native materials was well advanced at Malabang, while that for two companies stationed at Bongao and Siassi was completed. At Caloocan, the old nipa barracks were being put in order, and same at Santa Mesa, while the store houses at Malate were being converted into barracks for shelter of a battalion.

The question as to what should be the material used in construction of shelter received careful consideration. There were three kinds available and these were:

(1). Native lumber for floors, siding, doors, and windows; with galvanized iron roofs.

(2). Native wood posts and plates or girths; with grass or palm roofs and siding, secured to bamboo rafters, partitions and ribs. The floors of these houses were sometimes made of split bamboo on native wood poles serving as joists, and some-

times the floors were made of sawed lumber. In barracks, storehouses and stables of this construction the doors, and window shutters were frequently made of the same materials.

(3). Puget Sound rough lumber was available; the roof of galvanized iron, or of a kind of thick tar paper of recent invention that went by trade mark names, such as Rubberoid, Paroid, etc.; but the basis of all these stuffs was paper saturated with coal tar or asphalt.

At the date of American occupation the native materials such as poles, nipa, bamboo and rattan for lashings, were all very cheap and abundant, but with the advent of Americans the prices went up until it resulted that a nipa house which in 1898 would cost but \$50, had come to cost \$500. This was true of all localities where many Americans, and especially troops, had established themselves.

To construct shelter of native lumber throughout was out of the question, as the expense would be prohibitive. The native woods were never cheap as compared with Puget Sound material, and in 1902 they cost two or three times the prices that ruled in 1898. About all this kind of lumber had to be dragged to the sea shore by the carabao, then rafted on bamboo, to keep it afloat, and towed to the place where it was to be used. It was usually sawed into boards and scantling by hand, and by the time the ordinary woods of a good class were sawed and ready for use, the lumber cost from \$60 to \$100 per thousand feet. Of course shelter for troops made of this expensive material was out of the question.

The subject was carefully gone over, and taking into account the high cost of the nipa-bamboo construction in many places, and the uncertainty when it would be possible to procure the vast quantity needed, it was finally decided to ask the War Department to have the necessary lumber bought in Puget Sound and shipped to these islands. The preparation of typical plans was begun, but as time was pressing, the first

order for 11,000,000 feet was sent before plans had been completed. This was on September 13th, but it was not until January that the first cargo of this lot arrived.

It was quite clear that the appropriation of one and a half million dollars would not suffice to supply shelter for 20,000 troops in the Philippines, after making due allowance for existing shelters of Spanish origin that were to be utilized. Again, the Congressional appropriation was to suffice for all purposes except rental of the cold storage, and for erection of some storehouses for the Manila Quartermaster Depot. It was evident that rentals and minor repairs would absorb approximately the half of the whole sum.

The lumber and other building material, including new roofing material recommended by the Chief Quartermaster, was available for issue in Manila from January to May, 1903; but the handling, unloading, transportation to a lumber yard that had to be hired, and the transfers involved passing the four city bridges, made it impossible to fill any requisition until the lumber had all been transferred to the yard, sorted and piled; and if the material was to be used at some other point than Manila, or the Laguna country, this lumber had to make again the transit of the bridges and be re-loaded on transports or other vessels for shipment to its destination.

As soon as the plans for 4 company, 8 company and 12 company posts were ready, they were distributed, and the costs of the buildings were carefully computed so that commanding officers could know what they could expect to accomplish with a given sum of money. The Puget Sound lumber cost on board transports at the mills about \$15 per thousand feet board measure. Its transportation to Manila on private steamers cost from \$5 to \$7 per thousand.

At the last session of Congress there was appropriated \$750,000, one-third of said sum having been made available for the last fiscal year, and \$500,000 for the current year.

A further order for an additional 11,000,000 feet of lumber was sent forward several months since and commenced to arrive in July.

In view of the intended reduction of the force here, and the considerable use that has been made of nipa and bamboo, and the use being made of the produce of two government saw mills that are now in use in Mindanao, the money allotted and the building materials on hand or due to arrive should suffice to make the troops fairly comfortable.

The question of water supply has not been an easy one to satisfactorily solve at some of the new stations, a matter that has always been very carefully studied; but in view of the fact that no troops in the Philippines now use any other than condensed or boiled water, the dangers from a polluted supply are almost entirely eliminated.

There has been considerable progress in the construction of Fort McKinley (map of which post is herewith submitted). The first lumber for this post, which was received in September, arrived in January. Barracks for 8 companies are under construction and will be ready for occupation in two or three months. Materials for 16 more barracks are on the way or are being shipped. One of the three artesian wells was bored some months ago, and under test, supplied 125 gallons or upwards of water per minute; another well is being completed, and a third will be bored; the three are expected to supply 500 gallons per minute. The water comes from a gravel stratum about 500 feet beneath the surface, and rises to within some 15 feet of the top. Plans for a complete sewer system and water supply are matured and will be pushed. The macadam road completed is about two and a half miles in extension, but several miles more will be needed. The broken stone used in making this road was quarried and crushed by the prisoners on Malahi Island.

A contract has just been made by the Municipal Government of Manila to install a modern electric system for the city. This road could very well extend about four miles and

reach the site of this post. The time required to ride from the center of the city to the site of this post at an easy pace of the horse is about an hour.

The appropriations for this post have been:—

Fiscal year 1903.....	\$ 500,000
Fiscal year 1904.....	1,000,000
Total.....	<u>\$1,500,000</u>

which should be sufficient to complete it for a brigade in accordance with the plans of the former Division Commander.

Shelter of Troops in Philippines.

MONEY STATEMENT

JUNE 22, 1903.

Appropriation 1902-1903.....	\$1,500,000
Deficiency 1902-1903.....	250,000
Appropriation 1903-1904.....	500,000
Total.....	<u>\$2,250,000</u>

ALLOTMENT.

Division Headquarters.....	\$ 50,000
Department of Luzon.....	871,250
Department of the Visayas.....	417,114
Department of Mindanao.....	421,636
Available for allotment.....	500,000
Total.....	<u>\$2,250,000</u>

Brigadier General Wint brought from Java a set of plans of barracks and quarters constructed and occupied by the Dutch troops at Tjimahi. These were so entirely different from any buildings occupied by our troops, and the plans so completely and carefully worked up, that it is deemed advisable to submit copies of two of the principal drawings. The plans submitted show the quarters for sheltering a battalion of troops, four companies of 160 men each, two companies being Europeans and two natives.

MILITARY RESERVATIONS.

Section 12, of the Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, places the control of all public lands and buildings in the

Philippine Islands within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Commission, except such areas as are reserved by the President for Military, Naval, or other public purpose.

The Act of Congress of June 30, 1902, made an appropriation for the purpose of constructing shelters in the Philippine Islands, and for acquiring sites for the same; and the Division Commander has full power to act in all matters within the scope of his authority, but no money can be paid for any public land until the Attorney General has reported that the proffered title is sufficient to vest ownership in the United States. The Division Commander can select the lands needed for erection of shelter; investigate the evidence of private ownership, if any; and if the land has no private owner, the papers may be forwarded so that the President may have the data on which to base an Executive Order reserving the particular tract from sale or entry, and assigning it to the proposed object.

Of course it was desired that the places chosen for erection of shelter for the troops should be easily reached by means of land or water transport, and also should be so situated with respect to the surrounding country and the inhabitants that the troops could, with facility, be brought to the points most likely to be disturbed by the law-breakers; for the only reason that exists for maintaining troops in the Philippines is that they may be used in maintaining order and supporting the authority of the Civil Officials who are charged to administer the Government of the Archipelago.

It was evident, almost from the beginning of the inquiry as to sites, that the government would but rarely find any vacant public land that was suitable to the use to which it was to be put; but there were many tracts of such land that had squatters upon them. Sometimes the occupants could show what appeared on the face to be good titles; some could show papers which could in a certain number of years be converted into good titles under the Spanish law; and sometimes the squatter could show no evidence of title at all except possession.

At first it was thought to be the best course to make leases with those persons in actual possession, and make contracts with them which would give the government the right to acquire the titles at an agreed upon price within a specified period of time; but it was soon evident that such a course could not be legally followed, for it might happen that the person claiming the lease money had no title or even an equity at all in the land. In all cases, where practicable, the War Department has occupied the sites desired with the consent of the real or pretended owners, but in several cases the government could come to no understanding. Seeing that nothing effective could be accomplished except through condemnation proceedings, and noting also that it was next to impossible to carry through such proceedings unless it was known who all the parties interested were, the Civil Government was appealed to for assistance so it might be known who the real owners or claimed owners were. After many conferences with the Governor and by the Judge Advocate of the Division with the Attorney General, it was finally arranged that the Civil Government would enact a law creating what was called a Land Registration Court; the procedure being for the United States through the Division Commander to request action, so that it might be definitely known in whom the title to a particular tract of land described by metes and bounds, was vested. Upon receipt of such notice, the Court, through its Fiscal, gave public notice to all who were interested to come into Court to produce their muniments of title. The procedure is all laid down in this Act.

Many tracts of land desired for Military occupancy, some of which are probably owned by the State *in toto* and others in part, have been referred to this Court. The proceedings in any case may require six months time before a decision is reached as to who the owners really are. When the Military Authorities have that knowledge they can negotiate to purchase the private title and in the event that an understanding is reached, the papers can be submitted to the Attorney

General. If the owner of these lands, or those having equities in it, can not come to an understanding with the Military Authorities as to price, then condemnation proceedings can be instituted.

On several of these tracts of land the shelter for troops are being erected; this on the theory that the buildings are temporary and may be removed should the government decide to vacate the property.

The points where proceedings have been taken into the Land Court, or where the papers have been prepared with that end in view, are: Salomague; San Fernando, Union; Bayambang; Angeles; Los Baños, Batangas; Lucena, Nueva Caceres; Legaspi, Sorsogon; all on Luzon; also Laguan and Calbayog on Samar; Tacloban and Ormoc, on Leyte; Jossman on Guimaras; Nonucan, Malabang, and Zamboanga, on Mindanao.

It is certain that some of these sites are public land, and that in very many others, the whole or part is probably public. Requests have been forwarded to the War Department in respect to many of the places named above, asking that the President set aside and reserve all the public lands included within the described limits.

The effect of such action is advantageous, for it is the best form of a public notice in which to announce the intention of the government with respect to the whole tract. The government encounters the same difficulties here as in the United States in attempting to acquire land; when it is known that the government officials are considering the advisability of establishing a garrison in a named locality, instantly the value of all eligible realty in the neighbourhood increases several hundred per cent, and so remains until the Government has reached a determination as to its plans, and acted accordingly.

The needs of the Government with respect to the public lands of Manila have been presented to the Department. Of course the lands in this city are very valuable, and if private

parties had any claim to them, valid or otherwise, a long controversy with respect to them might be expected. Fortunately, there is no claimant except the city of Manila; but as there is a clear case of exclusive military occupation for many years or even centuries, there should be no real difficulty in settling the matter.

When Fort McKinley is completed, as it should be in the course of twelve months, the necessity for extensive areas in Manila for barracks, etc., will have passed; but for depots and hospitals, and for quarters for a guard of adequate size for pressing local needs, some of the buildings now occupied will be needed for a long time, and the Bayambang Camp ground should be retained permanently in Military control.

MILITARY DEPOTS.

The existing physical and business conditions are such that for the military forces serving in Manila, there is and can be but one central magazine of supplies for the troops. During the period when active campaigning was in progress, and the number of troops serving here was three times as great as now, there were so-called Depots; i. e., small accumulations of supplies at various points; such as, Aparri, Vigan, Dagupan, Calumpit, Calamba, Batangas, Legaspi, Tacloban, Cebú, Iloilo, and Zamboanga. At one time there was a proposition on foot to make Cebú a great central distributing point for the southern islands, and it was even suggested that vessels freighted in San Francisco for the Philippines should call at Cebú and discharge cargo before coming to Manila; and on the return voyage the vessels were to make Cebú the port of departure for San Francisco; but this proposition never got beyond an inchoate project, which has never been realized. Iloilo has been the so-called Department Depot for the Visayas, as Zamboanga has been for Mindanao; but the accumulations of quartermaster, subsistence, ordnance, and medical supplies and other property kept at these places has been very greatly reduced and is now quite small.

As Manila is the commercial and political capital of the islands, so must it be the military centre and the entrepôt of all military business and exchanges. When the new harbor, now making, is completed, permitting deep sea vessels to discharge at the wharves in all weather, the facilities for receiving and re-shipping freight will be equal to those at any seaport.

Whether the inter-island service will be continued by the government, or carried on by commercial steamers will not affect this question. The troops to be supplied outside of Manila will be stationed at points accessible to the inter-island boats, and at these stations there will be adequate landing, handling, and storage facilities. The boats will make weekly or bi-weekly trips, and the necessity of large accumulations at the out-stations will not exist.

The Manila subsistence depot should not be an extensive affair. The deterioration of subsistence stores of almost all kinds is very rapid in this climate, however packed. Even stores contained in glass jars secured by caps of wax have greatly deteriorated, if in storage for a year or more. If the Pacific and Atlantic transports give place to private vessels, as they probably will, the purchases of Commissary Stores to supply the troops should be made in Manila; the deliveries to be so timed that there will never be on hand, of any article, more than a six months' supply, and it should be practicable to limit this stock to four months in respect to almost all goods. The contractor for supplying fresh meats and vegetables should make deliveries of those articles to all the points where they are to be consumed, and he should have his own cold storage plant for keeping the required reserve supply. The space needed for depot purposes in Manila will therefore be very much less than has been found necessary in the past.

The large accumulation of medical supplies now requires a good deal of space; but as this surplus is worked off either

through general deterioration or through consumption or expenditure, the space needed for storage purposes will be very much less than now.

As the telegraphs and telephones will ultimately go over to the government of the islands, or to a private company, there will be no reason to hold here any large stock of signal supplies, and the considerable space now used can be given up.

The space assigned to the Ordnance Depot is not sufficient for what is in store, but it is doubted if a large part of the property now accumulated has much value for military purposes. A special report has been made on this subject.

The accumulation of Quartermaster supplies and property of all kinds is very large, and of necessity had to be, but there has been a constant and very large shrinkage; and with the reduction of the numbers of troops now contemplated and with a completion of the building operations, which should take place in a year, the need will not exist for so much Depot space as formerly. If all water transportation is done by private vessel owners, and the Quartermaster has no further need for a very large lighterage service, a further reduction of storage area will be possible, through the elimination of transport supplies and coal storage. The present area of the Depot proper which adjoins Division Headquarters at Fort Santiago is about twenty acres; but this does not include part of the Subsistence Stores, nor any Medical, Signal or Ordnance supplies. When the new port works are completed, about one hundred and seventy acres of land will become available for commercial purposes which are now submerged or are not used to best advantage. Request has been submitted to the War Department asking that an arrangement be made with the Civil Government for the permanent assignment to the Army, for Depot purpose, of twenty acres of this reclaimed land. Such area will include a large part of the most valuable storehouses now owned by the government, and will supply only what will be indispensably necessary if the troops remain in the Philippines.

The consumption of coal during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, reached about 92,000 tons; and cost \$505,000 not counting expense of handling and cost of freight on the portion re-shipped. This coal was delivered from time to time as required, the accumulations beyond daily needs being stored in three coal hulks, having a storage capacity of 9,200 tons, and at Sangle y Point near Cavite. The ground where this coal was piled is under the control of the Navy Department, and objection has been made by the Navy to a continued use of this place. It will embarrass the military authorities very much to find ground accessible to deep sea vessels or even lighters, and suitable for the deposit of the 15,000 tons of coal that will have to be taken care of at times. The contract for coal for the ensuing year calls for 70,000 tons; and it is hoped that a Philippine coal deposit may be developed in the course of a few months, and shown to be capable of supplying all government needs here. Work is now in progress in developing the coal measures found on Batan Island, in Legaspi Province. It will soon be known what are the capabilities of these veins and the quality of the product.

The storage of hay has presented very considerable difficulties, as there was no forage shed available, nor could any be hired that was suitable. It has been necessary to lighter the hay to a vacant lot above the city, and there to store it, covered only by paulins. There has been considerable loss from damage by rain, for it is not possible with canvas alone to properly protect hay from driving rains. If the twenty-acre lot, referred to above as desired for depot purposes, is set aside, there will be no difficulty in utilizing a part of the space for a forage shed.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.

The reports of the Division Staff Officers are summarized or otherwise utilized in the report of the Division Commander,

as required by General Orders No. 47, Headquarters of the Army, A. G. O., 1902, but the original reports of these officers are on file at Division Headquarters.

Colonel Charles F. Humphrey was the Chief Quartermaster of the Division from October 1, 1902 to March 31, 1903, and his report, to the latter date, has already been printed, and copies of same can be secured from General Humphrey's office, as he is now the Quartermaster General of the Army; only a single copy of his report is on file at Division Headquarters.

The heads of the Division Staff during the command of the undersigned have been:

ADJUTANT GENERAL.....	<i>Colonel H. O. S. Heistand</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to date.
INSPECTORS GENERAL..	<i>Major R. D. Potts</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to Oct. 15, 1902. <i>Major Frank West</i> , Oct. 15, 1902 to Nov. 30, 1902. <i>Colonel P. D. Vroom</i> , Nov. 30, 1902 to April 15, 1903. <i>Lieut. Col. Frank West</i> , April 15, 1903 to June 8, 1903. <i>Lieut. Col. J. L. Chamberlain</i> , June 8, 1903 to date.
JUDGE ADVOCATE.....	<i>Lieut. Col. H. C. Carbaugh</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to date.
CHIEF QUARTERMASTER..	<i>Colonel C. F. Humphrey</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to March 31, 1903. <i>Colonel E. B. Atwood</i> , April 1, 1903 to date.
CHIEF COMMISSARY.....	<i>Colonel Henry G. Sharpe</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to date.
CHIEF SURGEON.....	<i>Lieut. Col. G. W. Adair</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to Nov. 30, 1902. <i>Colonel Charles Smart</i> , Nov. 30, 1902 to date.
CHIEF PAYMASTER.....	<i>Colonel C. H. Whipple</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to Feb. 19, 1903. <i>Major G. R. Smith</i> , Feb. 19, 1903 to date.
CHIEF ENG'R OFFICER..	<i>Lieut. Col. C. E. L. B. Davis</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to date.
CHIEF ORD'CE OFFICER..	<i>Major A. H. Russell</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to date.
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER..	<i>Major W. A. Glassford</i> , Oct. 1, 1902 to date.

The Adjutant General calls attention to the re-organization of his office force and a sub-division of duties which he thinks has economized labor, simplified duties, and made mistakes almost impossible. There are five Divisions; viz., Commissioned; Enlisted; Miscellaneous; Mail and Record; and Information.

In respect to the office force employed at Division Headquarters, the undersigned notes a constant rapid growth which it seems to him is far away beyond what should exist. If all the clerks on the rolls are needed to do the work, then some means ought to be found to reduce or simplify the work itself.

In the report of the Adjutant General in Manila dated August 12, 1899, the clerical force was stated as 22, made up of nine civilians and thirteen enlisted men; aggregate strength of officers and men 34,651; total number of original papers received and sent 60,000; papers handled in the Adjutant General Office, 375,000.

The Adjutant General in his report of August 1, 1900, stated that his force consisted of 15 civilian clerks and 45 enlisted clerks, or 60 in all; total force in Division, officers and men, 63,845; total number of communications received and sent 73,500; and 220,000 indorsements made and entered; total number of occupied stations, 423.

The report of the Adjutant General on June 30, 1901, does not mention the number of clerks or the volume of business, but the aggregate strength of the Division on the date given, including the force withdrawn and sent to China, and thence returned to the Philippines, was 47,732; and if the scouts and military police be included, the numbers are 55,279 officers and men.

The Adjutant General reported June 30, 1902, that his clerical force numbered sixty, of whom 43 were civilians and 26 enlisted soldiers. The maximum strength of the Division was 49,568, and the minimum was 33,929 officers and men.

At the date of this report the number of civilian clerks is 32, and enlisted 42, an aggregate of 74; against 60 of a year ago; while there is a messenger force of 22, some of whom are employed as clerks; against 11 a year earlier. The number of stations has been reduced from 211 to 128. The Adjutant General remarks on the accuracy and despatch with which the records of the Division have been handled and also remarks that last year 127,296 communications passed into and out of the office in a year, against 73,500 mentioned by one of his predecessors. This is cited by the Adjutant General as illustrating the fact that with the return of peace, a reduction of force does not mean a corresponding decrease of clerical work.

The whole office force of the Division and three Departments is as follows:

Headquarters	Civilian Clerks	Enlisted Clerks	Civilian Messengers	Enlisted Messengers
Division	32	42	7	15
Department, Luzon	8	30	2	19
Department, Visayas	4	17	2	3
Department, Mindanao ..	5	8	3	1
Total	49	97	14	38

Grand total 198. There are besides a few enlisted clerks and messengers at the 2nd and 3rd Brigade Headquarters.

At another place in this report will be found a recommendation that it is believed would, if carried into effect, reduce the clerical force by one third or even one half. In the opinion of the undersigned there are now employed a sufficient number of Civil Service or Civilian Clerks and Messengers to attend to all the work of the Adjutant General, Judge Advocate and Inspector General for all the troops in the Philippines; but the undersigned has been so much occupied with various and pressing duties, and his continuation in command was of so brief duration, that he has not felt that he could spare time to, or find justification for, entering upon and completing a reform in this matter.

The Adjutant General calls attention to the ill effects of discharging enlisted men in the Philippines, especially those who are discharged without honor, for the good of the service. A great many of the undesirable characters who are now drifting about the Philippines are discharged soldiers and they are a very great detriment to this community, where all Americans are viewed as representative citizens, and their misconduct becomes a serious embarrassment. This observation has the full and unqualified indorsement of the Division Commander, who considers that the very worst people in these Islands, those whose influence is worse than three times the same number of the worst natives, are the blackguard Americans, largely ex-soldiers, who have either been discharged here on one pretext or another, or who have returned here after their discharge; but there are in civil life other ex-soldiers who would be a credit to any community.

The cost of making known by telegraph to the Paymaster General the facts respecting the allotments of pay of enlisted men reached \$3,171.93, and it is probable that the amount of money involved did not much exceed the sum stated. There ought to be found some way to avoid such an outlay; the Adjutant General's recommendation is concurred in, which in effect contemplates the deferment of an allotment until 60 days after same is due; all correspondence to be transacted by mail.

The proposition of the Adjutant General that he be furnished with a Secretary who shall be a personal appendage is not favorably indorsed; but another suggestion is favorably considered; it is, that the National Air have an official arrangement of its music, and all military bands be required to adhere strictly to the score, permitting no latitude to band leaders as respects variations. The music should be printed in the drill books or some other War Department publication. A further suggestion respecting this matter is a good one and that is, that the military men, present at the playing of the National Air, stand at attention, or if mounted sit facing the

music, and while the score is being played have hand at the salute throughout the playing. While this air is being played at evening concerts, it is not unusual to see officers with their hats off engaged in loud conversation with ladies and others.

The Adjutant General has ascertained from the records that the total number of trials by Court Martial during the year reached 13,815, of which 4088 or almost 30% were due to over indulgence in intoxicants, a condition of affairs that is deplorable.

The recommendation of the Adjutant General is concurred in, that the clerical force, after having been classified under the Civil Service law, be exchanged with those serving in the United States; this will ensure a rotation of duties.

As soldiers and officers receive an increase in pay for foreign service, it would seem but right to allow this to Civil Service Clerks also.

The following named General officers who were serving in the Division of the Philippines on October 1, 1902, have been relieved and returned to the United States:

Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell.

Brigadier General Frank D. Baldwin.

Brigadier General S. S. Sumner, (Now Major-General).

The following named General Officers have reported in the Division and have been assigned to duty:

Brigadier General George M. Randall.

Brigadier General Leonard Wood, (Now Major-General).

Colonel Francis Moore, 11th Cavalry, was promoted to be Brigadier General and was assigned to duty in the Division.

Brigadier General Joseph P. Sanger, formerly the Inspector General of the Division, was detailed on special duty with the Civil Government as Director of the Census; and several other Army Officers are also performing civil duties with the Civil Government; besides, thirty companies of Native troops with their officers are under the Governor's orders, and are helping the Constabulary preserve order.

The work in the Adjutant General's Office has been promptly done, considering the inexperience of a part of the force.

Colonel Heistand's services have been eminently satisfactory.

INSPECTIONS.

During the year no less than six different officers have occupied the office of the Inspector General, or acting Inspector General of the Division, and nineteen officers have acted in same capacity.

While serving in the Division, Colonel Peter D. Vroom was promoted to be The Inspector General of the Army and at the same time retired from active service.

The following is a summary of inspections made during the year by officers on duty in the office of the Division Inspector, or of reports which have passed through that office:

Military Posts,..... 117

SUPPLY DEPARTMNETS.

Commissary Depots,..... 4

Quartermaster Depots,..... 6

Medical Depots,..... 3

Signal Depots,..... 1

General Hospitals,..... 3

Base Hospitals,..... 1

Army Transports, (involving 9 Transports)..... 31

Military Prisons,..... 4

Money Accounts,..... 386

Unserviceable property,.....3723

Special Investigations,..... 32

The 386 inspections of Money Accounts involved disbursements of \$62,878,155.61; the reported balances aggregating \$11,652,253.33.

The total property inspected for condemnation aggregates \$2,382,439.

A recent Division Order provides for the regular inspection of owned or chartered transports, which work has already been taken up.

The Inspector General makes several recommendations for changes and improvements in matters affecting the service. Respecting the Scouts, he observes that they should be trained in rifle firing; that the clothing allowance for first six months should be increased, and that their ration be increased. The Division Commander some time since gave orders that the Scouts be instructed in target practice, particularly the Macabebes. The second and third recommendations are not concurred in. The views of the undersigned respecting the clothing allowance and ration of the native troops have been fully stated in previous pages.

Colonel Chamberlain's statement that an establishment under military control where the troops could buy pure beer and wine at a reasonable price would be a blessing, is heartily concurred in, and statistics furnished by the Adjutant General, cited on a previous page, are a proof of the wisdom of this recommendation.

The suggested discontinuance of the detail of special inspectors of property should be observed except in certain special cases and emergencies.

The Summary Court Officer is proposed for investigation of all property losses and damages, that are now inquired into by Boards of Survey. This is an excellent suggestion, for the Board of Survey has quite outlived its usefulness. The officer detailed for this duty should have the authority to administer oaths. There should be no formal order required to set this officer at work; instead there should be a reference to him of the report by accountable or responsible officer of any loss or damage. He should be required to be present on the spot as soon as possible after the loss or damage occurred. There should be no "proceedings" at all; the record of action should be a blank form, of foolscap sheet size in triplicate, with record evidence attached when the survey covered a long list of articles concerning some of which a correspondence becomes necessary; the report should be handed in at once concerning all articles regarding which

the evidence was complete, and the report would come later concerning other articles. Everything should be recorded in a book kept at the post, like report of Summary Court trials; so that in case of sickness or removal of an officer pending an investigation, the case could be taken up and completed by his successor. A good name for this officer would be "Surveyor" or "Survey Officer."

Use of canvas for shelter of men and property is properly advised against and concurred in save under circumstances of necessity, but it has been found that nipa-bamboo shelters are not cheap nor economical in some places.

Dry earth closets to be completely enclosed is a good suggestion; but the conditions that generally exist now with respect to these devices are excellent as compared to the disgusting sink of the past. In the Philippines, water closets at temporary posts are a long way off.

Khaki clothing now in use is of divers colors, but should be uniform. Uniformity respecting cut and observance of orders respecting maximum height of collar and make of shoulder straps should be insisted upon. This recommendation is concurred in by the Division Commander.

Campaign hat and shoes not good enough; this is disapproved by the Division Commander as to the hat. The shoes of new pattern soon to be issued will, it is said, be a great improvement over the old ones.

A khaki stock for the neck is proposed. This is not concurred in. It adds another article to the equipment list which is now too long.

Insignia of arm of the service and coat of arms too large. In the opinion of the Division Commander there should be nothing whatever on the collar; the coat of arms should be omitted altogether on khaki coat and the insignia of arm of service should be put on the shoulder loop.

Coal oil boxes too frail and easily punctured; this is concurred in.

Distilling, Ice and Cold Storage Plants recommended at all permanent posts occupied by white troops. As the policy of the Government appears to be to supply these luxuries generally, it seems to be obligatory that we should classify the proceeds of these establishments as necessities.

The ration is spoken of as generally satisfactory, the exceptions being certain kinds of bread, bacon, flour and sales stores. Considering the remoteness of these Islands from points of supply, and the fact that the surplus left from former accumulations had to be disposed of as required by law, the troops generally have been well supplied; and any one who notes the stalwart appearance of the men and their healthy complexions will not willingly believe that they have been underfed. The issue of the emergency ration which the Inspector General objects to has been suspended. The sealing up of the flour in tins as proposed is unnecessary, if the Subsistence Department sees to it that the stock of flour on hand does not exceed three or four months' supply. The recommendation that expert bakers be hired and sent out here is not concurred in.

The recommendation that the troops be paid in local currency is not concurred in, as the local money now ready to go into circulation is practically a gold currency like the Yen of Japan and the Rupee of India.

The recommendation respecting the Luegar Automatic pistol is concurred in. This is not suited to our military needs. When an assailant has approached near enough to be hit with reasonable certainty by an ordinary pistol shot, the man defending himself wants to stop his assailant. This the 38 calibre bullet will not do unless it hits a vital spot or breaks an important bone. The Inspector General's personal observation in this respect corresponds with that of the Division Commander.

MILITARY JUSTICE.

During the years four officers have been tried by General Courts Martial convened by Division Orders. Of these

three, Major Glenn, 5th Infantry; Captain Hartmann, Signal Corps; and Lieutenant Lee, 10th Infantry, were acquitted; and one, Captain Rogers, 27th Infantry, was found guilty of "disrespect to his Commanding General" and sentenced to be reprimanded. Lieutenant Hamilton Foley, 5th Cavalry, was also tried by Division General Court and the proceedings, in the case have been forwarded to the War Department for final action.

One hundred and twenty-two cases of General Courts Martial of enlisted men have been promulgated from Division Headquarters, in which 127 men were tried; of these 115 resulted in convictions. The offenses were charged under Articles of War as follows:

Two cases under 16th, four under 17th, two under 20th, nineteen under 21st, one under 24th, three under 31st, ten under 32nd, seven under 33rd, one under 34th, ten under 38th, nineteen under 39th, five under 40th, seventeen under 58th, six under 60th, one hundred fifty-four under 62nd. These cases all came to Division Headquarters from discontinued commands, the Division Commander being the superior in command, and as such promulgated the cases.

The records of trials of General Courts Martial involving dishonorable discharge that were received from the several Department and Brigade Headquarters numbered 489, and all were forwarded to the Judge Advocate General of the Army.

There was one case of trial by Military Commission wherein the trial was commenced and concluded before the proclamation of July 4, 1902, the sentence having been approved by the convening authority on July 2nd; the sentence was ordered to be executed on August 25, 1902.

The Judge Advocate of the Division remarks as follows:

"Wherever the Army of the United States is stationed there necessarily arise interests of the United States to be prosecuted or defended in Courts of Justice, such as vio-

lations of contract, bonds; breaches of ordinary contracts; damages to the United States; suits against its officers arising out of the exercise of their federal duties; and condemnation of land for military purposes. It is thought that in the Philippine Islands there is a failure by Congress, in reference to these interests, to establish Courts of competent jurisdiction, to designate who may bring suits in the name of the United States, and to provide for the expenses incurred in and through such actions." The Division Commander concurs in this observation.

At the close of the period of Military Government on July 4, 1902, there were many natives of the Philippines confined in the various prisons throughout the Archipelago who had been sentenced to confinement by various Military tribunals who were not of the class to secure a release under the President's Amnesty Proclamation. Applications for pardon or mitigation of sentence were constantly coming up, and there was at first doubt and uncertainty as to where the authority lay for acting on these appeals and petitions. The matter was referred to Washington by the Civil Governor, and he was consulted respecting the matter. Finally an understanding was reached in writing and is as follows:

"All applications for clemency by persons now confined in civil prisons in these Islands finally convicted of the crimes of murder, arson, rape, and robbery, by Provost Courts of Military Commissions during the period of insurrection ending July 4, 1902, which crimes were committed by the applicants against members of the U. S. Army, or against persons in some way identified with the Army while engaged in suppressing the insurrection; or which said crimes, though not so committed, were actually found by the Court to be in violations of the laws of war, will be forwarded by the Commanding General, Division of the Philippines, to the War Department for action of the President.

All other such applications by persons so convicted and confined—of said crimes or lesser ones—will be finally acted upon by the Civil Governor, or be forwarded by him direct to the War Department.

This rule of action has no reference to trials by General Court Martial."

This arrangement has well served its purpose.

There was no change in the incumbency of the Division Judge Advocate's office during the period covered by this report. The work pertaining to this staff office was always promptly and efficiently performed. The number of questions coming up from day to day upon which the Division Commander needs legal advice or a brief, setting forth the law and facts, is very large, and appears to be constantly increasing; and the Judge Advocate is every year becoming a more and more important and useful staff officer.

QUARTERMASTER AFFAIRS.

The Chief Quartermaster remarks that the work of supply of this Department has been rendered much easier by the reduction in force of the Division, and still more by the concentration of troops in larger garrisons. During the year the number of garrisoned stations has been reduced in number from 211 to 128, about half of which are either on lines regularly visited by owned or chartered transports, or are on the Manila & Dagupan Railway. This concentration, which it is intended to further continue, will greatly facilitate the supply of the perishable components of the ration, especially the supply of fresh beef, and the supply of forage for the animals.

During the year the supply of fresh beef to the troops has been greatly improved. The refrigerator transports, "Seward" and "Wright", have been actively engaged in the work, and iceboxes have been placed on some of the chartered transports and commercial vessels. Cold storage has been provided at a number of stations, and large ice-chests at others, so that most of the posts are, at frequent intervals, supplied with frozen beef and mutton. Two refrigerator cars have been prepared for supply of the troops on the railroad, who receive the full allowance of fresh meat. The great improvement in supply is shown by the fact that the quan-

tity of fresh beef and ice forwarded from Manila to stations not on the railway, in the city, or on the Laguna, has been as follows:

Average per month, 1901, meat, 12,081 lbs.; ice, 2,100 lbs.
 Average per month, 1902, meat, 61,941 lbs.; ice, 49,735 lbs.
 Average per month, 1903, meat, 229,559 lbs.; ice, 241,720 lbs.

At the present time ice machines are in operation or are being installed at the following stations:

Camp Wallace, Batangas, Calamba, Calbayog, Cebu, Corregidor, Iligan, Iloilo, Legaspi, Malabang, Nueva Caceres, Tacloban, Salomague, Zamboanga, Camp Jossman, Laguna, Cottabato, and Ormoc. Cold storage rooms are to be built for operation in connection with such of these machines as are not already provided. A monthly report by postal card is required to be made at the close of each month to Division Headquarters.

Possibly the most important work under charge of the Quartermaster's Department has been the construction of cantonments and storehouses for the troops at places selected for occupation. Congress has appropriated \$2,250,000 for this work and present indications are that this sum will be ample. The general type of the building selected is simple and roomy and suitable for the climate:—one story construction, elevated above the earth surface; provided with verandas on all sides, and with overhanging roof to protect against sun and beating rains; with a roof or sheathing covered by Ruberoid, a new sort of tar or asphalted pasteboard. The material of construction is Oregon fir (excepting doors and main posts) shipped from the United States; about 11,000,000 B. M. having been received between January 18, 1903, and the close of the fiscal year.

The following named stations have been selected: Fort William McKinley, Post for two regiments of Infantry, two squadrons of Cavalry, and two batteries of light artillery; Camp Stotsenberg, near Angeles, Pampanga, for Headquarters, Band and twelve troops of Cavalry; Camp Gregg,

near Bayambang, Pangasinan, for one battalion of Infantry; Camp McGrath, Batangas, for Regimental Headquarters, Band and six troops of Cavalry; Los Baños, Laguna, for one battalion of Infantry; Camp Wallace, San Fernando, Union, six companies; Camp Morrison, Ilocos Sur, six companies; Nueva Caceres, Ambos Camarines, two troops Cavalry, Headquarters, Band and four Companies of Infantry; Bacon, near Sorsogon Province, four companies of Infantry; Lucena, Tayabas, four troops Cavalry; Daraga, near Legaspi, Albay, four companies Infantry; Santo Tomas, Batangas, Headquarters, Band and four troops Cavalry; Baguio, Benguet, for detachment temporarily; Camp Hartshorne, Laguan, Samar, four companies Infantry; Camp Connell, Calbayog, Samar, four companies Infantry; Camp Bumpus, Tacloban, Leyte, four companies Infantry; Camp Downes, Ormoc, Leyte, four companies Infantry; Cebú, one battalion Infantry being prepared by conversion of old Spanish barracks and fort; Camp Jossman, Guimaras Island, Regiment Infantry and two troops Cavalry; Camp Vicars, Lake Lanao, battalion Infantry, two troops Cavalry, one battery mountain artillery; Jolo, Headquarters, Band and four troops Cavalry, and one battalion Infantry, utilizing old Spanish barracks mainly as shelter for troops.

Construction at nearly all of these posts is under way and progress has been very satisfactory, considering the difficulties encountered in supplying the lumber and the labor necessary for the work.

The rental paid for buildings occupied by the Army in the Division during the fiscal year outside the City of Manila amounted to \$178,270.03. There were allotted for repairs \$105,164.97 and for new construction (the greater part of which was in construction of new posts referred to above) \$22,884.30. In the City of Manila the same items amount to \$235,157.56, \$64,527.64 and \$159,457.70 (about a third of this last item being in new construction at Fort William McKinley). Rental items for the coming fiscal year will be

largely reduced in the provinces through the gradual vacating of rented buildings in occupying new posts; while in the City of Manila, through the release of many rented storehouses and offices, a large economy has been effected during the year just closed.

Trans-shipment of stores and supplies at Manila from transports bringing them from the States, to the inter-island transports, has been greatly improved upon during the year by the consolidation of the Manila Supply Depots in the new storehouses at the mouth of the Pasig River, which were completed in January.

During the fiscal year just closed, nearly 75,000 tons of supplies, exclusive of coal, were received by the Department from the United States, and over 5,000 tons received from coastwise ports; and shipments have been made from Manila of 5,000 tons to the States, and of about 42,000 tons to coastwise ports.

The work of the Burial Corps during the year deserves mention. The work of disinterment of remains of soldiers and marines in China having been completed early in the year, work was undertaken in Luzon on the line of the railroad. In November, the Corps left Manila on the chartered transport Proteus and arrived back March 21, 1903. During the year 148 stations were visited. The remains of 625 officers, soldiers, marines and employees have been disinterred and shipped.

A contract has been entered into for the supply in the Division of 300,000 gallons of mineral illuminating oil at fourteen cents U. S. Currency per gallon; an increase of $3\frac{1}{4}$ cents per gallon over the contract price for the year closing, as there was no competition at the bidding.

A contract has been made with the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to supply Kishima (Japanese) coal at \$4.87 U. S. Currency per ton, a saving of 36 cents per ton over the price for the year just closed.

The investigation of the coal deposits of the islands is being continued. The Batan mines are being exploited by an officer of Engineers, Acting Quartermaster, under an appropriation of \$15,000 U. S. Currency. This work has just been begun. Should the output meet expectations as to quantity, quality and cost, the government will have a local supply of fuel for transport, pumping, ice and distilling machinery. Arrangements have just been completed with owners of the undeveloped Balerma, Urgera, Ganalda, Perseverencia, and San Francisco deposits for such output of those veins as may be desired by the Government for a period of two years, with reservation of right to purchase within that period.

During the year at Manila 13,000 tons of hay have been received and 10,000 have been issued and sold; 12,000 tons of oats have been received and 8,000 tons issued and sold.

Native grass for forage has been contracted for the ensuing year at forty eight cents U. S. Currency per hundred pounds, a saving of 11 cents on the contract of last year.

Complaints of the issues of clothing and equipage are briefly as follows: Khaki uniform supplied for the soldiers is of inferior quality, fading rapidly. It is believed that the policy of the Department to patronize the American firms has been a mistake, as the English Khaki formerly purchased, and still obtained by officers and soldiers from native tailors is very satisfactory.

The present tan shoe is criticized as too light. The calfskin has been much used for field service. Experiments are recommended for a tan shoe modeled after, but lighter than, the English Army shoe. It is unofficially reported that such a shoe has just been adopted by the uniform board in Washington.

All iron materials rust very rapidly, so much so as to make it inadvisable to use iron buttons, buckles, or hooks,

on any article of clothing, such as the buttons and hooks on blouses, eyelets and buckles on leggings, etc.

All clothing and shoes should be packed in boxes thickly lined with petroleum paper as a protection against the white ants, and incidentally against mould.

Some of the complaints are doubtless due to the issues of surplus stores, retained here after the considerable reduction in forces which has taken place in the past year.

Some months since, the transfer to the Insular Government of the quartermaster shops was under consideration. The value of the plant was appraised and reported to the Civil Governor. A counter proposition was made to pay less than half the cost of the machinery, tools, etc.; the Division Commander's intention was to establish shops of a less extensive character in connection with the wheelwright shops within the grounds of the land transportation corral; but the uncertainties respecting a continued occupation of this ground by the Government and the delay that attended the negotiations, resulted in a dropping of the matter for the time being. At the present time, these shops are the only property the Quartermaster Department has on the north side of the Pasig River. The establishment is inconveniently located, and all War Department shops ought to be brought together. The year's work in these shops cost: for material, \$63,975.46, and for labor \$130,428.95, making a total of \$164,404.41; a cost which it is believed is far in excess of the value of the output.

The Manila Depot was formerly divided into four parts or departments,—Water Transportation, Land Transportation, Property, and Quartermaster Shops—with an officer in charge of each, reporting direct to the Chief Quartermaster. During the incumbency of the present able Quartermaster General—then the Chief Quartermaster of the Division—this plan was satisfactory until the illness of the Chief compelled his temporary relief. He was soon after appointed

Quartermaster General. The Division Commander considered it necessary to concentrate the Depot work, and Major Aleshire was placed in charge of all; but the plan to move the Quartermaster shops could not be carried out as planned, and these were restored to the charge of the Chief Quartermaster. The result of this concentration of all depot work under one head has been justified by the outcome. All rented storehouses have been given up, and there has been a considerable reduction of the personnel and a saving in various ways; besides a more expeditious transaction of business.

The work of the Quartermasters has been well done, and there have been no just complaints respecting alleged shortcomings. The cost of this work is, however, enormous; and in the opinion of the Division Commander the business should be done in future with a very great saving over the cost for the last year. The expense of the Quartermaster service ought to bear a close relation to the number of troops to be supplied, but it appears that when there were over 60,000 men in the Division the cost was not nearly double what it was last year, with about one third the force maintained and served at the earlier date.

There is a large surplus of Machine oil on hand, left over from the time when the requirements of transports were greater. The protection the barrels receive is not the best, and there is a considerable wastage. Recently the suggestion was made to the Department that the San Francisco transports be required to take their oil supply at Manila, so the stock could be used in service.

The number of employees in the depot is 3,348, and their monthly cost is \$92,930.56.

The invoice value of the property on hand is reported at \$8,594,216, which includes the transport service.

Other important matters treated of by the Chief Quartermaster will be discussed under other headings.

WATER TRANSPORT.

The Chief Quartermaster remarks that handling the Army freight by utilizing the commercial steamship companies, instead of the regular and chartered transports, has been investigated but no change has yet been made.

The movement of surplus regiments to the States, and of surplus property; the sending home of 2,000 soldiers discharged in December to effect a reduction in the force; the exchange of stations of regiments between the States and the Islands; and the shipment of large quantities of stores required for shelter constructions; have kept the Atlantic and Pacific transports busy. This state of affairs will doubtless continue until the transfer of troops is completed. The necessity for cholera quarantine during the greater part of the year, and the accident by grounding to the *Sherman*, Dec. 26, 1902, have also operated to hamper the operations of the Department. The supply of outstations has resulted in the development of schedules for the owned and chartered inter-island vessels; these are now running on carefully prepared time schedules, and give excellent satisfaction to all. One minor advantage worthy of note is the facility given to the postal authorities in providing mail service.

The list of accidents to owned transports during the year and to July 25th was as follows: *Ingalls*, grounded Nov. 22, 1902, near Legaspi, floated at high tide without serious damage; *Liscum*, collided Feb. 24, 1903, with junk at Shanghai, China, no damage; *Trenton*, steam lighter, lost Dec. 22, 1902, at Oroquieta, Mindanao, engine and boiler saved by crew; *Rafaelito*, small launch, beached Dec. 30, 1902, on coast of Samar, hull abandoned, engine saved. The *Sumner* struck a reef near Antimonan, July 4, 1903; was floated and sent to Hongkong for repairs, which involves the removal of fifty-two plates and several frames.

Seventeen launches were turned over to the Civil Government in February, 1903, as no longer required by the Army.

There have been numerous statements presented from year to year by the Chief Quartermaster giving certain data respecting the cost of operation of vessels owned by the Government and of those which were chartered; but none of these reports or statements went to the bottom of the subject or presented all the figures of cost of all the vessels of any stated class. In this year's report, the Chief Quartermaster supplied further data of the same kind, but it was unsatisfactory, because incomplete.

The inter-island transport service falls under the administrative supervision of the Division Commander, and towards the close of the fiscal year, he set himself to the task of obtaining the official figures of cost of this service; and reports were called for from all officers of the Quartermaster's Department who had possession of data that could elucidate the subject. To collect the statistics has been slow and difficult, for it was necessary to have returns from every vessel owned or hired, if of ten tons capacity or over.

With respect to all the chartered cargo boats, the data was required to be supplied with respect to each vessel under five heads as follows: tonnage, time in service, rate per day, cost of personnel, cost of coal and supplies. While with respect to the vessels of same class owned by the Government, the data had to give for each vessel its tonnage, value of coal and supplies, cost of repairs, cost of crew's service, and cost of subsistence issued to crew and others. As this is the first time any complete official data has ever been compiled in the Philippines, showing the entire cost of the Inter-Island Transport Service, it is all here submitted so that any one interested in the subject may see at a glance what the charge is against the Treasury for distributing the troops and their supplies in these Islands.

**Cost of Operation and Maintenance of Inter-Island Army
Transports; Division of the Philippines; Fiscal
Year Ending June 30, 1903.**

Table includes all craft ten tons freight capacity and over.
Owned by the Government.

NAME	Ton- nage 1	Fuel and Supplies 2	Repairs 3	Service 4	Steward's Depart- ment, and Rations. 5	Total.
TRANSPORTS						
Burnside	2190	\$27084.81	\$96223.64	\$59736.00	\$ 20485.55	\$ 203530.00
Ingalls	891	6131.95	21924.83	37342.04	22117.46	87516.28
Wright	871	16557.82	82714.53	30024.00	8601.92	137898.27
Liscum	1079	6717.85	115415.27	26636.04	7720.15	156489.31
Seward	1297	6388.48	7157.24	21671.96	9039.41	44257.09
STEAM LIGHTERS						
Custer	82	3679.30	8784.98	7300.96	566.76	20332.00
Sacramento	350	2096.12	19897.19	10452.36	1579.97	34025.64
Omaha	272	1419.23	15990.24	9929.57		27339.04
Kansas City	159	4884.17	21211.90	6430.44		32526.51
Syracuse	140	3977.26	12299.35	6424.00		22700.61
Indianapolis	272	1964.53	5616.01	4909.84		12490.38
* Trenton		462.50	1158.50	2106.60		3727.60
LAUNCHES						
† Guy Howard		1040.00	95.86	2516.00		3651.86
America		1937.98	4937.28	2228.34		9103.60
Blanche		814.79	1570.00	1123.50		3508.20
Boston		2099.59	890.24	2742.42		5732.25
Buffalo		802.03	1609.76	2355.67		4767.46
Beatrice		296.58	903.07	400.50		1600.15
California		1386.04	1614.39	2431.33		5431.76
† Charleston		957.23	120.03	2340.91		3418.17
Cleveland		2810.00	1259.89	2703.50		6773.39
Cartwright		1290.41	781.40	2732.15		4803.96
Des Moines		872.20	3914.91	3361.25		8147.36
Atlanta		618.82	3262.66	1473.83		5355.31
Florida		3216.41	2295.95	2718.34		8230.70
Grace		62.48	655.59	385.38		1103.45
Hercules		1106.98	2521.10	1652.50		5280.58
† Relief No. 2		297.53	469.56			767.09
Helena		1944.05	2124.78	2236.13		6304.96
† Julia		138.68	625.45	495.00		1259.13
† Johnny				265.00		265.00
Logan		647.99	814.58	772.33		2234.90
Lucille		425.77	242.12	524.16		1192.05
Louisville		2305.98	4497.91	2513.33		9317.22
† Mary		638.83	1179.10	958.67		2776.60
Marietta		1963.46	8181.34	2198.93		12343.73
Maurice		660.88	891.10	971.66		2523.13
Memphis		2004.50	5119.54	2652.59		9776.63
Napindan		2323.66	5143.65	4574.42		12041.73
Nashville		5263.11	3195.97	3207.24		11666.32
Natchez		5190.03	2290.32	3391.49		10871.84
Newport		230.799	5647.98	2878.34		10832.11
New Albany		1525.99	516.724	2701.08		6180.81
† Missouri		125.00		330.67		455.67

Vessels marked thus * have been wrecked.

Vessels marked thus † were transferred to Civil Government.

Vessels marked thus ‡ have been condemned and dropped, or are out of commission.

TABLE INCLUDES ALL CRAFT TEN TONS FREIGHT CAPACITY AND OVER. OWNED BY THE
GOVERNMENT.—CONTINUED.

NAME	Ton- nage 1	Fuel and Supplies 2	Repairs 3	Service 4	Steward's Depart- ment, and Rations. 5	Total.
Peterson.....		\$2334.38	\$3123.69	\$2062.34		\$7520.41
† Pittsburg.....		963.47	823.28	1884.67		3671.42
† Frankfort.....		1679.49		1815.84		3495.38
Powerful.....		1683.47	1785.35	3352.01		6820.83
Q. M. D.....		462.21	489.50	662.50		1614.21
† Relief No. 1.....		76.16	388.80	433.74		898.70
Reilley.....		4718.00	550.61	2989.83		8258.44
Rochester.....		1392.00	1524.83	2004.51		4921.34
Richmond.....		4206.76	7017.48	5893.92		17118.16
West Point.....		1898.00	406.89	4361.97		6666.86
Spokane.....		602.21	263.67	1112.40		1978.28
† Suerte.....		208.06	1210.61	1319.97		2738.64
Seattle.....		1840.36	3554.36	2201.50		7596.22
† San Antonio.....		1275.75	738.27	3622.54		5636.56
St. Paul.....		1855.48	5133.58	2099.59		9088.65
St. Louis.....		2383.75	798.03	2780.16		5961.94
† Walla Walla.....				1018.00		1018.00
† Leader.....		1489.05	4.61	2002.90		3496.56
New Orleans.....		1129.80	1749.33	1610.92		4490.05
Cheyenne.....		10650.00	26.91	3180.00		13856.91
† Ogden.....		5400.00	249.00	2750.00		8399.00
Taal.....		185.14	1569.63	596.33		2351.10
† Philadelphia.....		5964.29	393.35	2285.33		8642.97
† Lexington.....			34.30	45.33		79.63
† Sultana.....		4375.00	103.03	1390.00		5868.03
† Denver.....		666.00	139.82	787.81		1593.63
Chicago.....		600.50	1880.62	2117.50		4598.62
Columbia.....		2397.62	1123.70	2783.79		6305.11
Mobile.....		4054.12	215.05	3061.50		7330.67
* Rafelito.....		746.88		710.83		1457.71
† Troy.....		6864.00	72.62	2246.00		9182.62
Detroit.....		7800.00	402.50	3186.00		11388.50
Baltimore.....		11162.50	187.00	2915.00		14264.50
† Raleigh.....		714.50	869.13	2301.75		3885.38
Missoula.....		2941.51	1807.34	3570.00		8318.85
Scows and Row boats.			1083.56	80.00		1163.56
Bangor.....		1924.87	3337.43	4482.66		9744.96
15 Lorchas.....			10635.09	8356.20		18991.29
§ Coal Hulks.....	9200	7412.00	17261.41	9556.33		34229.74
Scows, Lighters, Cas- cos, Row boats, etc.		464.33	2724.45	4205.99		7394.77
Invoice Value of rations issued to employees on Launches, Cascos, Lorchas, etc.,					\$26,690.68	26690.68
						\$1,269,276.78

§ \$15,454 of the amount of repairs on three coal hulks was paid for in July, but work was done previous to June 30, 1903.

Vessels marked thus * have been wrecked.

Vessels marked thus † were transferred to Civil Government.

Vessels marked thus ‡ have been condemned and dropped, or are out of commission.

**Cost of Operation and Maintenance of Inter-Island Chartered
Transports, during Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1903.**

NAME	Ton- nage	Number days in service	Rate per day	Cost of Service, Repairs, Pay of Q. M., Agts. and Pilots	Cost of Coal, Water, Supplies, etc.	Total Cost
STEAMERS						
Ysla de Negros.....	250	365	\$125.00	\$ 1207.36	\$ 6615.70	\$ 53448.06
Lal-Loc.....	375	351	137.50	1232.57	8805.54	48300.61
Buen Vieje **.....	620	213	* *	750.88	4052.32	36733.20
Ibadan.....	798	343	185.00	1715.87	13083.67	78254.54
Columbia.....	560	273	137.50	1350.38	6575.13	45463.01
Formosa.....	800	288	200.00	1998.49	14070.84	72069.33
Hai-mun.....	1311	274	275.00	1260.31	13767.30	90377.61
Dr. Hans Jurg Kiaer.....	1020	346	190.00	1367.14	10087.40	77194.54
Legaspi.....	986	343	150.00	1395.41	14564.03	67409.44
Castellano.....	322	127	125.00	422.91	2634.54	18932.45
Salamanca.....	1385	82	190.00	450.39	945.36	16975.75
Hai Loong.....	1311	14	275.00	46.62		3896.62
Proteus.....	1020	256	190.00	1234.39	9390.45	59264.84
Sam Shui.....	269	349	100.00	1629.66	7686.58	44216.24
Butuan ††.....	502	128	† †	9.00	625.77	19749.77
Aeolus.....	497	283	160.00		7273.05	52553.05
N. S. del Carmen.....	306	278	125.00	1241.00	7074.08	43035.08
Borneo.....	150	365	50.00		6546.17	24796.17
Taganac.....	80	241	20.00		4909.50	9729.50
Don Engracio.....	185	3	200.00			600.00
Concord.....	248	103	70.00		1097.27	8307.27
SCHOONERS						
Mayo.....		117	45.00			5265.00
Peerless.....		123	50.00			6150.00
J. B. Leeds.....		120	45.00			5400.00
Dolores.....		110	60.00			6600.00
Mathilde.....		40	68.00			2620.00
F. de Maria.....		15	55.00			825.00
Cecilia.....		14	45.00			630.00
Loyola.....		24	65.00			1560.00
Lorchas from time to time during year.....					644.25	226324.96
Cascos during fiscal year.....						74299.03
						\$1,200,981.07

** The Buen Vieje, two days at \$140, and 211 days at \$150.

† † The Butuan, 89 days at \$160, and 39 days at \$125.

SUMMARY.

Cost of owned transports, launches, etc.....	\$1,269,276.78
Cost of chartered transports, schooners, lorchas, cascos, etc.	1,200,981.07
Half cost price of vessels wrecked.....	16,182.75

Labor, loading and unloading Inter-Island trans- ports, in Manila.....	24,970.69
Estimated labor loading, and unloading at out- side stations.....	24,970.69
Grand aggregate.....	<u>\$2,536,381.98</u>

There are various other minor expenses that were not capable of segregation from other accounts and definite determination; such as, part cost of the clerical force of the Depot, and the wages and keep of Officers and enlisted men who were sometimes detailed on these boats. But these figures for the cost of operation of the vessel owned omits a very important item of cost that would appear in the statement of a private company operating the boats; namely, the interest on the money invested, deterioration, and insurance.

The five owned transports have an aggregate gross tonnage of 6,409, and these boats had spent on them last year \$323,435 for repairs, or at the average rate of \$50 per gross ton. Assuming the value of the ship to be \$100 per ton, the total valuation would reach \$640,900.

The six steam lighters have a tonnage of 1,275 and cost last year for repairs \$83,799, or at the rate of a little more than \$65 per ton; but assuming the value of these boats to be only \$50 per ton, we get as the value of the steam lighters the sum of \$127,500. There are forty steam launches still in the service, and these are worth \$10,000 each, or a total for the 40 of \$400,000; counting the coal hulks (three) at \$5,000 each, adds to the total, \$15,000. The lighters, scows, lorchas, etc., owned by the Government are certainly worth not less than \$2,000 each; and they are sixty in number, \$120,000. These figures, which are only approximate, give a total valuation of \$1,303,400. If 15% be allowed for interest on capital, insurance, and depreciation, the resultant charge against maintenance is \$195,510. Adding this to the cost of operation as above stated; to wit, \$2,536,382, the total becomes \$2,731,892, which it has cost the United States to do the inter-island transportation; and this does not include the service between Manila, San Francisco, and New York.

If Congress will confer upon the Secretary of War the authority to make a contract for five years covering the island service—perhaps three years would answer—and the Government will advertise for and make award of this transportation, the vessel owners can afford to put on better steamers than now, and maintain regular schedules. The freight and passengers should be taken at the wharf in Manila, and the same landed at destination on the wharf or at the customary landing place; while vice versa, they should fetch to Manila and land on the wharf all the freight consigned to the latter port by all Philippine shipping quartermasters. This done, the Quartermasters will not need lighters or launches.

There is no probability that the number of troops in the Philippines will fall below 15,000 in a good many years; and the Government can very well afford to make contracts for a long term. This is done by the Engineers on River and Harbor work and is done by the Treasury Department, in the case of public buildings whose construction covers two or more years. If some such plan as this is adopted, there is little doubt that the Treasury will save a million dollars a year on transportation of troops and supplies within the Philippine Islands, and the service will be well but not luxuriously done.

A glance at the reports, appearing from time to time, of Quartermasters in charge of transports, will show that there is no lack of data to prove that the work is now done much cheaper than it could be by owners of private vessels; but it is believed that a compilation similar to the above with respect to the Oceanic Transport Service would give an object lesson as to what the Government is now paying to maintain a comparatively small military force in the Philippines. Great Britain once owned transports and operated them between home ports and her colonies; but after a very long and costly experience, England went out of the transport business, apparently forever.

The transport service of the United States as now conducted and as observed by the undersigned is a most costly luxury; but it is defended or excused on the ground of inexorable military necessity, which in his judgment does not exist.

LAND TRANSPORT.

The Chief Quartermaster remarks that loss of horses and mules throughout the Division has continued throughout the year, to such an extent as to cause grave concern; and to require him to recommend that shipments of draft animals from the United States be resumed at an early date. He calls attention to the fact in explanation of the losses that, while they are largely due to surra and glanders, many of the animals have been in use in this Division for four years or more, subjected to severe work over roads almost impassable and on very bad mountain trails.

The losses during the year have aggregated 4,702 horses and mules, leaving an aggregate of 8,007 in the Division for all purposes, among which losses still continue though less in numbers; but in view of the proposed reduction of the force, the undersigned suggests that the present supply of animals may suffice for some time to come.

The investigation of the causation, and prevention, control or cure of tropical animal diseases occupied during the year the principal part of the time of Major Ramsey D. Potts, Inspector General. Full reports of his investigation and of the action taken in respect to the matters presented have been forwarded to the Adjutant General of the Army.

Upon the recommendation of the undersigned, the War Department authorized the visit to India of a Board of Officers consisting of Brigadier General Wint and Major Ramsey D. Potts, Inspector General, for the purpose of studying the conditions existing in British India with respect to the so-called disease of "surra" which affects horses, mules, camels, and some other animals. The Board started in December, 1902, and returned the following April, having visited India,

Burmah, and Java. The report of this board on a disease which in two years destroyed not less than 5,000 military animals in the Philippines is a valuable contribution. It was forwarded to the War Department seven months since. The Board found that there did not exist in British India a military animal that was afflicted with the malady, which in former years had carried off tens of thousands of cavalry and transport animals annually in the same country. The reason assigned for this exemption is that all know the regions infected, and all such territory is avoided; or the grass fed to the stock is brought from meadows that are known to be unpolluted. Great care is also taken to see that the stock has no access to stagnant or swamp water. There is no instance known of a cure where the presence of surra parasite had been demonstrated; one distinguished officer remarked, "The bullet is the only remedy." If an animal is suspected of being afflicted, it is immediately isolated, and as soon as the disease is certainly identified the victim is destroyed.

A form of report made on a postal card the size of an official envelope, itself to be sent in the mails without wrapper or letter of transmittal, has been printed and distributed to every responsible officer. It is required that when any public animal dies from any cause, the responsible officer will fill out one of these cards that will give the life history of the case and drop the card in the mail. It is addressed to the Adjutant General of the Division who sends the cards to the Inspector General, where there is a veterinary surgeon on duty, whose business it will be to make record of all the facts elucidated; and under the supervision of the Inspector General to make such further critical investigations as may be required with a view to ascertain if possible which are the regions where the surra parasite is present, and how best to guard against infection.

The type of Army wagons issued here is various. It would seem that there should be but one type of Army or Escort wagon, one of low bodied Trucks, one of Ambulance,

one of Spring Wagon, one cart, and one water wagon; but it is certain that there are at least a half dozen kinds of some of these wagons in use, so when it comes to a question of obtaining spare parts for repairs, the variety of the materials seems to be almost infinite. There ought to be no more spare parts sent here after the present stock is expended save for the one adopted kind of each type.

The only railroad that serves an important military purpose is that extending from Manila to Dagupan. There are two important military stations being built on this line. The company owning the franchise is now engaged in extending the road to San Isidro and Cabanatuan, a distance of some 40 miles. This will be an important improvement and a great benefit to the military, should the occasion arise for operating in that region or north and east of it.

The Railroad Company very promptly responded to a request to put in a branch five miles long from the main line, for the service of Camp Stotsenberg.

In the Lanao country there must be troops for a long time. At present there are no civilized settlers in this rich and valuable country about the lake, but it will not be long before this section is brought under cultivation. The needs of the troops for transportation will probably be best met at first by means of the traction engine and later by the trolley—which will be a very valuable aid to the civilized settler. Such a road, starting from the coast near Iligan, should ascend the tableland, to the Lake; pass to the east of it and continue on south to Port Polloc, which is bound to be the most important center of trade in Mindanao. Further extensions of this road would traverse the valley of the Rio Grande. There are water powers conveniently located to supply the motive power. The Moros would do the work of grading, and supply cross ties; the metal work and rolling stock only would have to come from the exterior markets of the world.

It is hoped that the Quartermaster Department will soon be ready to furnish traction engines of approved type, for they will be needed at two or three localities for supply of the troops.

SUBSISTENCE.

At the beginning of the fiscal year there were on hand at the Depot in Manila, and stations throughout the Division, subsistence stores largely in excess of the requirements of the command, after the material reduction in number of troops during the year. Some action became necessary to dispose of a part of this excess by other means than regular issue. The surplus stores were submitted to action of an inspector and offered for sale in August and September, 1902. This and succeeding efforts in December, 1902, were unsuccessful. Finally, beginning April 8, 1903, auction sales were resorted to and netted the Government the sum of \$16,397.89. At present but a small quantity of the old stores remains on hand. The gross weight of supplies shipped by the depot commissary during the year amounts to 43,60,650 pounds, while only 20,956,006 pounds were received.

The regular schedules arranged for inter-island transports in October, 1902, greatly facilitated the supply of posts in the provinces. The installation of the Refrigerator boat "Seward" in October, 1902, and the "Wright" later, has permitted the distribution of fresh beef to nearly all posts in the islands at intervals of about two weeks.

During the year, there were purchased from the Insular Cold Storage and Ice Plant, 9,826,384 lbs. of ice at a total cost of \$49,144.76; the ice being used for issue to troops and preservation of subsistence stores. In addition to this, the Commissary Department has been furnished, since February, with ice from machines at different posts, formerly operated by the Medical Department.

On July 1, 1902, four warehouses were abandoned, effecting a monthly saving in rental of \$3625.00. During the year,

the force of employees at the Depot Commissary was decreased by 16 clerks and 106 laborers, effecting a monthly saving of \$2976.69.

The losses during the year at the Depot from deterioration have been \$80,047.37, principally in canned fruits. This was largely due to excessive quantities of stores on hand, some of which had been here for years; and inability to make sale of same. The average temperature in the storehouses during March, April, May and June, was 90° Far., at 2 p.m. and 89° Far., at 5 p.m. at the floors, and 5° higher at a height of 20 feet. Stores are not now piled so high as was necessary in former times. The Depot Commissary also issued 1,836,459 rations during the year.

Losses by damage and shortage as determined by Boards of Survey and Inspectors aggregated \$103,512.32, of which reclamation was recommended for \$5,481.13.

This Subsistence Depot is practically the grocery and butcher shop of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, located within fifteen miles of Manila. It is estimated that the average number of monthly purchasers is 4,500. This store also issues fresh meats to about 5,000 purchasers, commissaries to seven chartered transports, and provides the special diets for eleven hospitals.

During the year, losses by damage and shortage at the Sales Commissary, as determined by Boards of Survey, aggregated \$4,624.34, of which reclamation was recommended to the extent of \$1,690.77.

Sales during the year amounted to \$469,484.12, at an expense (including rental, salaries of commissary sergeants, transportation charges, and all other expenses) of less than 6% of that sum.

During the year, issues were made to native employees, paid from civil funds; native prisoners convicted of civil offenses; and Filipino destitutes. The total charges of this nature for the last three years amount to \$42,892.19 for which re-imbusement has not yet been made by the Insular Gov-

ernment. A claim has been presented by that Government for subsistence of Military prisoners in Bilibid penitentiary from April 1, 1901 to May 31, 1903, to the total amount of \$35,841.77. This claim has been forwarded to the Adjutant General, U. S. Army, for decision of the Comptroller as to whether it can be paid from subsistence funds.

The Department furnished 4,601,437 lbs. of rice in July, August, and September, 1902, at a total cost of \$67,515.13, for distribution to destitutes in Batangas and Laguna Provinces; and has been reimbursed for this amount. The Division Commander discontinued the issues of rice in Batangas on October 1, 1902.

The losses of stores by deterioration, shortage, etc., during the fiscal year, have amounted to \$344,279.03, largely due to the long storage of such articles. The principal losses from deterioration were in canned fruits, issue bacon, canned vegetables, and fresh potatoes.

The issue of the emergency ration has been suspended by the Division Commander. The large majority of these stores in the Division are the "Standard" ration, which does not seem to have good keeping qualities. The ration adopted by the Board of Officers appointed by the Secretary of War is on hand in comparatively small numbers. It is believed that the forced use of the ration will create a prejudice against it.

Through the assistance of the Navy Department, the Fresh Beef supply of the Division for the year was purchased in Australia and brought to Manila by Navy Supply vessels. The beef has been uniformly good, and except the last cargo was all furnished in hind quarters. In September, 1902, proposals were issued for purchase of beef in slings at ships' side in Manila of fore and hind quarter meat. A contract has been entered into for the coming year, the beef to be furnished from the Argentine Republic. The fresh vegetable supply during the past year has been very satisfactory. Larger losses than usual have occurred during the warm weather, near

the close of the fiscal year, due to the fact that the potatoes were old and that the temperature was excessive. Contracts for fresh vegetables have been made for the ensuing year at slightly reduced prices.

Next year's contract for space in the Cold Storage and Ice Plant is for a reduced area of one fifth, but the unit price is the same, as it is also for ice purchased. The total expense for beef storage will therefore be one fifth less than last year.

There have been presented a good many requests that the Scout ration be increased. The matter was very carefully considered, and the conclusions of the Division Commander on this subject will be found under the title "Native Scouts."

The Chief Commissary's administration of his department has been entirely satisfactory to the undersigned, but his acts have been criticized by some officers, because he was not disposed to violate the law and regulations in respect to the condemnation of stores that were not perfectly fresh.

The subject was very carefully investigated and the action of the Chief Commissary was sustained. Colonel Sharpe's efforts have been untiring to produce the highest efficiency of his Department, and to supply the command with suitable food in the most economical manner.

The following was filed on July 24, 1903, by the undersigned, with one of the many complaints; the writer urging that all stores on hand six months be condemned regardless of the condition:

"MEMORANDUM."

"It goes without saying that food supplies of any kind a long time in store will deteriorate. Sometimes the loss is in nutritive value, or when chemical changes have resulted in decay, oxidation, or fermentation; but sometimes the injury only touches matters of taste or flavor; i. e., acceptability, without any material impairment of the value of the food as a nourishment.

Bacon may be rancid; i. e., decayed and offensive to the taste or smell, or both—and have thus become noxious as food—or it may be infested with parasities which injure only special parts, leaving the remainder unimpaired in nutritive value and in taste. Flòur and rice

may be mouldy or what is called musty and really bad, or simply unacceptable. It may be infested with insects, but after cleaning by sifting, etc., will often make as good and wholesome food as when just from the mill.

Canned goods may be decayed and noxious, or merely off in appearance, etc., but not in nutritive value. Some persons prefer mouldy cheese to that which is fresh; and in the cold storage warehouses in the States are constantly kept thousands of pieces of meat that are covered with green mould, and this because such meat is preferred by users to that taken from fresh carcasses.

Stores that are actually bad or impaired in nutritive value are always segregated from the others by the Commissaries, and condemned by the Inspector; but as to the stores of the other class, those referred to by General Lee, as not positively bad but simply deficient in freshness, the duty of the Commissaries, the Captains, Colonels, and Generals, is to issue them as required by Army Regulations and law. If unfit stores are issued, the doctors and others will quickly interpose.

Frequently in the past a bad sack of flour, box of bread, piece of bacon or can of something, has been found among the stores issued, but this has excited no special remark, and has never been the basis of wholesale denunciation of the rations; but here in the Philippines it is not surprising that the proportion of stores which are not perfectly fresh is greater than the troops have been accustomed to in the past at home. To that extent their complaints have a certain justification.

In eleven months last year, the money value of the stores issued to troops was \$1,239,086. During the same time the money value of surplus stores sold and those condemned as unfit reached \$389,256. The government paid for ice to preserve fresh meat in transit and for issue to troops the sum of \$63,172, or an average of \$315 per company and band organization, white troops. The above figures measure in a graphic way the result of the effort of the government to exclude what is noxious from the sales and issue stores, and to issue only wholesome food.

Another reason for complaint is in my opinion, due to a disposition not infrequently seen to scold, find fault, and force the government, if possible, to concede unreasonable demands. The complainants, or some of them, appear to consider that it is not for the government to consider the cost at all of the Army subsistence.

Not a word is said in Army Regulations, 1901, about the allowance of ice to the troops. General Orders, No. 129, and cable instructions of February 4, 1903, from the Secretary of War, require that when ice machines are furnished, the product may be issued to troops and others after the hospital and commissary are supplied. This is the only mention of ice found in the Regulations or in General Orders since the

publication of the edition on May 1, 1901; yet the clamor for issues according to a lavish scheme seems to presuppose a belief in the existence of some vested right or fixed allowance. This is unreasonable, and commanding officers should put a stop to the clamor.

The government favors the troops in the tropics by allowing the surplus made by ice machines, after hospitals and the commissaries are supplied, to be issued to organizations. Some of the complainants about rations seems to have the idea that no matter where the troops are, at Camp Vicars or Aparri for instance, the government must supply ice to those garrisons to cool water for drinking, no matter what the cost or trouble. It would probably be *possible* to put enough teams on the road to actually deliver a hundred pounds of ice each day to each of the 7 companies at Camp Vicars. It is not doubted that it would be *possible* to haul frozen beef daily to Camp Vicars and to keep it iced en route, so that the full allowance could be daily issued to the troops there; but it is unreasonable to expect the government to do that.

There are now two transports running exclusively for the purpose of supplying fresh beef, and there are very few posts that do not receive at least six days' issue monthly.

The commissary beef stew is used constantly in Manila, where we have no difficulty in obtaining fresh beef every day. The troops can have the stew *ad libitum* at every post. The troops have never been so well fed in the Philippines as they were the last fiscal year; but there have been hundreds more of complaints about the ration this year than there were ever before, and none of these have come from the troops in the field in Mindanao. It would appear that the more done to improve the ration, the more complaints.

It is the exception for the troops to be without fresh vegetables, yet a perusal of some of these complaints would warrant a supposition by one not well informed that to supply vegetables was the exception. If the troops were worked more; were drilled say four hours a day; if they had to do what the Germans and Russians and Italians and Japanese soldiers, and the Dutch in Java do, as respects drill and physical exercise; they would be hungry three times a day, and the food which they now find fault with would be acceptable.

Many of the troops here are idle nearly all the time; their drills on the average, only reaching an hour or two a day; and sometimes only a half hour. The troops on the Lanao campaign hardly had a fresh vegetable from April 1 to July, 1902, and they were performing the hardest duty in mud, sun and rain; and yet the Commanding General, who was present in the field with the men on the march and in their

camps and discomfort much of the time, hardly heard a murmur in way of complaint; but men at some other stations who have done almost absolutely nothing beyond guard duty and trifling drills are constantly complaining about rations."

P.S.—I have just seen, since the above was written, copy of General Orders, No. 82, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, dated June 9, 1903.

HEALTH.

The report of the Chief Surgeon is thus summarized:

The establishment of larger concentrated stations throughout the Archipelago, and abandonment of most of the remote, small posts has had a salutary effect on the health of the troops serving in the Division. The housing of the troops in commodious, well constructed barracks, on well considered sites, with good water, good drainage, and satisfactory disposals of the various waste products, will exercise a markedly beneficial influence on the health of the troops.

The health of the command during the last year does not show a gain over the preceding year; but rather a decline, the percentage of constant sickness being 7.37 as compared with 6.90 the preceding year. This higher rate is in part due to the epidemic of cholera which has raged throughout the Archipelago during most of the year; and in part to the exposure and hard field service of the troops in Mindanao; the sick rate in that Department averaging about one per cent higher than in the other two departments.

The comparison of the death rates during the two years shows a gain over the preceding year, aside from the cases of cholera; deaths per thousand being for this year from all causes, 21.86 as compared with 20.56 for the preceding year; but excluding deaths from cholera, the rates per thousand become for the year just closed, 12.86 as compared with 18.90 for the preceding year.

The Cholera epidemic began in Manila, March 20, 1902, and spread rapidly, despite prompt efforts towards prevention and control as reported in last annual report. By June 15th,

there had occurred among the troops 68 fatalities in 116 cases; among the civilians and natives, 5,390 fatalities in 7,317 cases. During the preceding year, the total number of deaths was 224 from 361 cases; and by months beginning with the month ending July 15, 1902, the deaths were as follows: 54, 51, 19, 8, 20, 13, 24, 8, 1, 6, 11, 13. In August, Panay was invaded; in October, Mindanao at Iligan; and later the entire Island and the Sulu Archipelago. In Manila, the disease subsided in October; and in February, the quarantine was removed; but the disease broke out again soon after, though not in such violence.

In nearly every instance in which cholera has appeared among troops, it has been possible to trace the outbreaks to neglect or direct disobedience of standing sanitary orders.

Ninety-one of the deaths occurred among the Philippine Scout companies.

The reports of the Board of Health of Manila show that up to June 15th, the reported cases and deaths from the outbreak of the epidemic were as follows:

Manila.....	4,967 cases.....	3,825 deaths.
Provinces.....	136,075 ,,	86,572 ,,
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total.....	141,042 ,,	90,379 ,,

The disease was, however, more prevalent and fatal than these figures indicate.

Small-pox has prevailed to considerable extent among the natives throughout the Archipelago; but the troops have suffered only slightly, five deaths being reported. In March, the issue of G. O. No. 17, Headquarters of the Division, enforced vaccination on all incoming troops before landing in the Islands.

Typhoid Fever is given as the cause of twenty-three deaths during the year, of which about one-half occurred during the four months, December to March inclusive.

BERI-BERI.

During the year the Philippine Scouts have suffered severely from this disease, which is not so well known as it should be, and doubtless will be shortly, under the careful studies that are being made by those officers under whose observation it comes. Most of our Medical Officers attribute its onset to a defective dietary with excess of carbohydrates in the form of rice, and deficiency of proteids; and recommend a lessening of rice in the ration, addition of wheat and corn flour, and increase in meat and bean components. Lt. Colonel Adair, Chief Surgeon, Department of Mindanao, expressed the opinion, derived from observation of an outbreak of beri-beri at Zamboanga immediately following the cholera, that the exclusion of fruits and vegetables from the native dietary was an important predisposing cause of the disease. This observation is corroborated by the experience of the 39th and 44th companies of Scouts at Iloilo, in which companies in about a month after the cholera quarantine was put into effect, cutting off the supplies of vegetables and fruit, about a third of the force was affected by beri-beri.

It seems also to be infectious, more through infection of a locality, than from man to man; removal to a new locality frequently is all that is required; while occupation of, or return to an infected barrack, where no fault existed except that in some places the floor was too close to the ground, caused outbreak or recurrence of the disease. This case occurred at Cauayan, Isabela, in March, 1903.

The Board of Officers, General Wint, president, which investigated surra and other tropical diseases in India during last winter, reported June 8, 1903; from which report are extracted the following notes on beri-beri, here quoted in full:

“Beriberi has been known from early times, being first introduced into medical nomenclature by Bontins in 1645. There are numerous sources from which the name possibly is derived, the most likely being the Singalese word “*beri*” or “weakness” “beriberi” meaning “great

weakness". It is also termed the "bad sickness of Ceylon," and "the sleeping sickness of Africa"; although the authorities seem doubtful whether the last mentioned is the same disease.

Beriberi prevails endemically in India, Burma, and the whole of the Malayan peninsula. Though there have been no cases amongst the troops in several years, in that portion of India or Burma visited by the Board; nor had the medical officers now stationed at those garrisons had any experience with it. In Java, however, the board found the disease existed among the troops as epidemic. Great difficulty was experienced in eliciting the necessary information from the Dutch officials, who generally were unable to speak English. Dr. Fock in charge of the Base Hospital at Batavia, and a thesis by Dr. Bentley, furnished the following data: That the causes of beriberi are not generally understood. That as a rule the number of admissions to hospital in rainy season is augmented. That certain length of residence in a prison was essential for its production, but as the disease developed, this period became more curtailed. That damp and moisture unquestionably was a strong auxiliary to the disease. That any influence which tends to depress or lower the vital or resisting powers of the system, impoverish the blood, etc., may be among the causes of the disease. That it was a very rare thing for a woman or a boy under twenty to be attacked with it. That it was very much more common amongst the natives than among Europeans; and a certain period of residence in an infected locality appears to be necessary for its production. Overcrowded and badly ventilated rooms, the condition of soil, physical exhaustion and mental depression, are alleged predisposing causes.

Dr. Bentley is of the opinion that the six agents chiefly considered in the production of beriberi in recent times are: diet, impure water, damp and moisture, exposure to cold, and great alterations of temperature, and malaria.

Further he states "that this disease is not caused by any particular diet is clearly proven by the fact that all classes of individuals are liable to contract it, natives or Europeans, whether under favorable or unfavorable circumstances as regards food. It has occurred to persons when exposed to its influences, who have had the same diet all their lives; in free men who have had a choice of diet; in European officers as well as men; and in natives working on their own account, living in quarters of their own selection. Yet the history and progress of the outbreak of the disease in the prison in Singapore in June, 1880, shows conclusively that the diet has been a cipher in its production. That the most satisfactory results were obtained by largely increasing the amount of nitrogenous foods and decreasing the carbohydrates. In Java no rice is supplied the patients; but wheaten flour, steak and a kind of black bean are the principal food furnished."

The authorities there are of the opinion that while the diet has nothing to do with the cause of the disease, it is possible that its poverty in respect to its nitrogenous constituents may predispose the blood of the native soldiers to the reception of the poison, whatever the peculiarity of that virus may yet be discovered to be.

Of the five causes mentioned above, Dr. Bentley is of the opinion that all may be eliminated as having any direct bearing on the disease, except "damp and moisture" and "exposure to cold". Damp and moisture in the tropics being conditions synonymous with malaria, there being few instances where the two are not found together; for in well drained districts malaria is almost absent. There can be but little doubt that without these conditions (damp and moisture), the existing cause of beri-beri could not exist, hence the authorities hold that this is a strong proof of the malarious origin of the disease. But as the presence of a parasite similar to malaria has not yet been discovered, this theory is purely speculative. Observations show that exposure to cold or night air may be the cause of bringing on an attack of beriberi in those who are already in a low state of health; but whether this could be brought about and a cause of true beriberi produced without the presence of the poison is a doubtful question.

The Board was informed by Dr. Fock that it was almost invariably true, when the patients were sent to the Hill Hospital and a nitrogenous food supplied to them they began to improve immediately; and provided that they reached there when the disease was in its early stage, recovery in a few weeks was almost sure. Some, however, being attacked in remote districts, and the authorities being unable to transport them before some time elapsed, had fewer chances of recovery.

In addition to the foregoing, the following data was obtained from the "Report on Beriberi by Dr. Geo. M. Giles" published in Assam in 1890. He is convinced from his experience with beriberi or *kala azar*, (as it is named in Assam), that whatever the latter may be called elsewhere, the disease so-called in Gauhati Assam was undoubtedly a *chylostomiasis*. This information was deduced from post mortem examinations, and cases under treatment over a period of eight months. He considers malarial complications as of secondary importance. That it is an epidemic disease and is due to the action of a parasite organism (*anchylostoma*). Speaking in connection with the spread of the disease, another point remains to be considered, and this is the strong belief in its contagiousness, which belief is founded on the undisputed fact that when once a case appears in a village, it is followed by another—in other words, the disease spreads. This tendency is often noticed in members of the same family, one after another contracting the disease; while a large family living close by the infected one would be entirely free from

it; which fact certainly points to contagion. He is of the opinion that climatic influences have no effect upon the disease, because the outbreak does not attack a large number of people at once or nearly so; but that the disease always attacks a few inhabitants in a village, and then spreads very slowly. No hearsay or instance of a European becoming infected in Assam.

Probably in no two cases is the rate of infection uniform or similar, and the spread from man to man in a village must necessarily be equally irregular and uncertain for the individual, though inevitable for a considerable proportion of a village population. The rate and method of spread are in fact just what we find in *kala azar*, and are necessarily entirely different from the phenomena to be observed in directly infective disease, such as specific fevers.

In *anchylostomiasis*, the infection is indirect, and mere contact and association with a patient are quite incompetent to transmit the disease; whereas in ordinary communicable diseases the infection is direct and there is usually no difficulty in tracing its source. It was undoubtedly with the phenomena of direct contagion, such as these, alone in their minds, that previous observers of *kala azar* or beriberi have so confidently stated that there was no evidence in favor of its contagiousness, and, so limited, their deduction was perfectly correct. In reality, however, *anchylostomiasis*, for people in a low grade of civilization, is one of the most infectious of all maladies, taking the word in its broadest sense of communicability; and the methods of its spread coincide exactly with the facts observed in connection with the spread of *kala azar*. It is also noted that once the disease has made its appearance in a district, it never leaves; the weekly returns of the prevalence of epidemic diseases showing it to be present to-day in every part of the country where it has been hitherto reported. During Dr. Giles' tour in Assam, large numbers of specimens of drinking water were searched microscopically for *dochmius ambros*, but without success. However, after many experiments, Dr. Giles is convinced that the surface of the soil near dwellings offers by far the most favorable situation for the development of the parasite; hence in entering his hut and moving about among his neighbors, the inhabitant of the infected village must always be getting his feet covered with mud, (Assam being essentially muddy) which is absolutely teeming with infective embryos. In the house, there are many ways in which the parasite may gain access to the alimentary canal. For instance: Food is always eaten, squatting on the ground with at most a bit of seldom-cleaned matting as at once table and tablecloth. Under these circumstances, a certain amount of the dirt of the floor is certain to get into the dish at each meal. Thus on account of the broadcast

way in which the infective embryos are scattered about, and the impossibility of often recognizing the place where they are to be found, the use of chemical infection is out of the question, but the three following facts are worth nothing:

1. Prolonged exposure to the direct rays of the sun kills the embryos.
2. Same result may be had by exposing them to temperature exceeding 140° F.
3. Burying the embryos kills them.

Dr. Giles further states, with proper sanitary precautions and the measures recommended below, carried out with sufficient efficiency, there should be no trouble in stamping out the disease. The measures recommended are as follows:

1. The adoption and enforcement of some simple system of conservancy.
2. Migration from infected sites when practicable; the disinfection of infected sites when practicable; the disinfection of infected sites by measures above described when migration is not possible.
3. The improvement of water supply where this is at present unsatisfactory.
4. The clearing and drainage of ground included in village sites wherever practicable.

DYSENTERY.

One hundred and twelve deaths from this disease occurred during the year, of which nearly three-fourths originated in the camp and road guards of workmen from Malabang to Camp Vicars.

Experience has demonstrated that amoebic dysentery, once chronic in the tropics, can rarely be cured; and that unquestionably it is for the best interests of both the government and the patient to make an early transfer to a temperate zone where convalescence is more rapid, and the prospects of an ultimate cure are increased.

MALARIAL FEVERS.

These fevers have been troublesome, but not dangerous. Their influence has been reduced by systematic campaigns against mosquitoes, where this pest is numerous, and use of

mosquito bars for the same purpose. Attention is invited to Circular No. 14, Headquarters of the Division, March 26, 1903, to the above effect.

PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS.

Nine deaths during the year are attributed to this disease; 7 occurring during the first six months. All recently diagnosed cases have been at once transferred to the United States, as the chances of favorable ending in this climate are so small.

ALCOHOLISM.

The effect of alcoholism on the sick report seems to be less in this Division than in the stations in the States, and it is hoped its influence will be less under the Act of the Commission passed March 28, 1903, in enforcing the removal of saloons from the vicinity of large posts.

VENEREAL DISEASES.

It is believed that no marked change has occurred in the prevalence of these diseases. They hold the first place among all diseases as regards relative prevalence. The semi-monthly inspections of the men have been of marked value in effecting an early recognition of the disease and an early treatment. The affected women are reached with difficulty, for all efforts to effect their removal from the locality rests with the municipal authorities, who are not always as energetic as they might be.

The monthly report of sick and wounded from Dagupan attracted the attention of the Chief Surgeon of the Division on account of the large number of venereal cases reported. Sixty-nine were treated in hospital during the month and 41 of these were venereal cases. On February 12, 1903, a letter was sent to the post surgeon, inquiring concerning the excessive prevalence. He replied that the inspections directed by G. O., 101, Hdqrs. Div. of Philippines, series 1901, were carefully made on the 5th and 20th of each month; and any soldier found seriously infected was placed promptly under treatment.

On reporting for duty at this station on Dec. 30, 1902, he was struck by the unusual prevalence of these diseases, and on investigations he found the town filled with women, of the lowest orders—natives and Japanese. He learned the names and residence of many of the infected women; and called upon the municipal presidente, through the commanding officer of the post, to have these women sent away from the town. After the inspections of February, he found a few cases and again communicated with the Presidente, urging him to carry into effect the town ordinances with regard to these prostitutes. The commanding officer issued a post order forbidding soldiers from entering native shacks; and twenty convictions by Summary Court were shortly afterwards made for violation of this order. Nevertheless, the disease continued to prevail, and the report of May showed 29 venereal cases remaining from April; and 27 new cases admitted during the month; making a total of 22 per cent of the command infected. The mean strength for the month was 252 men, and the constantly sick from venereal diseases was 9.09 per cent of this strength.

From the report of a Board of Officers, Brigadier General T. J. Wint, president, appointed by S. O., 297, Dec. 4, 1902, to examine into and report upon various subjects, pertaining to the military administration in India, Burma, and Java, the following concerning venereal disease is submitted:

“The board has referred to a number of official and other reports and publications bearing upon the subject of the prevalence of venereal diseases in the British Army, in India, and the following data was collected: It is estimated that 13,000 soldiers return to England from India annually, and of these in 1894, sixty per cent had suffered from some form of venereal disease. It has been shown that in 1894, only 37 per cent of the British troops in India had never suffered from any form of venereal disease; that 28 per cent had been treated for syphilis, and of late years, there has been a rapid increase in the frequency of both the the primary and secondary forms of syphilis. The latest statistics obtainable by the board were taken from a report of a committee appointed by the Secretary of State of the English Government to examine the returns and report what changes, if any, had taken place during recent years in the prevalence of such disease in India. The report discloses the most deplorable state of things.

In the year 1895, an average of 45 men per one thousand or 3,300 in a force of 71,031 British soldiers in India were constantly in hospital for venereal diseases. Even these figures, striking as they are, do not include many cases which have been treated out of the hospital and which therefore do not appear in the returns. Again a large number of men who are nominally cured are only fit for service under peace conditions, and would break down on field service. Among 5,822 men detailed for field service with the Citral Relief force, 462 or nearly 8 per cent had to be rejected for venereal diseases; 279 more or an additional $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent had to be transferred from the field hospitals to the base for the same cause. On the basis of 8 per cent rejected before starting on field service; and $4\frac{1}{2}$ % more, subsequently invalidated for disease; 8,800 men out of a total force of 71,031 would have to be put down as useless from this one cause for field operations.

Of the enormous total of 522 venereal cases per 1000 troops, syphilis contributed nearly one-half, that is 259 cases per 1000, a figure many times greater than the highest record in the statistics of continental armies of recent years, either at home or abroad.

Among European forces, the average ratio of admission during the three years 1890-1892, for the graver form of disease, varied from 5.5 per thousand in the German Army to 14.8 in the Dutch Army. In the British Army in India it was 175.4 and has since risen to 259 per thousand. In the Dutch India force it was 47 per thousand, but this is a diminishing rate, whereas in the British Army in India, the rate has very greatly increased.

In summing up their inquiries as to the year 1895, the committee reports: "Venereal diseases directly caused more than 113 of the total amount of sickness; 15 deaths in India, 348 invalidings; resulting in 130 cases in final discharge from the service; the constant and total disablement of 3,200 out of a force of 71,000; and a vast amount of partial disablement and unfitness for any but routine duties indirectly increased the amount of sickness and invaliding under the head of many other complaints. That the military efficiency of the Army was most seriously impaired; and the increasing prevalence and intensity of contagious and inheritable diseases among a body of 71,000 men of whom many mingle with the civil population, was a growing danger to the health of the community; and concludes by calling attention to the terrible effect on the public health of the United Kingdom which the absorption of such a force among the civil population at home must tend to produce."

The report of the Chief Surgeon of the Division does not contain a statement of the ratio which the number of sick

with venereal disease bears to the whole command. He does, however, give the percentage for one post, the appalling figures of 9.09 per cent. If this rate applied to all the troops serving in the Philippines, then there must be about 2,000 constantly sick.

That the disease is much more prevalent among the inhabitants of the Philippines than before the American occupation is frequently remarked.

During the six months, October, 1902, to March, 1903, inclusive, no battle casualty of a fatal character was reported. From fatal accidents, including gun shot wounds, homicides and drowning, the casualties number thirty for the year; and those reported as suicides numbered twelve.

Considerable repairs have been made to the First Reserve Hospital in the city of Manila. During the year the movement of sick through this hospital is shown in the tabulation following:

Patients.	
In hospital, July 1, 1902.....	255
Cases received.....	3587
	<hr style="width: 10%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>
Returned to duty.....	1727
Died.....	72
Transferred to other hospitals.....	736
Transferred to United States.....	973
Discharged.....	14
Otherwise disposed of.....	38
	<hr style="width: 10%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>
Remaining.....	281
 3842
 3560

Personnel.

	Med. Off.	H. Corps.	Nurses		Civ. Emp.
			Fem.	Male	
July 1, 1902.	9	109	38	2	38
May 31, 1903.	8	106	32	1	36

In Ward No. 1, were treated 378 cases of eye, ear, nose, and throat troubles, besides 1,172 out-patients in the same troubles.

In Ward No. 2, the surgical ward, 571 cases were admitted, and in 199 of them surgical intervention was necessary; seven of these cases died, two from liver abscess, and one each from appendicitis, gunshot wound of the intestines, sarcoma of the intestines, tuberculosis and tetanus.

In Ward No. 3, cases treated reached 863, with 14 deaths.

Ward No. 6 was the convalescent ward, and wards 7 and 8 the Officers' ward. In the latter two wards, 217 cases were treated.

The hospital has continued its pathological and bacteriological work, and also the work of the Sanitary Chemical Laboratory.

The convalescent hospital, Corregidor, is excellently situated. During the 11 months ending May 31, 1229 patients were here treated; of these 511 were returned to duty; 25 transferred to other hospitals, and 531 to the United States; 21 were discharged; 9 died; and 132 remained for treatment, June 1st. The personnel consists of 3 officers, 50 Hospital Corps Men, and 6 female nurses.

The Nozaleda Hospital, established Dec. 18, 1901, for venereal diseases and pulmonary tuberculosis was broken up Jan. 21, 1903.

Hospital No. 4 was established April 3, 1902, in some unoccupied buildings at Santa Mesa Barracks, but was later transferred to Hospital Tents near the Small-Pox Hospital, the two constituting a military pest hospital. The cases treated during the 11 months ending May 31st, were four officers, (with one death from cholera); 119 enlisted men with 38 deaths, (37 from cholera and 1 from variola); 20 enlisted men with 7 deaths (all of cholera).

The high mountain plateau of Benguet Province, visited by the Division Commander, offers sites admirably close up somewhat situated to the establishment of a hospital where the conditions of the temperate zone will be found all the

year through. This locality will meet the same necessity for these Islands that Dahrgeeling and Simla do for India, or that Buetenzorg and many other hill stations do in Java.

The Baguio weather reports show that the mean, as well as the maximum and minimum, temperatures are about twenty degrees Fahrenheit lower than prevail at Manila, although for a part of the year there will be more dampness in the mountains.

A reconnoissance was made of Mariveles Mountain which is in plain sight of Manila, in the hope of finding a suitable locality for a hospital or sanitarium that would be more accessible than Baguio. The party found the mountain top to be over 4,000 feet elevation, but there was no water supply above two thousand feet, and no suitable ground for the buildings at any level.

ENGINEERING.

A considerable quantity of new map work has been accomplished during the year in the offices of the Chief Engineer and of Department Engineers. New maps have been made of the entire Archipelago: Mindanao; Lake region in Mindanao; Malahi Island; Cuyo Islands; Jolo Island; each of the three Departments; of Cebú Harbor approaches; Iloilo Harbor; Cagayan River, Luzon; Province of Ambos Camarines; Province of Bataan; Province of Rizal; five sheets of inch map of Luzon. Many corrections and additions have been made to old maps, bringing them up to about the following state of progress:

Luzon:—West coast south of Lingayen, the central portion extending east to the divide, and Cavite, Laguna, and Batangas Provinces mapped accurately on scale of one inch to mile; Southern peninsula and Cagayan Valley fairly mapped; and remainder of Island poorly mapped.

Mindoro:—Northeast coast and Paluan bay; also the southwestern part from Mangarin to Bula Cacas (an area of about 250 square miles made by the 2d Battalion Engineers) well mapped.

Panay:—Entire Island accurately mapped, but not contoured.

Cebú:—A map extending across the Island and embracing about one third of territory recently made by Co. F, Engineers, contoured at 200 feet intervals, made very accurate. Remainder of Island mapped very poorly.

Samar:—New map has been started; nothing being used except such as is obtained from American sources.

Bohol, Leyte, and Negros:—Poorly mapped. Existing maps reported as wholly unreliable.

Mindanao:—New map spoken of in last year's report has been divided into five sections, and has been greatly added to from notes and sketches made by officers and men of 2d Battalion of Engineers, other officers of the Army, and Coast and Geodetic charts. Outlines of Island seem reliable, but main topography except such as above derived, quite unreliable.

In addition, numerous maps have been made by Engineer officers and soldiers, of military reservations for new posts, for fortifications, of old fortifications, and Spanish ports or harbors, etc.; and special reports have been secured from the same sources on coal deposits of Batan Island, projects for river and harbor and fortification works.

During the year, several thousand blue prints have been made and issued, over 1500 of which were Census maps prepared for General Sanger in charge of that Bureau.

The entire 2d Battalion of Engineers was on duty in the Division throughout the year until June 6th, when Companies G and H, were relieved by Companies I and K, of the 3d Battalion.

During the entire year, two companies have been on duty in the present department of Luzon; and two companies in the present department of Mindanao until November, 1902, since which date, one company has been on duty in each of the two Departments of Visayas and Mindanao. The duties of the troops have consisted in road and bridge building; exploration and location of trails; reconnoissance; road sketch-

ing; map making; hydrographic, topographic, and land surveying; photography; wharf building; superintendence of building of posts, barracks and quarters; and other engineering work. Such troops as have not been engaged in actual field work have been instructed in Infantry and Engineer duties and photography.

Some of the most important work done under direction of Engineer officers and men during the year is as follows:

Lieuts. Pillsbury and Caples with 30 men, road and bridge work, surveying and laying out new post sites in Batangas.

Lieut. Lukesh with four men, superintending road and bridge work in Cagayan Valley.

Lieut. Lytle Brown with 11 men, surveying mouth of Cagayan River, and preparing plans and estimate for improvement of port of Aparri.

Lieuts. Markham, Lukesh, and Rand with 30 men, surveying and laying out post, building roads, wharf and storehouse at Ft. William McKinley, under direction of Capts. Hart and Cosby.

Lieut. Hannum with 10 men, surveying for fortifications of Cebú.

Lieut. Pillsbury with 12 men, surveying for fortifications at entrance to Manila Bay.

Lieut. Woodruff with 13 men, exploring Mariveles reservation with view to securing a site for a high level recuperation station.

Topographical surveys for military reservations at following sites: near Los Baños; Santo Tomas; Calamba; Angeles; Arayat; lands in Manila; near Bayambang; Malahi Island; Calbayog; near Santa Cruz; Corregidor Island; Mariveles; Iloilo; Guimaras Island; near Laguan, Samar; at Jolo; at Zamboanga; at Malabang; at Iligan; at Camp Overton, near Iligan; at Camp Vicars; Dumaguete; Ormoc.

Lieut. Otwell, engaged in construction of wharf at Calbayog.

Lieut. Dent with Company F, surveying and laying out post of Camp Jossman, and constructing road from that post to bay.

Lieut. Spalding with 3 men, supervising construction of wharf for new post of Camp Jossman.

Lieut. Peek with 15 to 21 men, constructing road from Cottabato to Parang, and building wharf at Parang.

Lieut. Fries with 30 men, completing wharf at Zamboanga.

Lieuts. Fries and Hannum with 12 men, constructing wharf at Jolo.

Lieut. Mitchell with 4 men, constructing wharf at Camp Overton.

Capt. Morrow, Lieuts. Brown and Dent with F, and G, Companies, supervising construction of Malabang-Vicars road.

Capt. Morrow, Lieuts. Rand, Pillsbury, and Mitchell, with about 40 men, supervising construction of Iligan-Lanao Road, and erection Pantar suspension bridge.

Capt. Jervey has served as superintendent of lighthouse construction under the Civil Government, and Capt. McGregor until his death, as sanitary Engineer for the Archipelago and City Engineer of Manila.

The work of these troops has been of a high grade and valuable to the Civil Government as well as to the Military.

Improvement of the Port of Manila is under way as follows in brief:

1st. Completion of (old Spanish) breakwater, and its extension to 30 foot contour (about 750 feet of extension).

2d. Construction of detached breakwater 3,000 feet long, extending in a southwesterly direction from a point near the outer end of the west breakwater.

3d. Construction of watertight bulkhead along the 12 foot contour, approximately parallel to shore west of walled city; and extension of short breakwater (about 875 feet extension) to intersection with this bulkhead. This will reclaim about 148 acres, to be filled with dredged material to $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet above mean low water.

4th. Dredging of 18-foot channel parallel to west breakwater, and small inner basin affording connection from deep water in harbor through a canal to Pasig River.

5th. Dredging of an area of about 350 acres, between breakwater and bulkhead, to a depth of 30 feet, to afford an anchorage for deep draft vessels.

The amount available is \$4,029,000 U. S. currency, under Act 22, U. S. Philippine Commission, and two later amendments. The work is being executed under contract with the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Company, of New York and San Francisco.

During the year, 3,096 linear feet of timber bulkhead were completed and protected by 85,239 short tons of rock. 81,105 long tons have been placed on the west breakwater and 12,311 tons on the east breakwater.

An hydraulic dredge of capacity of about 1,000 cubic yards per hour was installed in February, and since that time it has dredged and deposited behind the bulkhead 1,550,233 cubic yards of material.

Total expenditures during the year have been \$802,243.13.

IMPROVEMENT OF THE PASIG.

The project proposes maintaining an 18-foot channel from the Bridge of Spain (which bars large vessels from the upper river) to the Bay, about 6,000 feet, and a 6-foot channel from this Bridge to the Lake.

During the year, 696,264 cubic yards of material have been dredged with government plant by hired labor, so that a channel between 400 and 500 feet wide exists from the Bridge of Spain to the Bay. The depth across the bar at entrance of bay is only 300 feet wide, but 20 feet deep.

The old wall at canal entrance has been removed to depth of 12 feet. Preparations have been completed for beginning work on the upper river.

The work performed as reported above in constructing a new harbor for Manila, and in improving the navigability

of the Pasig River, was paid for with civil funds appropriated by the U. S. Philippine Commission; and while its successful prosecution was of great military interest, the work itself in no way came under the administrative control of the Division Commander.

The Division Commander expresses his entire satisfaction with the earnestness, intelligence, and effectiveness that has characterized the work of the Chief Engineer and his officers and men. The work of the battalion in Mindanao, and in a great variety of other duties has been very valuable to the service.

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

The operations of the Ordnance Department were confined chiefly to the Manila Depot of which the Division Chief Ordnance Officer is in command. During the year, the Depot's chief efforts have been toward repairing and supplying arms, ammunition, and equipment for the troops; unifying their equipment; and gathering into the Depot surplus serviceable stores. The Civil Government, the Marine Corps, and the Navy have been supplied also with some stores.

During the year, quantities of unserviceable property that could be repaired; unreliable small arms ammunition; and experimental stores that had been tested and reported on; aggregating in all 416 tons; were shipped to the various arsenals in the United States. During the same time regular issues aggregating 676 tons were made to the troops in the Division, the total number of requisitions honored being 1528. During the year, the Depot has received unserviceable stores inspected and condemned by inspectors, numbering 402,402 items, and having a total cost of \$97,997.93.

The most difficult problem in supply seems to be that of ammunition maintained in good condition. The trouble is due to moisture and mainly with the primers. The only apparent remedy is to keep all the ammunition in zinc lined boxes. Straw, excelsior, or any other material able to absorb and retain moisture, should be avoided in packing. Deterioration

of the unpacked and exposed ammunition is unavoidable, and such ammunition should be replaced frequently enough to insure reliability. The depot has always had a sufficient supply of good ammunition.

The Springfield carbine, issued to Scouts, has given rise to frequent complaints. The arms are old and not perfect; but a good part of the difficulty is due to the fact that the native lacks familiarity with his weapon, and its proper care. Complaints in regard to the firing pins, most of which are of steel, are frequent. These are rapidly being replaced by bronze pins which are satisfactory.

The Department has disbursed from Ordnance appropriations during the year, \$76,503.09; and under Quartermasters appropriations, \$1,150.

The shops comprise an armory, harness shop, machine shop, carpenter shop, foundry, blacksmith shop, and tin shop, all of which have been repaired; and some of which have been improved by installation of new machinery, during the year.

All shops have been kept busily employed.

The commanding officer examined all Returns of Ordnance Property in the Division before forwarding them to Washington. This system has worked well, allowing correction of errors without the great loss of time necessary in case they are forwarded direct.

Twelve ordnance sergeants have been on duty in the Division, besides a detachment of thirty-six enlisted men in the Depot. Six additional Ordnance Sergeants could be utilized to good advantage.

Up to the close of the fiscal year, the Civil Government is indebted to the Ordnance Department in the sum of \$124,787.95, for arms and equipment sold to the Civil authorities for use of Constabulary and officials, at reduced rates as arranged, for which payment has not been made. As a credit against this sum, the Civil Government has turned over to the Department, military stores paid for from funds of the Civil Government, to the value of \$178,340.54; which sum does not,

however, represent real values, as in most cases the articles received were valueless to the Military Government; purchased, for the most part, by the Civil Government during the insurrectionary period in the interests of peace, and turned over to the Military as the Civil Government had no place or arrangements for their care. A list has been prepared which shows that stores amounting to \$149,002.17 have been condemned, and either returned to the Civil Officials or were available for such return, leaving stores to the value of \$29,338.37, which the Department needs. The matter of the settlement of this account has been made the subject of a special report to the Department.

The Civil Government still holds a quantity of stores not included in the above account, which it is understood will be turned over at an early opportunity.

There have been captured from ladron bands by the Constabulary, and turned over to the Department, twenty-two magazine rifles, seven gun slings, and one canteen strap.

The Depot ordnance accommodations are not sufficient, and when work is begun on the seacoast defenses, the plant will be quite inadequate. On this subject a special report, at considerable length, was made quite recently by the undersigned. This matter should receive prompt attention. It is also very important that there be a settlement of the property account between the Ordnance Department and the Civil Government.

The Ordnance Service has been very satisfactorily performed.

PAYMENTS.

During the year, 22 paymasters have served in the Division, the average number continuously on duty being 16. Payments to the troops have been bi-monthly at some stations, and monthly at others. In the Department of Luzon up to the May 31, 1903 muster, all payments have been bi-monthly excepting to the troops in the Post of Manila. Commencing May 31st, monthly payments have been extended to

include all troops on the Manila and Dagupan railroad. In the Department of the Visayas, it has not been practicable, until quite recently, to pay any troops monthly except where paymasters have been stationed. The monthly service is now, however, extended to the larger coast ports. In the Department of Mindanao, monthly payments have been extended only to the Post of Zamboanga.

A paymaster was stationed at Tacloban, Leyte, from August, 1902, until April, 1903, in order to pay the posts around that station. This arrangement greatly facilitated these payments and was dropped only on the abandonment of nearly all the smaller stations.

The establishment of the Treasury of the Archipelago, and its designation as a U. S. Depository, which occurred November 1, 1902, has been of the greatest help in transacting the business of the Pay Department.

The statistics of the work of the Pay Department during the year are given in brief below:

U. S. Funds received during the year and on	
hand at the beginning of year	\$12,789,641.82
Received—Soldiers' Deposits	1,027,911.97
Received—Paymasters' Collections.....	334,943.56
	<hr/>
TOTAL.....	\$14,152,497.35

DISBURSED.

Pay of Army	\$8,246,481.69
Mileage	37,340.16
Deposited to Credit Treasurer U. S.....	3,205,187.19
Transferred to Paymasters outside of Division	10,000.00
On Hand	2,653,488.31
	<hr/>
TOTAL.....	\$14,152,497.35

PUBLIC CIVIL FUNDS.

Balance on Hand July 1, 1902.....	\$7,559.73
Disbursed, pay of Scouts	2,143.63
Deposited of Credit Treasurer Archipelago..	5,416.10

Colonel Charles H. Whipple was the Chief Paymaster until February 19, 1903, on which date he was succeeded by Major George R. Smith, who still continues in charge as Chief Paymaster.

TELEGRAPHS.

The Signal Corps at present consists of 7 officers and 421 enlisted men, with 4 detailed line officers as assistants; and operates and maintains 3,105 miles of land lines and 1,472 miles of cable, in addition to handling messages that pass over 2,250 miles of branch lines and 142 miles of cable that have been turned over to the Civil Government for maintenance.

The Chief Signal Officer remarks that there are only sixteen stations occupied by U. S. Troops that are without telegraphic or telephonic communication, and only one of these is of much importance. It is projected to connect this one (Camp Hartshorne, Samar) by a land line from Sorsogon to Matnog; thence a cable across San Bernardino Straits via Capul Light to Barobaybay; thence by land line to Laguan; incidentally giving telegraphic connection with Capul Light, for the reporting of vessels passing through San Bernardino Straits.

These lines furnish communication with 297 points in the Archipelago and connect 341 telephones comprising local systems at 23 military stations. There were 100,000,000 words sent during the year, and cost the United States \$320,000, exclusive of the cable vessel Burnside, which as will appear in another part of this report, cost for operation, maintenance and repairs, \$203,530; and was of little service for any other purpose. The telegraph service cost the Civil Government nothing, while lines that cost the United States \$118,704.18 were turned over without charge to the Government of the Philippines.

One officer of the Corps is assigned to the Division Staff; one is an accounting and disbursing officer; four are on telegraphic duty in departments; and five are inspectors of telegraphic stations.

In maintenance of the lines, iron poles have been substituted for wood as far as possible; 9,000 such poles have been purchased and will shortly be installed. When all present land lines are provided with these poles, the continuity of communication will be improved and the strength of the maintenance squads will be reduced by fully 100 men.

The maintenance of the cable lines during the year has been greatly interfered with by the absence of the Cablesip Burnside for about half the year. The Tukuran-Zamboanga Cable was interrupted for about three months; and the Zamboanga-Jolo cable became interrupted in March, and is still out of service. The date of the return of the Burnside, now in Alaska, is still uncertain, and the necessity of a cable repair ship, available at all times for this work has been demonstrated.

The Department maintains in Manila the telephone line, (of 176 telephones with one central and two sub-central offices); a machine and repair shop, which furnishes the electric energy for the fourteen circuits of telegraph radiating from Manila; and a signal station at Corregidor to report all vessels passing into the Bay during daylight hours. Every officer of the military government of considerable rank, and a good many of the officials of the Civil government have telephones in their residences, free of cost to them.

During the year, the Department sent messages as follows: War Department, 431,910; Navy Department, 5,533; U. S. Government Departments, 11,999; Civil Government, P. I., 190,838; Commercial, full rate, 127,163; Commercial, half rate, 30,648; total 798,091 messages; and has handled a total of 3,130,098 messages.

During the year, the Department has expended \$23,238.28 of U. S. Funds, and about \$65,582.26 that was appropriated from the Insular Treasury, of which it is estimated that about \$3,400 will be refunded to the Philippine Treasury as an unused balance; making the cost to the Civil Government for the year not more than the refund to the Civil Treasury from receipts on paid messages, \$62,194.64. Respecting this

deposit in the Philippine Treasury, instead of the United States Treasury, of the line receipts on commercial messages, a special communication was recently forwarded to the War Department by the Division Commander.

The Division Commander remarks respecting the telegraph and telephone maintenance and operation which has occupied the undivided attention of the Signal Officers and men, that the service has been generally well performed, though there have been cases of carelessness and neglect; complaints respecting them having largely come from officials of the Civil Government.

The causes of cable breaks have been those due to seismic disturbances in the ocean depths, (this cause it is claimed is responsible for the two breaks in comparatively deep water); and those due either to carelessness or ignorance in laying; or to the use of unsuited cables.

To traverse a harbor with a land end of a cable line and place it exactly where vessels must anchor, if they use the harbor at all, as was done at Parang Parang, is but to have the service interrupted; and this is exactly what happened more than once at this port until it was relaid in such way that the anchors of ships did not find it.

Some light and poorly armored cables were laid in very strong tidal currents over a coral bottom. This is the case with the cables in and out of Zamboanga, the Basilan line, and the Jolo line throughout a considerable part of the distance. The currents in their ebb and flow sweep these wires over the sharp rocky bottom, and in a few months the insulation is destroyed and the line is useless.

The instructions of the Secretary of War, communicated to the Civil Governor by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army in letter dated July 7, 1902, required that the telegraph lines be transferred to the Civil Government as soon as possible. The matter was taken up and some 2,392 miles have been turned over; but there has been some shortage of operators, and the Civil Government for some time past has not received any of the many lines recently offered for transfer.

It must be evident to the Civil Officials that an efficient cable service will be very expensive; for it is apparent that it will be necessary to maintain a steamer and have her always at command for the repairs of breaks in the many cable lines and a great many land ends, some one or more of which are almost all the time in trouble. A suitable vessel with proper deep sea equipment will cost at least \$150,000, and will cost for maintenance and operation not less than \$100,000 a year; and to maintain the land service on the extravagant American basis which prevails in all branches of the public service in the Philippines will cost probably \$250,000 a year at least. It would not be strange if the Civil Government preferred to avoid this expense and leave the burden to be carried by the United States Treasury as now.

Two cable companies are now doing business in the Philippines, although it has been suggested that they represent one business interest. Their wires reach America on the East, and China on the West.

There are now in use some 500 miles of inter-island cables owned by one of the Cable Companies, by means of which the three largest business centers in the Southern islands are reached; and the War Department has paralleled this private line and transmits commercial messages in competition with the private company.

The Commerical cable interests now in business here can care for and operate these cable lines at one half the outlay the Government will incur; consideration of economy points to an arrangement with these interests, that they may take over these lines, and the land lines also, and be paid such sum as the service is worth over and above the line receipts. Or a subsidiary Company to the Cable interests could be organized to own and operate these telegraphic connections in harmony with the cable lines.

When the wireless telegraph system shall have been established as a practicable going concern, the Philippines will afford an ideal field for the use of this method of com-

munication. There is now no inter-island connection more than 200 miles long. When the land lines are strung on iron poles and the wireless system is in use, their maintenance and operation should, in private hands, come well within the receipts, and the service be without cost to the Government save for usual tolls.

Now the operators are soldiers; but a company, that had a regard for the dividends of its stock holders, would substitute native operators and linemen exclusively for the expensive American; in this respect but carrying out an invariable practice in the Orient, where all telegraphers and linemen are natives, save a very few overseers and superintendents.

DEPARTMENT REPORTS.

Herewith are printed the reports of Brigadier General T. J. Wint, U. S. A., commanding the Department of the Visayas; and Brigadier General S. S. Sumner, U. S. A., commanding the Department of Mindanao. No report has been received from Major General J. F. Wade, U. S. A., commanding the Department of Luzon, but as this officer assumed command of the Division of the Philippines on the 25th day of July, 1903, he may intend to supply the Department of Luzon report later. General Wade commanded the Department throughout the period covered by this report.

The troops in the Department of Luzon are grouped into three commands, as follows:

Those North of the Pasig River, (except those in the City of Manila) are in the Second Brigade. During the year the commanding officers of this Brigade have been Brigadier Generals T. J. Wint and Francis Moore, the latter still in command.

Those South of the Pasig River (except those in the City of Manila) and including the Island of Mindoro, constitute the Third Brigade. During the year, the commanding officers of this Brigade have been Brigadier Generals J. F. Bell, J. M. Lee, and Colonel Constant Williams, 26th Infantry, and again General Lee, the last named still in command.

The troops in the City of Manila, including Pasay, under the senior officer present, report directly to the Department Commander, who, on the 25th day of July, was Brigadier General George M. Randall; this officer having relieved General Wade on the date given.

During the year there was no call made upon the Military Commander in the Philippines for the assistance of troops in preserving the peace except as reported under the title "Native Scouts." The military operations of these men, who were nearly three thousand, were directed by the Civil Governor.

Brigadier General Frank D. Baldwin commanded in the Department of the Visayas until Feb. 22, 1903, when he was succeeded by Brigadier General Jesse M. Lee; and on the 11th day of May, 1903, Brigadier General T. J. Wint succeeded General Lee and has remained in charge. There has been no occasion during the year to use the troops aggressively against the disturbers of the peace in the Department; but the Constabulary under the Governor, have been quite active. There was no call by the Governor for assistance except to have a company sent for station to the forks of the Gandara river in Samar, "for moral effect." The disturbances that occurred in March, April, and May in the Provinces of Surigao and Misamis; and of which a full account appears under "Public Order," were taken in hand first by General Lee of the Visayas, and he was succeeded by General Wint; this notwithstanding the fact that the disturbances occurred in territory that pertained to another Department. At this particular time, the cable between Division and Mindanao Headquarters was down; besides General Sumner at this time had full need for all the troops in his Department. For this reason, the department lines were ignored so far as concerned the military operations in these two Mindanao Provinces; and the forces from Iloilo, Tacloban, and Cebú restored the peace, under the Department Commander. The work assigned to Generals Lee and Wint, both of whom went

to the scene of disturbance, was very creditably performed.

In Mindanao, the only military operations were against the Moros in the Lanao region, and these are fully reported elsewhere.

In Sulu, the conditions have at times been critical. There has been abundant cause for punitive action of the troops with respect to the disorderly Moros, but the policy has been adhered to of avoiding by every honorable means an occasion for conflict and bloodshed.

There has been but one case of assault upon a soldier; this in the town of Jolo, the soldier being killed by a "Juramentado," who was instantly killed by other soldiers, while on-looking Moros assisted. Now that there is to be a Politico-Military Government for Sulu, it is probable the authorities and some of the fanatical and suspicious natives will come to blows; but the destruction of these people, save under the inexorable stress of necessity, would be unfortunate.

The affairs of the Department of Mindanao have been ably administered by the Department Commander, who has received the well merited promotion to Major General of the Army. General Sumner was relieved from command of the Department on July 1, 1903; and was succeeded by the senior officer present, Colonel Wm. M. Wallace, 14th Cavalry.

In the Appendix will be found the last annual report of Colonel Wallace, who commanded at Jolo during the year. There is also a copy of his last quarterly report which goes somewhat more into details than the other.

FINALLY.

DIVISION AND BRIGADES.

In the interest of economy, and benefit to the service in very many ways, an administrative change of very great importance should be made; a change which will be of immense value also in an executive way.

The time when it was necessary to segregate the command of the troops into Departments has passed, if indeed

the necessity ever existed. As there is but one depot for supply, so there can be, and actually is, but one military command concerned with the larger questions of military administration. The present arrangement of a territorial commander, really accomplishes nothing beneficial beyond what a Brigade commander may do, except that the former has the legal capacity to convene General Courts Martial; but so long as he is assigned to a control, which is recognized by the Articles of War, and in deference to custom, it is felt to be necessary, it seems, to give each such officer a larger staff than he has any use for: These officers are a Chief Quartermaster, Chief Commissary, Chief Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer, Chief Ordnance Officer and a Chief Engineer Officer. These men make work and increase the importance of the Commanding General, if his importance is to be measured by the number of officers and clerks at his Headquarters, and the number of papers that daily pass over his desk.

The change which is suggested is to give to the designation *Division* a meaning entirely foreign to what is usually conveyed by the word as now applied to a geographical command. It is proposed to let it have the same significance as when applied to the sub-division of an Army Corps, called a *Division*. The general officer assigned by the President to command the troops serving in this Archipelago would command the Philippine Division and not the Division of the Philippines.

The troops serving here should be divided into about four Brigades; at the head of each, a Brigadier General. The troops in North Luzon would be called the 1st Brigade, Headquarters at Fort McKinley; those serving in South Luzon to be designated as the 2nd Brigade, Headquarters at Batangas or Lipa; all troops in the Visayas to be designated as the 3rd Brigade, Headquarters at Camp Jossman; and those in Mindanao and Sulu, the 4th Brigade, Headquarters at Zamboanga, until the Illana-Iligan Railway shall be finished

when a new Headquarters would be established on the central Mindanao Plateau. The words *Division* and *Brigade* are Military but *Department* and *District* are not.

Each Brigade Commander should be his own inspector, and be required to spend one half of his time with the troops in their exercises and supervising their instruction. He would need an officer of the General Staff, an Adjutant General, a Judge Advocate, and one or two Aides-de-Camp, but no other staff officers. His troops, wherever situated, would be supplied from Manila depots; and he would have no use whatever for any administrative staff officers. The law should be changed so as to empower him to convene General Courts Martial for trial of enlisted men, and all officers, except those who may be charged with conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman, and embezzlement, in which cases the order for trial should be made by the Division Commander. It is not, however, indispensable, no matter how desirable, that the law be changed as suggested; for the Judge Advocate at Division Headquarters, with the help of an assistant, could critically examine all Court Martial proceedings, and the Chief of Staff present them for signature. The additional work would be no great burden.

The reform would release many staff officers and clerks, and save public expenditures which now give no useful result; and would leave the Brigade Commander foot-loose to be what a Brigade Commander is in every Army in the world but the American, a *field* officer. Now, a great deal of his time is consumed in office work and very little or none of it spent in the saddle.

When this is done, it is to be hoped that the responsibility of assisting the Civil Government in preserving the peace and upholding the authority of civil officials will be left where it always was until the 30th of January, 1903.

If the same plan were extended to the United States territory, a great stride in advance as respects the training of soldiers would be accomplished. The Atlantic Division,

The Mississippi Division, The Gulf Division and The Pacific Division come naturally; and then two or more Brigades in each; but these Brigadiers need not concern themselves with administrative matters, for in the United States there are practically no Subsistence Depots. The Quartermaster Depots are at New York, Philadelphia, St Louis, Jeffersonville and San Francisco; and the Medical Depots are but two or three in number; while all are controlled from Washington. The supplies and materials are usually sent direct by the merchant or contractor to the post where they are to be consumed. The Brigade Commanders would visé requisitions and estimates, and ought always to have their quarters in one of their own garrisons.

These are some general ideas that are submitted as treating of conditions that are quite unsatisfactory now and should be remedied at once. Those, like myself, who have spent a lifetime in the Army, know that there have been General Officers commanding Departments who never wore a uniform, save at social functions, or mounted a horse while they exercised General Officer's command. Their "inspections" were perfunctory affairs and of very little military consequence.

MILITARY HYGIENE.

The Chief Surgeon calls attention to the fact that the sick rate which has prevailed, and still prevails is approximately 7%, but he does not mention the mortality rate specifically and by itself. There is a difficulty in stating accurately the sick rate for the Philippines, for the reason that a considerable number of officers and men are invalided home; and as soon as the patient, on convalescent leave, leaves the Islands, he is at once dropped from Philippine statistical health records. It would perhaps be possible for the Surgeon General to state his data with more absolute accuracy than is now possible; but it is quite certain that the report of the Chief Surgeon does not give the whole story.

The diseases which have worked most injury are dysentery and other ailments of the digestive organs; so it has

ever been in the Tropics. In the first fifty-seven years of this century, the European troops serving in India lost 6.9% of the whole force by death; in other words, the death rate in India was nearly the same as has been the sick rate in the Philippines; but in India the conditions have improved; for since 1882 the mortality rate has never reached 17 per thousand.

When Luzon is traversed by a railway from Aparri to Manila, with branch lines to San Fernando, Union, Baguio, and the eastern provinces; with another line of rails reaching into Cavite Province, and still a third carried up the Pasig and along the Laguna shore to Pagsanjan; with further extensions to Batangas, Balayan, and Lucena; when Daet, Nueva Caceres, Legaspi and Sorsogon are all connected and have a port outlet at Pasacao; there will be no occasion to maintain more than about four stations for white troops in Luzon; namely, Fort McKinley, Stotsenberg, Batangas and Legaspi; and these troops should all spend a good part of the year in the Benguet Mountains, whence they could reach any place in the Island in a day or two. In the Visayas, there will be no station needed for Europeans except Camp Jossman; and in Mindanao, one large post for two regiments will suffice to be situated on the high tableland of Mindanao, either at the head of the Rio Grande or near Lake Lanao. This of course presupposes the existence of a railroad traversing the country, permitting quick movements to either the north or the south coast. The road, the route of which was sketched in another chapter, might be carried from Lake Lanao via the valley of the Taraca River to the great plateau where the 8th parallel of latitude crosses the Rio Grande; thence south to the lower valley; and so on to Cottabato and Port Pollok. With such an arrangement of stations, the white troops ought to have as good health as they would enjoy in the States. The native troops would, however, be more widely dispersed, and relied on for responding to first calls of the Civil Authorities. But such a system of roads, which would have a very

great military value, cannot be relied on to earn appropriate recompense for capital at first. The State must finance these undertakings in some way, either by advances for construction or by guaranteeing earning on invested capital.

THE WALLS OF MANILA.

In Appendix VIII will be found a paper, possessing some interest for the general reader, and perhaps for the antiquarian also, respecting the fortifications that surround the spot where stood the original Malay City of Manila, and which has given a name to the organization of districts of wards that, collectively, are now designated as Manila; but which is really composed of the separate municipal districts of Tondo, Binondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, Pandacan, Santa Ana, Malate, Ermita, San Fernando de Dilao and lastly, Manila, or as it is often designated Intramuros, or in English, "between the walls."

Major Joseph C. Bush, Artillery Corps, has collected many interesting facts concerning the Fortress of Manila, and has traced the development of the defenses and supplied the names of all the important designers and constructing engineers; while Captain A. C. Macomb, 5th Cavalry, in charge of the office of Military Information, has supplied translations and historical sketches respecting the different gateways, and an account of the English attack and capture of the place in 1762. The walls themselves are as complete an illustration of the designs and defensive methods of the times, as were those of Carcassonne but for a much longer period, that Viollet-le-Duc has described so charmingly.

But the walls of Manila, including those designed by the priest who followed Ponce de Leon and was lost in Florida, but extricated himself and came to Manila; or those built but a little more than a half century ago are all doomed to destruction and must disappear, save those that are still held sacred and protected by the Military.

Old Fort Santiago, that dates from 1590, is secure; and will not be molested; indeed there is no occasion for its mol-

estation; but the rest are obstructing the commercial and sanitary development of the City. The United States authorities may interpose to save them for a time; but the Filipinos care absolutely nothing about the fortifications. They wish to have them demolished, and if the plans of the United States respecting the future of the Filipino people are realized, they will abate the nuisance as soon as they have control of the Government and the power to do so; and the walls will go the way the ancient and modern city walls and forts have gone all over Europe.

The illustrations with the paper of Major Bush will give a good idea of the proportions and magnitude of these defenses and their present condition. The stone of which the masonry is made, volcanic ashes that have become consolidated, is so soft and the workmanship so poor, that they are all overgrown with weeds and shrubs and must be grubbed, mowed, and cleaned off every six months, so as to prevent them from disappearing in a jungle. In several of the photographs this aspect of the walls is well illustrated. In one photograph, the north and the west fronts of Fort Santiago are shown, and the office building that has been constructed there on the terre-plein of Battery Santa Barbara. The carriage entrance was built a few weeks ago.

The earliest drawing or map of the old city of Manila that has been consulted is one made about the year 1735. It was captured by the English in 1762, and is now deposited in the British Museum. A photograph of this map is with Major Bush's article.

A map has been prepared, based on official records, showing the position of the breaching battery planted by the English General in his siege operations.

SPANISH CAMPAIGN OF 1896-1898.

There does not exist in the English language any connected and complete account, or even a good synopsis of the Spanish operations against the Filipinos in 1896-8. This campaign

was but the beginning of the hostilities which continued until 1902; and it has seemed to the undersigned to be well worth while that an account of those military operations should be told somewhere in English.

The material relied on for data is unfortunately all of Spanish origin. Every possible effort was made to secure a Filipino account of the fighting, but there does not appear to have been any such account written; nor so far as can be ascertained, were there any carefully kept diaries. It therefore follows that the compiler was obliged to rely largely upon Spanish works. Major John S. Mallory, 1st Infantry, has spared no pains to present a fair resumé of the works he consulted, all of which are cited. There is a map of the Provinces of Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna, the principal scenes of insurrection.

POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION.

Just exactly what is the status of Government in these islands, in respect to the Army, is not easy to understand. It certainly is not the same as that which exists between a state and the military organizations that chance to be quartered in it; nor does it seem to be exactly the same as that which exists in a territory; for in these political sub-divisions the troops may not be used except that certain conditions of Federal Statute law be fulfilled by those asking for assistance to preserve or restore the peace. The Governor of a state or territory is not required to report to the Secretary of War; nor can this officer give any orders to the Chief Executive; or in any way influence or negative legislation; while in the Philippines, the formalities required to be observed in securing the assistance of the land forces of the United States are simplicity itself, compared with those that must be observed in the Union; and the Governor must render an account of his stewardship respecting finance to the head of the War Department,—indeed it would appear to be justifiable and legal for the President through the Secretary of War to veto legislation

enacted by the Philippine Commission. The Chief Executive in the Philippines is designated in the Act of July 1, 1902, as a Civil Governor. There does not appear in this Act any definite statement of his powers and responsibilities, only that he is authorized to exercise the powers of Government as provided by Executive Order of June 21, 1901; but when that order is consulted it appears that the powers devolved upon the Civil Governor were the same as those that were being exercised by the Military Governor. Here search for a definite schedule of powers ends, as the responsibility and authority of the Military Officer who administered civil affairs in the Philippines were never specified in any Statute; nor do they appear to have been enumerated or defined in any Executive Order of the President as Commander in Chief.

If the above assumption is correct as to the power of the Secretary of War to practically control legislation, and considering that the Chief Executive of the Islands must render to the Secretary certain reports, the Government of the Philippines would not be inappropriately styled "A Politico-Military Government"; that is, a Government in which Civil and Military attributes are combined.

At the present time there are some twelve or fifteen Army Officers holding office in this Government, many of their offices being created by local legislation; and if the Government was strictly Civil and the offices of a strictly Civil character, Section 1222, Revised Statutes, would forbid their employment.

At this date, very nearly 3,000 troops belonging to the Armies of the United States are serving in field operations aggressively, under the orders of the Governor, against the enemies of peace and good order; besides the Philippine Constabulary has a character much more closely resembling an army than a peace force. At its head is a General Officer and all its officers are described by purely military titles.

In no English Crown Colony, except the purely military ones like Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden, do the military, as a

rule, take any part. In India the military are more numerous, in the character of "Residents," "Political Agents," etc.; but the Government proper is composed of civilians. It is a fact that the Government of the Philippines now is more military in the make up of its personnel than any British Crown Colony.

It is self evident that the Army is very much closer and more essential to the Civil Government here than it is in any of our states and territories, and very much closer than in Porto Rico. For the present, the army would seem to be essential to the maintenance of orderly government; and no one can say for how long a time this will continue to be the case.

The Philippines are about as far away from the Capitol of the United States as it is possible to get. The Governor of these Islands has a very grave responsibility put upon him; a much heavier burden of responsibility than that which rests on the Chief Executive of any of our States. For these reasons, he should exercise very wide and far reaching powers. If he is not already possessed of the powers to control and direct the use of the land forces; if he is not in fact the Commander in Chief of the Military in these Islands; then it is respectfully submitted that such authority ought to be vested in him.

The President's order of June 21, 1901, said the Governor's powers should be the same, in respect to Civil Affairs, as that exercised by the Military Governor. Since the Military Governor could order the distribution and use of the troops, and respond to his own conception of necessity for armed intervention in civil affairs, it is suggested that the authority is now vested in the Civil Governor by the Act of July 1, 1902, which has confirmed and legalized the orders of April 7, 1900, June 21, 1901 and July 3, 1902; but if the result suggested above has not been accomplished entirely, it is evident that something approximating to it has been accomplished.

If the relations between the Government of the Philippines and the Military be the same as that between the Government of a state and the army quartered therein, then it would not be legal for the Military Commander to respond to a call of the Governor for assistance, unless the call were made in conformity with the Statutes; but in the Philippines, the Military Commander was ordered on July 3, 1902, to respond to the direct call of the Civil Authorities made in a form quite different from that prescribed for observance in the Union.

If the call of the Civil Authorities communicated directly must be observed, the Governor is in effect the Commander in Chief; and this is as it should be. If it be admitted that such is his relation to the U. S. Troops serving in the Philippines, the local Government itself of to-day seems to be a very close copy of that of an English Crown Colony:

A Governor who is the Commander in Chief of the Police, Milita, Military and Naval Forces;

An Executive Council, to aid and assist the Chief Executive, composed exclusively of nominated members, a part native, a part American;

An elected Legislative Assembly, of from fifty to one hundred members, to be allowed at a later date;

The power to legislate committed to the Governor and his Council, or later on to the Governor and the two houses.

An "Order in Council" of a British Crown Colony is the same in fact as an Act of the Philippine Commission, when approved by the Governor. When the assembly shall have been formed, it will participate in legislation; but if the lower house fails to bring in a bill, voting money to carry on the Government, that is satisfactory to the upper house, the former appropriation continues until an agreement is reached.

The Secretary of War may veto legislation just as may the Minister of the Colonies in Great Britain, or the King, by an "Order in Council." The similarity of all this to the basis of Crown Colony procedure is very close indeed.

But there is an important difference between the two, and all that has been submitted above under the caption "Politico-Military Situation" is stated for the purpose of illustrating this difference.

The commander of the British troops in every Crown Colony, including India, is a member of the Executive Council; and participates in its deliberations and votes on the measures under consideration. He usually stands next to the Governor in rank, and is in fact his Military advisor; in fact he might be called the Secretary of the Military Department. He is in fact as well as in name, a member of the Government; and has just as much at stake in it, and as keen an interest to see it successfully conducted as any person connected with the Government.

The sequel to this is a recommendation that if the Governor cannot now be legally called a Commander in Chief, that the law authorize such a designation; and second, that the Commanding General of the forces be ex-officio a member of the Council, and under the Governor, in charge of all matters connected with the maintenance of order and suppression of disorders. It is not contemplated that the Governor would interfere in any matter of military discipline or of administration, so long as the United States Treasury supplied the finances to meet the expenses; but the question of the number of troops to be retained in the Islands and their disposition, should be in the capacity of the Governor to dispose of.

With a General Officer of the Army a member of the Government, with strictly defined duties, there could not possibly arise any important question affecting the Military service in a way to make friction or cause disagreements.

This is the British and Dutch way, and it was the Spanish method. It is the natural course to pursue in the government of a remote dependency, that is, and must for a long time be, very slightly autonomous, but is mainly Executive. It has been suggested that the Filipinos might regard the partici-

pation of a military man in the Government, in an important station, as savoring too much of militarism; but they see fifteen or more officers, from Brigadier General down, holding civil places and performing very important civil duties, and it excites no comment. All intelligent natives know that peace and good order are essential to a prosperous existence, and that force must always be used to suppress brigandage and persistent wrong doing.

It is well the Military Government is ended; and there should be no suggestion or thought of its return; but military men in considerable numbers are rendering valuable assistance to the Civil Authorities, and the general tendency is to increase rather than diminish these numbers. It is respectfully submitted that it is due to the Army that it be recognized as entitled to a representative in the Executive Council herein suggested.

If the intervention of an armed force should be necessary in suppressing disorders, the military member of the Cabinet would, in pursuance of the Governor's orders, employ such force as might be necessary; and he would utilize the native or the American troops, whichever might best serve the particular purpose; always under the proper officers, and for so long a time as might be necessary to secure the desired result; that is, peace and respect for law. The agency that should accomplish this, in the most speedy manner and with the least possible bloodshed, would deserve to receive the gratitude of all well meaning law-abiding inhabitants.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE W. DAVIS,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Division of the Philippines.

(Eight appendices enclosed.)



APPENDIX I.

Headquarters Department of the Visayas.

Iloilo, Panay, Philippine Islands, July 2, 1903.

To the

Adjutant General,

Division of the Philippines,

Manila, P. I.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit the following report for the Department of the Visayas for the year ending June 30, 1903:

The Department of the Visayas was established with headquarters at Iloilo, Panay, P. I., October 1, 1902, pursuant to General Orders, No. 96, Headquarters of the Army, A. G. O., September 3, 1903. Its geographical limits are specified in that order, as amended by General Orders, No. 106, Headquarters of the Army, A. G. O., October 22, 1902. Brigadier General Frank D. Baldwin, U. S. Army, formerly commanding the Fifth Separate Brigade, was designated Department Commander. General Baldwin continued in command until February 22, 1903, when he relinquished command, being succeeded, the same day, by Brigadier General Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, who, in turn, relinquished command May 11, 1903, Brigadier General Theodore J. Wint, U. S. Army, assuming command immediately.

Brigadier General Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, was relieved from command of the Sixth Separate Brigade (which included the Islands of Samar and Leyte and the small islands adjacent thereto), headquarters at Tacloban, Island of Leyte, and was ordered to Manila, P. I., per General Orders, No. 207, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, dated October 21, 1902. He left his Brigade, October 27, 1902. From the date of General Lee's relief from command until the dis-

continuance of the Sixth Brigade, December 31, 1902, the Brigade was commanded by Colonel Walter T. Duggan, 1st Infantry.

At the time of the establishment of this Department, the command was composed of:

Company H, Signal Corps;

Detachment, Hospital Corps;

Headquarters 2nd Squadron, and Troops E and F, 1st Cavalry;

1st Infantry (entire regiment);

29th Infantry (entire regiment less Cos. I and K);

Companies 35 to 47, inclusive, Philippine Scouts, garrisoning 40 towns in the various islands. Company F, 2nd Battalion, Corps of Engineers, arrived in the Department November 25, 1902, taking station at Iloilo, Pánay; March 24, 1903, Company No. 41, Philippine Scouts, left Department of Luzon; March 25, 1903, the 14th Infantry arrived in the Department relieving the 1st Infantry in the Island of Samar, the latter organization leaving the Department, March 28, 1903, for Manila, P. I., en route to the United States; April 26, 1903, Companies I and K, 29th Infantry, arrived at Camp Jossman, Island of Guimaras, from Puerto Princesa, Island of Paragua (Department of Mindanao); May 2, 1903, the entire 18th Infantry arrived in the Department relieving that portion of the 11th Infantry in Island of Leyte, the latter leaving May 8, 1903, for station in Manila, P. I.

The annexed table, marked "A," shows the movements of troops within the Department during the year.

The appended list, marked "B," shows the dates of abandonment of stations since the present Department came into existence, together with a list of all stations newly occupied during the year.

It being the policy of the administration to concentrate the forces in the Philippines as much as possible and consistent with the interests of the United States Government and the

welfare of the resident inhabitants, as well as for the sake of economy, very soon after the inauguration of this Department the command was notified to make necessary preparations for a general mobilization at permanent posts. Near the close of 1902, the permanent posts at Camp Jossman, Buena Vista, Island of Guimaras; Camp Downes, at Ormoc, Island of Leyte; Camp Bumpus, at Tacloban, Island of Leyte; Camp Connell, at Calbayog, Island of Samar; Camp Hartshorne, at Laguan, Island of Samar (all named in honor of officers killed in action in the Philippines); and Cebu, Island of Cebu, were established providing for the accommodation of 18, 4, 8, 8, 4 and 4 companies, respectively. Almost immediately the removal of the minor garrisons (one company and less) to the permanent posts just selected was begun, and within a comparatively few months all the outlying stations were abandoned and the troops quartered in tents at the new cantonments. Location of the several proposed cantonments having been approved by the Division Commander and the allotment of funds for construction at the cantonments having been made, work was immediately commenced thereon, and since then has been pushed as rapidly as circumstances would permit, there being considerable delay incident to the continual changing of stations of troops and the slowness in delivery of lumber from the United States. Native material, such as hardwood poles, bamboo and nipa, was contracted for and delivered with considerable difficulty owing to the lack of necessary means of water transportation. Notwithstanding these hindrances and drawbacks, the work of construction has progressed very satisfactorily; the untiring efforts of the camp commanders and constructing quartermasters toward the completion of this very important work, is commendable.

November 24, 1902, the Cableship "BURNSIDE" completed the laying of the cable from a point on Panay Island, near Iloilo, to the Island of Guimaras, thus placing that important cantonment in direct communication with Manila.

The Lieutenant General commanding the Army visited several stations in the Department during his tour of inspection of the Philippines, in the month of December, 1902.

Throughout the Department there have been almost continuous disturbances caused by the lawless operations of the so-called ladrones or outlaws who glory in falling suddenly on isolated villages and haciendas, plundering and pillaging everything within sight and easy reach. The depredations of these bands are not confined merely to the devastation of property and stealing of stock and valuables, but murder in its most atrocious form is very frequently resorted to. The constabulary has apparently exerted every effort and means to exterminate these outlaws, but their (the outlaws') perfect knowledge of the topography of the localities in which they operate and their ability to secrete themselves in the mountains and jungles, has practically enabled them to continue their nefarious business with impunity.

Ladrones and banditti having become somewhat troublesome in Central Samar, upon the request of the Civil Governor of that island and the recommendation of the Governor of the Philippine Islands, a company (35th) of Philippine Scouts was sent on December 16, 1902, for moral effect only, up the Gandara River with instructions to go into camp at the site of the former town of Gandara (at the main forks of the river). Upon arrival at this point it was learned by the commanding officer that the majority of the supposed agitators were quietly engaged in legitimate business and apparently well disposed towards United States sovereignty, yet the underlying sentiment was against the presence of the native troops. This state of feeling culminated in a fight between a few members of the Scout company and municipal police and residents of the town; the affair is now under investigation. This company is still stationed at Gandara, and apparently tranquility reigns in the Gandara Valley which has always been conceded as the most troublesome section in the Island of Samar. Numerous meetings with these roving bands of outlaws have

been reported from all through the Department, frequently with casualties on one or both sides. At present all appears quiet.

On April 8, 1903, the commanding officer, Camp Bumpus, Tacloban, Island of Leyte, reported that ladrones were assembling in the hills back of Basey, Island of Samar (near Balangiga), and terrorizing the people, and requested authority to have a company of Scouts cooperate with the constabulary in dispersing the disturbing element. General Orders, No. 152, series 1902, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, prohibited such a procedure, and the matter was referred to the Division Commander. The Department Commander opened communication with Governor Llorente of Samar regarding the situation, and announced his readiness to act on the official call of the Governor. In reply, Governor Llorente reported that ladronism in his province, according to his investigation, had little significance; that the ladrones had no fire arms, and that several had been taken by volunteers and municipal police of Basey. His telegram concluded with: "Many thanks for your kindness. I will request you for troops as soon as I need them." Here the matter was closed. No disturbances have been reported from that locality since that date.

SURIGAO EXPEDITION.

On March 23, 1903, a band of about 30 insurgents, under a leader named Concepcion, entered the town of Surigao, Mindanao, at noon, the band being quickly joined by some one hundred natives, many other of the townsfolk being in strong sympathy with them; the combined forces then proceeded to Constabulary headquarters, knowing the barracks would be empty at that hour and the men at dinner. The one sentinel on duty was easily overpowered, Inspector Clark of the constabulary killed, and the barracks and constabulary storehouses sacked. The insurgents secured in all 56 Remington shot guns, 40 Colt revolvers, 10 Springfield carbines, 20 Remington rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition and 5,400

pesos, civil funds. The remainder of the day and that night they stayed in the town, remaining at constabulary headquarters and leaving early the succeeding morning, the padre of the town having warned them of the coming of an American gunboat (?). To meet in open combat with their enemies not being the natural tendency of the insurgents, the band numbering about 100, with probably 130 fire arms and abundant ammunition, fell back to the village of Placer in an organized band. The day following the attack on the town, two officers and a detachment of 30 men, Company M, 10th Infantry, arrived on the scene of the trouble from Iligan, Mindanao, and were followed the same day by Companies G and H, 29th Infantry from Camp Jossman, Island of Guimaras, under command of Captain H. R. Perry, of that regiment, to whom had been transmitted the instructions of the Division Commander which were, briefly, as follows: "Troops will occupy town, drive out insurgents, restore and maintain order in town of Surigao, and protect people and property from violence."

By this time constabulary reinforcements had arrived and scouting parties of both military and constabulary immediately set out in pursuit of the insurgents. As a military necessity, for the convenience of supply, and on account of its close proximity to, and easy approach from, Iloilo, the Province of Surigao was temporarily detached from the Department of Mindanao by the Commanding General, Division of the Philippines, and attached to this Department; but the Civil Commission decided that for the time being martial law would not be declared there, holding that the province was no more in a state of warfare than the majority of others in the islands. The Department Commander, Brigadier General Jesse M. Lee, U. S. Army, repaired personally to the seat of trouble individually directed the movements of all troops and constabulary in the Province of Surigao, until the arrival of Colonel Albert L. Myer, 11th Infantry, with the headquarters and 2 companies of his regiment from Camp Bumpus, Taclo-

ban, Island of Leyte. Colonel Myer was then placed in command and continued to exercise command until the formal breaking-up of the Surigao Expedition, June 29, 1903.

On the 28th of March, 1903, information was received that Concepcion, the insurgent leader, was at Mt. Magayaco, Province of Surigao, but by the end of that month he had not been discovered, neither had any of his followers, who had now divided into small parties, been encountered by the military forces. Much scouting was done by the troops during the week following the outbreak, and by the 29th of March 3,300 of the 5,400 pesos secured by the insurgents had been recovered from natives in Surigao and vicinity who took part in or aided and abetted the attack; over thirty of these being at that time under arrest in the hands of the civil authorities. The scouting parties continued their pursuit of the outlaws everywhere, killing, wounding and scattering them in all directions, and bringing many prisoners. During April, 29 Remington shotguns, 14 Colt revolvers, 7 Springfield carbines, and 9 Remington rifles, a total of 59 firearms, together with large quantities of ammunition, were recovered out of that originally secured by the outlaws. The scouting was pushed just as vigorously during May and June and by the end of the latter month there remained in the hands of the outlaws only 38 revolvers, caliber 45; 19 shot guns; 1 Springfield carbine, and 5 Remington rifles.

Considerable hardships were experienced by the troops operating in this province during the entire disturbance, due principally to their limited knowledge of the country, the rains, etc., but vigilance was not relaxed on this account and scouting was maintained continuously by all detachments with excellent results.

The greatest force taking part in the Surigao Expedition at any time, including both military and constabulary, aggregated 29 officers and 693 enlisted men. All these organizations were divided into detachments scattered throughout the affected district.

Investigation into this affair revealed the fact that various provincial and municipal officials had been implicated in the attack of March 23rd; these were placed under arrest and promptly removed from office. Civil proceedings were instituted against all persons charged with complicity in the raid and the stealing of the 5,400 pesos, and all awarded sentences of divers degrees; two were sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment each, two to 20 years' imprisonment each, and many others receiving lesser sentences. In all sixty-two (62) persons were tried and sentenced according to the gravity of the offense committed. The presidentes of Tigamana and Mainit were deposed May 5th and placed under arrest, charged with being among the most enthusiastic of the instigators of the attack on the constabulary, the evidence against them being quite conclusive. The unremitting vigilance and hard pressing of the insurrectos by the military forces and the heavy sentences of the civil courts did much to bring the unruly element to a realization of the futility of armed resistance against the United States Government, and they have now apparently submitted to the inevitable.

June 28, 1903, Colonel Myer, commanding the expedition, reported by wire from Surigao that he was confident that the band of outlaws against whom he and his command had been operating were all either killed or captured, with the exception of the leader Concepcion and a few stragglers unarmed and disorganized; most of the arms recovered and the condemned prisoners sent to Manila. The Surigao Expedition was broken up and ordered disbanded June 29, 1903, with the exception of two companies of Philippine Scouts to be left at Surigao, Placer and Mainit for temporary duty until a state of unquestionable peace had been declared. It is believed that these outlaws have been well punished and taught a profitable lesson, and that their next outbreak will be given weightier consideration; also that a precedent of what they may expect in the future has been firmly established.

CAGAYAN EXPEDITION.

Early in April, 1903, Governor Corralles at Cagayan, Mindanao, reported that the people were organizing into bands under one Flores, formerly a commission agent in that town. Cagayan being beyond the territorial bounds of this Department, no remedial action could be undertaken. Later, about the middle of the same month, the Governor again reported that conditions in his province were in a much worse condition and fast becoming alarming, and entreating that a force of 100 soldiers be sent there post haste, as the people of the town were leaving for the mountains declaring themselves rebels.

April 29, 1903, Captain Overton with his troop (D-15th Cavalry) left Iligan, Mindanao, for the purpose of making a scout to Cagayan and Tagaloan and return to Iligan, to ascertain definitely the real condition of affairs existing in that locality, and with instructions to strike any parties of outlaws with whom he might come in contact. Captain Overton arrived at Cagayan after an uneventful overland march, May 1st, the garrison at that time being one company (49th) Philippine Scouts, which in a few days was exchanged for the 43rd Company, Philippine Scouts, from Dapitan, Mindanao. The cavalry troop remained at Cagayan for more than a week protecting life and property and offering the insurgent leader, Flores, every possible opportunity for a brush; but nothing worthy of note transpired. Finally Captain Overton, May 12th, left Cagayan with his troop for a scout in the vicinity of Agusan on the east coast of the island. Here he learned that Flores and his band were in a village up in the Suclatan Mountains. Arriving at Flores' reported rendezvous with a small detachment, he disarmed the people of their bolos, placed about 40 prisoners in a house under a guard of one man, and proceeded with one other man through the town aiming to intercept anyone who might attempt to warn Flores of his presence. Before Captain Overton had gone far the prisoners escaped from the improvised guard house,

secured the bolos previously taken from them (they had been piled in a heap in an adjoining lot), and a desperate conflict ensued. The result was that Captain Overton and one private were killed, and one man badly wounded, the third man succeeding in withstanding the ferocious onslaught of the enraged prisoners until the return of a detachment reconnoitering in another direction. The troop with its dead and wounded thereupon returned to Cagayan.

At this juncture, the Department Commander, General Wint, pursuant to instructions from Division Headquarters, went to Cagayan, made a thorough investigation, and decided that the situation was not serious. The people had to some extent been organized and although some twenty-five rifles were presumed to be "out," it was apparent that their possessors were without ammunition for them. The Department Commander, however, recommended the withdrawal of the cavalry troop, and the substitution of a company of infantry and one company of Scouts to assist in running to earth the outlaws, and that the section in which they were to operate be attached to this Department, temporarily at least. Accordingly, May 24, 1903, the affected section was temporarily added to this Department and the Department Commander assumed command of all troops and constabulary in and around Cagayan, province of Misamis, these forces having previously been under the control of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary. The territorial limits of this section were defined thus: On the west side of Iligan Bay all territory belonging to the Province of Misamis lying north of a line five miles from and practically parallel to the north shore of Panquil Bay; on the east side of Iligan Bay all territory of Misamis Province lying east of a line ten miles from and practically parallel to the Agus River and the shore of Lake Lanao.

Troop D, 15th Cavalry, was relieved and returned to Iligan, and replaced by Company A, 18th Infantry, from Cebu; Company No. 40, Philippine Scouts, from Camp Joss-

man, Guimaras, was also transferred to that point. Lieutenant Colonel Walter S. Scott, 18th Infantry, was placed in command. These troops continually and carefully scouted the surrounding country frequently striking small scattered bands of outlaws and succeeded in bringing in arms, prisoners and small quantities of ammunition. Flores continues to roam at large with a following of only about six men, but is being closely pursued and his capture or death may be expected soon.

CAMAGUIM EXPEDITION.

The people living on this island, as stated by Governor Corralles, are exceedingly ignorant, so much so that they would not permit the taking of the census. Notices were sent explaining its object and they were warned that opposition would result in punishment. The people, however, proceeded to arm themselves, whereupon Captain Green of the constabulary went there to aid the presidentes in taking the census. Resistance being offered, the constabulary opened fire, but owing to unfamiliarity with their pieces did no damage, and, two of their number being wounded, they retreated to Cagayan. Upon the departure of the constabulary, the rebel chief picked up all the empty cartridge shells, and, showing them to the people, said: "All these cartridges were fired at me, but they could not penetrate me." The people then pronounced him a saint and many recruits joined his ranks. The constabulary made a second trip to that section but returned accomplishing practically nothing.

May 12, 1903, Lieutenant Frank with Company No. 43, Philippine Scouts, and Governor Corralles, left Cagayan for the Island of Camaguim. They disembarked at Catarman, the principal town on the island, and upon landing found the people had fled on learning that troops were coming. The rebel leader had assumed the title of "Chief of the Arisen Forces." The governor entered into communication with him and asked what was meant by the people being armed.

The reply was that they did not care to pay land tax and were going to fight the soldiers and were resigned to die. Having seen that the shooting of the constabulary had done no harm they were not afraid of the Scouts, so the Governor, finding that he could not change their determination to fight, informed Lieutenant Frank that he had better attack them, which was done, with results as follows:

The Scouts charged the band, about three hundred bolomen, led by Valero. The enemy put up a stubborn and determined defense and made several desperate assaults, arriving several times within a few feet of the Scouts' lines. The fight lasted one hour and a half, when the band was broken up and driven from their intrenchments. Later they reassembled, about 100 strong, in a cane field three miles northwest of Catarman. Here Lieutenant Frank struck them again and after about one hour's fighting again succeeded in breaking up the band. The Scouts' casualties were two wounded; the enemy's loss in killed was between seventy and one hundred. They carried no fire arms, but were all armed with two or more bolos.

After the fight one platoon of this company returned to Cagayan leaving the other platoon to continue hunting down remnants of the band. On the 28th of May, the platoon left behind also returned bringing in 40 prisoners who had surrendered during the few days just preceding that date. The second platoon encountered on several occasions small parties of insurgents ranging in strength from two to eight, and reported eighteen killed all told. The island of Camaguin is now quiet; a detachment of twenty-one Scouts remains at Catarman but has been ordered returned to Cagayan.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The officers serving as adjutants general at these headquarters were as follows:

Captain Robert H. Noble, 3rd Infantry, October 1 to 16, 1902 (Captain Noble was also adjutant general of the

Fifth Separate Brigade from July 1 to September 30, 1903); 1st Lieutenant Hugh A. Drum, 27th Infantry, A.D.C., from October 16 to November 19, 1902; Captain George H. Shelton, 11th Infantry, from November 19 to December 22, 1902; 1st Lieutenant Hugh A. Drum, 27th Infantry, A.D.C., acting assistant adjutant general from December 5, 1902, to February 23, 1903; Major Walter L. Finley, U. S. Cavalry, A. A. G., from December 22, 1902, to the present time; Captain George H. Shelton, 11th Infantry, acting assistant adjutant general from December 22, 1902, to June 9, 1903; 1st Lieutenant Geo. V. H. Moseley, 1st Cavalry, acting assistant adjutant general from March 19 to May 12, 1903; and Captain Walter H. Gordon, 18th Infantry, acting assistant adjutant general from May 14, 1903, to the present time.

The clerical force of the adjutant general's department consists of three (3) civilian clerks and two (2) civilian messengers, seventeen (17) enlisted clerks and three (3) enlisted messengers. Various efforts have been made to secure an increase in allowance of civilian clerks but without avail. The system of utilizing enlisted men as clerks is highly unsatisfactory because they are continually being relieved; generally by the time they have become reasonably familiar with the work of the office their relief becomes imperative requiring the detailing of others who must also be instructed in the work consuming valuable time of the permanent clerks. The work of the adjutant general's office is of considerable magnitude and more civilian clerks should be allowed. A tour of two and one half years of duty in the Philippines would appear to be a reasonable length of time for U. S. civil service clerks; more than that works on their constitution and diminishes their capacity for work.

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The usual inspections of troops, stations, staff departments, and accounts of officers charged with the custody and

disbursing of public funds, have been made by the various officers of the inspector general's department who have been on duty at these headquarters. During the year, 592 Inventory and Inspection Reports were disposed of, the approximate value of property and stores condemned being \$172,730.13, and of that continued in the service, \$12,946.41. Ten (10) special investigations were made and reports rendered. Two investigations are now in progress. Since March of this year all proceedings of boards of survey have been referred to the inspector general for review, the total number so acted upon being 200.

The inspector general's suggestion that a suitable bolo be manufactured and issued to Scout organizations, is noteworthy and deserving of a trial. The bolo is the most effective weapon that can be placed in the hands of a Filipino, and such an instrument would materially increase the efficiency of our native auxiliaries.

Inspections of affairs of post staff officers, who are often young and inexperienced, have frequently revealed a laxness on their part, and records and accounts are meager and improperly kept. This condition of affairs should be rectified by commanding officers giving their personal attention to this matter and seeing that the transactions of their several staff officers are strictly in accordance with regulations and existing orders. A complete set of requisite books and forms should be kept by all.

For detailed report of the inspector general, see appendix "C."

JUDGE ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

For the fiscal year, one (1) commissioned officer was tried by general court martial (final action yet unknown), and 270 enlisted men, of which 22 were acquitted, 3 sentence disapproved, and 105 dishonorably discharged. Twelve men while awaiting sentence were discharged for the good of the service in November, 1902, per cablegram from the War

Department, dated November 4, 1902. At the time of the breaking up of the Department of South Philippines and Fifth Separate Brigade, twenty (20) general court martial proceedings were forwarded to the Commanding General of the Division for final review, per telegraphic instructions from Division Headquarters, dated October 2, 1902.

In the Department of South Philippines for the period from July 1 to September 30, 1902, ninety (90) enlisted men were tried by general court martial, or about 1 per cent. of the average present strength; in the Department of the Visayas for nine months ending June 30, 1903, 180 trials, or about 4 per cent. of actual present strength.

Trials by Summary Court during the year aggregated 4595 (3426 different men being tried), with 81 acquittals and 15 disapprovals.

For detailed report of Judge Advocate of Dept., see appendix "D."

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The clothing on hand and received during the year is sufficient in quantity and of good quality. The campaign hat without the corrugated sweat band and ventilator is most desirable. Tan shoes are preferred. Light woolen underwear is in demand. On account of the prevalence of white ants in the Philippines it is recommended that all clothing be put in boxes lined with petroleum paper. The present issue of khaki fades rapidly, which defect should receive attention with a view to being remedied. It is further recommended that two hip pockets be placed in trousers issued, and that brass buttons be used as they withstand both rust and the rough handling incident to laundry work in this country. The hooks of leggins should also be of brass and should be fastened more securely with a thin brass circle of plate. Complaints have been received that the last of the shoes issued is too low, which defect should be rectified, as at present many enlisted men of necessity draw a larger shoe than needed in order to

get a higher instep. The adoption of the mosquito bar issued by the medical department is recommended as many mosquitoes are small enough to enter the holes in the bar issued by the quartermater's department.

BUILDING OPERATIONS.

A building for quarters for teamsters and mechanics was erected on the beach in the rear of Cuartel de Infanteria, Cebu, Cebu, at a cost of two hundred and seventy-five dollars. Building operations are now going on at Camp Hartshorne, Camp Bumpus, Camp Downes, and Camp Jossman. At Camp Hartshorne twenty-four buildings were authorized, and good progress is reported, both in construction of buildings and in repair to roads leading to the site. At Camp Connell forty buildings were authorized; excellent progress is being made and all rented buildings will be vacated in the near future. At Camp Bumpus, thirty-one buildings were authorized; work is progressing rapidly. Camp Downes was authorized twenty-five buildings; fair progress is being made. At Camp Jossman sixty-seven buildings have been authorized, the construction of which has been considerably delayed owing to the change made in site of the cantonment. The change made, however, was decidedly for the better and farther inland, in a better location with regard to water supply, soil, and general sanitary condition. An excellent graded road has been constructed from the wharf to the new camp. The wharf, also, is fast nearing completion. At Cebu the old Cuartel de Infanteria is to be converted into barracks sufficiently large for the accommodation of one battalion of infantry.

All buildings rented have received repairs when necessary at owners' expense; minor repairs have been made to government buildings by material and labor on hand. Total cost of repairs made on public buildings for fiscal year approximates two thousand five hundred dollars.

For construction of buildings throughout the Department, other than those mentioned above for new posts, three

thousand two hundred and eighty-seven dollars and sixty cents have been expended. For rentals throughout the Department the amount expended will approximate sixty-five thousand four hundred and ninety-one dollars. Great reduction has been made in order that the cost of rentals could be utilized for construction of shelter for troops. A number of buildings are still rented for storehouses.

WATER SUPPLY.

A fifty thousand gallon reservoir has been completed at Camp Jossman, at which station a distilling plant is now in operation. Condensing plants are in operation at Cebu, Tacloban and Iloilo. Forbes-Waterhouse sterilizers are successfully used at other posts. At Ormoc, Laguan and Camp Jossman, water is procured from springs; at Borongan, Calbayog and Cebu from wells.

TRANSPORTATION.

Land transportation on hand is considered sufficient. Escort wagons would be more durable if bodies were banded on inside with iron held down by bolts and nuts, latter spread. Land transportation used for civil government will approximate two hundred and twenty-five dollars in value, and that used for engineer work (roads) two thousand five hundred dollars. The following is a list of means of land transportation in Department: 498 horses, 201 mules, 8 ponies, 22 bulls, 19 ambulances, 180 wagons, 70 carts, and one buckboard.

Under water transportation, the following is a list of the vessels, and classes, in use in the Department: 4 steamers, 10 launches, 15 lorchas, 14 lighters, 24 row-boats, 2 praos, 1 scow, 1 whale boat, 1 casco, 1 cutter, and 2 cargo boats. All vessels should be provided with a sufficient supply of rope nets for the purpose of discharging or loading cargo. A number of times, piles of boxes being hoisted have fallen to the hold and injured employees; this would be obviated if the nets were secure and sufficiently strong. The permanent posts

in the Department are badly in need of wharves, the cost of which would ultimately be offset by the lessening of the expense involved in the use of lighters for the purpose of loading and unloading cargos.

ANIMALS.

The supply has been sufficient. Reports from Tacloban, and Ormoc (Leyte), Calbayog, Samar, and San Joaquin, Panay, show very little sickness among animals at those stations. At Iloilo considerable sickness has occurred; glanders and surra especially, having made great havoc among horses. Surra alone had caused the death of practically all of the horses of two troops of cavalry. At Cebu the sickness among animals has been psuedo-farcy, glanders, tetanus, catarrh, grease canker, dhobie itch and nasal gleet.

Animals killed in action and died of wounds,—None.
 Killed on account of sickness,—16 horses and 5 mules;
 Died of disease,—71 horses and 41 mules;
 Drowned,—2 horses and 2 mules;

Estimated value of animals above enumerated, original cost to the U. S., \$28,560.00.

SUPPLIES.

Supplies have been sufficient and good in quality. Losses in transit would be materially reduced if boxes were reduced to a weight of from fifty to one hundred pounds and strapped well with galvanized iron. Cans containing paints, oil, etc., should be of extra heavy tin. Naphtholeum should be used for destruction of insects.

COLD STORAGE FACILITIES.

Since February 1, 1903, the ice plants have been operated by the quartermaster's department. During the month of May, 1903, 173,710 pounds of ice were manufactured at Iloilo at an average cost of 30 ⁹/₁₀ cents per 100 pounds. Cold storage is also in operation at Tacloban where about fifteen days' supply of fresh meat can be taken care of; cold storage capacity at Iloilo appears ample. Ice plants are also in operation at Camp Jossman, Calbayog and Cebu.

For detailed report of the Chief Quartermaster of the Department, see appendix "E."

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

To this department (subsistence) is due much credit for its excellent system of supplying the command, even under the most trying circumstances, particularly lack of necessary means of transportation. Comparatively few complaints against either quality or quantity of commissary stores have been received, and apparent satisfaction exists everywhere. Occasionally some isolated post off the regular route of the supply boats reported lack of a few staple articles, but these cases were exceptional and all are amply provided at all times. The continual changes of stations and transfers of troops occasioned heavy work for the subsistence department. Since the breaking out of hostilities in Surigao Province and that immediate vicinity, all the garrisons there have been supplied from the Iloilo and Tacloban depots.

Soon after the establishment of this Department, the abandonment of small stations and removal of the garrisons to the permanent posts was begun, necessitating the reshipment of large quantities of subsistence stores and supplies, a very large percentage of which were in a sadly deteriorated condition when received and absolutely worthless when received at the depots and permanent stations, showing a manifest neglect on the part of many concerned, and causing heavy losses. This transfer in supplies, occasioned heavy work at the supply depots, numerous boards of survey, and accounts for the heavy losses of subsistence stores reported in the first year of a new department.

The commissary depot at Cebu was discontinued shortly after the change of Departments (from South Philippines to Visayas) materially reducing expenses in the subsistence department, approximately \$500.00 monthly.

FRESH BEEF.

The supply of fresh beef to the troops has ever been a serious problem. During the past year this problem has been fairly well solved by the regular trips of meat boats from Manila, and the inauguration of cold storage rooms where practicable. At most stations at the present time ice "boxes" are used for the preservation of fresh beef. The cold storage at Iloilo has given entire satisfaction and its capacity has been sufficient for the storing of fresh beef consumed at Iloilo and Camp Jossman, as well as the regular supply heretofore of small garrisons in the near vicinity. The issue of native beef is virtually impracticable due to the difficulty in procuring it and the exorbitant prices charged; it is inferior in quality and sustaining properties, and in view of the vast difference in the prices and quality of it and the frozen Australian beef, the latter is much more desirable and by far the more economical, even could the former be obtained.

At present the supply of various stations is at times irregular, but as a general rule each station is twice a month visited by one of the two refrigerator steamers—SEWARD and WRIGHT,—excepting a few which are reached by small department boats or commercial steamers. The supply, though somewhat irregular, is effected in a very satisfactory manner and but few complaints are registered against either the supply or the quality. Since October 1, 1902, 634,305 pounds of fresh beef and mutton have been received from Manila, the total losses reported by boards of survey amounting to 19,635 pounds, or a trifle more than 3 per cent. of the actual amount received, indicative of great care and attention being displayed in its transit.

FLOUR.

The practice of packing flour in hermetically sealed tins has apparently failed in its purpose. From examination of the tins it is believed that their failure to resist the ravages of

heat, moisture and tropical insect pests is due in a large measure to faulty and defective sealing at the factory. It is recommended that all articles in tins be subjected to the water test before acceptance.

SODA CRACKERS.

The soda crackers are usually found in a perfect state of preservation, free from marks of deterioration, and the tins also in apparently perfect condition, but upon opening the tins a rank, distasteful odor is emitted and the crackers are bitter, unpalatable and absolutely unsalable. Proceedings of boards of survey during the year show action on soda crackers amounting to 22,342 pounds valued at \$2,167.17 and all, so far as ascertainable, the product of the American Biscuit Co., and the Pacific Coast Biscuit Co.

TOBACCO.

Heavy losses of tobacco are reported, apparently due to the moist atmosphere of the islands. Most of the losses, however, pertain to tobacco long on hand.

LOSSES OF FUNDS AND STORES.

Proceedings of boards of survey show losses of subsistence funds to the amount of \$6,226.48 during the past year. At Cebu, \$526.33 alleged to have been stolen from the commissary building together with the iron safe in which it was kept; at Calbayog, Samar, \$5,700.15 alleged to been lost in the mail.

The money value of subsistence stores and supplies lost and destroyed in Department South Philippines and Department of the Visayas, during the period from July 1 to September 30, 1902, and the period October 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903, respectively, as reported by boards of survey, amounted as follows: damaged, \$72,689.18; shortages, \$3,547.66; stolen, \$765.09; lost in transit, \$348.23, making a grand total of \$77,350.16. Of these losses, the greatest were in bacon, potatoes, flour, canned vegetables, etc.

FILIPINO RATION.

The issuance of a larger amount of the regular army ration to Philippine Scouts, say in proportion to his comparative size, to the white soldier, is recommended as he is expected to do practically the same work.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The chief surgeon reports that the medical supplies furnished are of excellent quality and adequately sufficient in quantity, and that all stations are amply supplied at all times with necessary medicines. The ordinary diseases prevailing have been well handled by the medical officers and the mortality has been much less than at any time since the arrival of United States troops in this section of the Philippines. At the time of the organization of the Department, cholera raged in almost every island, but with the assistance of the civil boards of health, the medical department was able to cope with the situation with surprisingly favorable results. This disease has now practically disappeared excepting in Northern Mindanao, where it is making considerable headway, and a few sporadic cases generally. The troops sustained a loss of 47 men from cholera during the year.

The present strength of the medical department is 36 officers (26 being Contract Surgeons), 32 non-commissioned officers, and 113 privates. About six surgeons and thirty corps men are needed.

Dental treatment has been dispensed generally to the troops. A base dental station has been established and maintained at Iloilo.

Base hospitals had been in operation at Iloilo, Panay, and Tacloban, Leyte, until December 31, 1902, when the latter was discontinued.

Total number of deaths in Department of South Philippines and Department of the Visayas at end of fiscal year, 110

among troops, and 11 among civilians attached to the Army, caused by wounds, cholera, smallpox, malaria, beriberi alcoholism, etc.

The valuable services of the medical officers have been faithfully and efficiently rendered, and their strict attention to duty is commendable.

The health of the troops in general has been good.

For detailed report of the Chief Surgeon of the Department, see appendix "G".

PAY DEPARTMENT.

The troops in the Department are paid bi-monthly, with the exception of those stationed in Iloilo and Camp Jossman, Guimaras. Until recently a paymaster had been stationed at Tacloban, Leyte, who was charged with the payment of troops on the Islands of Samar and Leyte, but it was found that, owing to a dearth of water transportation at Tacloban, payments on the islands mentioned could be as easily, if not more easily made from Iloilo and the paymaster there stationed was ordered to Iloilo for station. The stations on the east coast of Samar are paid from Manila.

For detailed report of the Chief Paymaster of the Department, see appendix "H".

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

During the year the engineer department has carried on road bridge work throughout the Department, as well as making all necessary repairs on such.

The Philippine Commission having appropriated \$5,000 U. S. currency, for raising wrecks in the Iloilo River, proposals for the removal of such were submitted, contract awarded, and work pushed with all possible speed. By February 14, 1903, the wrecks had all been removed.

In August of last year, the survey of the Iloilo Harbor was completed and recommendations of the needs of the Port of Iloilo submitted, but no appropriation has as yet been made for improvements.

Company F, 2nd Battalion of Engineers, has been steadily occupied in making surveys of the various cantonments, and on road, bridge, and repair work.

For detailed report of the Engineer Officer of the Department, see appendix 'I'.

SIGNAL DEPARTMENT.

There are in this Department 22 telegraph and telephone stations operated and maintained by the Signal Corps distributed by islands as follows: Panay, 6; Leyte, 4; Cebu, 4; Negros, 5; Samar, 2; and Guimaras, 1. During the year 3 telegraph stations were opened while 19 telegraph and 19 telephone stations were closed by reason of withdrawal of troops from those stations, and transfer of lines to the Insular Government. One telegraph station is maintained in Iloilo as a "test" station for enlisted men of the line detailed for instruction in telegraphy. There are in operation 6 local telephone systems with a total number of 142 phones, and this number will probably be increased when all structures at the permanent cantonments have been completed, but which will not be for some time yet to come.

The following table shows the telegraph and telephone mileage in the Department:

ISLAND	TELEGRAPH	TELEPHONE
Panay	232	20
Negros	189	0
Cebu	74	20
Leyte and Samar	86	0
TOTAL.....	581	40

Total miles of military cable, 358,267.

During the year 87 miles of telegraph and 208 miles of telephone line, and 47,931 miles of deep sea cable were transferred to the Civil Government.

For the eleven months terminating May 31, 1903, 163,737 messages were sent, 169,878 received, and 509,452 relayed, making a total of 841,019 messages handled. The tolls for the same amounted to \$18,876.75.

Company H, Signal Corps, has been charged with the operation and maintenance of the lines of communication in this Department in the past year. Its work has been done in a very efficient and commendable manner.

For detailed report of the Department, see appendix "J".

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

An adequate supply of ordnance and ordnance stores is always kept on hand for immediate use. Surplus stores, old ammunition, and unserviceable ordnance capable of being repaired, are turned in to Manila depot. Few stores are on hand in excess of needs of Department. Target material is about exhausted.

Detailed report of Acting Ordnance Officer attached, marked "K".

FORT SAN PEDRO 22.

The following statement shows the number of prisoners confined, released, etc., for the year:

Confined:

Americans (general)	122
Native Military (general).....	4
Native Civil (sentence provost court).....	27

TOTAL.....	153
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Released:

Americans	69
Native Military	0
Native Civil.....	24

TOTAL.....	93
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Transferred:

Americans.....	12
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Deaths:

Americans.....	1
Native Civil.....	3

TOTAL.....	4
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Total in confinement, June 30, 1903	44
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Since October, 1902, 20 to 25 prisoners have been employed daily on the construction of a government pier at Camp

Jossman Landing and returned each evening to the prison; other work performed by prisoners has been ordinary police duty in and around post and prison. During the year 10 escapes were attempted, but none were successful, the prisoners generally being returned within a few hours. The health of the prisoners has been good; 75% of the deaths during the year were due to beriberi.

Prisoners are permitted to purchase stamps and tobacco to the amount of \$1.00 per month and allowed reading matter under reasonable restrictions. (A small library was presented to the prison by the Secretary of the Iloilo Branch of the Y. M. C. A.)

For detailed report of the Prison Officer, Fort San Pedro 22, see appendix "L".

For list of stations occupied and distribution of troops, see appendix "M".

For statement of Army and Chartered Transports in the Department for the year July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1903, see appendix "N".

Respectfully submitted:

THEODORE J. WINT.

*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.*

(Appendices not printed).

APPENDIX II

Headquarters Department of Mindanao.

Zamboanga, P. I., June 30, 1903.

Adjutant General,

United States Army,

Washington, D. C.

(Through Headquarters, Division of the Philippines).

SIR:

I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations in this Department from the date of my assignment to command, to date of my being relieved.

I reached Zamboanga, July 4, 1902, pursuant to Special Order, No. 142, Division Philippines, and on July 10th relieved General G. W. Davis of the Command of the 7th Separate Brigade. Herewith is a statement showing the troops in the Department at that date; also the changes and present strength of Command.

TROOPS IN 7TH SEPARATE BRIGADE ON JULY 10, 1902.	TROOPS JOINING SINCE JULY 10, 1902.	TROOPS LEAVING SINCE JULY 10, 1902.	TROOPS AT PRESENT IN DEPARTMENT.
Entire 15th Cav..... Entire 27th Inf.....		Entire 27th Inf., June 7, 1903.....	Entire 15th Cav.
10th Inf., 10 Companies.....	10th Inf., Co. A, July 19, 1902 and Co. B, July 20, 1902.....	10th Inf., Cos. C, D, K, L and M, May 15, 1903.....	10th Inf., Hqrs., Cos. A, B, E, F, G, H, and I.
Co. F, Engineers....		Co. F, Engineers, Nov. 24, 1902.....	
Co. G, Engineers....		Co. G, Engineers, May 15, 1903.....	Co. E, Engineers.
25th Bat. F. Art....	Co. E, Engineers, May 13, 1903.....	25th Bat. F. Art., Apr. 24, 1903.....	
	17th Bat. F. Art., Mar. 5, 1903.....		17th Battery Field Artillery.
	11th Inf. 2d Bat. July 27, 1902.....		11th Inf., 2d Bat- talion.
	Entire 23d Inf., June 1, 1903.....		Entire 23d Inf.
	28th Inf., 3d Bat. Oct. 11, 1903.....		Entire 28th Inf.
	28th Inf., Cos. A, D, F, G, Jan. 17, 1903.		
	25th Inf., Cos. B, C, E, and H, Jan. 31, 1903.....		
	29th Inf., Cos. I, and K, Oct. 1, 1902.....	29th Inf., Cos. I, and K, Apr. 24, 1903.....	
49th and 50th Cos. Phil. Scouts.....	48th Co. P. S., Oct. 1, 1902.....		48th, 49th and 50th Cos., P. S.

Aggregate strength of Command on July 10, 1902 was.....4596.

Aggregate strength of Command at present is.....4516.

On October 1st, the Brigade was discontinued and the Department of Mindanao established, containing the territory heretofore covered by Brigade lines and adding the island of Paragua. When I assumed command, all the island of Mindanao, excepting the northern provinces of Misamis and Surigao, and all the Jolo archipelago were under military jurisdiction and have so remained to present date. While there are scattered settlements of Filipinos at several places along the sea shore, the main population consists of Moros and Pagan tribes. The Filipinos that inhabit the sea coast towns live about as is usual throughout the Philippine Islands. They raise considerable rice and other food stuffs, seek employment in various ways and are a very peaceful community. Ladronism as it exists in the other islands is not known in Military Mindanao. The Moros live in villages scattered along the sea shores, and are found in the interior, noticeably in the high open lands surrounding Lake Lanao and the Rio Grande valley. They have no general form of government, are broken up and divided into numberless tribes and clans, each ruled by a Sultan or Datto. These petty chiefs are practically independent of any superior control and are powerful in proportion to their following and their weapons of war. They make peace and alliances with each other; fall out and quarrel whenever any disagreement springs up; wage war on each other; and are generally in a state of perpetual fear and distrust of neighbors; this engenders the almost universal habit of carrying weapons. Fire arms are a great advantage and the average Moro will take almost any risk and commit any crime to secure a gun. They are not well armed as a whole and most of their guns are of obsolete pattern and ammunition is very scarce and hard to obtain. Every man carries a hand weapon and it varies in shape and size in different localities; many carry lances which are perhaps their most effective weapons against Europeans. From early times they have used small cannon, called Lantacas

for defense of their cottas. These guns were evidently made by the Chinese and probably traded to the Moros for such articles as had money value.

While all Moros have many characteristics in common they vary in some particulars according to locality. The shore Moros are generally fishermen and live largely by toiling in the sea. The Lake Moros are farmers in a rude way and raise such crops as the soil and the climate permit. All Moros are weavers of cloth and are expert in making mats, baskets and various articles from native fibers. They are also expert workers in iron and produce hand weapons of various designs for war, and a working bolo that answers many purposes.

The sea Moros are expert sailors and go about in all weather in their small boats often loaded to the water's edge. The inland Moros have many ponies and were formerly well provided with carabao, but in common with others have lost most of their work cattle by disease. They have no education as a class. The priests or panditas are generally conversant with Arabic characters and some of the chiefs are similarly informed. In communicating with them the Arabic letter is used and generally an answer is returned, probably written by the Pandita. This limited education has been kept up by the selection of boys willing to study and who replace their instructors as time goes on. The impossibility to converse directly with the Moros, and having often to use both Moro and Spanish interpreters who in turn require a Spanish and an English interpreter has made communication difficult and has probably led to misunderstandings.

The feeling of the Mindanao Moros towards the Americans presents the two opposite phases of friendship and hostility. The Moros inhabiting the Rio Grande valley have been uniformly friendly. The Moros about Zamboanga and along the coast in both directions have never given trouble. The Lake Moros are divided; some accepted our presence with good will, others stood aloof and are standing aloof to-day, while

others were actively hostile and opposed to any advance into their country. This is due no doubt to the personal inclinations of the various chiefs.

The Moro problem as presented in Mindanao and in the Jolo archipelago, is essentially different; in Mindanao we are under no treaty obligations, and the way is open, following military control, to inaugurate such form of government as time and circumstances may prove advisable. In Jolo the problem is much more complicated; while the Bates treaty clearly establishes sovereign rights, the interior economy and general management of the inhabitants is left in Moro hands and to Moro methods. So far we have managed to avoid any conflict with these people by using the utmost caution and patience. Anarchy prevails in Jolo as elsewhere in the country. The Sultan while nominal head of the people has very little actual control and the more powerful chiefs do about as they please without any regard to his wishes or directions. I think it can be stated as a fact that neither the Sultan nor the leading chiefs care to try conclusions with the Americans, but these people have never felt the power of our government in any way. They are well armed (for Moros) and in their ignorance are apt to overestimate their strength. Without going into a discussion of the Bates treaty, I do not believe any development can take place or any advance be made, so long as the treaty stands. It was made, as I am informed, to meet and cover an emergency; its use as a temporary measure has passed and we should now replace it by some wise and just measures that would allow us to get into closer contact and have more direct control and supervision of these people.

The theatre of active military operations has been confined to the Lake Lanao country and the road leading from Malabang to Camp Vicars. When I assumed command, the expedition under General Baldwin was already established at Camp Vicars after a hard march from the sea and a severe fight at Fort Pande Patin. A wagon road was being constructed by the labor of soldiers on route surveyed and laid

out by Captain Morrow of the Engineers. This road was commenced about June 1st, and was completed to Camp Vicars, twenty-two miles, by November 15th. It is a monument to the energy and skill of the American soldiers and represents months of hard work and daily discomfort, which was borne without complaint. When I first visited Camp Vicars in company with General Davis about July 7th, General Baldwin had received notice of his promotion and was preparing to leave the Department. This change placed Captain J. J. Pershing, 15th Cavalry, in the command of Camp Vicars. During July and August disaffected Moros were continually firing into Camp Vicars at night, assaulting outposts, and raiding along the road to Malabang. These attacks were reported to Division Headquarters, and General Chaffee, then commanding the Division, directed that some active measures might be taken to put a stop to the outbreaks. Accordingly on September 10th, I proceeded to Camp Vicars taking seven additional companies of Infantry. Expeditions were sent into the Butig country where it was known that Datto Oali and his people lived and who had acknowledged participation in raids and defied the soldiers. Captain Pershing visited this country first with a considerable command; and later Captain Helmick, 10th Infantry, with three companies and a platoon of Artillery, covered the same ground. The forts and cottas belonging to Oali were destroyed; some of his people killed and he was driven out of the country. He has never appeared since as a leader and is reported dead. Two expeditions were sent into the Maciu country at the south end of the Lake under Captain Pershing; he had several minor engagements, destroyed a number of forts and cottas and severely punished these Maciu Moros, who refused to return Government property in their possession and who were defiant and actively hostile. As a result of this lesson the road from Vicars to Malabang has been free from any attacks since that date. The camp at Vicars has seldom been fired into.

Another branch of the Moros inhabit a place on the west shore of the Lake and north of Camp Vicars; their main village is at Bacolod, near which place they were actively engaged in constructing a large fort. It was the original plan to proceed against them on the return from Maciu, but General Chaffee advised giving them time to think over matters and wished to avoid any more bloodshed if disaffected Moros could be won over by peaceful means. Several letters were sent to the Sultan of Bacolod and every effort made to cultivate friendship but the letters were returned with more or less evasive and impudent replies, and finally I notified the Sultan that he had either to be a friend or be prepared to take the consequences. Meanwhile, these Moros continued strengthening their large fort, and finally considered it secure from capture. The cholera had made its appearance in the Lake country and spread rapidly over the entire section; this necessitated strict quarantine at Vicars and a suspension of field operations.

Early in April, it was determined to make a thorough exploration of the west shore of the Lake as far as Marahui at the North end. Captain Pershing had received assurances of good will and friendship from the various rancherias along the west shore except Bacolod and anticipated no opposition except at that point. He left Camp Vicars April 5th, with four companies of Infantry, two field batteries, and three troops of Cavalry. As there were no roads and a difficult trail, everything had to be transported by pack animals. Several friendly Dattos living near Vicars assisted with native ponies. A letter was sent to the Sultan of Bacolod notifying him of our intentions and advising him to make peace on the arrival of the command in his country; further warning him of the consequences in case he attacked the soldiers or defied our Government. No reply was received and on reaching the vicinity of Bacolod, the outpost was attacked at night and several men wounded. Red flags were flying on the fort, a Moro challenge to war. Captain Pershing immediately invested the place,

securing favorable ground for his mortars and mountain guns. The mortars were not so effective as expected, but Captain McNair pushed his Vicars Maxims up to within three hundred yards and did very effective work. After two days' shelling and the use of small arms when practicable, the fort was assaulted and captured by infantry and dismounted cavalry. It was a large earthwork covered over by a bamboo shelter and surrounded by a ditch some thirty feet deep and about the same width. Trees were cut down and thrown into the ditch; bamboo ladders were thrown across this fill and the men crossed to the top of the wall. The effective shelling had demoralized the Moros and many got away and escaped in boats during the two nights' siege; the remaining few were shortly overcome and thanks to care and able management, the place was captured with very slight loss, the total being one killed and fourteen wounded during the entire siege. The fort was set on fire and everything combustible completely destroyed. Two miles further on the trail another fort was discovered, occupied probably by the same tribe. It was shelled and after a slight defence abandoned. From this point to Marahui the march was uninterrupted, and the Moros met the soldiers with expressions of friendship and goodwill. The return march to Camp Vicars was made without incident. In repassing Bacolod the town was completely deserted, but care was taken not to injure or molest any property. I have enlarged rather freely on this incident as it shows the character and disposition of these strange people, and the best method of attacking their strongholds. Bacolod was probably the strongest fort in the Lake Lanao country and most Moros considered it impregnable. Its easy reduction can hardly fail to have a lasting effect.

In accordance with instructions from the Division Commander, an expedition under command of Captain J. J. Pershing, 15th Cavalry, left Camp Vicars on April 2d to explore the south and east shores of Lake Lanao. The command consisted of four companies, 27th Infantry; three Troops, 15th

Cavalry; the 17th Field Battery; a pack train of eighty mules; and a native pack train belonging to several friendly Dattos. The command passed around the south shore and through the Maciu country without opposition, the inhabitants along the route professing friendship. On reaching the vicinity of Taraca a large village on the east shore, it was found that preparations had been made to oppose a further advance. The population in this section is dense and the many cottas and rancherias along the several streams and Lake shore had combined to fight. No fort was found so formidable as at Bacolod, but many smaller earthworks, some of considerable strength. The artillery was used as in former attacks, and in proper time the infantry assaulted. Some ten forts were taken and the Moro loss was heavy; a number of prisoners were taken and released next day. A large amount of weapons, including cannon of various design and about sixty small arms, was captured and destroyed.

This capture of arms was a severe loss to the Moros. We lost two men killed and several wounded. Our vast superiority in arms and discipline gives us every advantage and if our troops are properly handled our loss should never be heavy in conflict with these people. The command met with no further opposition and reached Madaya on April 8th. The country along the east shore was found low and marshy at many points and was difficult to traverse even at the end of a long dry season. It was determined to cross the command over to Marahui, across the Agus river. This was done without loss and the command returned to Camp Vicars along the west shore. Some Moros near Bacolod fired on the Cavalry flanks and were severely punished, otherwise the march was uninterrupted and without incident. The Moros along the route were friendly and were not interfered with in any way.

This is probably the first body of white men that has ever marched around the Lake and the effect on the Moros must be salutary. Captain Pershing deserves great credit for his able handling of this difficult problem. He and his command

had to fight a savage foe in an unknown country; to overcome great natural obstacles and to face a dreadful epidemic, prevailing throughout that country. The Lake country no longer remains an unknown land. We now have a correct and complete map of the entire lake shores and of the country between it and the sea to the North and South. The high mountain ranges to the West and East can be explored at a later day if deemed advisable.

Early in October, 1902, it was determined to construct another wagon road to the Lake, taking Iligan as the base and Marahui as the objective. The Spaniards had constructed a road between these points and had carried small gun boats to the Lake in sections and used them to some extent. This Spanish road was found impracticable in many places for our purpose and a new line was surveyed which joins the Spanish road some twelve miles from Iligan. The garrison at Iligan consisted of five companies of the 10th Infantry and two troops of the 15th Cavalry. The 28th Infantry was sent down from Manila and on November 1st, work on the road was commenced. As this additional force brought two Regimental Headquarters with two colonels at the same post, the Senior Colonel, Foote, 28th Infantry, was placed in command and Colonel Noble with Headquarters, 10th Infantry, was transferred to the important station of Cottabato in the Rio Grande valley. At first no native labor could be secured and the soldiers did all the work, but as we got into the country, the Moros began to seek employment and at the present time a large number are regularly employed. For several miles after leaving the sea this road was very difficult to construct, and it was only by the untiring energy of the officers and the willingness of the enlisted men that the natural obstacles were overcome. The road at this date is fast approaching completion and when the suspension bridge over the Agus river is in place another highway will be available to the interior of Mindanao. The length of this road is about twenty-one miles or nearly the same length as the road from Malabang to Vicars. With these

roads into the Lake country, the Moro problem in this section, so far as supervision and contact goes, should be well in hand.

If it is contemplated to change the customs and habits of these people and bring them to an intelligent understanding and appreciation of our methods of government, it will be necessary to eradicate about all the customs that have heretofore governed their habits of life. They are an essentially different people from us in thought, word and action and their religion will be a serious bar to any efforts towards christian civilization. So long as Mohammedanism prevails, Anglo Saxon civilization will make slow headway. They have already learned the futility of open warfare against organized troops, but their propensity to kill and steal, remains, and so long as any white man inhabits their country or attempts to travel about, they will assault whenever a good opportunity offers. This is not entirely savage instinct, rather a settled conviction that such methods are right and proper.

At the present time there seems to be no system of general control or government amongst the Moros. Every Datto and Sultan is a law unto himself and has the power of life and death over his followers. Some seem to have more or less influence outside their rancherias, but it is generally in the shape of counsel. No war lords are paramount, and they come together or stay apart as the numerous petty chiefs decide; and even when banded together for any special purpose, there does not seem to any ruling leader. This absence of combination and concerted action has been of great advantage to us. It would perhaps be as well not to inaugurate any methods towards concentration of power and authority.

For the present at least, military control seems about the most practical government for the Moros, and this applies as well to the Jolo Moros as to those inhabiting Mindanao. In consulting with officers who have been closely identified with these people for several years past, it seems to be the general opinion that we should control them through

their Sultan and Dattos. We can't assume complete personal supervision; and to remove their natural leaders and leave them without any control, would add to, rather than decrease, the already existing anarchy. If the Dattos are held responsible and their authority recognized, they will generally work in favor of order, and if a Military Chief is at hand they can be easily guided to acknowledge his authority and accept his decision on differences among themselves. This strikes me as the most practicable solution of the problem as it stands to-day and by careful and just management the way may be gradually opened for some form of civil government at a later day.

Regarding the so-called Pagan tribes who inhabit the mountains of Mindanao, very little is known owing to the limited contact with them. I can add no important information to the interesting and valuable paper already submitted by Major General G. W. Davis, in his annual report of this Department for 1902.

The Jolo group of islands has formed a provisional district, and for the past year has been under the supervision of Colonel W. M. Wallace, 15th Cavalry. Many complications have arisen with these Jolo Moros, and at one time armed conflict seemed imminent; additional troops were hurried to Jolo, and the Navy concentrated a number of gunboats in that vicinity. Fortunately quiet was restored without resort to arms. Colonel Wallace has had a delicate situation to handle and by patience and sound judgment has preserved order in his district.

In conclusion I wish to add a word of praise for the officers and soldiers who have served in the Department of Mindanao during the past year. It has not been the good fortune of all to do equally conspicuous service, but all have had to undergo equal hardship. The danger of assassination has been present at times to all and every organization in Mindanao has done its share of hard manual labor in constructing roads and making possible the holding and gradual

extension of our authority in the Lake country. For months they have had to face a dreadful epidemic both in Jolo and Mindanao which is perhaps a greater mental strain than actual conflict. It is a great pleasure to say that the command has proved fully equal to the extraordinary and trying duties required of it, and by their humane and kind treatment of the natives have materially assisted the Government in its future dealing with the Moros.

Extracts from reports of several Staff Departments at these Headquarters are herewith submitted and also a Spanish description of the Juramentado which may prove of interest.

Very respectfully,

SAMUEL S. SUMNER,
Brigadier General,
Commanding.

THE JURAMENTADO.

The Moros are accustomed to suffer all the caprices of their despotic authority. The laws of centuries permit the men to be recruited for any purpose whatsoever. The debtor who can not pay becomes, with his family, the slave of the creditor; and the Moros are so indifferent to these conditions that their owners do not encounter any difficulty in making them contract such debts for their own resources. The debtor thus loses all his rights, and his children can be sold throughout the archipelago. He can, however, buy the liberty of his family at the risk of his own life; *i. e.*, for the largest number of Christians whom he can slay. If the debtor accepts this proposition he becomes that moment a Juramentado, knowing perfectly well that if he manages to get into the midst of a Spanish settlement that all hope for escape is dead. Death is therefore certain for all Juramentados, and it is never the case that one repents his imprudence because there are a number of Juramentados assembled to submit themselves to certain rites performed by expert panditas or priests. Alone in the deserted forest, the moonlight adding its rays to the

weird, fantastic scene, they commence their exercises by fasting, reciting and praying over the graves of the departed Juramentados and speaking of the bliss and happiness that is to be theirs in the heaven of Mohammed. When they arrive at a sufficient state of exaltation, but never before, they are sent into a Christian community. As this is a ceremony that interests more or less different families, and a great number of formalities have to be gone through with, it can never be kept absolutely secret, no matter how much it would be to their interest to do so, and thus it is that the Governor of Jolo receives notice that an attack by the Juramentados will be made. But they can never inform him of the exact time when the attack will be made because the Juramentados themselves do not know at what time they will reach the exalted state. At nightfall in the magic splendor of the moon, reverberates in the depth of the forest warlike sounding metal like the everlasting lamenting echo of ever wandering souls; the priest congregates all fame-thirsting youths; speaks of the strong ones who died a noble death in front of the enemy's steel; of the menacing shadows of creditors; of the glory of the hero; and the infamy and slavery for the coward; and of other inexhaustible lives of pleasure where brilliant eyes look upon infinite treasures; and imagination crazes them, they convulsively grasp their sharp kris (sword) and imagine themselves feeling the cold sweat of death on their foreheads. From the damp vapors of the night surge voices, instilling valor into their hearts. The following day they die at an outpost. The first Juramentados of whom we have knowledge, through history or tradition, gave themselves to martyrdom through exaltation of belief. Exalted in their practice of prayer, fasting and making abstractions of all terrestrial pleasures, anxious to gain the paradise offered to all believers of Mohammed, they prepare themselves for the sacrifice imposing upon themselves material mortification, putting strong binding upon their members and resolve to die on the terminal day. They shave their heads carefully,

clothe themselves in clean white clothing (color for mourning among the islanders) and accompanied by their relatives, after arriving at the spot of bloody purification, they take leave from their relatives and present themselves before the largest possible body of armed Christians, calling their attention, provoking them, in search of death and martyrdom. The merit of eternal recompense is to receive cruel blows without a murmur or lament, without a show of agony, or avoidance of suffering, until expiring they lie victims of their own ignorance. These mystic martyrs followed the warriors and were not satisfied in dying but anxious to kill, mixing religious fanaticism with political fervor, never retreating, showing themselves to their enemies and trying to cause the death of the largest number before falling. Their open attacks were followed by ambuscades and surprises, any means seeming proper to gain their martyrdom. The odium of races, the desire to distinguish themselves before their families, the wish to be revenged and many other causes today make the Juramentado. Abuse, scorn or any injury will make assassins of Moros and will convert the greatest coward into a ferocious beast. Take a Moro who has been your friend and force him to leave you and he will make you take a kris and kill him because he will never allow himself to be so dishonored. Tragedies of all kinds among the Moros are credited to the Juramentado. Modern arms have, however, diminished these devils in human form and only the bravest and most fanatical commit themselves for this purpose. There are few panditas to be found who will prepare candidates for martyrdom as their respect for authority cools their religious ardor.

The following extracts from Annual Reports of the several Chiefs of Department Staff Officers are submitted with this report for special consideration.

FROM CHIEF QUARTERMASTER.

LAND TRANSPORTATION.

The land transportation has been barely sufficient for the needs of the Department. Wagons and other vehicles have been supplied in sufficient quantities, but there has been a frequent demand for more draft and pack animals.

FORAGE.

American animals get thin on native forage when much work is required of them, but except when the animal is taxed to its utmost, native grasses can be used to advantage except in a few localities where it grows so rank that there is no nutriment in it. The supply of American hay and oats has been sufficient and of good quality.

WATER TRANSPORTATION.

The arrangement made by the Chief Quartermaster of the Division whereby the supplies for Posts on the north coast of Mindanao are delivered direct via U. S. C. T. "Dr. Hans Jurg Kiaer;" and to Jolo, Malabang and Parang direct via U. S. A. T. "Liscum," has greatly expedited the prompt delivery of supplies required for the comfort and maintenance of troops, as well as affording regular transmission of the mail. The schedule inaugurated for these vessels has been carried out with surprising regularity, especially when the ordinary delays occasioned by rough weather are taken into consideration. Cargoes handled by these vessels have arrived at their destination in better condition than formerly.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPAGE.

Sufficient and generally of good quality. Complaint has been made that Nankeen underwear is of inferior quality and easily torn; that Buckskin gauntlets are sewed with a poor quality of thread and rip easily. The above notation has been made from two posts only. It is thought that it is due to the stock being old.

SUPPLIES.

Sufficient and of good quality. Losses in transit exceedingly small, with the exception of mineral oil. The complaint is made from several Posts that the material used in the shipping cases and cans is of such a poor quality that it does not stand the handling required by transportation. This matter has been reported, and if the cases were of heavier material and a better quality of tin used in the cans the waste would be exceedingly small.

At Posts or camps which are permanent to any extent, a more improved system should be adopted for the disposal of the excreta than simply removing it by hand and carting it away in open wagons. I would recommend the trough with odorless excavating tank wagon and pump, as a solution of this problem.

(NOTE.—Special attention invited to this recommendation, which I understand has been tried at various places with marked success.)

Statement showing how troops are sheltered in the Department of Mindanao.

STATION.	TENTS		RENTED BLDGS.		GOV'T. BLDGS.		TOTAL	
	ENL. MEN.	OFF.	ENL. MEN.	OFF.	ENL. MEN.	OFF.	ENL. MEN.	OFF.
Zamboanga Hdqtrs.							20	13
Post.			8	11	12	2	132	8
Tucuran					67	4	67	4
Malabang and Sub-P.	60	3			432	16	492	19
Parang					133	5	133	5
Camp Vicars.	546	22					546	22
Cottabato			1	9	240	7	241	16
Davao				3	179	6	179	9
Jolo		9	1	5	714	18	715	32
Iligan	1058	41	70	20	204		1332	61
Misamis			1	1	63	2	64	3
Puerta Princesa					106	2	106	2
Rongao					71	3	71	3
Sinasi					85	4	85	4
Dapitan					94	2	94	2
Zamboanga Casuals					58		58	
	1664	75	81	49	2590	79	4335	203

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed) F. VON SCHRADER,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. A.,
Chief Quartermaster.

Statement of allotments made from appropriation, barracks and quarters, in the Department of Mindanao, during the fiscal year, 1903.

STATION	TOTAL AMOUNT
Zamboanga Post.....	\$ 474.25
Tucuran.....	1,850.12
Malabang.....	11,184.70
Parang.....	731.70
Davao.....	200.00
Jolo.....	4,319.96
Siassi.....	59.50
Iligan.....	25,023.09
Camp Vicars.....	7,155.70
Cottabato.....	225.00
Makar.....	724.86
Puerta Princesa.....	1,200.00
Coron.....	437.02
Alphonso XIII.....	183.00
Total construction.....	\$ 53,768.90

STATEMENT OF FIELD RANGES.

The Buzzacott and Hunt have been used principally and both have given satisfaction, but especially the Buzzacott. The Linley and Carr ranges have only lately been received and sufficient time has not elapsed to make report of merits. The durability of the Buzzacott, Hunt and Linley and Carr are seemingly about equal.

FROM CHIEF COMMISSARY.

The Depot at Malabang has supplied the troops at Malabang, Camp Vicars and all camps between those two stations; while the larger distributing station at Iligan has supplied all Troops from Iligan to Lake Lanao. The work of Captain Simonds at Malabang, and Captains Barber and Pursell at Iligan has been most efficient and satisfactory.

The supply of frozen beef received every two weeks by the transport "Seward" has been supplemented by the purchase of native cattle, and beef cattle bought from the stock yards at Singapore. They were healthy, well conditioned steers, small herds of which have been kept at Malabang and Camp Vicars, as well as at several other stations. They were offered to every station in the Department, not receiving a full

supply of frozen beef but a number of Posts declined to handle beef cattle. They were the best grade of beef cattle on the market of the East, and so far only two head have been lost. Native cattle in these islands are small, and almost entirely bulls and cows. They are not purchased save as a last resort to obtain fresh beef.

It is uncontrovertible that troops serving in these islands desire a full supply of frozen or refrigerated beef, and their prejudice against native beef, or beef cattle obtained from any other source is so marked, that they often prefer the canned meats. My experience during the past year but confirms earlier convictions, that the only practical, economical and satisfactory method of supplying troops with the fresh meat component of the ration in these islands is by bringing to Manila frozen or refrigerated beef, and issuing it from local and central cold-storage plants. I do not know anything more badly needed, at stations in this Department, than cold-storage plants.

FRESH VEGETABLES.

Until my arrival here all stations in the Department except those on the north coast, were supplied with Java potatoes and onions. I stopped the supply as they were very small and unsatisfactory in every way, and there was much loss from deterioration. The potatoes and onions shipped from the Depot at Manila have been very satisfactory until the last two months, during which time the loss on potatoes has been very heavy. This is due to the age of the potatoes at this season of the year, when it seems to be impossible to prevent rapid deterioration under the best of handling.

LOSSES.

Proceedings of Boards of Survey and inspection reports show the following losses:

Damaged.....	\$ 34,956.04
Shortages.....	2,952.41
Thefts.....	406.06
Lost in transit..	448.24
Total.....	\$ 38,762.76

The losses on bacon and flour were chiefly in crated bacon and flour in sacks. The loss on fresh meats was due to delays in transportation and breaking down of ice plants. The losses of hard bread, canned meats, canned fruits, and in some cases canned vegetables, were due to the continued supply of old stores, many of which were unfit for sale or issue on arrival at stations, or were in such condition from age that they deteriorated rapidly after receipt.

The inability of the Subsistence Department, from well known causes to sell surplus stores a year ago, has forced the supply of some stores which had long outlived their keeping power in any climate. Proceedings of Boards of Survey are replete with grave charges against the climate as almost the universal cause of losses during the past year. A tropical climate is undoubtedly severe on stores, but I am thoroughly convinced from personal observation as well as close inspection of "statements of stores" which accompany Boards of Survey, that over two thirds of the losses on many articles were directly due to the fact that they were old, and were in process of deterioration when received. I am of the decided opinion that fresh stores properly packed and carefully handled in transportation, will keep in this climate at least six months and longer without unreasonable loss from deterioration.

CANNED MEATS.

Roast beef, beef and vegetable stew, and corned beef hash, have been used extensively and have given satisfaction. In many instances, troops have expressed preference for these articles over native beef. Corned beef, always a reliable article, is showing deterioration from age.

DESICCATED VEGETABLES.

Desiccated potatoes and onions have been issued when fresh vegetables could not be supplied. They are the only articles of the ration which officers and soldiers dislike, and I have yet to find any organization that could by any means make them palatable.

EMERGENCY RATIONS.

Very few of these rations have been used in active operations, which will be the case so long as there is any means of transporting bacon, canned meats, hard bread, sugar and coffee.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

In my annual report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, I recommended that at least half the flour and bacon be sent to these islands packed in tin. I now strongly urge that all the flour and bacon be packed in tin, no matter what the original cost may be. As a measure of economy the net weight of the flour package might be increased to seventy five pounds and the bacon to twenty seven or thirty six pounds. All tinning should be first class work, seams folded and well soldered, the tops and bottoms put on in first class manner, and all cans lacquered. Indeed the tinning should be much better than is used by the average commercial house at home. Many cans small and large, particularly the square coffee cans, in which both issue and sale coffee are packed, give way in the seams under jars in transportation. The Army tin cup is a grade of work which would save much loss on canned stores.

FROM CHIEF SURGEON.

As shown by Table II, 129 deaths have been reported of which 19 were among civilians attached to commands. Of the 110 deaths among soldiers 12 were from wounds and accidents and ninety-eight (98) from disease. Of the latter, cholera caused 32, dysentery 22, typhoid fever 11, beriberi 10, small-pox 1. That is twenty six of the ninety-eight occurred from so called preventable diseases.

The first case of cholera occurred November 27, 1902, in Zamboanga; in Iligan, December 19th; in Lintogoup, January 10, 1903; in Malabang, January 12th; in Mataling Falls, January 14th; in Camp Vicars, January 19th; in Cottabato, April 6th. A reference to Table IV shows that the largest losses were

in Camp Vicars and Iligan. The cases from the former included those sent in from marching commands and of the latter those sent in from camps engaged in building a road to Lake Lanao. It is very difficult to enforce sanitary precautions with moving commands. The percentage of deaths to population was much greater among the civilians attached to the commands. These men were not subject to so strict discipline.

It is probable that a great reduction can be made in the prevalence of all of these diseases by the study of the problem how to regulate the daily life in large commands so as to exclude human excrement from human mouths. At present the impracticability of this is recognized and a compromise made by insisting that the offensive and disease producing material shall be cooked before serving. This is performed in drinking water by the Forbes-Waterhouse sterilizer, by distillation or by boiling. Without definite data the general opinion formed by experience is that boiling is the only method that is absolutely reliable. Bacteriologists report the number of colonies that can be cultivated from a cubic centimeter of distilled water, and dysentery is reported from the commands using the Forbes-Waterhouse sterilizer. This indicates defects either in the apparatus or in the administration. It is believed that the latter is more frequently the fault. Human nature is frail; and men required to attend a machine for many hours and frequently called upon to furnish water in excess of the capacity of the machine lose interest in the life history of microbes and are liable to meet demands by more direct methods. By boiling the water for thirty minutes: by boiling all utensils used in the preparation and serving of food; by protecting all food from insects and rats; by making men wash their hands before eating and avoid putting their fingers in their mouths, a great reduction can be made in the use of the over-worked expression "climatic influence". A further reduction will be made when the men can be protected from the sun and rain in barracks with floors four or five feet above the ground, giving each man a floor space of 100 square feet.

This can be accomplished with nipa and bamboo at small expense. Tents are more expensive, more perishable, and more unsanitary. It is very difficult for soldiers to lead clean lives in crowded tents.

Beriberi is the bane of native troops, and anything to throw light on its causation is desirable. Accumulated experience will, it is believed, place this among the preventable diseases. It is very rare among white men but they are not exempt. As the native troops are clothed and lodged the same as white soldiers, it is natural to turn to the food supply as the source of infection. The scout ration as ordinarily drawn differs from that of the white soldiers, in being less in quantity and containing a larger proportion of rice. As the men appear active and well nourished, suspicion is directed to the rice. Common opinion pronounces the fine quality of rice imported from the main land of Asia more dangerous than the native product. It is possible that the infective material gains access to the sacks in the unventilated holds of old ships, as beriberi is common among sailors in the tropics.

The writer does not believe that the disease is directly contagious. He has for months watched many cases of the paralytic and dropsical forms, in large families and crowded houses without seeing a new case develop, and without further precaution than to expose sleeping mats to the sun.

Many intelligent natives have assured the writer that until last November, beriberi was unknown in Zamboanga, except when some afflicted sailor was brought ashore. In that month cholera appeared and measures very effective for stamping out that disease were taken. The natives shut themselves in their houses, boiled the water and excluded fruit and vegetables from their diet, subsisting exclusively upon rice and fish. By the end of December there were many cases of beriberi scattered about the town. All rice was imported from Saigon, as new rice was not ready for use and the native crop of the preceding year had been long exhausted.

The writer believes that the exclusion of fruit and vegetables from the dietary was an important predisposing cause of the disease.

The only case of small-pox was that of an officer who came into the Department with the disease. He had evaded vaccination. His young wife who travelled with him had been vaccinated and escaped.

The four dental surgeons in this Department have done a great amount of useful work, but lose much time awaiting transportation from post to post. Much time could be saved by having the teeth of the recruits put in order at the Post before being sent from the United States. In the absence of such provision perhaps the new arrivals in the Division could be held in a casual camp in Manila until their dental work can be completed.

FROM SIGNAL OFFICER.

On its formation, the Department contained within its territorial limits 501 miles of submarine cable, 326 miles land telegraph line, and 64 miles land telephone line operated by the enlisted men of Company "F," Signal Corps. During the fiscal year the land mileage was decreased by the abandonment of the Reina Regente-Davao telegraph line (210 miles) pursuant to 4th Endorsement, dated Headquarters Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I., February 4, 1903; by the abandonment of the Tukuran-Lubig telephone line (7 miles) pursuant to telegraphic instructions dated office of the Chief Signal Officer, Manila, P. I., June 6, 1903; and by the transfer to the Philippine Constabulary of the Maasin-Surigao cable (47.5 miles) and the Misamis-Langaran telephone line (45 miles). A telephone line 18 miles in length, between Punta Separacion and Alphonso XIII, Paragua, was completed March 13, 1903, and a line intended ultimately to establish telegraphic communication between Iligan and Marahui (Lake Lanao) was completed as far as Pantar (23 miles) and operated as a telephone line. The

Cottabato-Reina Regente line (50 miles) was changed from telegraph to telephone. At the close of the fiscal year the Department contained 453.8 miles submarine cable, 66 miles land telegraph line, and 98 miles land telephone line which connect the following stations:

The telegraph line from Malabang north to Lake Lanao is equipped with "Russel Cut-In" telephones, permitting, in addition to the usual telegraph service, a satisfactory telephone service between Malabang, Mataling Falls and Camp Vicars. This valuable telephone devised by Captain Edgar Russel, Signal Corps, has been of great benefit to the line. A similar line constructed during the year from Iligan along the new military road to Lake Lanao, has at the date of making this report, been completed to Pantar, 5 miles south of Marahui on Lake Lanao which latter place will be the ultimate end of the land line. This line though now used as a telephone line will be immediately changed to a telegraph line and equipped with "Russel Cut-In" telephones with offices at Iligan, Nonucan, Momungan, Pantar and Marahui. In the construction of this line the Signal Corps is under many obligations to Major R. L. Bullard, 28th Infantry, who has been in charge of the work of constructing the military road through the jungles and across the mountains from Iligan to Lake Lanao.

The main line of communication between the north and the south coast of Mindanao is over the Tucuran-Liutogup land line which has been a constant menace to communication ever since its completion. The line passes over a wild rocky region which includes a dense forest of high trees. The region is subject to violent wind storms which sweep across it from Iligan Bay and which are constantly blowing trees across the line. To clear a path through this forest wide enough to enable falling trees to clear the line, is impracticable. Inasmuch as it is understood that two launches are to be put in commission on Lake Lanao, I therefore recommend that the offices at Marahui and Camp Vicars be con-

nected by cable thus creating a new and better line of communication across the island, and that the Tucuran-Lintogup line be abandoned. The old line needs constant repairs and necessitates the presence of a company of Infantry at Tucuran. The new line can be kept in repair more easily than the Lintogup line inasmuch as it is built along the new military roads over which wagon trains are constantly passing. The establishment of a line of communication between Iligan and Malabang would permit the recovery of the Malabang-Tucuran cable and the relaying of the Zamboanga-Tucuran cable from Zamboanga to Malabang as it is understood that the present garrison at Tucuran is kept at that point for the maintenance of the Tucuran-Lintogup land line. This recovered cable could well be used elsewhere.

There is a very strong current passing Zamboanga between the mainland and the Island of Basilan which is felt by the largest vessels for ten miles east and west of Zamboanga and which changes direction with the tides. The water in this channel is only about 40 fathoms deep and the bottom is of the roughest coral formation. The constant chafing of our deep sea type of cable over these coral formations rapidly damages the cable. The Zamboanga-Isabela cable (interrupted since September 14, 1902) laid across this channel is in many places unserviceable. I recommend that it be recovered as soon as possible and that communication between Zamboanga and the Naval station at Isabela be established by a system of wireless telegraphy. The Zamboanga-Tucuran cable is also laid in this channel and has suffered accordingly. Communication over this cable was interrupted February 12, 1903, during the absence of the cable-ship "Burnside" from the Division of the Philippines. The cable was under-run for some distance and all possible efforts made to repair the fault but on account of the depth of the water, the strength of the current, and the absence of all proper apparatus, the cable necessarily

remained interrupted until the return of the cable-ship "Burnside" from China. On the repair of the cable May 30, 1903, the electrician of the repair ship reported three faults within sixteen miles of Zamboanga and that the general resistance of the cable was weakened due to the damaging effects of the current. I recommend that this cable be landed at Bolon, a small village 18 miles north of Zamboanga, and that an iron pole land line be laid between the two points named. This location of the cable will enable it to avoid the shoal water and the current mentioned above. On March 11, 1903, a fault developed in the Jolo-Zamboanga cable near Jolo. The Jolo end was under-run for four miles in an effort to reach the fault but the depth of the water prevented further efforts with the apparatus available at Jolo. The cable-ship "Burnside" commenced the repair of this cable June 1, 1903, and continued the work for three days, but being under orders to proceed to the United States was unable to complete the work on account of lack of time.

The conduct of the enlisted men of the Corps in the Department has reflected credit on the Corps to which they belong.

(NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER.—While the telegraph service has been more or less satisfactory between certain points, the total cut off for months between Department Headquarters and the important stations of Malabang, Camp Vicars, Jolo and Iligan has been a very serious inconvenience in carrying on important military operations. In my opinion, the Signal Corps should have made some effort to repair the cable to Tukuran and to Jolo, even if the regular cable-ship was not available; and even at the present date, Department Headquarters is cut off from telegraphic service with Jolo and has been since March 11, 1903, something over three months. So far as I am informed no present effort is being made to repair this break. The recommendation of the Chief Signal Officer regarding relaying of Tukuran and Jolo cable so as to avoid the strong current is approved.)

OFFICE OF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

The records for July, August and September, 1902, under the Headquarters of the Seventh Separate Brigade, Zamboanga, Mind., P. I., were transferred to the Headquarters, Department of the Visayas, Iloilo, Panay, P. I.

No record of trials by General Court Martial during June, 1903, have yet been received at this office, and probably not all of the trials for May, 1903. The records of Summary Court trials for June, 1903, will not be received before the middle of July, 1903, and the same may be said of trials by Provost Courts. Record to June 26, 1903: Number of General Court cases 177; number of Summary cases, 1870; number of garrison cases 6; number of provost court cases 62; number of regimental cases none.

OFFICE OF THE ENGINEER OFFICER.

During the fiscal year the following work has been done:

ROADS.

In the vicinity of Zamboanga. Work of repair on the two roads extending from Zamboanga to Tetuan, and from Zamboanga to Masinloc was begun in February under the personal direction of a Sergeant of Co. "G," 2d Battalion of Engineers. Two allotments, aggregating \$751.12, Mexican Currency, were made for this work. The contemplated work of repair, consisting of installation of several small culverts and surfacing of bad stretches in the road was completed about the end of May, at a total expenditure of \$707.40, Mexican currency.

Military road, Malabang to Camp Vicars. This road was begun in May, 1902, and completed in November of the same year, by labor of troops entirely. The necessity for its construction followed from the decision of the Division Commander to maintain a Post (Camp Vicars) in the Lanao region, and from the breaking down of the difficult Ganassi trail almost impassable after a few days of wet weather and certain to be so after continued rains. An allotment of \$10,000, Mexican currency, was made by the Division Commander in May, 1902, and after preliminary explorations, work was begun about May 20th. The troops engaged on the work at the start were "F" company and a portion of "G" company, Engineers, one troop of the Sixth Cavalry,

two troops of the 15th Cavalry, one company of the 17th Infantry, and one company of the 10th Infantry, shortly joined by a second company of the 10th Infantry. Major Lea Febiger had charge of the work until May 30th, when his Battalion was relieved from duty in the Division and the work was turned over to the Engineer Officer of the Brigade. On June 10th the two companies of the 10th Infantry were relieved and shortly thereafter, the three troops of Cavalry, six companies of the 27th Infantry replacing them on the work. Two weeks later one of these companies was relieved and on July 10th, another company detailed on the work in its place. On August 10th, the troops of the 27th Infantry were relieved excepting one company working by weekly detail from Malabang, and one battalion of the 11th Infantry was detailed in its place, remaining on duty until the work was completed, excepting that two companies and the one company of the 27th Infantry, were withdrawn during military operations during the entire month of September. About the middle of October these two companies with an additional one of the 10th Infantry, and one company of the 27th Infantry, were returned to the work, remaining until its completion about the first of November.

The total length of the road is about 21 miles, of which about 15 miles is through heavy timber. The timber has been cleared throughout most of the timbered section to a width of about a hundred feet.

The surface is a hard sand with just sufficient loam mixed to hold the sand firmly together. Throughout nearly the whole length of the road this sand was found overlaid by from three to twelve inches of vegetable mould. This latter was entirely removed and the road ditched on both sides (except on hills). The ditching and scraping of the surface was omitted through the cleared land near Camp Vicars as the underlying clay was quite close to the surface, and it was deemed better to shift the trail through these fields when necessary than to attempt further improvement. The result-

ing surface has proved to be hard and firm in wet weather, pulverizing considerably in long continued dry weather, and washing somewhat in unusually heavy rains. The road requires constant maintenance, equivalent to about half a company of troops continuously at work. An allotment of \$2,000 has been made and the money forwarded to Captain J. L. Hines, 23d Infantry, for pay of native camineros for this purpose.

The construction of this road was under the personal supervision of the Engineer Officer of the Department from the date it was begun in May, 1902, until October 13th, and from that date to its completion under the supervision of Lieut. E. J. Dent, Corps of Engineers.

The road was visited at about the time of its completion by the Lieutenant General, Commanding the Army, and the officers connected with the work were complimented upon its appearance.

The total disbursements on this road, exclusive of those made by Captain Hines were \$6,116.40, Mexican Currency.

Parang-Cottabato Road. Work on this road in progress at the beginning of the fiscal year was completed in May by Lieutenant E. D. Peek, Corps of Engineers, assisted by a detail of from fourteen to seventeen men of "G" Company, 2d Battalion of Engineers. The total disbursements on this road to date have amounted to \$36,449.64 Mex.

The total length of the road is thirteen and a half miles. Three rivers are crossed: the Parang river just outside the town of Parang by a bridge 200 feet long constructed of pile bents with a 48-foot timber truss over the channel; the Simoay, about four and a half miles from Cottabato, crossed by a ford; and the Rio Grande at Cottabato, where a ferry will be installed, for which a lighter has been constructed but not yet sheathed.

The road was constructed by Moro labor at 40 and 50 cents Mexican per day. Grades and curves are easy, but the surface is mainly clay with a covering of sand and gravel

over about half the distance. Several hundred feet of corduroy was put in near the Parang river, and about a mile of swampy section near the Simoay River was built in embankment with a surface of fine gravel, the fill being accomplished by means of a portable tramway and cars borrowed from the Tamontaca work.

Cottabato-Tamontaca Road. Work on this road in progress at beginning of the fiscal year was practically completed under direction of Lieutenant Wallace McNamara, 27th Infantry; Sergeant Wilson of Co. "G", 2d Battalion of Engineers being employed as supervisor, the labor being furnished by Moros.

In March an additional allotment of \$1,000, Mexican Currency, was made for repairs to the road and to a bridge across an estero on the road. Lieut. W. L. Reed, 10th Infantry, has charge of the repair work. About \$600 Mexican, of the last allotment has been expended by that officer in repairs to the bridge.

The bed for a large part of the distance is a natural soil of the alluvial bottom without top dressing, containing, especially near Cottabato, a mixture of red clay, troublesome in wet weather. A short stretch of the road is covered with a good limestone found near the road. This portion contains the only steep grades in the road.

Roads in Davao District. But little work has been done in this section, excepting on trails in the vicinity of Makar. It has been found practically impossible to secure native labor at any reasonable price. In March, 1903, \$10,000, Mexican Currency, was ordered withdrawn from the allotments for this work, but the order was not received until the balance had been reduced to \$9,968.80, which was turned in for use on the Iligan-Lanao Road.

Jolo Archipelago, Paragua and Calamianes. No road work in these islands has been done during the fiscal year.

North Coast of Mindanao. The only work done on the north coast of Mindanao was the construction of the military road from Iligan to Lake Lanao.

Work on this road was begun in October, 1902, by "G" company, 2d Battalion Engineers, one Battalion of the 28th Infantry, and two companies of the 10th Infantry. The labor was supplied by the troops. The route extends along the old Spanish railway grade to Tominobo river, a distance from Iligan ford, at the edge of town, of about two miles; thence along the foot of the hills to the beach at the mouth of the Nonucan river, about one mile further; thence climbing the hill near the Agus river to the old Spanish road near Momungan, about seven miles from Nonucan ford; thence generally following the Spanish road to Pantar, about six miles from Momungan; thence to Marahui on Lake Lanao about four miles from Pantar. Total distance from Iligan to Marahui about twenty miles. The above working force was augmented at the close of January by one additional battalion of the 28th Infantry, and early in February by the remaining battalion of this regiment and two additional companies of the 10th Infantry. In February, work was also begun in hiring Moro labor, at first by the day and later by agreement for finished work. The money available for this purpose was about \$32,000, Mexican Currency, being the Mexican equivalent of a portion of an allotment of \$20,000 U. S. Currency, made from the appropriation for Transportation of the Army by the Secretary of War. In addition, allotments of \$26,468.80 Mexican Currency, were made from funds appropriated by Act 1, Philippine Commission.

To date the road has been completed to three and a half miles beyond Pantar and work is under way from that point toward Marahui, which is on the lake and but a mile distant. The bridge across the Nonucan river has been completed and the suspension bridge over the Agus partially completed. It is estimated that the work will be completed by the middle of August.

The road bed is generally clay. In numerous places boulder outcrop was encountered and parts of the stone taken out were used in surfacing, but not in many places in sufficient quantity to be regarded as a macadam surface. The road is ditched throughout on both sides (excepting on hill sides) and the timber is cleared to a hundred feet on either side to allow the sun and breeze full play in drying out after wet weather. Camineros are being employed to maintain the surface.

WHARF WORK.

Zamboanga. The wharf at Zamboanga, nearly completed at the beginning of the fiscal year was completed in October. This wharf is a pile structure extending from the stem of the old Spanish masonry wharf to a depth of eighteen feet at low tide. The stem eighteen feet wide is 500 feet long and an L shaped head 40 by 120 feet completes the structure. All the work was done by small details from "G" company, 2d Battalion of Engineers.

Funds were appropriated by Act 490, U. S. Philippine Commission, for the purchase of mooring buoys and anchors for this wharf. The supplies have been ordered but will not be received for some two months, when they will be installed.

Parang. Construction of an extension to the masonry wharf at Parang was begun by Lieut. Peek in November, 1902, from funds appropriated under Act 430, U. S. Philippine Commission, to the amount of \$3,500, Mexican currency. A number of piles and a quantity of supplies and lumber had previously been purchased from funds appropriated by Act 289. The start in the work was delayed by the slow progress of the Zamboanga wharf, which required the use of the pile driver until October. Difficulty was met in securing piles; about half those used being purchased at Isabela, Basilan, and shipped from ten to twenty at a time on the U. S. C. T. Aeolus. The remainder were cut under the supervision of

Engineer soldiers on Bongo Island. The work was entirely completed in May, 1903; the work included construction of a stem 18 feet wide and 50 feet long in prolongation of the masonry stem, and an oblique head 34x80 feet to twenty feet in depth. Some repairs were also made to the masonry work of the stem.

This wharf is still in need of suitable mooring buoys and anchorage appliances, as the seas during about five months of the year are such as to make it difficult for a vessel to approach the wharf.

The total expended on this work to date is \$4684.97 from the two appropriations. The labor was done by natives under the supervision of the Engineer troops.

Jolo. The sum of \$23,000, Mexican currency, for repair to the old masonry wharf at Jolo and its extension by a piled tee-head was appropriated by Acts 430 and 483, U. S. Philippine Commission. An additional pile driver was secured from Manila and shipped to Jolo in December, 1902. Lieut. Fries, Corps of Engineers, with a small detachment of Engineer soldiers from Co. "G," 2d Battalion Engineers, had charge of the work until his departure for Manila in March when the work was turned over to Captain F. C. Marshall, 15th Cavalry, until the arrival of Lieutenant Hannum, Corps of Engineers, about May 15th. The project consisted of repairs to the masonry work, extensive additions to the rip-rap protection, and the addition at the end of the wharf of a tee-head 122 by 38 feet. A suitable supply of rip-rap was found on the beach near Jolo and work on the repairs to masonry work was begun in January. The work met with several delays, from the outbreak of cholera in February, the breakdown of the station transport "Taganac" in March, the impossibility of obtaining piles except from Basilan and Zamboanga, and the lack of transportation for those secured, and finally the departure of Lieut. Fries, and the late arrival of Lieut. Hannum.

At this date work is progressing well. All lumber and piles are on hand, the former having been purchased mainly from Sandakan, and the latter hauled from Zamboanga by U. S. Chartered Lighter "Concord" early in June. A new station boat (the Gibson) has been chartered by the Quartermaster's Department, which will be of great assistance in the rip-rap work, a large lighter having been constructed for this work.

The total expended on this work, to date is about \$15,500, Mexican currency, which includes the purchase of all the piles and lumber that will be needed. The work is done by native labor, under the supervision of Engineer troops.

Siassi. A small appropriation, \$960, Mexican currency, was made by Act 430, U. S. Philippine Commission for construction of a new wharf at Siassi. No work was done during the fiscal year as all pile drivers available were in use elsewhere. The plant liberated by the completion of the Parang wharf, has, however, been shipped to Siassi, and Lieutenant Hannum has been given charge of the work. The appropriation is so small that only a piled landing stage 20x38 feet is contemplated.

The work will be done by native labor under the direction of Engineer troops.

Iligan. Funds for the construction of the wharf at Iligan were appropriated under Acts 430, and 490 U. S. Philippine Commission, to the amount of \$9,500, U. S. Currency, which was converted into Mexican Currency in the sum of \$23,750. Start on the work was delayed by inability to secure an Engineer Officer to supervise the work until Lieutenant C. O. Sherrill, Corps of Engineers, reported at Iligan about March 1, 1903. Preparatory work was then begun in securing piles, lumber and necessary supplies, a pile driver having been secured from Manila.

In April, the Division Commander directed that the wharf be constructed at the new post at Camp Overton, about three miles south of the town of Iligan at the mouth of the Nonucan

river. These instructions were later confirmed by Governor Taft. The construction was begun accordingly by Lieutenant Sherrill and continued by Lieutenant W. A. Mitchell, who relieved the former officer about May 15th.

To date about fifteen bents of four piles each have been placed and capped and the work is progressing favorably. A piled stem from six to seven hundred feet long will be required with a T or L head.

The total disbursements to date on this work amount to about \$9,500, Mexican Currency.

Survey work. In addition to the above work the officers and men of the two companies were able to complete survey work as follows. Town of Iligan, reservation and post of Camp Overton near Iligan, reservation of Zamboanga, reservation of Malabang, reservation of Parang, reservation of Jolo, besides numerous reconnaissances of the roads and trails between Malabang and Lake Lanao, around Lake Lanao, and from Marahui to Iligan.

FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT.

INSTRUCTION AND DISCIPLINE.

Instruction of officers as prescribed by G. O., A. G. O., has been carried on at most Posts conscientiously and with excellent results. Field service, road building and other conditions have in some instances interfered with this work. The officers generally have taken an interest in their work and have benefited thereby.

Cases of intemperance among the officers have been few. Discipline is generally good, considering conditions,—certain exceptions have been noted in my "Report of Inspections."

Attention is invited to the fact that at dates of Inspection fifty five officers were absent from their commands; twenty six of the fifty four companies and troops inspected were commanded by Lieutenants, some of whom were officers of short service and small experience.

TARGET PRACTICE.

Target practice has, so far as conditions would permit, been held as prescribed, but for various causes a number of organizations have had no practice. Since the date of issue of G. O., No. 355, series 1901, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, conditions in the Islands have materially changed.

Many Posts have ranges; many more will have them in the near future. The requirements of Section 11, paragraph A, order noted, are not carried out generally. I recommend that this section be so modified as to meet present conditions.

Target ranges in this Department are as follows: Jolo, 1000 yds.; Parang 300 yds.; Reina Regente, 500 yds., no skirmish; Malabang, 300 yds.; 1000 yds. possible; Makar 600 yds.; Lintogup 500 yds.; Cottabato, 700 yds., no skirmish; Puerta Princesa, 1000 yds.; Iligan, 1400 yds.; Zamboanga, none; Misamis, 1000 yds.; Davao, 800 yds.

CANTEEN.

The absence of the canteen is seriously felt. The effect is to encourage men to drink the various native drinks, many of which are very injurious and to encourage the use of opium. At the several Posts inspected it was learned that, in spite of all precautions, considerable liquor, usually of bad quality, found its way into garrison.

Prices for whiskey, smuggled into garrison, range from five to eight dollars gold per quart, and it finds ready sale even at these exorbitant prices. The "Chino" and native merchants can afford to take very heavy chances with such profits in view. A canteen where the men could procure good pure beer and wine at a reasonable price would be a blessing.

LAND TRANSPORTATION.

Many cases of glanders, farcy and surra have developed, otherwise the animals have stood the climate fairly well.

The effect of recent orders restricting the use of native

grass or forage, has I believe, resulted beneficially. During this fiscal year two hundred fifty six (256) animals have been destroyed on account of disease.

The most serious transportation problem for this Department at present is the supply of troops in the Lake Lanao region. I recommend the construction at an early date of an electric road from Iligan to Marahui. The original cost will be considerable, but it will soon pay for itself in the saving of men, animals, etc., now needed to supply the troops even imperfectly, and to keep the roads in good repair.

ROADS.

Good wagon roads have been built mostly by troop labor as follows:

Cottabato to Parang, 14 miles, completed, native labor.

Malabang to Camp Vicars, 23 miles, completed.

Iligan to Pantar, 18 miles, serviceable but not entirely completed.

Pantar to Marahui, 5 miles, now under construction.

These roads require constant repairs, which during the rainy season will involve much hard labor, and will at best be very difficult of passage for heavy trains.

WATER TRANSPORTATION.

The Posts of the Department are dependent for supplies upon water transportation; several posts of the department have small garrisons and are remote from any base of supplies. At times transportation available has been insufficient to keep them fully supplied; this has caused temporary inconvenience, but in no instance, suffering.

The boats now in service together with those already authorized, should be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Department.

The water transportation generally throughout the Department has been well cared for. The chartered transports "Borneo" and "Aeolus" are clean; linen is abundant and clean; food abundant, of good quality and satisfactorily served; and service generally satisfactory.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

Consideration of comfort and economy dictate that, so far as possible, troops be housed. Temporary quarters should be constructed, even though it be contemplated to occupy the site for not more than six months or a year. Men under canvas in this climate, especially during the rainy season, are neither comfortable, contented nor healthy. Canvas is costly and its life is short,—six or eight months.

Closets for use with dry earth receptacles, as supplied by the Quartermaster's Department, are defective in that they are not completely enclosed and seats are not provided with covers.

CLOTHING.

It is hoped that the near future may see the Troops in the Philippines provided with clothing of better quality, having some semblance of uniformity. The khaki clothing now in use is a mixed lot of various colors and types. Some blouses have standing, some have rolling collars; some are pleated, some plain; some have shoulder loops, some have none.

With such issues one cannot expect much from individuals or organizations. About the only presentable khaki clothing seen, is that which has been made, or at least made over, by civilian tailors at the personal expense of the men.

The quality of the campaign hat is a cause of general complaint and justly so. A hat of better quality should be provided. In my judgment a tan shoe stronger and of better quality could and should be provided. The original cost would be greater, but in the end it would result in economy for the wearer.

Gauntlets are of poor quality, much of the stitching is rotten, whether from faulty manufacture, or from long storage, I am unable to state.

The khaki coat unless protected from the neck soon becomes soiled at the collar and unsightly. White collars

are impracticable and undesirable even at ceremonies. To remedy this defect many devices are resorted to by officers and men.

I recommend that a stock made of khaki cloth be authorized and issued by the Quartermaster's Department, to be worn by officers and men as prescribed by the Commanding Officer.

Regarding the new uniforms for officers; the meaning of "Falling collar from 1 to 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches in width" prescribed for the "service coat" is either generally misunderstood or the provision is disregarded. One sees collars varying from the low rolling collar fastened by one hook, to the high box collar, three inches or more in width.

The coat of arms and insignia of "Arm of service" or "Corps" are too large for convenience or for appearance; the size should be reduced about one half. If the present size be retained, the coat of arms should be worn on the shoulder loop.

SUPPLIES.

Boxes in which coal oil cans are packed are too frail, resulting in great inconvenience and in considerable loss. Considerable loss of oil also results from cans being punctured by nails in packing.

Throughout this department generally the climatic conditions are excellent for the tropics and wherever Troops are properly housed, the supply of authorized articles including fresh beef and vegetables is ample, and water is of good quality and plentiful. The health of the Troops is good. These conditions cannot exist without distilled water and ice.

I recommend that distilling plants be supplied all garrisoned Posts and camps and that ice-plants and refrigerating plants be supplied all Posts designated as permanent Posts, which are occupied by American troops.

SUBSISTENCE.

The components of the ration are generally excellent; exceptions noted being hard bread, crate bacon, sack flour.

Sales stores on the authorized list appear to be suitable to the climate. Many sales stores supplied this Department are old and either partially or wholly unfit for consumption. Of others there has been and is a deficiency.

Officers of the Philippine scouts which I have inspected and several medical officers, who have devoted special attention to the subject, believe that the ration prescribed for scouts is undesirable. It is reported that scouts, while using the soldier's ration, showed marked physical development and greatly improved health. It is also believed by these officers that the great number of cases of beri-beri among the scouts, is due to the ration; principally to the excessive amount of rice consumed. Under normal tropical conditions natives subsist principally upon rice, but they do little work and they eat often.

The life of activity and regularity of the scout, develops an inordinate appetite, resulting in overloading the stomach with rice; this affects the nervous system and is believed to cause beri-beri eventually. A change in the ration is recommended.

There have been some complaints about the coffee; not only have these been fully investigated, but careful inquiry has been made of commissary officers, company commanders, and of men on duty in the various messes and kitchens. Coffee put up by Castle Brothers, whenever examined, was found to be unsatisfactory; this may have been due to long storage. Most of the coffee examined was found to be of excellent quality. Coffee roasted and ground will under the most favorable conditions lose some of its aroma.

At many posts it is impossible to find among the troops competent bakers. First class bread is the exception, not the rule. This can be corrected only by the employment of competent civilian bakers and I renew the oft repeated recommendation that the employment of a liberal number be authorized.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

Owing to the large number of troops on duty in the Department, to the distance from Manila and to the lack of suitable facilities for transportation of sick and injured to Manila, a Base Hospital in the Department is urgently needed. From its central and sanitary location, its excellent climate, and from the fact that it is the location of Headquarters of the Department, Zamboanga is the natural, and it is believed to be the place best suited, to the location of such a Hospital.

The old Spanish buildings now used as barracks for Troops, as Hospital, and for various other purposes, are well suited to the purpose and would provide a Hospital of capacity for 150 to 200 patients.

DENTAL SURGEONS.

The Dental Surgeons in the Department take keen interest and pride in their profession, and the excellent work which they have done has contributed vastly to the comfort and health of the troops. Charges made for gold and other material supplied have, so far as I can learn, been satisfactory.

They have been handicapped of late in their work, due to lack of supplies and to the impossibility of getting requisitions filled. I am unable to state the cause of this deficiency.

PAY DEPARTMENT.

Troops serving outside the limits of the United States should, if they so elect, be paid in the currency of the country in which they are serving. The Navy serving on this station receive their pay in Mexican currency. Payment, exclusively in United States currency, is always an inconvenience and at times a great injustice often resulting in actual hardship. At many stations only Mexican currency can be used. At points remote from Manila, it is always with difficulty that one can purchase Mexican money even at an exorbitant price; frequently one dollar gold for two dollars Mexican currency being demanded, regardless of the official rate of exchange.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

The Luger automatic pistol as a hunting pistol and for dress occasions is attractive and useful. I have one which I prize highly, but for field service, in the hands of officers and men, it is a failure. It is too complicated and cartridges often jam; but the main defect is that the bullet will not stop a Moro. The .38 calibre possesses the same defect, but to a less degree. The proper pistol for troops is a .45 calibre double action revolver. This gun will stop a Moro as has been repeatedly demonstrated, during the past year. I have been led to this conclusion through personal observation, and through the statement of many officers and men, who have had ample opportunity to use the guns and to observe their execution. I have heard no dissenting opinion. I recommend that all Luger pistols now in the hands of Troops be turned in; that troops in the field be supplied with .45 calibre revolvers as soon as possible, and that as soon as practicable all .38 calibre pistols be replaced by those of .45 calibre.

The attachment near the center of the carbine scabbard is not sufficiently strong; many scabbards become unserviceable, due to breaking of this attachment.

In my "Reports of Inspection" I have noted certain defects in small arms ammunition, in Maxim ammunition, in certain tin cups issued and in the pack for Field mortar; all of which have been investigated in the field by an officer of the Ordnance Department, and will I doubt not, be remedied in the near future.

SIGNAL CORPS.

Cable service in the Department has been very unsatisfactory. The land line from Lintogup to Tucuran is unserviceable much of the time. Parties are at work on the line almost constantly, but it is found impossible to keep it in working order.

The main line should run from Iligan to Marahui, thence by cable across Lake Lanao to a point near Camp

Vicars, thence to Malaban, thence to a point on the east shore of the southern end of Zamboanga peninsula, thence by land to Zamboanga.

From the best information obtainable it is believed that the greater portion of the cable, now in use in these waters, has outlived its efficiency. If such be the case it should be replaced at an early date.

FROM ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Active field operations and frequent change of stations have prevented the holding of lyceums regularly and the establishment of Post schools.

Instructions required by General Order 102, Adjutant General's Office, 1902, have been carried out as far as it was practicable. Statements of efficiency and reports of officers who have failed to acquire a proper degree of efficiency have not been received from all stations in the Department. Those that have been received indicate that the order has been carried out. The number of officers reported deficient is not large.

Target practice has not been regularly held. More attention should be given to this practice and those Posts that have not a suitable range should secure one to include at least 600 yards.

No general recruiting has been attempted and none necessary; as a matter of fact the Department was called upon to reduce the number of enlisted men by discharging over three hundred. They were recommended to be selected from several classes. Under each class names were submitted, but only those recommended to be discharged for the good of the service were selected.

I renew my recommendation of last year that officers for the native companies be selected from Sergeants of the Regular Army by a Board of Officers to determine their qualifications.

The enlisted strength of the regular regiments in the Department has been kept up to maximum by re-enlistments and transfer from regiments going home to organizations remaining in the Islands. No such process has been possible as to the officers. A scarcity of officers in staff and line is to be regretted. Details to special duty, leave of absence (few are granted) and officers absent sick, reduce number present far below the number required for efficiency.

FROM INSPECTOR OF SMALL ARMS PRACTICE.

Ranges.

COTTABATO, MINDANAO, P. I.

Best obtainable range within easy reach of the post was used. Total distance available 700 yards, ground swampy and full of holes, making skirmish firing impossible. Difficult to keep grass and weeds down. Ricochets frequently land dangerously near Company "A" barracks on hill.

In view of the fact that this range is dangerous, and will be very difficult and expensive to repair, it is recommended that if practicable another range be built at Cottabato, even if further from the post than the one now in use.

DAPITAN.

A very good range may be had up to 600 yards, with very little labor or expense.

ILIGAN.

The range used this season, to the east of the town, extends over more than 1000 yards of rough, low ground to a hill about 100 feet high which was used as a back stop.

CAMP OVERTON.

No range has as yet been constructed. It is thought suitable ground may be found near the post for the construction of a 1000 yard range.

JOLO.

No report made as required by par. 477, Firing Regulations for Small Arms.

Range about 1000 yards in extent. Not altogether satisfactory for skirmish firing. With reasonable expenditures for repairs, can be put in good condition for next season's practice. Six hundred dollars has recently been allotted this Post.

MALABANG.

The range used this season was only 300 yards in extent. A good target range may be constructed on the north side of the post between the Malabang River and the Mataling River, 1000 yards in extent over level ground with a sandy hill for a background. This range could be constructed with very little expense to the government, and it is recommended that this be done as the range used at present is obviously unsuitable. Four hundred dollars has recently been allotted this Post.

PARANG.

The range is only 300 yards in extent, quite satisfactory to that distance. A more extensive range can not be constructed, safety considered, in the vicinity of the post.

CAMP VICARS.

No report has been made as required by par. 477, Firing Regulations for Small Arms. Firing has been had up to 600 yards by troops stationed at this post during the past season. It is recommended that a range 1000 yards in extent be constructed in the vicinity of this post.

AMMUNITION.

Captains Kinnison and Allen, 29th Infantry, report defective ammunition discovered in target practice. This ammunition was made by the U. S. Cartridge Co., and was at least 20% bad. Lieut. Willard, Range Officer at Puerto Princesa, Paragua, reports that the only ammunition that could be depended on during practice conducted by himself was the "Winchester."

APPENDIX III.

OCCUPATION OF THE LAKE LANAO REGION.

Headquarters Department of Mindanao.

Zamboanga, P. I., June 13, 1903.

*Adjutant General,
Division of the Philippines,
Manila, P. I.*

SIR:

I have the honor to forward report of Capt. J. J. Pershing, 15th Cavalry, covering the operations of his command during the past year.

When I assumed command of the Department of Mindanao, I was informed by the Division Commander, that a general war with the Moros was to be avoided if possible, and that a policy of pacification and friendship was desired. This policy has been carried out as near as circumstances would permit, and while we have steadily gained a knowledge and control of the Lake Lanao country, and its inhabitants, we have fortunately accomplished our object at a minimum loss of life, and a very slight destruction of property.

Soon after assuming command, I found that certain Dattos were hostile, and were determined to oppose our presence in their country. The Malabang-Vicars road was raided on several occasions; attacks were made on small parties of soldiers; Camp Vicars and the camps along the road were fired into; and one determined attack was made on the outpost at Vicars. The hostile demonstrations were reported to Division Commander with recommendation that active measures be taken to suppress these Moros. Authority was granted in telegram dated September 5th, copy attached. A Command consisting of a battalion of the 27th Infantry, 1 battalion (3 companies) 10th

Infantry, 2 Troops 15th Cavalry and the 25th Field Battery, was concentrated at Camp Vicars, all under personal supervision of Department Commander. Expeditions consisting of all arms were sent out under Capt. Pershing, 15th Cavalry and Capt. Helmick, 10th Infantry. The expeditions were successful in impressing the Moros with our power and our ability to punish them for transgressions. It certainly put a complete stop to attacks along the road and generally to night attacks on our outposts. The camp at Vicars was fired into almost every night previous to these demonstrations.

The Bacolod Moros still remained unfriendly and continued to work on their large fort. I intended proceeding against them at this time but the Division Commander advised that they be given time and opportunity to take warning and it was thought they would accept friendship without being forced. In fact the Sultan seemed strongly inclined to be friendly and wrote several letters to that effect; he was probably overruled by more warlike Dattos and it finally became necessary to reduce his stronghold, the particulars of which will be found in Capt. Pershing's report.

The exploration of the west shore of Lake Lanao and finally the exploration of the entire Lake, was accomplished in March and April, 1903, under instructions from the Division Commander. Detailed account of these expeditions will be found in Captain Pershing's report, who had personal command and conducted the undertaking with skill and judgment.

In making these explorations it was not found necessary to use a larger force than the regular garrison at Camp Vicars and one additional troop of cavalry from Malabang.

At the present time, affairs in the Lake country are practically peaceful and it looks as if we would have no further general opposition. The Moros around Camp Vicars are in daily friendly intercourse with the Post, and the Moros inhabiting the north end of the Lake, are apparently friendly with the soldiers in that section; in fact we are using a large

number of Moros in constructing the wagon road from Iligan to Marahui, and they are also engaged in transporting supplies to camps along this route.

I do not, however, anticipate perfect peace and security. Murder and robbery will take place so long as we are in the country, at least for years to come. The Moro is a savage and has no idea of law and order as we understand it. Capt. Pershing's recommendation regarding their present control is perhaps the best plan that can be adopted, at least it may lay the foundation for a future system of government. Anarchy practically prevails throughout the region. To take power and control away from the Sultans and Dattos until we can inaugurate and put in force a better government would add to the confusion already existing.

Copies of telegrams and orders regarding Military operations in the Lake country are herewith attached.

Very respectfully,
 Your obedient servant,
 SAMUEL S. SUMNER.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.

Headquarters Division.

Manila, September 5, 1902. 4:50 p.m.

General Sumner, Zamboanga, Mindanao.

(Cebú take copy for General Wade).

Owing to the attacks made on the troops in the vicinity of Vicars since May 2d, in which we have lost four men killed, one officer and eleven men wounded, and especially with reference to attacks since August 11th, it is evidently necessary an offensive reply be made as our only means of putting a stop to attacks by Moros; with one exception, that of August 12th, the parties engaged in the attacks appear to belong in the Maciu section, perhaps the ladron element, but they certainly act with the knowledge of, and probably with encouragement

of, some of the Dattos. Uli has acknowledged his participation in the attack, August 13th, and is reported with the party at Mataling Falls, September 1st. There seems to be no doubt regarding his hostility toward the troops, and that he will have to be punished before he will cease his attacks. You are authorized to organize at Vicars at once, weather permitting, a field column of two battalions of infantry, two troops of cavalry and the battery; move into the Maciu country, and require the Dattos, known to be hostile to us, to make promise that they will cease hostilities personally and control their followers to the same end, and deliver up captured arms by those known to have them. Punishment when necessary to use force will be limited to those parties whom we know have shown hostility to us (see Pershing's dispatch), or who may do so during your movements. Disarm any cotta you find it necessary to attack. A Datto really friendly could not object to your visiting him in his cotta. Destruction of property, houses, rice, stock, etc., outside cottas not to be permitted. Treat prisoners humanely but be on guard against treachery. I do not approve of proposition to attack Bacolod, Maciu and other places same day. It is not good practice to disperse your force on day of battle beyond reach of your orders. That you show more force than is necessary to use will be beneficial, rather the reverse on the Moro mind. Please go in person to Vicars, superintend operations, remaining until matters resume a state of tranquility after the expedition. We are after effect not revenge for wrongs done, so if Bacolod takes warning from your movements on Maciu, your purpose is accomplished. Camp Vicars to have a guard, say two companies, while troops are absent. Burnside en route to repair cables.

CHAFFEE.

Malabang, P. I., March 31, 1903.

Pershing,
Vicars.

I am here and ready to arrange for an expedition to Bacolod. Have you any later news from there? What force do

you propose to take and do you need any troops from here to accompany you or to guard Vicars? How long will you probably be absent from Vicars and when will you be ready to start? The Division Commander is anxious to have the west coast of the Lake explored and would be much gratified if it can be accomplished without fighting or bloodshed, but if hostile Moro cottas bar the way, they must be destroyed. I understand you propose to visit Bacolod and return to Vicars before proceeding to Marahui.

(Signed) SUMNER,
Brigadier General.

*Brigadier General S. S. Sumner,
Commanding Dept. of Mindanao,
Zamboanga, Mindanao, P. I.*

Zamboanga, P. I., April 10, 1903.

General:

The favorable results which have been secured by the recent expedition from Vicars justify the conviction that the near future will be the best time to complete the exploration of the Lake. We now have a good knowledge of the topography and inhabitants on the south, west and north shores of the Lake. There remain only twenty miles on the east shore to close the gap. The Moro inhabitants have had abundant proofs of the beneficent purposes of the government and of the humanity of the Army, but there may still be a few disaffected ones.

In carrying out these objects of an occupation of the Lanao, I desire that there shall be a steady adherence to the policy of pacification and peaceable intercourse. If there should be any conflict, it must never be initiated by the troops. All Moros must learn that the troops may not be molested in passing along the roads and trails, and they must also learn that they cannot with impunity brandish their weapons and fly war flags in our faces.

The Moros have had abundant displays of our power and of their own impotence; and this has been specially emphasized at Bacolod. I trust there will be no more fighting and shall be specially glad if this work, herein set out, can be done without further bloodshed. Of course you will use the troops from Pantar should you deem such coöperation available. The sooner this work is done, the more likely will be an avoidance of bad weather.

Very respectfully,
 (Signed) GEO. W. DAVIS,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Division Philippines.

Misamis, May 10, 1903.

Capt. Pershing, Camp Vicars,

Please accept for yourself, and express to your Command, my appreciation of the soldierly manner in which they behaved during the recent expedition around Lake Lanao. They are the first Military force that ever encircled the Lake, and have accomplished a feat that has generally been deemed impossible. They have had to meet a savage foe, to overcome great natural obstacles, and to face a deadly disease. This was done cheerfully and manfully.

The Division Commander has asked me to add his thanks to my own to the officers and enlisted men who formed the Lake Lanao expedition and participated in this memorable march.

(Signed) SUMNER,
Brigadier General, Commanding.

Camp Vicars, Mindanao, P. I., May 15, 1903.

Adjutant General,

Department of Mindanao,

Zamboanga, P. I.

Sir:

In compliance with telegraphic instructions I have the honor to submit the following report covering the period from June 30, 1902, to the present date.

The Command of Camp Vicars was relinquished by Col. Frank Baldwin on June 30, 1902, and being the senior officer present, I assumed the duties of Commanding Officer. At that time the Command consisted of Troops "A" and "L", 15th Cavalry; the 25th Battery of Field Artillery and Companies "F", "G" and "H" of the 27th Infantry; in all about seven hundred men. There have been some changes during the year: Company "M" relieved Company "H" on July 4th, and Company "C" reported at Camp Vicars, August 21st.

Having been on duty at this station for practically a year, these Troops have become thoroughly efficient by campaigning among, and fighting against, the hostile Moros of Lake Lanao. Having learned something of the Moro character, they have by fair and just treatment done much towards impressing upon the Moro mind the sincerity of our friendship. Partly through their influence, many Moros have come to believe that American occupation will eventually have a beneficial effect upon the future of Lake Lanao Moros.

The rainy season in this region lasts from May until September, the months of July and August being the months of greatest rainfall.

On account of lack of tentage during the early occupation of this station, the Command was not properly protected from the heavy rains, and more or less sickness resulted. Up to the middle of October, all the supplies were brought from Malabang by Quartermaster's pack trains or by pony trains hired from the Moros, and of course supplies of all kinds were necessarily limited. In October, the wagon road, for some time completed only to the Mataling River, was finished through to Vicars and we were enabled to increase the variety of food and the supply of Quartermaster stores.

So far as weather and field service would permit, daily instruction has been held by all organizations and a practice march has been made on an average of at least once a week, except when the rainy season was at its height and during the prevalence of the cholera epidemic in the Lake region. Ser-

viceable sheds for cavalry and Quartermaster's animals were built during June and July by Moro labor. On the evening of August 21st, a severe earthquake was felt about Lake Lanao resulting in the destruction of the stables and the Quartermaster and Commissary store houses. Several Moro houses about the Lake were destroyed and it is estimated that at least fifty Moros lost their lives. None of the old inhabitants remember an earthquake of equal severity. In rebuilding the stables they were placed south of camp on same ridge, thus giving a more concentrated as well as a more defensible position. In December a target range was constructed about a mile to the north and during the three months following all organizations completed known distance firing.

The water supply at Camp Vicars has been obtained from a small spring which proved ample during the rainy season but insufficient for all purposes during the dry season, making it necessary to use water from a small stream about a mile south west of camp towards Tubaran for bathing, for laundry purposes, and for the animals. Later a well sunk in the ravine below the spring has furnished enough water for bathing purposes. This water question is one that should be carefully investigated before final action is taken on the establishment of a permanent Post at or in the vicinity of Camp Vicars, should the construction of a Post at any time in the future be considered necessary. An estimate was made of the cost of keeping a Command of this size under tentage for a year in this climate and it was found that temporary buildings could be erected for about half the cost of the tentage. Their construction was authorized and the work will probably be completed before the rainy season is well under way.

As to the construction of a permanent Post, of course circumstances, depending to a great extent upon our relations with the Moros, must ultimately determine the course to be pursued. It is believed that troops will have to be kept on the south shore of the Lake for some time to come, in the event of which there are several considerations which ought to

govern in the selection of a permanent site. Other things being equal, that place should be selected which will bring to us and our market the greatest number of Moros. Their principal means of communication being by water, a site accessible to the lake would be most likely to attract them. Such a site would have an additional advantage, as regards supply, of being within reach by water from Marahui or such point on the north shore as may ultimately be selected for a permanent Post there. For a site on the south shore it is believed that the second plateau at Bayan fulfills all conditions as well as any other and its proximity to the Lake eliminates the question of water supply.

MORO AFFAIRS.

In order to more clearly understand the conditions as they exist in the Lake region today it should be borne in mind that there are three tribes or branches of Malanao Moros; viz., those of Bayabao, inhabiting the northern third of the Lake from Bucayauan on the west shore around to Dalama on the east shore, with a center of population near Marahui; the Onayans, inhabiting the southern shore of the Lake from Madumba on the west to Saur on the East, with a center of population at the former capital, Bayan; and the Macui tribe, consisting of the remaining Moros about the Lake except those inhabiting a few rancherias east of Macui among the foot hills, who belong to the Bayabaos. Macui Moros claim to be the most ancient, the Bayabaos and Onayans being off-shoots, although none of them are able to trace their ancestry back of the 13th century. It is probable that at one time each tribe had a Sultan or leading Datto whose rule over them was absolute and while the lines separating these tribes are still more or less distinct, at present the head of each is practically such in name only, or at most, exercises a very limited control over them as a whole. Moros from the different tribes intermarry and have done so to such an extent in the past that it is often difficult for them to trace their ancestry to a particular tribe. The tribes have also

disintegrated so that in some four hundred rancherias around the Lake there are today about one hundred and fifty Sultans, all claiming to be of royal blood.

At the time of our occupation of Lake Lanao we found a considerable number of Moros opposing us either openly or secretly. Perhaps one half of the Onayan Moros expressed their friendship soon after the battle of Bayan and previous to this we had received assurances of friendship from most of the people constituting the Bayabao tribe, many of whom I had personally visited while stationed at Iligan.

All others in the Laguna may be considered as being opposed to us at that time. The Bacolod Moros on the west, some of the Macuis on the east and a number of the Onayan Moros under the leadership of Sultan Uali of Butig were openly hostile to us. With the small nucleus of friendly Moros to assist us, efforts were at once begun to influence others, at first those of the Onayan and Bayabao tribes and later those of Macui. Letters were written and friendly Moros were sent out to assure all of them that we had their best interests at heart, and inviting those who had not done so to visit us and become personally acquainted, in order if possible, that mutual confidence might be established between us. They were told that our purpose was to avoid further war with them if possible; that we did not want to kill their people nor destroy their property; that we desired them to bring their produce to our market; that we wished to employ them as laborers on the road and about camp; that we had no intention of disturbing their religion nor of changing their lawful customs; and that in coming among them we had no other idea than to make them our friends.

In response to these letters and invitations, many visited us and others replied by letter expressing their desire to be on friendly terms with us. To all who came, a welcome was given and every effort made to assure them that our motives were the best. A special invitation was sent inviting Moros to come and join us in celebrating the Fourth of July. About seven

hundred from rancherias in the vicinity accepted the invitation and seemed to enjoy both our sports and their own for which special prizes were offered.

On June 21st, ten Moros under the leadership of Datto Tanguil attacked two soldiers on the trail to Malabang near Camp No. 10, wounding both of them and securing both their rifles. An investigation brought out the fact that these Moros were from Binidayan. The Sultan had visited the camp after the battle of Bayan, had expressed his friendship and had received pay for some growing rice destroyed during the Lake Lanao expedition. In conversation he acknowledged that the Moros who committed this offence were from his rancheria but plead that he was powerless to control them. I told him it would be our policy to hold the Sultans and Dattos responsible for the acts of their people and that he must deliver the leader of these offenders to us. As he failed to comply with this demand I arrested him and brought him to camp a prisoner. The two stolen rifles were delivered next day and in a few days several of his Moros brought in the body of one of Tanguil's party, reporting that it was Tanguil himself. This Moro whom they thought dead regained consciousness long enough to confess that he was a member of the party but that he was not Tanguil and that the Binidayan Moros were trying to deceive us. I still insisted that the leader be brought in and offered to send troops to make the arrest if they would locate him. Before this could be done however the Sultan went juramentado, struck the sergeant of the guard with a piece of bamboo, grabbed the gun of the sentry immediately over him and began to use it. Of course the guard was compelled to fire and the sultan fell mortally wounded. Every effort was made by the surgeons to save his life without avail. He made the statement that he had run amuck expecting to be killed by the guard and did not hold them to blame. His death in this manner was unfortunate and was to be regretted, but the whole affair served to impress upon the minds of all Dattos the position we had taken for the enforcement of law and order and caused positive action

to be taken by many of them. The Moros of that rancheria assumed more or less of an unfriendly attitude but they eventually presented themselves at camp under the new Sultan Mambao and extended an invitation for us to visit their rancheria, which we did in February for the first time.

During the months of June and July there were several acts of violence committed along the trails by unfriendly Moros, usually in attempts to capture arms, and it may be stated in this connection that the one great desire of every Moro is to possess a modern rifle. Telegraph lines were constantly interfered with and the wire often for a distance of a mile was carried away. Camp Vicars itself, however, was not molested until the night of August 11th when one of the outposts was attacked by a band of fifteen Moros from Bacolod. A sergeant and one man were killed and two men wounded. One Moro of the party was found dead afterwards and others were reported wounded. Night attacks were made on camp at intervals during August and September and several Moros were killed or wounded from time to time. These attacks were mainly under the leadership of Sultan Uali who drew around him a crowd of renegade Moros from Butig and its subordinate rancherias in that section; and Moros from Macui and Bacolod under different leaders also became offensive. To determine the correctness of reports regarding them I demanded explanations from the Sultans and Dattos of those rancherias and in most cases received hostile replies. Our inactivity and failure to punish these offenders was misconstrued as cowardice on our part and even friendly Moros could not understand why we took no action. I informed them that a time would come when they must pay the penalty and that they would learn sooner or later that they could not with impunity attack our soldiers and destroy our property. To put a stop to this marauding, it became necessary to punish the Moros responsible for it and a campaign against them was ordered. The first campaign September 18—22nd, was made against Sultan Uali of Gauan and Butig and Moros of the rancherias of Bayabao who had been active in their hostility against us.

The second campaign September 29th, to October 3rd, was made against Macui Moros under Sultans Tauagan and Gandauli. An effort was made even after the campaign had begun to induce them to come in and surrender without fighting but they refused and made stubborn resistance to our advance into their territory. The result was that their forts were destroyed and all who opposed us were killed in battle or dislodged from their position in defeat. The immediate effect of these campaigns was to put a stop to attacks on camps and on soldiers along trails, and since September, 1902, with one exception, there has been no further interference of this kind. It has been the experience with us, as with the Spaniards, that after the Moros of a particular rancheria have received a sound thrashing the lesson is remembered by them and its effect upon others has been beneficial. Their attacks on our troops and their attempts to stand against us have met with comparatively little success; while they seldom failed to secure arms from the Spaniards when they tried, at one time taking the Spaniards by surprise and securing thirty seven Remingtons and ammunition. After reaching Marahui the Spaniards made little progress in exploring the Lanao region and there is no record of their having made any expedition against any of the then hostile rancherias except one against Tugaya. Even with launches on the Lake, they secured no foothold on the eastern side and were constantly annoyed and even attacked in their forts by large numbers of Moros from Pitacus, Taraca and other rancherias from that side of the Lake. Neither did they ever secure a foothold on the south side of the Lake nor did they progress along the western shore south of Tugaya.

After the campaign of Macui, it was decided to postpone further movements against other hostile Moros in the hope that they would profit by the experience of those who had encountered us. Letters were sent to the east Lake and to Bacolod Moros giving them every opportunity to come to friendly terms with us; they were told, that even though previously hostile they might visit us without fear and that we

would welcome a change in their hostile attitude. Several Moros on the eastern side of the Lake expressed a desire to be friends, including Raha Nurul Caquim who controls a number of rancherias in that section and who told his people that they must not interfere with Americans under penalty of severe punishment. Some of the Moros of Butig and Bayabao visited us declaring that they wished no more war. Nothing of a friendly nature, however, was heard from Bacolod who still held out against us and continued to send hostile notes.

Under escort of Amai-Manibilang and some of his people from Madaya, I crossed the Lake in vintas with fifty men, in November, stopping at several towns along the route, visited Madaya and Marahui and proceeded thence to Iligan and returned to Camp Vicars by the same route. We were shown every attention at Madaya and also at Marahui where a large conference was held on market day at which some five hundred Moros from all sections were present. The assurances of friendship we received during this trip convinced me of the sincerity of the promises made one year previous by the Bayabao Moros. Moreover it was plain that all Moros on the west shore of the Lake except those under the influence of Bacolod had by this time become reconciled to our presence in the Lake country.

In December, cholera reached the Lake and has probably extended to all rancherias. Our market was closed for a time and a strict quarantine against Moros was established. I had letters of instructions prepared in Moro and sent to all the principal rancherias explaining to them how to avoid the disease and offering to supply medicine in limited quantity to those who wished it. In some places the instructions were followed in the main and it had the effect of holding the disease in check to a large extent. According to the best obtainable information it is probable that about fifteen hundred people died of this disease.

After the Battle of Bayan in May, 1902, a relative of the former Sultan, Datto Maguindanao, was unanimously elected Sultan of that rancheria and visited camp several times expressing the friendship of his people. It soon became known, however, that Bayan harbored feelings of resentment towards us and that they were strengthening their fort at Malianac preparatory to making another stand against us. The actual leader of these Moros was an old Pandita by the name of Sajiduciaman. Knowing his friendship for Amai-Manibilang and one or two others, I summoned them to Camp Vicars to aid me in bringing him to see the folly of further resistance. In view of the proximity of Bayan and on account of the Pandita's influence with other Moros, it was important that we should win him to our side without resort to force. An interview was finally arranged at which he and I agreed to be personal friends but he claimed to be unable to give any assurances as to the future actions of his people. In January his followers began to interfere with the Moros employed by us; and the Sultan was forced by them to return to Oato, his former home, thus confessing that he could not control them and practically relinquishing his rights. As he is a man of little force of character for whom the Moros have little respect I made no effort to induce him to remain. Again addressing Sajiduciaman directly, I told him that he must come to camp and explain to me the meaning of the attitude of his people. In the conference that followed he said that he desired to be on friendly terms with us and that the Bayan Moros had committed no offense but that they did not desire us to visit their rancherias.

I told him that such friendship was of no value to us and that I should therefore not consider him as a friend. As a result a visit was arranged and made, and we were received with every manifestation of friendship. Since then there have been no complaints and many Bayan Moros are today employed about Camp Vicars.

Towards the latter part of January, reports indicated that cholera was abating to such an extent that, with caution, practice marches for short distances might be resumed. These marches were originally undertaken to convince the Moros that they need have no fear from the presence of our troops in their territory and nearly every Onayan rancheria had been visited. With a command consisting of a Battery of Artillery, one Troop of Cavalry and three Companies of Infantry, a march was made to Gata under the assurance that we would be received in a friendly spirit. Arriving in the vicinity we were met by Amai Buncurang whom I had previously sent with messages, who told us that cholera existed there and that they did not desire us to visit them. From this and from their general attitude, it was evident that there was an unfriendly faction among them and that insistence upon a visit at that time would probably bring a clash. I reluctantly returned to Camp Vicars passing through Macui where at the crossing of the Malaig river, five Moros fired on the column wounding one man. These Moros together with their cotta were destroyed. In February with a command of the same size, a visit was made to Madumba on the west side of the Lake which was further in that direction than we had yet been. While here I endeavored to communicate with the Sultan and the Panandungan of Bacolod, but they refused to receive the Moro messengers. Their attitude was extremely hostile; war flags were flying over their fort and they even went so far as to fire in the vicinity of our camp at night.

During the preceding months every possible efforts had been made to convince these people of our friendly purposes and of our desire to avoid further bloodshed. Several Dattos visited Bacolod of their own accord, entertaining with me the hope that the disastrous results that must certainly come to the Bacolod people in case of a war with us might be averted; but the advice of these friendly Dattos was scorned. Among the Moros who have been of friendly assistance and who have used their influence with unfriendly Moros, a few deserve

especial mention in this report for their loyalty. Datto Grande of Makadar aided in securing the Cavalry horses lost by Lieut. Forsyth in March, 1902, all of which have been turned in or are accounted for, but one, so far as known, remaining in the hands of the Moros. Amai-Manibilang of Madaya, the Sultan of Ganasi, Datto Adta of Paiguay, Amai-Buncuring of Oato, have made every effort to induce hostile Moros to become friends. Many Onayan Moros have furnished us with pack ponies and vintas for various expeditions.

In order to thoroughly explore the Lake country and to convince all Moros of our benevolent intentions and to demonstrate to them that there was no truth in the stories they had heard that our purpose was conquest, it had been contemplated for some time to send an expedition completely around the Lake. Cholera having abated to some extent, and the dry season being nearly at an end, such an expedition was ordered to explore the west shore of the Lake from Camp Vicars to Marahui and return. While the experience of the two attempted friendly visits recently undertaken indicated that there would probably be some opposition, the best information obtainable was to the effect that the Moros of Bacolod on the one side and of Taraca on the other side of the Lake would be the only ones who would offer opposition of a determined character. The Moros of Bacolod had been strengthening their fort for a year and believed it to be impregnable.

In anticipation of the expedition around the Lake a letter was written to all Moros as follows:

"TO ALL MOROS IN THE LAGUNA DE LANAOS.

The Americans have now been in the Laguna de Lanao nearly one year. During that time we have constructed a good road from Malabang to the Lake. We have given employment to many Moros at good wages. We have purchased a great deal of Moro produce. We have established a good market at Bayan. We have not molested any Moros except some who attacked us. We have visited as friends all points on the south side of the Lake from Ganassi to Gata. We have gone across the Lake and visited many rancherias there. We have kept every promise we have made. We have not interfered with the customs, habits, government nor religion of any Moro. Therefore we have

demonstrated to the Moros and to the whole world that we are not here to make war, nor to dispossess the inhabitants of Lanao of their lives, property or anything that is theirs, but are here for the good of the Moros as representatives of our great government, of which all Moros are a part. All fair minded Moros who know us have become our friends because they believe we are honest and that we can and will help the people in the Laguna. All sensible Moros in the Laguna want peace. Two or three Dattos refuse our friendship simply because, as they say, they do not like the Americans. To these Dattos I say they are obstructing the establishment of universal peace in the Laguna, and if they continue their opposition, they must some day suffer the consequences of their stubborn ignorance."

The expedition consisting of the Camp Vicars Command started on April 5th, troops from Malabang having been sent to take their place in camp temporarily, and the following afternoon we arrived at Bacolod. It was evident that anything but fight was entirely out of the question and that they had planned a stubborn resistance. Outlying positions held by them were soon taken and their stronghold invested. After closing the avenues of escape, this fort was pounded by artillery and afterwards taken in a brilliant assault by Infantry and dismounted Cavalry of the Command. One hundred and twenty Moros lost their lives in this battle, while the Americans sustained a small loss of eleven wounded. At Calahui, three miles further on, some resistance was also met but the fort at that place could not withstand the effect of our batteries and the hundred defenders, said to have been inside, deserted their position, twenty three of their number being killed or wounded. The expedition continued to Pantar on the Agus river and returned, meeting friendly receptions at all places along the entire route except the two above given.

The success of the Bacolod expedition warranted undertaking an expedition around the eastern side of the Lake and as the season continued favorable the necessary orders were given by General Sumner and the expedition got away May 2nd. Notice had been sent to all Moros in that section that we would not molest the persons nor the property of any who desired to be our friends, but that we would overcome any opposition offered in carrying out the purposes of exploration

for which the expedition was ordered. Several Moros from the eastern part of the lake accompanied us and used their influence to persuade those who had declared hostility, that opposition against us was useless. Among those who assisted us was the leading Pandita of Lake Lanao, Imam Nuzca. He opposed resistance against us on religious grounds and declared to the people that they would be punished in the hereafter for all such conduct, arguing that it was not supported by the teachings of the Koran and could not be upheld by any argument.

No opposition was encountered until we reached Taraca where a group of cottas were flying red flags and making other hostile demonstrations. The battle of Taraca river was the result, in which, according to Moro accounts, some two hundred and fifty Moros lost their lives and ten cottas were destroyed, including the strong forts at Pitacus and Taraca which were taken with great gallantry by our troops; and 36 cannon, 60 rifles, and fifty two prisoners were captured.

With the exception of a few shots fired at long range soon after leaving Taraca, we were received in a friendly spirit along the route to Madaya. Even though the season was late and there had been no rains on the eastern side of the Lake for three or four months, the flat rice country there was well nigh impassable. It was found necessary to corduroy the trails in many places and to fill them with grass in others, in order to make them passable for our animals without their loads. Our transport trains had to be unpacked several times and the cargoes carried by hand across the marshes. The labor of the troops was indeed very trying and in order to avoid possibly a worse experience, it was determined to return to Camp Vicars by way of the less difficult trail along the west shore of the Lake. As a result of the exploration of the trails around Lake Lanao it is suggested that plans be laid for the construction of a road around the Lake at such time in the future as necessity for employing Moros may arise on account of any shortage of crops in the Lake region.

The favorable results of these expeditions can hardly be estimated at this time, but reasoning from our own experience during the past year and from the experience of the Spaniards in Lake Lanao during several years, and comparing them, it seems probable that there will be no more combined resistance in the future nor is it believed that the Moros will again undertake to oppose us by the construction or defense of cottas. It is believed that our accomplishment of the entire circuit of the Lake overcoming as we did all hostile opposition with comparatively few casualties to ourselves; treating as friends all other Moros; visiting their rancherias without molesting them; taking no property for which we did not pay; and destroying nothing except unavoidably in battle; has had and will have a far reaching effect in permanently settling the Moro question of Lake Lanao in so far as hostility is concerned; if indeed it does not result, under a wise administration, in the establishment of amicable relations that will lead to universal peace in this hitherto warlike region, without any further use of force. The achievement has given us an advantage in their future control which the Moro will be as quick to recognize as we are.

In view of the progress that has been made we are now in position to study carefully and work out along the lines of material progress the future of the Lanao Moros. Their government should, of course, for some time remain in charge of the military, either directly or indirectly, thus naturally following the kind of rule to which they have been accustomed for generations. To handle the situation properly, all these Moros, being of one group with the same dialect, customs, and habits of life, should be under the control of one head in whom they have confidence, who should know something of their language, their character and their history and to whom they can go for advice and for the settlement of many questions which heretofore have necessarily been left unsettled. As far as it is consistent with advancement, it is believed the government as we find it, a government by the Sultan or Datto as

the case may be, should be disturbed as little as possible; that is, the people should be managed through the Dattos themselves, who being recognized as such in their authority should therefore be held responsible for the proper control of the people of their several rancherías.

As between different rancherías, each of which is practically independent of every other, each having its own Sultan or Datto, who denies the right of every other Sultan or Datto to dictate to him, some sort of judicial tribunal appointed by or brought under the Military governor could probably be successfully established. In fact experience has proved that in settling disputes between Moros of different rancherías and often those of the same rancherías, a board of arbitration consisting of friendly Dattos, agreeable to both parties, selected by the military authority, could be relied upon to satisfactorily adjust their differences. Due to their lack of confidence in each other it would be difficult to select members to constitute a permanent board of this kind, nor would it be advisable at this time to do so. It is probable that by appealing to their reason, slight changes in their laws could be made from time to time through the medium of these courts of equity and that it could be done without exciting their suspicions, although all growth along these lines must be gradual.

The Moro is of a peculiar make-up as to character, though the reason is plain when it is considered: first, that he is a savage; second, that he is a Malay; and third that he is a Mohammedan. The almost infinite combination of superstitions, prejudices and suspicions blended into his character make him a difficult person to handle until fully understood. In order to control him other than by brute force one must first win his implicit confidence, nor is this as difficult as it would seem; but once accomplished, one can accordingly guide and direct his thoughts and actions by patient and continuous effort. He is jealous of his religion but he knows very little about its teachings. The observance of a few rites and ceremonies is about all that is required to satisfy him that he is a

good Mohammedan. As long as he is undisturbed in the possession of his women and children and his slaves, there need be little fear from him. As a rule he treats his so-called slaves, who are really but serfs or vassals, as members of his family; but any interference with what he thinks his right regarding them, had best be made gradually by the natural process of development, which must logically come by contact with and under the wise supervision of a civilized people.

The number of people in the Lake Lanao region according to the recent census is estimated to be about 80,000. They have been unfortunate during the past year in losing a large number, probably fifty per cent, of their carabaos. For this reason it is excepted that the acreage of crops this year will be considerably less than in previous years. People of Lake Lanao are practically self-sustaining, raising a great variety of agricultural products and fruit, and manufacturing most of their own cloth and other articles of domestic use.

Naturally industrious and inhabiting a country capable of a high state of cultivation, there is no doubt but that the Moro can be induced to cultivate new products and introduce more modern methods in agriculture. His talent for creation is such as to warrant the belief that he is susceptible of training along the lines of industrial pursuits. In my opinion it would be a good investment on the part of the Government to select a few of the leading Moros and take them on a visit to the United States, preferably during the World's Fair at St. Louis, and I would also recommend that the education of at least ten bright boys of the upper class be undertaken to the extent of teaching them English in connection with work in some industrial school in the States.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
*Captain 15th Cavalry,
Comdg.*

APPENDIX IV.

CONDITION OF MORO AFFAIRS IN SULU GROUP:

“A” Annual Report of Colonel William M. Wallace, 15th Cavalry, commanding.

“B” Quarterly Report for third quarter fiscal year furnishing details of events and circumstances.

“A”

Jolo, Jolo, P. I., June 30, 1903.

To the Adjutant General,

Division of the Philippines,

Manila, P. I.

(Through Headquarters Department of Mindanao.)

SIR:—

In compliance with your instructions of 23rd inst., I have the honor to submit the following report of Moro affairs in the Jolo Archipelago for the fiscal year 1903:—

Little progress has been made in the general development of this group of islands; material conditions remain throughout about the same, and political conditions were during the last six months far less satisfactory than at the close of the preceding year. The latter remark, however, refers mainly to Jolo Island, the population of which equals that of all the other islands of this Archipelago collectively, and is also the most unruly. Cholera, naval survey, and census combined, produced a state of unrest and excitement among the Moros on Jolo Island, which often verged upon open hostility. Only the great patience and discretion exercised in dealing with this excitable people have averted open rupture.

As regards internal affairs of the Moros, commanding officers in the Sulu Archipelago are still guided and restricted

in their relation and actions toward the natives by the provisions of the Bates' agreement; their efforts have been mainly and successfully directed toward the prevention of the formerly so frequent feuds between the different chiefs, which wars, although never bloody, were always the cause of much looting and burning of houses, destruction of crops, etc. In some instances, chiefs were induced by pressure brought to bear upon them, to return spoil they had taken from some hapless Moro by unjustly imposed fines or outright robbery. Protection has been extended to slaves who applied for same; this action on the part of the American authorities is, however, much resented by the owners.

The principal events recorded during the year were as follows, in order of their succession:—

In the beginning of the year a reconciliation took place between the Sultan and the Dattos Joakanain and Kalbi; thefts of horses and cattle were, however, mutually continued by both factions and were often made a matter of complaint to me by the Sultan as well as the Dattos. The Sultan's race horse for instance, which was recovered in Manila, was at the time stolen and sold by a follower of Datta Joakanain.

During part of July and August the Sultan resided in Siassi, indulging his passion for gambling; his emissaries were sent about to try cases, impose fines and collect poll tax for the Sultan in the Siassi and Tawi Tawi groups; his brothers, the Datto Rajah Muda and Datto Attick, went to other parts to do some collecting on their own account. I instructed the Commanding Officers at Bongao and Siassi, not to interfere as long as the people paid willingly but to allow no forcible tax collection.

An incident which occurred during September in the Tawi Tawi group is of interest as touching the Sultan's claim of his hereditary right to all produce of the Sulu waters, in exercising which he taxes the pearl fisheries and demands that pearls or other products of the sea above a certain value, be brought to him; he pays the finder whatever he, the Sultan,

deems an appropriate share of the value. A delegation of natives from Banaran Island visited the then Commanding Officer at Bongao, Lieutenant Warren Dean, 15th Cavalry, and complained that Hadji Taib, in the Sultan's name, had imposed and collected unjust fines. Lieutenant Dean's investigation brought out the following facts: Panglima Jehan of Banaran had found floating on the sea a large quantity of "ambal," which is said to be valued by the Chinese at 200 pesos per pound and used by them for medicinal purposes. The Panglima had given the Sultan 9 pounds of his find, for which the Sultan paid him 700 pesos; 15 pounds had been secreted and sold by the Panglima to outsiders. For this reason Hadji Taib fined him and some others 5,000 pesos in all, but had only been able to collect about 400 pesos, which amount covered the visible worldly possessions of those fined. As the Panglima had previously stated to Lieutenant Dean that he had sold his own interest, only 2 pounds of said ambal, which statement he later admitted to have been false, and as he also acknowledged the Sultan's above mentioned right, Lieutenant Dean endorsed Hadji Taib's judgment.

Captain K. W. Walker, 15th Cavalry, made an extended trip through Jolo Island with Troop "B," 15th Cavalry, from October 23rd to 31st. The troops were received in a friendly manner at all places except at Panglima Hassan's in Look. Hassan was not cordial. November 18th to 22nd, Troop "H," 15th Cavalry, made a similar trip through the District of Parang and was well received by chiefs and people.

The first news that cholera existed in the Sulu Archipelago reached this post November 27th, when the Commander of the gunboat Samar reported Manunga, a small island N. E. of Jolo, infected. The epidemic gradually spread through all of the islands, but it appeared most virulent on Jolo, where some cases occurred as late as May; and the mortality is estimated to have amounted to from 10% to 12% of the whole population. In the Siassi and Tawi Tawi group the disease assumed a much milder form and was reported

extinct in February. Captain Hickok, Commanding Siassi, estimated that 2 % of the populace died of cholera in his district. In the Tawi Tawi group the percentage is probably less. At the posts of Jolo, Siassi, and Bongao the strictly enforced quarantine and rigidly observed sanitary measures effectually protected the garrison, and only a very few cases occurred among the civilians.

Towards the end of November, a disturbance arose on Lugas Island which led to a fight between Hadji Taib and Maharajah Sarapuddin. Captain Le Roy Eltinge, 15th Cavalry, Commanding Siassi, went with a detachment of 15 men to the scene and stopped the fight; Hadji Taib and Maharajah Sarapuddin, he sent to Jolo to report to me for investigation. There later developed the following interesting details as to the cause of the trouble: The Rajah Muda had come to Lugas to collect 200 pesos fine of a man named Dugusan, a follower of Maharajah Sarapuddin, for a crime said to have been committed by Dugusan about ten years ago. Dugusan paid one hundred pesos and requested that the balance be remitted; this being refused, he fled to Lamenua. The Rajah Muda then ordered Dugusan's mother-in law, who is also the mother-in-law of Hadji Taib, to pay the remaining 100 pesos; she refused, and was seized by Sarapuddin by order of the Rajah Muda who took her to Maibun. Later Hadji Taib arrived at Lugas, and when he heard about this affair, he demanded from Sarapuddin the value of twenty slaves (commonly computed at 40 pesos per slave) as fine for having seized his, Taib's, mother-in-law. Both the Hadji and the Maharajah took their case to the Commanding Officer at Siassi, who advised them to refer the matter to the Sultan for judgment. It seems that Sarapuddin refused to accompany Hadji Taib to Maibun and that this caused the fight. I ordered the parties to lay their complaint before the Sultan, and sent word to the Rajah Muda to at once liberate the woman seized; he obeyed.

A general restlessness and an unfriendly if not threatening attitude towards us commenced to manifest itself among the Moros of Jolo Island during the third quarter of the year. Several reasons for this condition were given by the Sultan who was evidently exceedingly troubled about the state of affairs, as were his officers and those chiefs who came to see me. The cholera was one of the reasons assigned, which disease undeniably caused much distress and excitement among the people. The Sultan and chiefs further contended that the naval survey of Jolo Island had augmented this feeling. The survey was commenced without notification being sent to me or the Sultan. Later, on different occasions, the latter requested that the survey be postponed until after the cholera had ceased. It was necessary for the boats engaged in this work to send parties on shore to temporarily put up tripods and flags at prominent landmarks. The Moros know nothing about surveying and it is no easy matter to explain to them. At some places, their superstition prompted them to believe that these flags were propagating cholera; at others, suspicion and distrust whispered that they were put up as a sign of the United States taking possession of the Moros' lands. As the Cavalry had taken several trips through the island just previous to the outbreak of the cholera, it was also rumored that they had poisoned the water courses, which latter suggestion, however, found few believers. February 4th, at Patotol on the north eastern coast of Jolo Island, shots were fired from shore at the U. S. S. Albay, engaged in surveying. The Commander of the ship, Lieut. Walker, U. S. N., went ashore with an armed boat's crew and sent for the chief, who explained that the firing had been done by some bad men without his knowledge. On February 24th, a shore party of the U. S. S. Frolic, consisting of Lieut. Jones, U. S. N., midshipman Finney, and 4 enlisted men were ascending a hill about two miles north east of Maibun, when they saw a large mob of armed Moros running yelling toward them; shots were fired by the Moros, and the naval party, who were armed with pistols only,

did not await the near approach of the crowd, but leaving their instruments behind, retreated hastily to the shore and returned thence to the ship. Lt. Commander Dunn of the Frolic demanded of the Sultan the immediate restitution of the instruments and the surrender of the leader of the supposed attack. The former demand was complied with, but the Sultan declared that no attack of the Americans had been intended and that the Moros in question had only been chasing a mad man, trying to capture him and prevent his doing any harm to the party. The supposed madman was delivered to Commander Dunn who took him to Jolo. Charges were filed by Lt. Jones before the court of First Instance, Jolo, against several Moros in connection with this affair, which were later withdrawn and a trial by Provost Court ordered; owing to the absence of Lt. Jones on account of sickness and his declaration that he is unable to identify the supposed leaders of the attack the trial did not take place.

During the night of February 9th, the Chinese quarter at Kaunawai, Parang District, was burned by incendiaries and property valued by the Chinese at 24,000 pesos either destroyed by the fire or looted. The owners swore out warrants before the court of First Instance, Jolo, against a number of Moros including several small chiefs. The warrants were handed to me for execution and I demanded of the Sultan the prompt surrender of the accused, notifying him that his failure to do so would result in immediate action being taken by the troops and navy to effect the arrest by force. A number of gunboats assembled at Jolo, plainly demonstrated to the Moros the seriousness of the affair. Yielding to pressure, and despite the great excitement prevailing in Parang, the Sultan had the accused arrested by his officers and they were surrendered at Jolo, February 15th. The case was tried before the Court of First Instance, Jolo; seven of the accused were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, one was acquitted. During the month of March, several cases of juramentado occurred at Jolo. On the 9th, a Moro entered the cockpit at

Tullei, killed one Filipino and wounded one Moro and one Chino before he himself was killed by a vigilante. The following day, at Point Tandoh, a private of the Engineer Corps, member of a party who were blasting rock to be used in repairing the Jolo pier, while resting on shore was killed by a juramentado; the murderer was at once shot dead by the other soldiers. Four days later, a party of three juramentados killed 3 Mohammedans and wounded one Filipino and one Moro woman; they then attacked an approaching detachment of cavalry and were shot before they could do any more damage. The only possible explanation for their killing of Mohammedans is that in their madness they forgot to discriminate. In all these cases it was impossible to identify the murderers or to obtain any positive information of where they had come from.

A new prophet arose among the Moros on Pata Island about January, who declared that he had been selected by Allah to preach to the people and teach them to mend their evil ways. The story went about among the Moros that his mission had been announced to the prophet by a voice issuing from a cocoanut which he had found drifting on the water and split open. It was reported to me that his preaching was mainly directed against the Sultan and chiefs whose injustice toward the people he said was the cause that the country was approaching ruin. He attributed, it was reported, to himself the power of healing any sickness, and to make the Americans leave the country. It appears that in the beginning of his career the prophet found many adherents on Pata Island and that many Moros from other places went to see and hear him, but as the novelty was wearing off, the prophet seems to have returned to his former obscurity; nothing more is heard of him.

In view of the turbulent conditions on the island and the constant prospect of serious trouble, I advised an increase of the garrison at Jolo. March 22nd, the Department Commander, Brigadier S. S. Sumner, U. S. A., arrived at Jolo,

also one battalion, 11th Infantry, which disembarked and took station at Jolo. On the following day General Sumner met the Sultan and many chiefs in conference; a number of chiefs, though notified that the General wished to see them in Jolo, did not appear. Panglima Hassan of Look, one of the latter, arrived near Jolo, on March 27th, with about 700 armed followers; he came to town next morning with four of his sub-chiefs and 50 armed men whom I had permitted him to bring in.

Residents of Jolo town and Tullei complained to me that a number of branded horses and cattle had lately been stolen from them, presumably by followers of Maharajah Indanan of Parang. I therefore sent, April 2nd, Captain Le Roy Eltinge with troops H, I and M, 15th Cavalry to the Maharajah's territory, to look about for the stolen property. The troops proceeded along the Maibun road and then followed a trail leading to Indanan's cotta. Bodies of troops have at different times visited and camped in Parang, their appearance should therefore create neither surprise nor apprehension among the natives; yet the reception of the cavalry on this occasion was extremely hostile. When Captain Eltinge arrived near Indanan's place, the troops halted and dismounted for a rest, the Captain intending to visit Indanan. Immediately gongs were heard sounding at the latter's cotta summoning his people to arms, and in an incredibly short time about 500 armed men gathered at the place, all carrying rifles or spears besides one or two knives each; even women and boys armed with barong or spear, hurried to the scene. This mob crowded around the soldiers in the most threatening manner. The Maharajah appeared, surrounded by a number of his men, to meet Captain Eltinge. A short conversation took place, in the course of which Indanan professed total ignorance regarding the stolen cattle. His whole behavior was most insolent. When Captain Eltinge inquired why he had called his people together at the approach of the troops, and requested him to at least stop his men from provoking the soldiers as this might

lead to trouble, Indanan replied that if any one of his men was hurt there would be a fight, and if the troops remained at his place until afternoon some 1500 of his, Indanan's, followers would gather there. When the troops resumed the march, after a stay of two hours and a half they were followed part of the way by the yelling mob. It was reported to me that Indanan expected the command to return next day, and made preparations for a fight. Some armed bands even advanced that day along the Maibun road and late in the evening their yelling was heard at the Asturias blockhouse.

I informed the Sultan of this occurrence and enjoined him to take Indanan severely to task, as a repetition of such demonstrations would not be tolerated. A few days later Indanan came to me with profound apologies. However, no faith can be placed in his sincerity; he is an ignorant but cunning, unprincipled savage, and his henchmen are composed of the worst element. Though the cavalry did not see any of the stolen cattle in his territory, yet there exists but little doubt that the thieves are among his people, and that he is perfectly cognizant of the fact.

The Sultan, with quite a numerous suite left Jolo, April 9th, for a visit to Singapore via Sandakan, after having appointed his brother, the Datto Rajah Muda, and Hadji Taib, his representatives during his absence. While at Sandakan, the Sultan sent an emissary to Cagayan de Jolo to collect a tax of 5 pesos per capita from the inhabitants, and the collector is said to have succeeded in gathering about 1700 pesos. In the Sultan's letter to the chiefs of said island, which letter was presented by the emissary, the Sultan stated that "the money thus collected was intended to be used for the improvement of the country and to make his people happy and prosperous." I was informed of this transaction when I officially visited Cagayan de Jolo on May 21st, and have left instructions that collections of such taxes will not be permitted unless authorized by the Commanding Officer, Jolo.

The Division Commander, Major General G. W. Davis, U. S. A., and Brigadier General S. S. Sumner, U. S. A., commanding this department, arrived at Jolo, April 12th. Messengers were despatched to the prominent chiefs, inviting them to meet the General at these Headquarters. The following chiefs came: Hadji Taib, Hadji Butu, Dattos Tambuyung and Uyung, Sarip Magarip, Maharajahs Indanan and Amad, Nakib Indasan, Orang Kayah Tang, Hatib Awab and Aburan. The Datto Rajah Muda remained absent; I have not seen him or heard from him since. Word was sent to Panglima Hassan of Look to meet the generals at Lake Seit 16 miles east of Jolo on April 14th, and the meeting took place as appointed. Hassan was escorted by 500 men armed with spears, barangs and rifles. General Davis talked to the Moros for two hours.

Two Moros, who attacked the quarantine guard near the Asturias blockhouse in December last and whose surrender I had since repeatedly demanded from the Sultan and chiefs, were delivered to me May 5th; their trial will take place before the Court of First Instance at Jolo.

A typical case of trouble among the Moros, which occurred in May was reported to me as follows: The son of Hadji Imam Usup, chief of Patian Island, was returning from a voyage when his boat was swamped off Parang. Some Parang people came to his assistance. After his goods had been collected, a bundle containing clothing and 40 pesos in coin was missing. Part of this clothing is said to have been found in the possession of a slave of one of the Parang men, Mohamad Apas, a Moro of some standing. The son of Imam Usup charged the slave with the theft of said bundle and Apas told the complainant to come to him with his companions on a certain day, when the case should be tried. The trial took place accordingly, but Mohamad Apas constituted himself judge and acquitted his slave. The other party objected to the proceeding and judgment for the reason that Apas being the owner of the slave and as such, according to Moro law, responsible for the slave's actions, was an interested party to the suit and dis-

qualified to judge the case. The plaintiff declared his intention of appealing to Hadji Taib, the Sultan's representative. Thereupon Mohamad Apas drew his barong and struck down Imam Usup's son; a fight followed resulting in the death of seven of the Patian men, eight being present; the other side had one man killed and two wounded. The Patian chief then prepared to avenge the death of his son and his companions upon the slayers. I received timely news of his intention and at once ordered the Rajah Muda to intervene. It appears that he promptly sent Hadji Butu to settle the matter peaceably.

On Friday, June 26th, at 3 a.m., a band of six or more men, followers of Hadji Panglima Tahir of Parang, stole to a hut at Schuck's plantation, situated only 100 yards from Mr. Schuck's own house, and there shot and killed an old man and kidnapped a girl about 15 years of age. They made their escape before help reached the place. Being between Moro and Moro, this case was turned over to the Datto Rajah Muda for trial in strict compliance with the Bates' agreement. It was not only a deliberate murder but there was a contempt for the U. S. authority evinced. Mr. Schuck, on whose place the outrage was committed, is the official interpreter, and the people attacked were working for him. I have demanded that the girl be returned and that the murderer be punished.

On Jolo Island, work in the fields was greatly retarded by the cholera, which appeared most virulent during the months of January, February and March, the season for plowing and preparing the land for the planting of the staple crops, rice, tapioca and corn. The tilled acreage is, in consequence, considerably smaller than last year's, but copious rains have fallen and the growing crop presents a fine appearance, promising a more than average yield, whereas in the preceding year the partly prevailing drought severely impaired the crops. As a result of last year's small harvest, the supply of native rice was exhausted some time since; imported rice is sold by the Chinese dealers at the exorbitant price of 15 to 18 pesos per

bag. Those Moros owning hemp are very busy lately working and marketing the same as they need money to purchase rice. The season for pearl fishing is now at its height and the numerous Moros engaged in this industry should benefit by the increase of about 50 % since last season in the price of M. O. P. shell.

The Sultan has engaged a German tobacco planter of experience to start a large tobacco estate for him near Maibun, and has contracted to furnish the necessary considerable capital. The planter, a Mr. Benjamin, (German), arrived here June 23; he declares that part of the land he has so far seen around Jolo is superior to the best Delhi tobacco lands, but that to start the plantation and until the Moros have learned the work required on a rationally conducted tobacco estate, Chinese labor is absolutely necessary.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. M. WALLACE,

Col. 15th Cavalry.

“B”

Jolo, P. I., June 30, 1903.

To the

Adjutant General,

Department of Mindanao,

Zamboanga, P. I.

SIR:

I have the honour to submit the following report on Moro affairs for the quarter ending June 30, 1903:

The critical condition existing on Jolo Island as described in my last quarterly report was illustrated by the behavior of the natives on the occasion of a trip of the cavalry, April 2nd, to Parang. Residents of Jolo town and Tullei had complained to me that a number of branded horses and cattle had lately been stolen from them, presumably by followers of Maharajah

Indanan. I therefore sent, on the above date, Captain Le Roy Eltinge with troops H, I, and M, 15th Cavalry, to the Maharajah's territory, to look about for the stolen property. The troops proceeded along the Maibun road and then followed a trail leading to Indanan's cotta. Bodies of troops have at different times visited and camped in Parang, their appearance should therefore create neither surprise nor apprehension among the natives; yet the reception of the cavalry on this occasion was extremely hostile. When Captain Eltinge arrived near Indanan's place the troops halted and dismounted for a rest, the Captain intending to visit Indanan. Immediately gongs were heard sounding at the latter's cotta, summoning his people together, and in an incredibly short time, about 500 armed men gathered at the place, many of whom carried rifles or spears besides one or two knives; even women and boys armed with barong or spear hurried to the scene. This mob crowded around the soldiers in the most threatening manner. The Maharajah appeared, summoned by a number of his men, to meet Captain Eltinge. A short conversation took place in the course of which Indanan professed total ignorance regarding the stolen cattle. His whole behavior was most insolent. When Captain Eltinge inquired why he had called his people together at the approach of the troops and requested him to at least stop his men from provoking the soldiers as this might lead to trouble, Indanan replied that if any one of his men was hurt there would be a fight, and if the troops remained at his place until afternoon some 1500 of his, Indanan's, followers would gather there. When the troops resumed the march, they were followed part of the way by the yelling mob. It was reported to me that Indanan expected the command to return next day, and made preparations for a fight. Some armed bands even advanced that day along the Maibun road and late in the evening their yelling was heard at the Asturias blockhouse.

I informed the Sultan of the occurrence and enjoined him to take Indanan severely to task as a repetition of such demon-

stration would not be tolerated. A few days later Indanan came to me and made profound apologies, stating as the main reason for the ill conduct of his people that they were still very much excited over the arrest and conviction of Sarabi, Selungan, et al, in connection with the burning and looting of the Chinese shops in Parang. However, no faith can be placed in his sincerity; he is an ignoerent but cunning, unprincipled savage, and his henchmen are composed of the worst element. Though the cavalry did not see any of the stolen cattle in Indanan's territory, yet there exists but little doubt that his people are the thieves and that he is perfectly cognizant of the fact.

The Sultan with quite a numerous suite left Jolo, April 9th, for a visit to Singapore via Sandakan, after having appointed his brother, the Datto Rajah Muda, and Hadji Taib his representatives during his absence. While at Sandakan, the Sultan sent an emissary to Cagayan de Jolo to collect a tax of five pesos per capita from its inhabitants, and the collector is said to have succeeded in gathering about 1700 pesos. In the Sultan's letter to the chiefs and people of said island which letter was presented by the emissary, the Sultan stated that the money thus collected was intended to be used in "improving the country and making the people happy and prosperous." I was informed of this transaction when I officially visited Cagayan de Jolo on May 21st, and have left instructions that collection of such taxes will not be permitted unless authorized by the Commanding Officer, Jolo.

April 12th, the Division Commander, Major General Geo. W. Davis, U. S. A., and Brigadier General S. S. Sumner, U. S. A., commanding this Department, arrived at Jolo. Messengers were dispatched to the prominent chiefs, inviting them to meet the generals at these headquarters; the following chiefs came: Hadji Taib, Hadji Butu, Tambuyung and Uyung, Sarip Magarip, Maharajahs Indanan and Amad, Nakib Indanan, Orang Kayah Tang, Hatib Awab and Aburan. The Datto Rajah Muda was absent. I have not

seen him or heard from him since. Word was sent to Panglima Hassan of Look to meet the generals at Lake Seit on April 14th, and the meeting took place as arranged. Hassan was escorted by 500 men armed with spears, barongs and many rifles.

Datto Joakanain and other prominent Moros returned May 3rd, from their pilgrimage to Mecca. The Datto, now Hadji Datto Joakanain, appears improved in his views; he has expressed his desire to henceforth keep away from trouble and fighting, cultivate the friendship of the Americans and look after the welfare of his people.

Soon after the Sultan's departure, several disturbances occurred at Maibun and the Chinese traders either left or intended leaving the place for that reason. However, Hadji Taib assured them of their safety and those who left returned.

The two Moros, Dabusan and Kulapo, who attacked the quarantine guard in December last whose surrender I had repeatedly demanded of the Sultan and the chief, were delivered to me May 5th, and are now confined in the guard house awaiting trial by civil court. They were brought in by Panglima Ambutong of Bawisan, Parang. He related to me that some time ago some of Panglima Dammang's men had been seen stealing his, Ambutong's, cocoanuts; that the thieves had escaped but he had captured some of their arms. Panglima Dammang had then demanded the restitution of these arms, and this being refused, he and Panglima Hadji Tahil of Silangkan, Parang, had arranged to fight Ambutong, and Maharajah Indanan had agreed to join them. Ambutong stated that he had incurred Indanan's enmity by refusing to deliver to him the above Dabusan and Kulapo, whom he, Ambutong, had captured and Indanan wanted to bring to me so that he, Indanan, might receive the credit for their capture and surrender. I sent a letter to Panglima Dammang ordering him and his allies to keep the peace, and if they

had any complaint against Ambutong, to submit the case to the Datto Rajah Muda. Since then I have heard no more of this matter, but peace has been maintained.

Another typical case of trouble among the Moros was reported to me as follows: The son of Hadji Iman Usup, chief of Patjan Island, was returning from a voyage when his boat was swamped off Parang. Some Parang people came to his assistance. After his goods had been collected, a bundle containing clothing and 40 pesos in coin was missing. Part of this clothing is said to have been found in the possession of a slave of one of the Parang men, Mohamad Apas, a Moro of some standing. The son of Imam Usup charged the slave with the theft of said bundle and Apas then told the complainant to come to him with his companions on a certain day, when the case would be tried. The trial took place accordingly, but Mohamad Apas constituted himself the judge and acquitted his slave. The other party objected to the proceeding and judgment for the reason that Apas being the owner of the accused slave, and as such, according to Moro law, responsible for the slave's actions, was an interested party to the suit, and disqualified to judge the case. The plaintiff declared his intentions of appealing to Hadji Taib, the Sultan's representative. Thereupon Mohamad Apas drew his barong and struck down Imam Usup's son; a fight ensued resulting in the death of seven of the Patian men, eight being present, the other side losing one man killed and two wounded, Apas being one of the latter. The Patian chief then prepared to avenge the death of his son and his companions upon the slayers. I received timely news of his intention and at once ordered the Rajah Muda to intervene. It appears that he promptly sent Hadji Butu to settle the matter peaceably.

Panglima Hassan, with a small retinue, visited me on June 1st. He complained of having trouble with Orang Kayah Haman, a chief living at Cotta Makirs, on the N. E. shore of Jolo Island; saying that Haman had seized and was detaining a number of his, Hassan's, people under the pre-

tense that they were slaves belonging to him, Haman. The Panglima declared that those people were no slaves, but free. He said he had tried to induce Haman to let them return to their homes, but Haman had refused to do so. Hassan further informed me of having lately been told by Datto Maharajah Leila Sali of Bual, Look, that the party of three juramentados (see my last quarterly report, page 6) were given an escort of two men by Orang Kayah Haman to accompany them part of the way to Jolo, and that these two men had returned and were now staying at Haman's cotta. Hassan added that, at the time, it had been reported to him that five men were passing through his territory, behaving strangely and singing religious songs; he had sent out men to look for and apprehend them, but his men had failed to find the party. The Panglima proposed that I should send a gunboat to Cotta Makirs; he would then attack it from the land side, and capture and deliver Haman to me. I replied that as soon as a boat was available for the purpose, I would proceed to Bual to investigate personally the matter and that my further action must depend upon the result of this investigation and the orders I should receive from my superior commander upon report. June 7th, rumors reached me of a clash between some of Hassan's and Haman's followers; it was said that one man had been killed on either side. Later I received word from Hassan that he had decided to await the return of the Sultan, when he would submit his case against Haman to him, which means that Hassan and Haman have become good friends once more.

On Friday, June 26th, at 3. a. m., a band of six or more men, followers of Hadji Panglima Tahir of Parang, stole to a hut at Schuck's plantation situated only 100 yards from Mr. Schuck's own house, and there shot and killed an old man and kidnapped a girl about 15 years of age. They made their escape before help reached the place; however, three of the band were recognized. Being between Moro and Moro, this case was turned over to the Datto Rajah Muda for trial

in strict conformity with the Bates agreement. It was not only a deliberate murder but there was a contempt for United States authority evinced. Mr. Schuck, on whose place the outrage was committed, is the official interpreter, and the people attacked were working for him. I have demanded that the girl be returned and that the murderer be punished.

With reference to the several cases of juramentado which occurred during last March, I continued inquiries to ascertain, if possible, where the miscreants had come from, their motives, and if any of the chiefs had been cognizant of their murderous intentions. Most of the chiefs professed total ignorance upon the subject. Aside from Hassan's above report based upon what Datto Maharajah Leila told him, the following is the statement of:

Datto Kalbi: The man who killed the soldier at Point Tandoh was probably Katibun, a former follower of my brother Joakanain. Katibun had killed one of Joakanain's slaves and then ran away, leaving his family behind. During my brother's absence on this pilgrimage, Katibun returned to Datto Tambuyung, Joakanain's representative, and requested pardon for his former crime. Tambuyung told him he could return to his family if he promised future good behavior; his crime should be adjudged by Datto Joakanain on the latter's return from Mecca. Katibun rejoined his family. Later his only son died of cholera and the father appeared to be mad with grief. He purchased a muzzle loading gun and disappeared. He has not been seen or heard from since and it is believed that he was the man who killed the soldier and was then, himself, killed. The party of three juramentados consisted of Seiril, Ahamad and Omang, followers of Nakib Mauddin of Bual, of Look.

Maharajah Indanan: The juramentado at the cockpit in Tullei, March 8th, was Bayani, a slave who ran away from Panglima Ambutong to Datto Kalbi. The Moro who killed the soldier at Point Tandoh was Pamis, the elder brother of Bayani. The three juramentados of March 13th were the

followers of Orang Kayah Bangsauan Hatai of Tandoh, Look. They told this chief of their intention to juramentado and he advised them to go to Zamboanga as the Sultan had forbidden it in Jolo. Omang, alleged by others to have been one of three, did not belong to the party; he was a son of Nakib Mauddin of Bual and died of cholera.

Datto Maharajah Leila Sali of Bual: (his statement to the interpreter, Mr. Schuck, whom he met at Panglima Hassan's house) The three juramentados of March 13th were Seiril, Ahamad and Omag, followers of Nakib Mauddin of Bual. Orang Kayah Haman of Catta Makirs near Bual, furnished them an escort of two men, Usman and Purroh. These latter returned and are now with Haman.

June 4, 1903, I visited a so-called fort which is situated three miles west from Taglibi. The place was in dispute between Datto Joakanain and a man named Hegaran, formerly a follower of the Datto. The place about twenty yards square, has a stone and earth wall five feet high, and four feet thick on four sides, and there is no ditch or other form of defense. It is quite an old work, having several large trees growing out of the middle of the wall, their roots coming inside. Datto Kalbi's and Joakanain's cottas were visited en route. The last named chief was on the point of going to Jolo, but was easily persuaded to accompany us to the old fort. Although we traveled without delay, fifty armed natives accompanied the Datto, twenty of them being mounted on ponies. All chiefs have a number of armed followers always at hand, some of them being able to muster five hundred armed men in an hour's time. The trail passed over could only be travelled in column of troopers. Several streams of fresh water were crossed, all of them having precipitate banks. Land was cultivated in many places along the trail. Total distance marched was about eighteen miles.

Sporadic cases of cholera appeared on Jolo Island as late as in May; quite a number of deaths from this disease occurred during that month among the people living at the S. W.

point of Jolo harbor, and two fatal cases at San Ramondo, the village situated about 150 yards from the main gate of the walled town. At the present time, however, the epidemic seems extinct.

Work in the fields was greatly retarded by the epidemic, which appeared most virulent during the months of January, February and March, the season for plowing and planting of the staple crops: rice, tapioca and corn. The tilled acreage is in consequence considerably smaller than last year's, but copious rains have fallen and the growing crop presents a fine appearance, promising a more than average yield, whereas in the preceding year the partly prevailing drought severely damaged the crops. As a result of last year's small harvest, the supply of native rice is exhausted; imported rice is sold by the Chinese dealers at the exorbitant price of 14 to 18 pesos per bag. Those Moros owning hemp are now busy working and marketing the same and larger shipments of this produce than usual are taking place at Jolo. The season for pearl fishing is at its height and the numerous Moros engaged in this industry should benefit by the increase of about 50% since last season in the price of M. O. P. shell.

The Sultan has engaged in Singapore a German tobacco planter of experience to start a large tobacco estate for him near Maibun, and has contracted to furnish the necessary considerable capital. The planter, a Mr. Benjamin, arrived here June 23rd. I hear that he has declared part of the land he has so far seen around Jolo, superior to the best Delhi tobacco lands.

The Commanding Officer at Siassi, Captain H. R. Hickok, 15th Cavalry, reports that many persons are applying to him for protection against slavery or involuntary servitude. The latter term refers to the custom of the Moros to pawn members of their family, or relatives, often children, as security for money borrowed. In my experience, in most such cases the money was needed to pay a fine in order to prevent the borrower and his whole family from being—conformably to

Moro law—enslaved in default of payment. Objection to being thus pawned is seldom made even by grown persons, but trouble frequently arises later through the creditor's refusing to release the pawn, on the claim that either capital or interest is still due him, or he himself may have later borrowed money and transferred the pawn. Captain Hickok reports that the methods of Datto Dakolah, the Sultan's representative at Siassi, are objectionable and a source of irritation, and that his fines smack more of a robbery than of justice. The same may well be said of most, if not all, Moro Judges; they receive no salary but depend upon the fines imposed as a source of income, the judges of low rank having to divide the proceeds with the Sultan or some chief bigger than they. The system is corrupt.

Captain K. W. Walker, 15th Cavalry, Commanding at Bongao, reported that a number of slaves applied to him for protection which was accorded them. In April, seven Moros (Bajaws) from Sibutu Island, complained to him of having been robbed of money and goods to the value of 750 pesos and also of being maltreated by Datto Mohamad, a son of Datto Baginda of Sitankai. Captain Walker sent for both Dattos and upon their appearance investigated the case. The Dattos claimed that the Bajaws had not been robbed but the property was taken from them in payment of a fine imposed upon one of their number for having shown disrespect to a Datto. The Captain told them that the amount taken from the Bajaws, according to the latter's statement, was far in excess of the maximum limit of punishment for the offense charged. During the severe cross-examination the Dattos became very much confused and ultimately admitted having lied. Captain Walker gave Datto Baginda a week's time in which to go and fetch the property, telling him that he would hold Datto Mohamad until his, Baginda's, return. In due time the goods and money were all produced exactly as claimed by the Bajaws, and returned to them.

Several small reconnaissance parties, in charge of non-commissioned officers, were sent out by sail boat to neighbouring islands, and were universally received in a friendly manner by the natives. One party, when visiting the island of Sicibong, was warned by the inhabitants not to go to the adjacent islands of Lataan and Tandubas, for the reason that the people there would probably fire upon them if they tried to land. The party followed this advice. Tandubas is the island where the census enumerator was not permitted to land.

Very respectfully,

W. M. WALLACE,

Colonel 15th Cavalry,

Commanding.

APPENDIX V.

THE MOROS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

A monograph prepared in 1901 by *The Rev. Pio Pi, Superior of the Jesuit Order in the Philippines*, who has supplied this copy by request.

We have no scruple in affirming, and we do not believe that there is anyone who will be so rash as to deny, that the principal obstacle in the way of the reduction * and civilization of Mindanao and Jolo is the Moro. We shall devote some space to prove this and to indicate some means for overcoming this obstacle.

* *Reduction* equivalent to the English *conversion*.

I.

In two senses are the Moros opposed to reduction and culture in the Archipelago: 1st, in that they prevent reduction and civilization for themselves; and 2nd, that they impede its reaching the other infidel races. The Moros are interested and anxious that Mindanao shall continue the present *status quo* indefinitely throughout that territory, seeing that they cannot extend their lordship over all.

And to this they are influenced by; 1st, their character; 2nd, their history or tradition; 3rd, their fanaticism; 4th, their interests. Concerning these four points we will make a few brief remarks.

I. THEIR CHARACTER.

Their character is especially haughty, independent and dominating.

(a) *Haughty*.—They believe themselves to be the only sons of God. None are more zealous than they in their genealogies. To all the natives not Moros they give the depreciatory title of *bisayas*, as we should say, pariahs. In

carriage, attitude, manners and dealings they are accustomed to show great asperity and disdain. Although poor, miserable and needy they show scarcely any gratitude to those who aid them.

(b) *Independent*:—History eloquently records with what tenacity they resist all domination, with what insincerity they submit, how treacherously they rebel. The subjection to the payment of any tribute whatever, or to the recognition of the Spanish Government, even among those Moros living nearest to the Spanish settlements where the action of the Spanish Government could more easily reach, has ever been an arduous undertaking, and has almost always been evaded. It may well be said that they were indifferent even to the most common legislation, nor do they take care to fulfil, for example, the requirements, of public hygiene, the forestry regulations, etc., as though they were exempt from all law.

(c) *Dominating*:—They consider themselves the true lords of Mindanao and Jolo. All other native races are looked upon by them as inferiors and from all of them, as far as as possible, they collect tribute, and exploit, vex and raid them, as though their neighbors had no more right than what they (the Moros) consented to give them. It is as common a thing for them to enter the settlements and villages, both of infidels and christians, and to rob, kill, take captives, and destroy property, as it was common for them formerly to scour the seas, engaged in expeditions of piracy, for they believed themselves lords of the seas also.

2. THEIR HISTORY OR TRADITION.

Their ancestors were refractory to all reduction and civilization; and they desire to be like their ancestors. And, in fact, such is the history of more than three centuries, or in other words, of the whole time of the Spanish sovereignty in these Islands. The Moros have been the only, but constant and tenacious enemies of the civilization brought

here by Spain. Run through the list of the Sultans of Jolo and Mindanao and investigate the deeds of the principal Dattos and it will be clearly seen, in spite of the passing of centuries, that what was done by an Ali-Aliudin was done by an Amilol-Quiram; what a Corralat did has been repeated by Uto in what relates to the acceptance of the European domination and civilization. The sole difference is in the degree of resistance offered by the one or the other, more or less rigorous, more or less declared, more or less efficacious, according to the power the said datto had to reckon with, or the importance to which he was reduced. The most obdurate opposition of soul and of instinct, the most obstinate passive resistance, the most pertinacious and vigilant intention of really revolting whether by the aid of strength or craftiness, the very moment the material impossibility of success ceases, or his own personal convenience, which caused him to be temporarily and feignedly submissive, is threatened; this at least is the attitude and constant disposition of the average Moro and of his race against the dominating nation, no matter what be the material power which holds him subject for the moment, or the moral or legal obligation of preserving the most formal treaties and covenants.

3. HIS FANATICISM.

The religious ignorance of the Moro of the Philippine Archipelago is universal and almost absolute, even in relation to affairs concerning Mohammedanism; since all his instruction, and little it is, is reduced to the poor reading of the Koran without understanding what he reads. They have, however, a blind and ever living hatred of all things Christian, whether catholic, schismatical, or protestant; and this one thing they know for certain, that Mahomet commanded a holy war without truce or termination, upon Christians, who according to their idea are infidels, (or *capir*); and they believe that it is a meritorious thing to rob, and that to gain heaven it is suffi-

cient to kill the Christians. Hence they must cease to be Moros in order to resign themselves to support a domination so repulsive to their false beliefs.

4. THEIR INTERESTS.

Or rather, particularizing it somewhat more, the love of their wealth, their territory, their independence.

(a) *The love of wealth, or rather the love of the dattos for their wealth.* They acquire their riches and preserve them principally by means of slavery; for their slaves are their servants both in their houses and on their voyages; they are the laborers in their fields, the workmen in their small industries, the instruments of their rapine, of their exactions, and of their vexations. They are the most esteemed objects of commerce and the most available means for the making of treaties, settlement of business affairs and of differences, and for the contracting of matrimony; all of which the datto must pay attention to for his sustenance and comfort. The datto who owns many slaves is rich, and he who has them not has not wherewith to eat; hence the energy exerted to obtain slaves, without consideration of the means by which they are obtained; the continual robbery of children, not only from people of another race but even from the Moros of other settlements, and the killing on most occasions of the parents in order the more easily to carry off the children. It is evident that this chief source of wealth of the Moro dattos must cease the day the reduction aimed at by the Government reaches them.

(b) *The love of their territory.* The lands still occupied by the Moros in Mindanao and Jolo are numerous, and of vast extent and finely situated. They embrace not a few entire islands, fertile territories, great coast lines, the channels and valleys of many navigable rivers or a great part of them, and the mouths of others which are not navigable, and the great and beautiful Lake Lanao with its banks and cascades; all of which is a matter of importance, not only

in the matter of the effective domination they exercise over the land, but also in the power they exert over the people who are their neighbors, and whom they do not permit to approach the rivers or the sea coasts, so that they may the better shut them in, bury them in the interior, keep them from all communication with the exterior, and so the more advantageously subject and exploit them in the manner above stated. Hence the Moros understand thoroughly that in proportion as their reduction and civilization is advanced in the regions they inhabit, they will be less able to preserve their possessions and advantageous positions, at least under the conditions under which they occupy them at present, and much less can they maintain them for themselves without interference from the white race, which is the way in which they desire to be and live.

(c) *Their love of independence.* It is none the less certain that the day in which the reduction becomes a fact, all their autonomy and their political, military and religious organization must cease to exist; an organization which ensures the race its cohesion and duration in the country, and which up to a certain point they esteem; and if threatened with its loss they would rather resolve without hesitation to abandon the region they occupy, their settlements, their estates and crops, all their means of livelihood. Now, how will their Sultans, Dattos, Panditas, and Paglimas live, except at best as mere ornaments and historical figure-heads, mere names without actual significance and offices without utility; even deprived in a very short time of the servile submission and stupid veneration of their sacopes; and both the one and the other with but the remembrance of their once entire exemption from law? Well they know that this would be the loss of the interior constitution of their people, the end of their nationality still sustained in those islands, and above all, in their disappearance from the country as a distinct race.

A priori then, it is well proved that far from the Moros being an element favorable to the reduction, colonization and civilization of Mindanao and Jolo, they constitute in their present state as they ever will be, while they enjoy their autonomy and organization, a most powerful obstacle in the way of obtaining that *desideratum*.

* * * * *

But there is a fact, although this be a negative one, which confirms moreover this statement *a posteriori*; namely, the hostile disposition of the Moros to all that the reduction, colonization and civilization of the country implies. Who in fact, Spanish, foreigner, or even native, has ever been bold enough to locate any establishment, undertake any exploration, break or cultivate any portion of the soil amidst Moro settlements?

Even in Christian settlements already formed, the number of estates is small and these few exist only in the outlying districts of the settlement and under the shelter of some military detachment. One of these few is the Estate of Rosales and Co., adjoining the military camp of Parang-Parang; and of how many depredations has it not been the object! How many victims, Spaniards and soldiers, has it not cost! How many times was it not necessary for the troops to deal out punishment for the violences perpetrated there by their Moro neighbors! The same might be said of any other estate established in Cottabato, in Isabela de Basilan, or near the town and fortifications of Jolo. And if in this latter place the German, Herr Shuck, succeeded in establishing himself, even before the Spanish occupation in 1876, acquiring and cultivating some tracts of land which his sons still possess, we shall find without doubt, for this singular fact very peculiar reasons, at least in the most admirable political arrangements made with the Sultan by that old time merchant; when, as such, he made voyages from Singapore to Maibung and from Maibung to Singapore again.

Can we then deny great significance to this general want of all kinds of enterprises in Moro territory, on the part of even those who lived as neighbors in the same regions and in continual relations with the Moros? It will be necessary to recognize the fact that such proximity and relationship did not engender intimacy or confidence.

* * * * *

And as we foresee that against what we are sustaining, some particular fact may undoubtedly be put forward, we will explain these facts briefly in order that it may be seen that as a matter of fact they prove nothing against what we say.

It cannot be denied, in fact, that there have been a few Moro dattos who have always or for a greater or lesser length of time shown themselves sincerely friendly to the Spanish Government, and who, moreover, recognized the American Government as soon as it took possession of that territory. Why then, it may be said, can we not hope to find the other caciques of the same race the same, and expect that all will lend a hand in the reduction and reconciliation of the Moros to the new, common and civilizing régime which America will establish, especially if that Government adopts a good policy of conciliation? Will not the Moros thus submitted and disposed of be an example and instrument towards the submission of the other infidel tribes of Mindanao, who will hasten to imitate them, thus facilitating and advancing the reduction and civilization of all that island?

We shall reply by coming down to particulars. One of the Moro dattos alluded to is doubtless Mandi, the Zamboangueno, of the barrio of Magay. We begin by recognizing his genuine adhesion to Spain till the end of her domination, since, apart from other good services even during the war with the United States in the Philippines, Mandi and his people bore arms on behalf of Spain against the native malcontents of the Bisayas. But it must be remembered that Mandi, Moro and all, is a Spanish mestizo, brought up from

childhood in Zamboanga, the most Spanish settlement in the Archipelago, always treated considerably, fondled and recompensed by the Government of Mindanao, and associated with the patriotic deeds of Zamboanga patriots. Mandi is a Spanish datto. It must be remembered also that the population of the settlements of Mandi is to a great extent the result of the dispersion of Balanginingui, made more subject precisely by the lesson given in 1848 by the Gov. Gen. Sr. Claveria, a lesson which was, in all truth, not of that class badly named the "policy of attraction." Another reason for the fidelity of Datto Mandi to Spain at the outbreak of hostilities between the Spanish troops of Zamboanga and the revolutionists under Vicente Alvarez, as also for his favorable conduct towards the triumphant Americans, was the evidence of the insane attitude of the revolutionists and of the well known fact of the ancient personal enmity existing between the two caciques.

Another datto to whom reference may be made in connection with the matter we are dealing with, is Pedro Cuevas of Basilan. We must note in his case the special circumstances which give a reason for his conduct. He is not a Moro, but a Tagalo. He was condemned to garrison prison for highway robbery, fled with his reckless companions from the colony of San Ramon (Zamboanga) to the island of Basilan, where, without danger of ever being captured, he entered into negotiations with the Spanish Government, with the intention of replacing himself in the good books of that authority and making himself worthy of pardon; struggled with the Moro rebels at the disposition of the Governor of that district; and conquered and killed in single combat the Datto Calung, being then proclaimed datto by Calung's people and by those he had himself drawn around him. He was at length pardoned, and afterwards being made datto by Alindi, the claimant to the sultanship of Jolo; the Spanish Government confirmed his dignity, in the hope that in future he would defend the interests of the Spaniards in the Island. This he

did. But it must be confessed that in this he has also defended, and perhaps bettered, his own interests, that is to say the excellent position he held and his prestige and influence, by making habitual use of deception. He became in reality very Moorish without ceasing to show himself Spanish in appearance and by compromising in things of small importance, because circumstances did not permit him to do otherwise. He took no hand with the revolutionists, who, a little before the occupation of Zamboanga by the United States, took up arms against the Spaniards, and desired to resist the Americans; since apart from his antecedents which were favorable to Spain, he was crafty like Mandi and more so than Alvarez, and knew how foolish such a course was, and what a sorry end the latter's enterprise promised.

We wish also to say a few words concerning the Datto Piang, since he is another of those whom some might avail themselves of in argument against the proposition we are defending. It must be understood that Piang is a Chinese mestizo. In the time of the celebrated Datto Uto he was advanced by him to the station of datto, and kept faith until he found Uto overcome and humiliated by the Spaniards, and himself, owing to his greater leniency when commanding, master of the sympathizers whom Uto had alienated by reason of his harshness in treating with his subjects. He then drew away the greater part of the sacopes from their master. Taught by another's experience, he considered it politic, and it proved also profitable to him, to maintain good relations with the Cottabato Government which was also interested in fomenting discord between the two dattos, and to favor Piang. The datto was a great help in the construction of the beautiful fortress of Reina Regente in supplying men and materials, and offering other services for which he was recompensed. When the Spanish Government retired forever from Cottabato, in order to assure the peace made under agreement with Piang it handed over the capital to the Indian Roman Vilo, then named presidente; but the good understanding between th

two did not last long, and Vilo and some of the other honorable and intelligent Indians of the district became victims, sacrificed to the rapacity and gross excesses of the Chinese residents there who were protected and probably stirred up by the half-caste datto who thus dishonored the power which he possessed.

Hence, bearing in mind the small number of such dattos, who they are, under what circumstances and with what motives they work, and that they conduct themselves in a manner which is unusual among the Moros, what can be deduced from these particular cases when compared with the constant, general and never failing tendencies of the Moros of this country and of all the world? Nothing, absolutely nothing! It is necessary then, to do away with the obstacle which the Moros constitute, because otherwise the reduction will never be brought about, and much less will the civilization of the islands occupied by the Moros be accomplished.

II.

What then should be the plan of procedure? We have already been taught by abundant experience and we shall briefly expound a plan based on that experience.

Above all be it understood that we are not going to defend the extermination of the Mohammedan race; on the contrary we reject it as unjust, inhuman, impolitic, most difficult, and very costly. (On this point read the memorandum written by P. Pablo Pastells, ex-Superior of the Mission of the Society, published as the Appendix to volume IX of the *Cartas* of the Missionaries.)

The system we are about to propose for the reduction to civil life of the infidel tribes of Mindanao and Jolo under the Government of the Archipelago is different. It must be remembered that some Moros have submitted although not voluntarily, whilst others have not; and that among the infidels or mountain tribes some are under the thumb of the Moro, whilst others are not. The system of political action

of the Government must comprehend the four following enterprises or operations intimately connected with the one or the other, procedure being made gradually in each one of them, although at the same time in all jointly: 1st, The assimilation of the submissive Moros to whom the action of the government reaches, with the remaining population of the islands; 2nd, The liberation or emancipation from Moro slavery of the infidels who are under the dominion of this race; 3rd, The extension of the effective domination of the Government over the Moros not yet really submitted, or still beyond the action of the said government; and 4th, The decided protection of catholic evangelization of all the region. We will amplify this thought point by point.

1. *The assimilation of the submissive Moros.* The four reasons explained above why the Moros are a great obstacle to the reduction and civilization of Mindanao and Jolo, will cease to exist as soon as the assimilation of the race under a common régime is effected. It must be noted, however, that those four qualities we have described in the Moro do not exist among the whole people in general, but among, what we might call, the aristocracy, or rather caciques who, as is well known, are such generally by right of blood and that in so far as the popular mass participates in the said qualities, in that same degree do they derive it from their chiefs who foment it. The Moro population of the Philippines is what it is, by reason of its Sultans, Dattos, Panditas, and Paglimas. This organization being suppressed, not in what relates to matters purely religious (which it will be necessary to tolerate to the same degree as other false religions are tolerated) but in matters political and military, the Moro population of the Philippines will be in a very few generations no more or less than the remaining population. What we have said relative to the character of the Moros, haughty, independent and dominating, is to be said principally of their dattos and panditas. These are, moreover, the only zealous guardians of their traditions, su-

perstitions and fanatical hatred of Christianity and they and not the people are the ones really interested in the maintenance of their social and political *status quo*.

It is necessary in order to understand thoroughly what we say, to know and even better to realize by experience, what these dattos are among the Moros. The datto is, as a general rule, and with very rare exceptions, a semi-savage when he is not entirely a savage; he is as haughty as he is ignorant, embruted by the blackest passions, polygamy and other vices. He is held by his sacopes, and represented by his panditas or priests, to be an extraordinary being, a demi-god, against whom he who dares to raise a hand or to despise shall be held in disgrace before man and cursed by God. Thus it may be explained that in spite of their continued and horrible cruelties not a single case is recorded in which any one of the sacopes have attempted to do the least harm to the person of the datto; and thus also is it explained how they scarcely ever dare to try and escape their tyrannical power; because they believe (and the panditas take care to assure them of it) that if they flee, doubtless a greater misfortune than the slavery or the mal-treatment they suffer will overtake them. Hence the datto is a veritable lord of the lives and property of his subjects, and these he is able to turn to his own account without reserve, without the rightful owners being able to complain, much less to have recourse to another authority, when they are despoiled, exploited or chastised with inhumanity and arbitrariness beyond imagination; and finally the datto is the only one interested in the maintenance of slavery, as we stated above. What estimate of the civilization offered to him, will a man have who finds himself satisfied with his pride and brutal passions, a man who does not realize the existence of things better than those he possesses? How will he accept willingly a social state ordered and ruled according to the demand of the greater good of the public, he who is the law and who rules according to the dictates of his own passions?

If then the Dattos of Mindanao and Jolo are such in their dealings with one another, and such they usually are and in perfect accord concerning the subjects of their common and chief interests, consider how great ought to be the opposition to Filipino Moroism, extensive as it already is, so widely influenced and governed by such an aristocracy. It is therefore evident that the action of a good government ought to be directed towards the undoing of such an organism as moroism constitutes which is a nationality or state within another sovereignty systematically and obstinately opposed to the ruler's civilizing aims. Why then should not the submissive Moros or those who are so called or wish to pass for such, be subjected to the popular organization adopted generally in Mindanao for the reduction of these heathens? Not many years ago this was tried, and not without good results, among the Moros of the fourth district (Davao), who commenced to live under *Gobernadorcillos*, (petty-governors) lieutenants, and judges elected by the people themselves, and subject to certain services and personal labor contributions. This arrangement should be followed and continued without interruption till, gradually and in due time, as we have previously indicated, complete political, administrative, and judicial uniformity shall have been attained.

"Let us make a beginning," said P. Pablo Pastells, as early as 1892, "by taking a list of those subject to the payment of taxes, a general muster or census of the population, made by definite groups, levying upon them as guarantee of security in their travels, a small tribute of half a real for instance, as a personal cedula which should be in due time a new indication of the recognition of sovereignty, and which later on should be gradually transformed into general tribute which should be increased in proportion to the progressive development of culture in the several branches of civilized life. When this is attained there might be planted among them a system of embryonic rule, similar to that in other parts of the Archipelago, leaving them to themselves, naming in each

settlement *Gobernadorcillos*, lieutenants, judges, constables and sheriffs (*cuadrillos*) holding an election every two years. Afterwards gently and by means of their own justices, will follow the grouping of their settlements, distinct pueblos being raised among them, the obligation being placed upon the Moros themselves of planning the streets and squares, with their corresponding public buildings, tribunal, schools, convent and a small church. In this manner a new form of government and of justice, our legislation and codes would continue to be observed, and at the same time the elements of material, intellectual and moral culture are fomented and established, impulse be given to the advancement of agriculture, industry and commerce, primary instruction and solid maxims of the Gospel." So speaks P. Pastells.*

This advice falls all without exception within the bounds of religious liberty as outlined by the constitution of the U. S.

2.—*Emanicipation of the infidels subjected to the Moros.* We have already spoken of the sad oppression and miserable state in which the Moros of Mindanao hold the neighboring infidels, who compose the tribes in the South and a considerable part of those in the North. From these tribes they provide themselves with slaves; they collect taxes in the form of provisions and enforced labor; they rob or at least they purchase from them for whatever trifle they have a mind to give them, their scanty harvests and manufactures. They prevent them from engaging in all commerce which is not carried on under the immediate supervision of the Moros themselves; they aim whenever possible to conceal them or keep them at a distance from the missionary; they exercise against them, all kind of arbitrary measures, and when they feel so inclined make war upon them and invade their settlements, bringing fire and death; and how will these people who treat their subjects as harshly as we have seen above, treat a foreign people?

* Appendix to Vol. IX of the letters of the Padres of the Comp. of J. in the Philippine Missions.

The enterprise therefore of the emancipation of these poor natives, an emancipation which would be an act of great humanity for any individual, is one of rigorous justice for the government of the nation which is the sovereign of the territory.

On the other hand it is an enterprise which ought to be undertaken because there is a question of populating an island still sparsely populated, and this is the principal element with which we have to reckon. What is certain is, that whilst writers of the Archipelago have for many years been disputing to no purpose about the problem of the colonization of the island by means of this or that scheme of emigration, promoted by the Government of the Philippines, the missionaries have been busy gathering together into pueblos many thousands of infidels who were previously completely useless for the purpose of colonization, since they destroyed one another in continual petty conflicts, completing the havoc made among them by famine and pestilence and thus causing the death of those spared by disasters.* The system still was a slow work; but it is surer than any other, it does not offer the grave inconveniences of all the others which have been attempted, and to this very day is the only efficacious one, if we leave out of account the not inconsiderable spontaneous immigration, which has gone on from the other neighboring islands of the Archipelago.

Whoever wishes to gather more information concerning what we have said should study the statistical reports annually published by the mission of the Society of Jesus and read the above cited memorandum of P. Pastell and the statement of P. Juan Ricart, another ex-superior of the mission. The latter is to be found in Vol X of the letters of the missionaries. The increase of Christian and civil population of Min-

* The number of those reduced to civilized life and baptized by the Jesuit Missionaries alone amounts to more than 70,000, representing the labor of 40 years, although at the beginning of that time they had under their care but few missions or centers of action.

danao in the last twelve years of Spanish domination is owing to two causes; namely, evangelization and native immigration, one half to each.

The Government of the Philippines should be encouraged in this enterprise, by the consideration that the infidels are still in great numbers in Mindanao; that they are not less intelligent than the Moros and certainly more docile and accessible, and many of them susceptible of culture as the best races of the Archipelago; that the labor undertaken in their reduction and christianizing, under equal circumstances, gives much better results than those employed in civilizing the Moros; and that the thinly populated district of South Mindanao would have been very different now, and the production of hemp, sugar, coffee, cocoa, copra, etc., incomparably more extended and beneficial in those most fertile regions had the Subanos, Tirurayes, and other infidels been free from the harassing tyranny of the Moros, and had these districts been free from their effective domination which has always proved sterile and sterilizing wherever it has existed.

To help on in all possible ways this emancipation, it will be necessary; 1st—that the government should declare publicly and formally that it will receive and shelter under its banner, power and protection, with entire equality, all its subjects of Mindanao who recognize it, whatever may be the race to which they pertain; and that consequently the authorities of the island and the officials will administer justice with the same equality among individuals as among communities of distinct races; 2nd—that it should be absolutely prohibited for any individual or caciques of any race whatever to capture or enslave other individuals of another race; 3rd—that every slave or captive whether of a foreign or the same race or settlement, who in any way should effect his escape and put himself under the protection of the Government should be held free from all subjection to his former master, and that the master should have no right whatever or title to indemnification; 4th—that the Moros, or those of any other race whatever,

established on the coasts, along the course or at the outlets of the rivers, be obliged to permit free passage over all water and land ways and free access to the shores, and anchorages, to all those other races who live in the interior, and not to impede any one in passing from one place to another; 5th—that there be a general prohibition to collect tribute of any kind whatever from the natives of other races, without the express approbation of the Government; 6th—that provision be made that any assault or arbitrary action committed by the caciques of any race whatever upon the persons or property of the individuals of another, whatever be the condition of the person committing it, be rigorously chastised; 7th—that provision be made that some Government vessels patrol the coasts occupied by the Moros, and be anchored opposite their settlements, and even that gunboats of light draught should ascend the navigable rivers where the said Moros live, in order that some agent of the Government may visit the settlements, correct abuses, give audience and dispense protection to anyone who considers himself aggrieved; 8th—that it procure that all these dispositions and others leading to the same end be perfectly fulfilled, so that after a few severe chastisements many disturbances may be avoided and what is aimed at be attained.

3. *Extension of the dominion to the Moros who are still independent.* It is our opinion, and more especially in view of what we have just discussed that it will be of great interest to the country, and something to which the Government ought to direct its political labors with decision, to proceed to the reduction of Moroism as it exists in the Philippines, to a perfect assimilation with the remaining population under a common law and this under the penalty of driving it out from the territory by means of war, unless perhaps the government should prefer to concentrate it in some specified spot (a particular island or group of islands for example) where the Moros might live with more or less autonomy and protection, or with total independance. Otherwise the

Mohammadan-Malay race will be ever in the Philippines, not merely in Mindanao or Jolo, a powerful element of disturbance.

To adopt the third suggestion, that is to concentrate the race in some point of the Archipelago, does not appear to be a sufficiently radical remedy nor a solution very worthy of the civilizing aims of a cultured nation, in dealing as it must with a race so abject, deceitful and likely to break out in treacherous rebellion.

Our whole aim was to accomplish the perfect assimilation of the Moros into the other races. For apart from other considerations, Moroism constitutes a nucleus of population by no means to be despised even supposing that the alleged number of 350,000 exists in Mindanao alone, (this to some appears to be somewhat exaggerated); and it would avail much to our purpose to bear in mind to a greater or lesser degree, what we have already said as well as what we have not up to the present mentioned.

But if in the end Moroism exists, and determines at all costs to preserve its present autonomy and its organization, and if on the other hand its concentration in a limited strip of territory—a reservation—be not adopted by the Government and accepted by Moros; there remains no other course than to appeal to arms to obtain without hesitation the assimilation of those who submit and the driving out of those who prefer such a course to submission.

From all points of view, whatever may be the designs of the Government, we can not suppose that it would consent to the unfurling of any banner but its own in all the Filipino territory, or that another distinct sovereignty be exercised over the territory large or small which it occupies.

And in order not to remain silent concerning the measures which to all appearances it is well to adopt immediately, in order to extend the effectiveness of the dominion to all the territory of the Moros not submitted, we will do no more than indicate in general terms only these three:

1.—The recovery by the Army and Navy of all the ports, bays and anchorages, forts and strategical points and outposts, occupied in the last days of the Spanish Sovereignty by the Spanish Army and Navy, so that later on, new positions may be gradually taken.

2.—To patrol as frequently as possible with gunboats or war launches the coasts and navigable rivers, inhabited by the unconquered Moros. This alone will suffice to secure either their submission by their entering into a treaty with the dominating race, or their emigration to where they will not be molested with such visits which they do not care for.

3.—To treat of establishing among them, in the meanwhile, a worthy, just, and rigorous police, which whilst being neither irritating nor hard, might not give any evidence of cowardice or fear, nor reveal any weakness; that no countenance be given to abuses against them (the Moros) even by the white race; but that those who injure in any way the datto or Sultan be chastized without hesitation, that the people of that race or any other tribe may be protected against all injustice committed by caciques; that the Government permit all lawful commerce to the Moro, that it utilize and justly recompense even for public works, their labors, and services. Perhaps some would give the name of "policy of attraction" to such a policy as we advocate; in that case we find no exception to the "policy of attraction." But in no manner can we approve a more flattering and less decorous policy in dealing with the Moros, call it what you will. *

* I understand and believe it to be the common opinion, that the conduct of Spain in dealing with the Moros of Mindanao and Jolo in the latter days of her sovereignty, under a pretext of a policy of "attraction," was characterized by excessive toleration or condescension. I do not know whether this state of affairs was due to the individual character and temperament of good natured governors, who were not over scrupulous in upholding the dignity and honor of their country, or whether it was owing to inordinate fear on their part, of the complications that might arise from an energetic course of action; and who knows whether at times it may not have been owing to the loose moral tone of their private life, or to the political corruption of officials, both high and low, intent only on filling their pockets. This policy was shown in the open violation of the common laws with impunity, in odious exemptions, in a marked preference and favor shown to the Moro race, and in undue obsequiousness shown, and undeserved honors and attentions paid to their utterly repugnant magnates. I myself was for some years a witness of the contempt, of the shame and confusion felt by the honorable Spanish element, especially the military who lived in the Southern Islands, under such a pusillanimous government; for the result was always the opposite of that desired, making both the subdued and unsubdued Moros haughty and ungovernable.

4. PROTECTION TO CATHOLIC EVANGELIZATION.

In speaking of the protection of Catholic evangelization of Mindanao and Jolo, we do not propose that the new Government should discard its principles of religious liberty in the sense of dispensing protection to any one communion in preference to another. We aim at much less; as it is unlawful, anti-Christian and subversive of the end intended, that the Government should use physical force to oblige any infidel to become Christian. Even though the Government were Catholic as was that of Spain, it could not infringe in the least on the liberty of its subjects by forcing them to embrace or not to embrace the Christian faith. Our idea is that the Government should recognize and protect the Catholic missionaries of Mindanao and Jolo, in their entire liberty to follow up their work in the evangelization of these infidels, and in every possible way to assist them even with material resources which may enable them to labor in favor of the peoples, not only in evangelical work but as propagators of civilization in the name of the Government and with its approbation.

We found our pretension upon the following reasons:

1.—That instruction and persuasion such as are employed by the Catholic Missionaries of Mindanao and Jolo in their apostolic labors, do not deprive any subject of liberty to labor but rather assist him to do so.

2.—That up to the present, Catholic missionaries alone have evangelized those regions, and all the native Christian inhabitants are Catholics.

3.—That Catholic evangelization has been of immense value in Mindanao, not only to religion but also to the State, inasmuch as the interests of the one are well identified with those of the other; so much so that in proportion as the missionaries made Christians out of the Moros, in the same proportion did they acquire faithful subjects for Spain; in this way the evangelization and the reduction to civilization have

been practically one and the same thing; and this the said converted infidels have well understood up till now, namely that in becoming Christians they were becoming Spaniards, and that upon ceasing to be *Subanos*, *Manobos*, or *Mandayas*, they become at one and the same time sons of the Catholic Church and vassals of the King of Spain, whose place and rights have fallen to the Republic of the United States of America.

4.—The fact that the conduct of the missionaries of Mindanao and Jolo was never opposed to the action of the Spanish government; never gave rise to conflicts but on the contrary were always of assistance in building up the prestige and popularity of that Government in everything that concerned patriotism, culture and civilization, is a sufficient guarantee that those who never abused the effective protection afforded by the Spanish authorities, would still less abuse the simple and effective liberty of action which the Government of the United States may accord them.

5.—That the defending of the persons of the missionaries and repression of any violence offered to them when, in the exercise of their ministry among the infidels, they run any risk of danger, is not imposing upon the government nor is it forcing the will of the subjects in matters of religion; nor granted the constitutional state of liberty of religion, is the Government exceeding its rights in this matter, or contradicting its principles, but, it is simply sanctioning the liberty of action it recognizes in the ministers of the Catholic religion as well as those of any other.

6.—That everything the Government may do to guarantee the free exercise of the evangelic ministry to the Catholic missionaries; also to facilitate the reduction to civil life of the natives, not only the pagans but also and more especially among the Moros themselves. For it is evident that the principal difficulty all the infidels, and particularly the Moros, experience in becoming reduced to civil life and law is their abominable customs, especially polygamy, and slavery

which are so deeply rooted among these last mentioned people. These customs the Catholic missionaries censure, condemn and endeavor to extirpate, for they can not be permitted in those who receive or ask the waters of baptism.

7.—That there exists no inconvenience but rather many motives for adopting this plan, under the title of the propagation not of Christianity but of civilizing the savages. The Government should grant resources for the erection of schools and the maintenance of masters and supply the material and expense of education, as also the expense of their other material and moral needs. There are none better able than the missionaries, as agents of the the government to carry on the above works in the reductions; which may be formed little by little and where neither the administrative nor even the personal inspection of the authorities is available, or if it is done by them can only be accomplished under the greatest difficulties.

We have spoken. Anyone who wishes to gather still further information as to what the Moros are in the Philippines, and what may be expected of them, as also to collect valuable data for the purpose of adopting a good system of reduction and civilization in the islands of the South of the Archipelago, should read the histories which have been written of the said districts, and especially those of Mindanao and Jolo, written by P. Combes, S. J.; also the collection of *Cartas* of the Padres of the said mission; the annual *estado* or statistical summaries which are published; the already cited *memoria* of P. Pastells and the *informe* of P. Ricart, S. J., ex-superior of the said mission; not omitting the memoirs which have been written or published by several Governors of Mindanao and of the provinces occupied by the Moros. We cite chiefly the publications of Jesuit Missionaries, because every one recognizes their ability to judge in this matter, and the disinterestedness of those who for so long and with such earnest labor and zeal have consecrated their lives to

the material and moral welfare of those islands, and who have received the unanimous praise of all unprejudiced critics for the results which they have accomplished.

This statement, written at the instance of the Most Rev. Apostolic Delegate of His Holiness, Mgr. Placidus Louis Chapelle, who expressed his lively desire to acquaint himself with the question of which we treat, we finished on the 8th of February, 1900. Later on yielding to the opinions of others, we thought that if it were translated into English and published, it might be of some utility in enlightening American opinion on the subject, hence we consented to give it to translation and the press. We add the following points recently communicated to us by one of our missionaries, who has resided among the Moros of Mindanao these twenty years. They form a collection of recent data very much to the point, and concern particular facts which form a good substantiation of what we have said above.

A FEW MORO VICES.

In dealing with this race, refractory to all that is good much may be said, and unfortunately all that can be said is bad. When we say that it is refractory to all good, or to all civilization we must be understood as speaking of its present organization with its Sultans, Dattos and Panditas; because if on a chosen day all these "birds" of the Archipelago should disappear the other Moros would obey the constituted authority and become as meek as lambs.

I will point out here a few facts that will serve to make known a few of their principal vices:

I. GAMBLING.

Perhaps there will not be wanting some who will wonder that we speak of gambling as a vice of the Moros, seeing that it is so general throughout the country; but though this be true the results of gambling among the Moros are especially worthy of attention.

The Moro dattos, as a rule, spend their lives in gambling; and when they lack money for keeping up that occupation they sell the first thing that falls to hand, namely the property of their vassals of whose lives and property they are the absolute lords. Often have I heard complaints from Moros on this point, who had been robbed of their only carabao, and who were considered as having no right to reclaim or recover it, the actual possessor having purchased it from the datto; and it is looked upon as luck if they sold only the carabaos of their sacopes, for at times they would sell some individual of the family, as it happened in the case of Emilio Calumpit, lost at play by his datto in gambling, and who after several vicissitudes went to Tamontaca and became a Christian. The lately deceased datto Galan, the most famous gambler and greatest mountebank of all the river, gambled away the daughter of his slave; and neither tears nor prayers were of any avail to cause him to desist from tearing her away from the arms of her mother and handing her out to the winner of the game.

What will civilization say to this?

2. CRUELTY.

The Moro dattos are notorious for their cruelty.

Uto, the once famous Uto, perhaps one of the most cruel men of these later days, gave at times his slaves and sacopes, even for insignificant short-comings, unheard of punishments; and other dattos used to do the same thing although less frequently. Those who escaped from him he punished by cutting the tendons below the knees so that they would be unable to run and walk only with difficulty. Others he ordered to be bound in a place swarming with red ants which are very vicious and whose bites are poisonous and insupportable. Others he cause to be bound naked to the trunks of trees and exposed by day to the burning rays of the sun and by night to the agonizing torments of the mosquitoes which infest and molest that part of the world. That an idea may

be formed of this torment I will merely state that a calf was once purchased in Tumbas for the purpose of slaughter on the following day; the calf was left that night bound to the trunk of a tree and on the following morning was found dead. Every one attributed its death to the cloud of mosquitoes that passed that way. For my own part I can say that one night in Tumbas I was seated in a canvas chair and was compelled to rise because the mosquitos penetrated with their "lancelas" not only the canvas but even the habit and trousers. The men of the garrison of Reine Regente always put newspapers over the seats of their chairs, this being the only way to prevent the bites of the mosquitos. It happened once that Uto put some one in stocks where he died slowly of hunger and misery, as the only food given him was some ears of corn which were thrown to him every afternoon in the same manner as they would be thrown to swine, serving rather to prolong his martyrdom than to nourish his body. Once a commander of a gunboat visited the house of Uto in Chapacan and came across a Moro there, dead in the stocks; there he had ended his days, and they had not even removed the corpse.

Another of the punishments meted out by the dattos, is that of throwing those they wish to chastise into the river with their bodies encumbered with an immense stone, but in such a manner that when the tide rises to its maximum height, the sufferer thus imprisoned has to stretch himself as much as he is able in order to prevent the water from entering his nostrils and mouth; thus they leave the victims at times for weeks in the water always exposed to death from drowning.

From the cruel Datto Andung, who ordered the death of Piang, there once escaped a slave, who hastened to take refuge in Tamontaca; but unfortunately the Datto heard of his flight shortly after his having set out in a banquita. Andung followed in pursuit and immediately upon coming up with him, put him to death with a kris.

About the year 1885, a schooner under command of a Dutchman visited Cottabato. It appears that, among other

articles of commerce he carried arms. Believing doubtless he would be able to do business there he made his way to the dwelling of the Sultan. The result of his visit was that he was robbed of all he had in his vessel which was scuttled and sunk; the crew were made captives and the Dutchman was tied naked to a tree, whilst the surrounding Moros tested the edges of their kris upon his body, thus putting him to death by a slow, cruel process.

Guillermo Galmes (or Uring) at the time of the evacuation of Cottabato remained in Tamontaca, and one day having seen a banquita floating down the tide, he captured it; this fact became known to the Datto Diambungan, to whom the boat belonged, and he accused Galmes of theft, and for this supposed robbery imposed upon him a fine of 60 pesos. As the accused was unable to pay, he was carried into captivity together with his wife and four children. Later on P. Ben-nasar, S. J., went there and aided by the Governor reclaimed the said family. The women and children were given up but the man had been killed in an attempt to escape.

One of the gentlemen who came with the American Civil Commission recorded, that in Jolo he had seen a Moro who had always carried a large bandage to hide from public view his repugnant mouth, which was unsightly not from any natural defect, but because having one day spoken disrespectfully to a datto, the chief ordered his mouth to be slit; and it was done with a kris, transversely, deepening it up to the articulation of the jaw-bone, the mouth in consequence remaining extraordinarily enlarged. The datto remained unmolested; according to his laws or customs he could do as he wished.

But are these customs compatible with civilization?

3. HAUGHTINESS.

I do not think it would be an easy task to find a haughtier people than the Moro dattos. As a rule they are a miserable set of people but believe themselves Russian czars. Their

pride is revealed in all their acts. In passing from one point to another they must always go under a *palio* or in other words an umbrella, guadily decorated and surrounded by guards of honor, armed with kris or campilan; and if they travel in their *vintas* the law commands that the drums and agungs must accompany them in their boats.

They are considered impeccable; and however great their faults may be they are not considered responsible for them. Datto Aco advanced this argument in the dispute which arose in the detachment of Tamontaca, in order to escape from being killed or bound. They did not know that although the datto is supposed to be irresponsible and invulnerable among the Moros, he is not so among the Christians.

Once some Moros traveling in a banca with their datto asked for some cocoanuts from the deceased H. Vinolas; and when the petition was refused, received the reply, "He who asks is the datto." Vinolas still continued to refuse and once again the Moros reminded him that it was the datto who wanted the cocoanuts. The Moros were dumbfounded to see, contrary to their customs, that he denied the datto what he asked.

Uto was accustomed to mount his horse by putting his foot upon the shoulders of one of his servants, who bent down purposely to accommodate the magnate. The writer once saw the act performed in Bacat.

The Datto Mamon ordered the immediate death of one of his vassals who had made some irreverent gesture.

We have frequently seen presents made to some dattos and although the said presents were of some value and things appreciated by them, they always received them with apparent indifference and as though they were of no importance; all this is a result of their haughtiness.

The wives of the dattos likewise always travel under a pays and accompanied by their maids-in-waiting who surround them chanting songs of a dirgelike nature but which to them

appear very agreeable music. At times also they mount their horse after the manner of the dattos, using the shoulders of one of their slaves as a stepping block.

As the Moros are very fanatical and superstitious they look upon their dattos as almost supernatural beings, a belief to which the Panditas contribute greatly, with their trickery; and thus it may be explained that in spite of the cruelty with which they ordinarily treat their vassals, there can scarcely be found a case where one of them has been found insubordinate or rebellious against his datto; the most they do is to attempt to escape, if an occasion offers, to some distant point.

Thus, haughty as they are, it is not strange that they should refuse to subject themselves to the rule of a civilized government. They do not desire to be governed by any one nor do they wish to have any communication with civilized beings. It is sufficient to put a group of houses of Christian Indians close to a Moro settlement, to see the latter little by little disappear. All the Moros who at the commencement of the occupation of Tamontaca lived around the neighborhood gradually disappeared. Gen. Salcedo proposed the formation of a Moro village in Tucuran, but a few weeks after the occupation of that point by Spanish troops, there was not a single Moro habitation remaining of those formerly existing there.

That the Moros do not desire to be governed by any one is evidenced by the wars of Jolo, by that of Uto in 1889, by those of Lanao in 1897 and '98, not counting the many previous wars which Spain was constantly obliged to wage against the Moros. All the several races of the Philippines, one after the other subjected themselves to the yoke of Spain and entered into the ways of civilization. And the Moros? As far as concerns later times, the only thing that has been accomplished with this race is what was done at Tamontaca, and well we know how it was obtained, by what means and at what cost. And there not a single datto was baptized, not

because they cannot be converted but because their organization and autonomy makes their evangelization exceedingly difficult.

4. ROBBERY.

Among the Moros there scarcely exists one who is not a ladron. This is not strange to any who knows a little of the race; for the Datto being the one who robs in the most barefaced manner, can it be expected that his vassals will not rob also? And let not the reader suppose that this vice is confined to dattos only; it is the same with all. They do not commit the robbery themselves, but they have at their orders those who are expert and accustomed to the work. Once a *Tiruraye* who knew perfectly well this *tinglado* was explaining it to me and said: "Datto A has so many, etc." One of their maxims is that to rob another settlement, above all if there be any enmity between the inhabitants of the two, is no fault. Such actions are so general that they are the common practice of all. At the southern mouth of the Rio Grande there lived and still lives the Datto Ara, who without any doubt is the most reasonable and decent of all the people of the river; and in spite of this we are aware that among his carabaos there are some branded with a cross, mark of the mission of Tamontaca.

5. TREACHERY.

Of the history of the Moros it may be added that it is nothing more or less than a series of treacheries both in Spain and in our possessions, in Morocco and the Philippines, for when have the Moros been found faithful? They submit to reduction for convenience or because they are powerless to resist. Or in other words are faithful in keeping treaties as long as it suits them, or whilst they have not sufficient strength to free themselves therefrom.

It is within a year and a half ago that one Mariano Doz, who several times has been skipper of the *vinta* of P. Beunasar, in his voyages to Lebac found a good rice field in that part

known as Linas, close by the River Tran. As he had good rice that was to yield a heavy crop, friends were not wanting to warn him not to trust the Moros; but he took no notice of these warnings. One day some Moros sent by Matabalan, Datto of the River Tran, visited him and entered into a very interesting conversation with him on the sea-shore; according to the custom of the country they chewed the buyo together; but suddenly drawing their krises, the Moros killed him. Immediately there appeared two more vintas which were near by and whilst one took up a position at the point as a watchman the remaining Moros busied themselves in cutting the rice and carrying it to the Datto.

About the year '84, two Moros who had escaped from the clutches of Uto reached Tamontaca. Both received Christian instruction in preparation for baptism. One day in the market-place of the same settlement an emissary of Uto entered into a friendly conversation with one of the two; whilst chewing the buyo together the emissary of the magnate, sent, as was afterwards known, with that object in view, suddenly drew his kris and cut off the Christian's head; without the possibility of his being captured, he escaped among the people, who were struck with amazement at the boldness of the deed.

A short time previous to the evacuation of Zamboanga by the Spanish troops, several families of Tamontaca who had followed the fathers to that capital wished to return once again to the former settlement. For this purpose two or three large vintas were hired. P. Beunasar gave them letters of recommendation to the Dattos, Benito and Mamogueten, the former having always been high in praise of the Spaniards and the latter always a great friend of P. Juanmarti, from whom he had received so many favors. The former ordered the death of several of these people, and the captivity of others with several women, although he afterwards freed them at the instance of Mandi. With the same end in view some others were also

detained for a day and a night; and if he did not finally carry out his idea it was because of the threat of one of the prisoners that P. Beunasar would return to Cottabato in a gunboat.

Another case that may be cited in this connection to prove the treachery of the Moros, is that of the treachery of Balabag.

6. PIRACY.

The Moros are unexcelled pirates, and slavery constitutes perhaps their greatest wealth. It is well known that within the last quarter of a century formidable fleets of *vintas* sailed continually from Jolo and the Rio Grande and after sacking some pueblos of the Visayas, returned to their strongholds loaded down with booty and with captive Christians. Their hatred inspired them at times even to approach the walls of Manila. The then Bishop of Cebú, Sr. Gimeno, did not desist from petitioning the Spanish Government to occupy southern Mindanao, in order to put a stop to such piracy. He sent every year a record of the people of his diocese who had been captured by the Moros and at times the number reached 2,000! At times whole pueblos were captured and the churches robbed of every object of any value they contained. At last the Rio Grande was occupied, and later on, Jolo. Several *faluas* (small row-boats) were sent down, but they were so heavy that when they were rowed they scarcely moved; whilst the Moros in the *vintas* which were generally very light and of but little draught, had the laugh on them.

Hence the *faluas* were useless to prevent piracy; but later on when the gun-boats came the scene changed. The *vintas* met with on the high sea were overhauled and if suspected were searched and if contraband was found aboard it was confiscated and the crew made prisoners. A great many were sunk, and in this manner, in less than a year piracy was stamped out in the south. From that time on, the Moros could no longer conduct their piratical expeditions to the Visayas or to other ports. But then they began stealing children among themselves. The Moros cannot exist without

their slaves and when they cannot have Christian ones they procure them from among their own race. Malabang and Baras have been for a long time the chief markets of human flesh; and to the said points were carried those captured in Lanao, to be sold to the Chinos of Cottabato or to the Moros of the Rio Grande. And there also were sold those captured in this last named place to be sold in turn to the Moros of Lanao. In this manner to a great extent escape from their masters was almost impossible, as they were far from their own settlement and in an unknown region. The immense majority of the children who entered the refuges established at Tamontaca were Malanaos; and it was an interesting thing to hear them recount the manner in which they had been captured.

From the time that the gun-boats commenced to cross the seas of the south to a degree did piracy cease at sea; for the seventeen years I was on the Rio Grande, I received notification of only three or four Christians being captured. But the practice was renewed after the evacuation by the Spanish when a Filipino Government was left in Cottabato. This was succeeded by the American Government after the cataclysm of crime and violence with which we are well acquainted. But the American Government has done nothing up to the present to put down piracy which has commenced once more to assume extraordinary proportions; its principal victims being the *Tirurayes*, the third part of whom have been carried away captive to Jolo and other points in two years. In this respect we have retrograded to the times of Corcuera, (1639).

In concluding this subject I will mention the following: Some time since speaking with the American Colonel at Zamboanga and with the Commanding General of Cottabato, I told them that it appeared to me that the Moros went to Rio Grande and neighboring shores in Joloan *pancos* loaded with arms which they sold at these places and returned loaded down with *Tirurayes*. Although the said officers did

not deny this they doubted it, or believed, at least, that the tale was exaggerated. The following occurrence dispelled their doubts.

On the 29th of April, the launch of Cottabato, which had come to Zamboanga three days before, returned having as passengers myself and two American officers. A good distance before reaching Punta Flechas, we discovered a white object on the larboard. We soon knew it to be a vinta. The captain of the launch remarked, "Surely that is a Joloan *panco* and if it is going that way they are certainly carrying arms, and if it comes thence it carries *Tirurayes*." In Spanish times this boat would have been examined. "Shall we examine it?" said the captain, as though defending his honor. Nosooner said than done. It was in fact a Joloan *panca* the crew of which seeing us bearing down upon it let down its sail and hoisted the American flag. However the flag proved of no value to them. The captain boarded her with four marines and commenced his examination. In half a minute they discovered in the hold large quantities of cartridges, carbines of various classes, rifles, Remingtons, and a large case of cartridges and pistols. The *panco* was taken in tow and together with its crew carried to Cottabato where the captain and crew were thrown into prison.

Our task is done. It will be a happy day when the Government of the U. S. becomes convinced of the existence of the obstacle to civilization we have here denounced and of the possibility and necessity of removing it for the common welfare of the country.

PRO PR, S. J.

Manila, P. I. July 25, 1901.



APPENDIX VI.

A brief Summary of Historical Accounts respecting the Spanish Military Operations against the Moros from the year 1578 to 1898, compiled for Major General George W. Davis, Commanding the Division of the Philippines, by 1st Lieutenant William E. W. McKinley, 9th U. S. Cavalry, Assistant to Officer in charge of Military Information Division, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I., July 1, 1903.

About the same time that the last Moorish Kingdom in Spain was conquered, the Mohammedan faith became the religion of the natives of southwestern Mindanao, as well as those of Jolo and other adjacent islands; and by the time of the arrival of Legaspi at the mouth of the Pasig in 1571, two Mohammedan chiefs had established themselves at Tondo and Manila. This Pasig River colony was soon converted to Christianity by the Spaniards, but the relations of the latter with the Mohammedans of Mindanao and Jolo have been more frequently hostile than amicable.

The Spaniards gave to these Malayan Mohammedans the name of Moros; and with the name brought much of their hereditary hatred for the Barbary Moors or Moros who for 700 years had held the most fertile spots of Spain.

For nearly three centuries, intermittent attempts were made by the Spaniards to destroy the power of the Moro pirates who, almost without intermission, raided the Spanish colonies throughout the islands south of Luzon and even occasionally on that island. Many reverses were met by the Spanish expeditions against the Jolo and Mindanao Moros and some successes. The important events of the three centuries will be sketched briefly below:

It was in 1578, during the administration of de Sande, the third Captain General of the Philippines, that the first conflict between the Mohammedans and the Spaniards took place. In this year, Sirela or Malaela, the Sultan of Borneo, came to Manila, offering his kingdom as a tributary of Spain for help to recover his throne from his brother. The Captain General personally headed the expedition of 400 Spaniards, 1500 natives, and 300 Borneans. This expedition was successful and Sirela was replaced in power.

In the same year, the Jolo Moros seized and enslaved the crew, partly Spanish, of a vessel en route from Manila to Cebú. An expedition against Mindanao and Jolo was successful, but achieved no permanent success, as the force was not sufficient to leave garrisons.

In 1581, a second expedition was sent against Borneo for the same purpose as the former one, Sirela having been again deposed by his brother; and in 1582, under orders from Philip II of Spain, an expedition was sent to conquer the Moluccas. This conquest was defeated by an epidemic among the troops.

In 1596, Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa was given the title to Mindanao for conquest at his own expense. In the same year, the conquest was entered into by an expedition of 214 Spaniards from Panay. The expedition reached the Rio Grande, was well received by the natives, who were hostile to the Buhayen Moros, under the leadership of the dattos, Silonga, Malaria and Bulusan, who had fortified themselves twenty-four miles up the river. The outcome, however, was disastrous, the commander losing his life. The survivors entrenched themselves near the mouth of the river, founding the town of Murcia. Advices were sent to Manila and an expedition of 400 men under Ronquilla was despatched to the relief of the colony; meanwhile, a fleet from the Moluccas organized by Buhisan, with 600 men, was surprised by two Spanish galleys, while in Illana Bay en route to the Rio Grande, and was practically annihilated. This disaster caused the Buhayen Moros to seek peace, and the Spaniards were enabled to traverse their territory unmolested. Ronquilla, however, reported the place indefensible and asked leave to return to Manila, which request was so far approved as to authorize him to retire to Caldera, near Zamboanga. The Governor changed his mind after the completion of this move and of the fort at Caldera, and ordered a return to the Rio Grande. Ronquilla left a garrison at Caldera under Pacheo and returned to Manila, where he was court martialed but acquitted. The Rio Grande station was not re-occupied. Pacheo in 1598 made an unsuccessful attack on Jolo (the first Spanish attack on Jolo on record) and in this attack he was killed and his forces defeated. The Caldera fort was then abandoned.

In July, 1599, Datto Silonga with 3000 Buhayen Moros raided the coast settlements of Cebú, Negros, and Panay, committing all kinds of outrages. In 1600, a repetition was attempted by a large force, but was repulsed in southern Panay.

In February, 1602, a second expedition against Jolo under Gallinato failed on account of lack of supplies. In the same year, a raid of Mindanao Moros under the personal command of the datto of Buhayen penetrated to Batangas Province, but were repulsed at Balayan. The Moros, however, captured a Spanish vessel en route from Cebú to Ma-

nila, destroyed the principal towns of Mindoro, only 60 miles from Manila, and very nearly captured the Governor General who was returning to Manila. While dividing their spoils at Marapon, the Moros were attacked by an expedition under Travelo and were routed with a loss of 200 killed and 50 prisoners.

In 1603, the Governor General began the construction of forts in Panay. In 1605, Silonga asked for peace which was made and Moro captives were liberated.

The peace continued until 1616, when a Moro expedition was organized at Jolo. This fleet was surprised off Point Potol, and again between Cebú and Negros, and the remnant was finally destroyed off Cavite. The expedition was successful, however, in destroying Pantao in the Camarines and the shipyards at Cavite and exacting a large sum for ransom of Spanish prisoners. In 1625, a Moro raid from one of the islands near Borneo descended on Catbalogan, Samar, and sacked the town. A Spanish expedition from Iloilo retaliated on the pirate town near Borneo, reducing it to ashes. In 1627 and 1628, two expeditions were directed against Jolo, the first from Cebú was successful, considerable Moro property being destroyed; this attack was then directed against Basilan, the Moros inhabiting that island being allied with the Joloans. The second expedition failed, the leader being wounded. In 1628, a treaty was made between Spain and the Mindanao Moros. In 1629, the Jolo Moros committed outrages in Samar, Leyte, and other islands; and in 1630 a punitive expedition from Dapitan destroyed seven large, and 33 small boats at Jolo.

In 1635, the Moros raided and sacked Tayabas and numerous towns in Bohol and Leyte. In 1635, de Chaves with 300 Spaniards and 100 natives began work on a fort at Zamboanga. In the same year, Datto Tagal with a force of Buhayen Moros sacked Cuyo, Culion, and several towns of Mindoro, and enslaved 650 natives. He was surprised, while returning, near Punta Flechas, and his fleet destroyed with great loss; 130 of his prisoners being released and much booty retaken.

The Spanish Government concluded that this situation was intolerable, as no less than 20,000 prisoners had been carried off captives during the thirty years. The new Governor General, Corcuera, decided on a conquest of Mindanao and Jolo, and in February, 1637, his first successful campaign was inaugurated. Starting with four companies of Infantry, three of Marines, and a large number of Visayans and Pangangans, his force was augmented at Zamboanga by three additional companies, bringing his strength in Europeans to 760. He proceeded to the Rio Grande (called Corralat after the reigning Sultan). He pushed to success an attack against the town of Lamitan, burning it and several others, and executed 72 captured Moros. The defeated Sultan attempt-

ed another stand at the hill commanding the present town of Cottabato, but was driven also from there here, escaping wounded. The dattos of Buhayen and Basilan then submitted and Corcuera returned to Zamboanga and later to Manila. In October of the same year, Corcuera returned to Zamboanga and organized an expedition of 600 Spaniards and 1000 natives against Jolo. In January, 1638, the expedition was started. Landings were made on both sides of the island, and after several fights, Caceres and Jolo were captured, but the Sultan escaped. Corcuera repaired the fort on the hill now called Alphonso XIII, and appointing a Governor, left him with a garrison of 200 Spaniards and 200 natives. This is the record of the first mastery of the island by Spaniards.

In 1638, the Buhayen datto Moncay resented the construction of a fort near his own seat and besieged the Spanish garrison which was re-inforced by the Manobos with 2000 men. Supplies and reinforcements from Zamboanga raised the siege. Almonte built a fort at Sabonilla (now Malabang) and an expedition from there in 1639, against the Buhayens, defeated Moncay, but did not prevent his escape to the mountains. Meanwhile in 1639, the Lanao Moros, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Corralat, committed depredations on the north coast of Mindanao. The warlike Recoleta friar Agustin de San Pedro retaliated, leading a party of his people to the lake, and burning a Moro settlement. Again in April, 1639, a party of 50 soldiers and 500 volunteers from Caraga under Atienza, accompanied by the same priest, reached the lake without opposition, carrying up six boats from Iligan; and 2000 families are said to have submitted. (At this period the leading dattos were, Pagayayabon on the Didungan; Dagalo and Monocor of Taraca; Mabololo of Bayang; and Macaluyo of Banayan.) Atienza retired against the wishes of the priest, without fortifying in the lake region. Shortly afterwards another expedition from Sabonilla reached the lake and constructed a fort, which was later destroyed, the garrison returning to Iligan, as the Moros were becoming hostile.

In 1638, an attack at Jolo caused a loss of forty-two men to the garrison. General Almonte attempted the capture of the Sultan, but the latter escaped to Tawi-Tawi, though with severe loss. Almonte returned to Manila leaving Morales as Governor of Jolo.

The Moro submission was of short duration. Morales forcibly abducted a daughter of a leading Moro datto which exasperated the Jolo Moros into hostilities. Morales was relieved for this act, but was later restored to his command, losing his life in an imprudent pursuit near Parang. This disaster was soon avenged by the successor of Morales, and expeditions were sent against Pangutaran and Tapul.

A piratical expedition about this time ravaged the Calamianes.

In 1641 and 1642, Corralat, Sultan of Mindanao, captured two Spanish vessels, and with Moncay attacked the Buhayen fort, mortally wounding the commanding officer and completely defeating the relief expedition from Zamboanga, only seven Spaniards escaping. General Almonte made peace with Corralat and the Buhayen garrison returned to Sabonilla. General Corcuera, then at Zamboanga, beheaded the leader of the illfated relief expedition, caused the Sabonilla fort to be destroyed, and sent its garrison to punish Corralat. The expedition failed and Corralat, in his turn, attacked a town near Zamboanga and some minor settlements in Basilan.

In 1644, de Fajardo, the Captain General, made peace with Corralat and in 1645, at a convention at Simuay, the Governor of Zamboanga, de Atienza, representing Spain, signed a treaty to that effect. A Moro attack on Jolo was repulsed, but in 1646 the station was abandoned, and a treaty was made whereby the Jolo and Tawi Tawi Islands remained under the Sultan; the islands of Tapul, Balanguitan, Siassi and Pangutaran remaining Spanish. The Sultan acknowledged Spanish sovereignty and promised to prevent piratical depredations. Very shortly afterwards, however, trouble arose between Corralat and Moncay, into which Monforte, at Zamboanga, was drawn as an ally of Corralat. Despite the Jolo treaty, the Jolo datto, Salicala, and a datto from Borneo ravaged the Visayan coast. The force of the latter was defeated by Monforte near Masbate, and Salicala returned to Jolo. Monforte destroyed several towns and 300 boats in Borneo. In 1655, trouble again broke out between Corralat and the Spanish forces, the Moros sacking numerous towns in the Calamianes and one town near Zamboanga. In 1656, a fleet despatched by de Sara, the new Captain General, burned Corralat's town and some Moro towns in Sibuguey Bay, destroying also a Dutch fleet allied with the Moros. The Moros at the same time were ravaging the coasts of Mindoro and Marinduque, and succeeded also in repulsing the attack on the fort at Corralat, forcing the Spaniards to return to Sabonilla and Zamboanga. In 1657, Salicala scoured the Philippine seas capturing over 1000 native prisoners, entering the bay of Manila during the raid. In 1660, Moros from Jolo and Tawi Tawi, taking advantage of an insurrection in Luzon, raided the coasts of Bohol, Leyte and Mindoro.

In 1662, a Chinese rebellion embarrassed the Spaniards, and at this time several dattos from the Jolo and Tawi-Tawi Islands sacked and burned a great many towns in the Visayas. Following these inroads Bobadilla, Governor of Zamboanga, was ordered to evacuate that station, which was done in January, 1663.

For the next half century, Moro raids on the Mindanao and Visayan settlements marked each year and many fights were chronicled between the fleets of praus and the Spanish fleet known as the "Armada de los Pintados".

The Jesuits had endeavored in 1666 and 1672 to have the fort of Zamboanga rebuilt, but it was not until 1712, that the Spanish King ordered its re-establishment, and even then the project was not realized until 1718, in which year the present fort with four bastions was built and the city walls protected. The place was defended by 61 pieces of Artillery. The re-establishment of the Zamboanga station caused great discontent among the Moros; it was besieged for two months, in 1720 and 1721, by 5000 Moros under the datto of Butig; the resistance, directed by the Governor, Amorrea, was successful, and the siege abandoned; the Moros turning their efforts to raids on Mindoro and the Calamianes, where great damage was done.

In 1724, the Jolo Sultan made a treaty of peace with the Spaniards, ceding the Island of Basilan; but this same year Manaol in Mindoro, and Cateel in Mindanao were attacked. In 1730, Tay-Tay was sacked and burned by Tawi-Tawi Moros and the fort at that place unsuccessfully attacked. In 1731, a punitive expedition was sent to Jolo and a number of Moro towns destroyed. In 1734, the Tawi-Tawi Moros attacked, and nearly succeeded in capturing Zamboanga. In the same year and again in 1735, Tay-Tay was again attacked, but the Moros were severely punished in these engagements. In the same year, another surprise was attempted at Zamboanga. These actions were supplemented by numerous minor engagements and were temporarily terminated by a new peace treaty in 1737 with the new Sultan of Jolo.

In 1746, letters from King Philip V addressed to the Sultans of Jolo and Tamontaca (Mindanao) requesting that the Christian religion be allowed to be preached in their domains were received; and upon sending embassies to the Sultans the project was apparently well received. In 1748, two Jesuit priests took their station in Jolo, but on account of a family quarrel, Bantilan, brother of the Sultan, proclaimed himself as ruler of Jolo during the absence of the Sultan at Zamboanga. The deposed Sultan came to Manila in 1749, and in 1750 professed a desire to become a Christian. The Archbishop of Manila did not believe in his sincerity, but he was baptized at Paniqui in another diocese. In 1751, the Sultan returned to Jolo escorted by a Spanish force under Antonio de Abad with the intention of overthrowing Bantilan. The expedition was unsuccessful and returned to Zamboanga. In the meantime, a letter was intercepted from the Sultan of Sulu to the Sultan of Mindanao, and its contents established the infidelity and disloyalty of the

Sultan Ali Mudin. He, his family and his followers, numbering over two hundred, were imprisoned in Manila and Cavite, and a second expedition was sent against Jolo without result.

During the succeeding two years, the Jolo Moros were unmerciful in their raids, which were most extensive. Paragua, Leyte, the north coast of Mindanao, Romblon, Tayabas, Ticao, Mindoro, Culion, and the Calamianes suffered severely. Two towns in Zambales province were reached by the Moros. In 1754, the raids were repeated in Mindoro, Leyte and Mindanao and extended to Cebú, Negros and Panay; this year Albay and Batangas Provinces also were reached. The Spanish were not without success in these years. In 1753, a fleet of 150 praus was destroyed with about 2,000 Moros and 500 captives liberated. In 1754, the fort at Misamis was built. In 1756, it is reported that 2500 Moros were killed in an attack on a Spanish galley off Batangas. In 1757, the Moros burned the town of Mariveles in Manila Bay, as well as several towns in the southern islands and the Calamianes, but lost a fleet from Tuboc in an encounter with Spanish galleys.

During these five years, the Moro attacks were so persistent and successful, that in many of the Visayan towns 50% of the inhabitants were killed or enslaved.

In 1762, the British captured Manila, and, due to this and the rising of the natives of the northern provinces, the Moros renewed their attacks on the southern islands. Continuing for several years, they sacked and burned towns in Sorsogon, Tablas, Sibuyan, Mindoro, Bataan, and Leyte, and in Surigao and Misamis Provinces in Mindanao. Even Manila suffered from the raids during this period, twenty captives being secured in Malate. Malabon and Paranaque were also attacked.

In 1771, de Anda, the new Captain General, re-organized the *Armada de los Pintados* but the incursions continued. In this year, a Spanish friar was captured by a Moro fleet at Aparri, Cagayan. About this time Israel, the son of Ali Mudin, was established in the Sultanate of Jolo by the British.

In 1773, Anda, desiring to promote better relations between the Spaniards and the new Sultan of Jolo, proposed free trade, and Spanish help to expel the British from the Moro territory without interference with the internal government of the Sultan; but the Spanish officer failed to observe his instructions and nothing beneficial resulted, save further irritation of the Moros. About 4,000 Chinese expelled from Manila in 1758, joined the Jolo Moros, also a number of Englishmen, the leader of whom named Brun, was put in charge of the defense. In 1775, the Moros destroyed the British colony on Balambangan led by the datto Teteng, who later in the year made an attempt against Zamboanga and, upon its being frustrated, committed great ravages upon the coast of Cebú,

and continued this for two years. From 1776 to 1778, during the rule of Governor Pedro Sarrío, the Moros harassed the coast as never before. At this time the Sultan Israel of Jolo was poisoned by Ali Mudin, his cousin. In 1778 the "Light Fleet" dislodged the Moros from their fort at Mamburao, Mindoro, and traffic between Luzon and the southern islands, which had been practically paralyzed for ten years, began to revive. The Sultan of Jolo asked for peace in 1781. In 1781, also, the Mindanao Moros invaded the Visayan Islands, but were defeated.

In 1785, the Moros burned several towns in the Visayas and captured a prau in Bulacan Province near Manila.

In 1789, the Captain General Marquina informed the King that constant war with the Moros "was an evil without remedy". The Governor of Iloilo reported more than 400 persons made captives in two towns. In 1792, Boljoon in Cebú and another town in Leyte were burned, and 120 of the inhabitants made prisoners. In 1794, expeditions visited Mindoro and the Jolo Moros became more peaceful, but the Illanaos living on the bay of Tubug in Mindanao, and the natives of Tampassook on the west coast of Borneo, made constant raids, not only in the Philippines but also upon the Dutch Islands of Banca and Malacca. In 1794, Siroma, in the Camarines, was attacked and many natives of Daet in the same province were carried off.

In 1796, the ship yard of San Blas, Mexico, was transferred to Cavite for building the vessels required in the Moro campaigns. From this resulted the Naval arsenal at Cavite.

In 1796, the Naval Lieutenant Arcillos was captured and put to death at Sibuguey and the next year Caraga was attacked by the Moros.

In 1798, Zamboanga was attacked by the British Fleet; and in the same year, 500 Moros with 25 praus fell upon Baler, Casiguran, and Palanan, east coast of Luzon, capturing 450 people. The headquarters of the pirates for years was on Burias Island from whence they descended upon the neighboring towns. The Spanish ship "San Jose" was also captured at Tawi-Tawi by the brother of the Sultan of Jolo and part of its crew sacrificed.

In 1803, the Moros had so ravaged Mindoro that the greater part of the people abandoned the towns for the mountains.

In 1793 to 1794, no headway was made against the pirates, while some of their boats made a landing on the coast of Zambales, north of Manila Bay and escaped without loss.

At a meeting of the authorities in Manila and persons of the southern islands, it was shown that each year the Moros captured and enslaved about 500 persons.

The expenses from 1778 to the end of 1793 amounted to 1,519,209 pesos fuertes. Six divisions were formed, each of six gunboats

and one "Panco" or prau, and the forts of the Visayas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Batangas, and Zamboanga were repaired. Privateering against the Moros was also made permanent.

In 1805, a treaty was made between the Sultan of Jolo and the Spanish Government whereby it was agreed that no foreign resident would be permitted in Sulu without the consent of the Spanish Government and that in case of war between Spain and any foreign country, the Sultan's ports would be closed against Spain's enemies. From 1806 to 1815, detailed accounts of piratical raids are infrequent.

In 1813, a Royal order incorporated the privateer fleet of the Philippines with the Royal fleet. In 1815, the raiders took 1000 natives prisoners and captured several Spanish, British and Dutch vessels. In 1818, twenty three Moro praus were captured or destroyed in a naval action off the coast of Albay, but later attacks were made by pirates upon Catanduanes Island and some towns of Albay and Camarines.

In 1824, at Pilas, 21 miles west of Basilan, a Moro fort was taken and severe losses inflicted upon its defenders, among the dead being the datto Ipoypo called "the lash of the Visayas", who each year had carried off more than 500 persons. The expedition also destroyed piratical boats at Jolo, Illana Bay, Pollok, and other parts of Mindanao.

From 1827 to 1835, the records respecting Moro conflicts are meagre. In 1836, under Salazar, a treaty (mainly commercial) was made with the Sultan of Jolo. In this same year, hostile Moros were dislodged from Masbate.

In 1842, a fort was erected in Basilan. In April, 1843, a convention between the Sultan and the French Emissary was made. It stipulated for equal rights of trade between the French and Joloan ports, and a later treaty, dated February 20, 1845, ceded the island of Basilan to France for the sum of 100,000 pesos. In 1844, the French warship "Sabine" arrived at Zamboanga, and the commander notified the Spanish Governor, Figueroa, that he had come to investigate the capture of some of his crew by the Maluso Moros; and later three other French vessels under Vice Admiral Cecille arrived and blockaded the Island of Basilan, the offender being the datto Usak. A Spanish force under Bocalan went immediately to Zamboanga, and soon the French raised the blockade. A Spanish fort was built at Pasanjan, Basilan. Later, the Davao country was ceded to the Spaniards by the Sultan of Mindanao. The Davao settlement was made by Jose Oyanguren, who, in 1849, took the fort of Hijo.

In 1845, a Spanish frigate left Manila for Zamboanga and from there proceeded to the Island of Balanguingui of the Samales group where an anchorage was made at the principal port. Col. Penaranda, Secretary to the Civil Governor, of the Philippines, tried to communi-

cate with the datto of the island, but in place of this was ordered to leave at once, and the Moro fort fired upon the Spanish frigate. A landing was made, but the party was obliged to retire with the loss of some men and Commander Rodriguez. At this time this island was the center of piracy in the Archipelago, and the visit of the Spanish vessel was to ascertain its means of defense.

In 1848, the English built steam gunboats "El Cano" "Magalanes" and "Reina de Castilla" with three barkentines carrying three companies of troops, went to Balanguingui, which was still a center of piracy. The expedition, headed by Claveria in person, anchored off Balanguingui and an attack was made. After a cannonade from the vessels, three companies and 150 Zamboanga volunteers assaulted the walls and carried the fort after a desperate resistance; the Moros losing 100 killed. The Spanish lost seven killed and fifty wounded. The next day, another fort was captured in the same manner; 340 Moros being killed and 150, mostly women and children, being taken prisoners. The Spaniards lost one officer and 15 men killed, 224 wounded and 22 contused. 79 pieces of artillery were captured in the two forts and 30 captives rescued. Two smaller forts were also taken, and the towns of Buasugan, Suitan, Pahat and Padanan destroyed.

In 1848, two Dutch corvettes, being denied the return of some captives by the Sultan of Jolo, cannonaded the forts there for twenty-four hours.

In 1849, the British warship "Meander," Captain Kepple, with Sir James Brooke, the founder of Sarawak, on board, made a treaty with the Sultan of Jolo in which the Sultan promised not to recognize any other power as his suzerain without the consent of Great Britain. Later in 1849, 3,000 Moros from Jolo attacked the fort of Isabela de Basilan, but were repulsed. The prisoners taken were conducted to Zamboanga and a notice was sent to the Sultan of Jolo concerning the capture and punishment of his subjects.

A Moro fleet from Tonquil together with some praus, in 1850, raided the islands of Samar and Camiguin, carrying off seventy-five natives. The old and the children were thrown overboard as useless. A Spanish fleet then went to Jolo. The place was defended by five cottas or forts. It was also fortified by a wall and was well supplied with cannon. The population numbered some 7,000 people of whom 500 were Chinese. Two officers sent to arrange an interview were fired upon by Moros after embarking. The place was deemed to be too strong for attack by the force present and the Spanish commander decided to return and await re-inforcements; but the forts without notice opened a general fire upon the fleet at anchor, killing seven and wounding four sailors; the fleet replied, but soon returned to Zamboanga. The "El Cano" was sent to

Manila with the news. Reinforcements arrived and the expedition returned to Jolo capturing the place after a spirited action. The Spanish lost three killed and 92 wounded, while the Moros had 300 killed and lost over 100 cannon.

The fall of Jolo was not without effect. Numerous small expeditions to various Mindanao dattos and Sultans were well received. In April, 1850, the Governor of Zamboanga went to Jolo and on the 19th, the Spanish flag was raised. The same day in a treaty, the Sultan acknowledged the sovereignty of Spain and agreed not to make treaties, conventions, and alliances with European powers, companies, persons, corporations, nor with any Sultan or Chief; and all treaties previously made with other powers were declared null and void. The Sultan also agreed to use no flag but that of Spain, and the Spanish Governor guaranteed to respect the religion of the Moros. Piracy was also declared to be prohibited. A salary of 1500 pesos was allowed to the Sultan, 600 pesos to three dattos, and 360 pesos to the "sherif" for his services to the Spanish Government. This treaty was dated and signed April 19, 1851.

Notwithstanding the promises of the Sultan, pirate vessels continued to scour the remote parts of the Archipelago. Five small Spanish vessels encountered a Moro fleet of four praus on the southwest coast of Paragua. One of the Spanish vessels was blown up but the pirates were defeated with a loss of 100 dead. The Spaniards lost 14 killed and 12 wounded, but rescued 20 captives from the Moros.

In 1852, a general rebellion broke out in Sugut near Pollok. The Spanish attacked the fort and killed fifty of the Moros.

In January, 1854, a company of the Principi Regiment was ambuscaded in Basilan and nearly all killed. In this same year, a town on Capul, near Jolo, was burned by the Spaniards from Basilan; but in 1855 the Moros from Sulu made a dash upon Zamboanga and burned the best part of the town.

In 1856, a Spanish expedition burned a town of Jolo for piracy; also one in the Islands of Simisa, and one on Basilan.

In 1857, the gunboat "Reina de Castilla", 150 soldiers and 50 Zamboanga volunteers, destroyed two villages near Zamboanga. In 1858, General Norzagaray offered premiums to whomsoever should kill any pirate wherever found, but this was of no important result.

In this year the "Light fleet" of Isabella de Basilan sailed for Simisa where it surprised the Moros and after a hard fight put them to flight. Seventy six captives were rescued and 116 prisoners taken, among them the families of two powerful dattos. In view of the state of the island and the captivity of their people, the two chiefs presented themselves at Basilan with 60 captives, one a priest and another a

European woman, and in view of their submission, the Governor made an exchange of prisoners. In 1860 the Moros established themselves on the Islands of Catanduanes and Biti, and others belonging to the Province of Albay; the Governor of the Province being unable to dislodge them. They also infested the straits of San Bernardino between Luzon and Samar, their number being between 400 and 500, where they killed some 16 persons, captured ten, and carried off a vessel; the same year two piratical dattos of Dong-Dong in Tawi-Tawi were killed by the datto Alip and their heads carried to Zamboanga. In 1860, the Moros attempted to seize a vessel lying at anchor at Tuluyan, and in the attempt three of them were killed. The Spanish officer wrote an arrogant letter to the Sultan demanding the return of two Spaniards and 200 natives within six days; and the Sultan acceding, sent twelve vessels to Tawi-Tawi to repress some of the pirate dattos.

In 1861, eighteen steam gunboats were purchased in England, and it was due to these boats that the almost continued piracy which had existed up to that time was soon reduced to insignificance.

In 1862, Samales Moros made raids on the Zamboanga coast, but the raids ceased when a small gunboat sank a large prau with all of its crew. At the same time a small fleet forced the Sultan of Mindanao to hoist a Spanish Flag at Pollok. The Moros met reverses in loss of fleets near Guimaras and Tugubanja Islands and in the destruction of the four towns Ponugan, Bugamputi, Patan, and Caneanga.

In September of 1864, an expedition was sent from Pollok against the Rio Grande Moros who had built defenses on that river from Cotabato to Tumbao. The fort at Pagalungan was captured with a severe loss to the Moros. In the report of this assault, honorable mention was made of Ensigns Cervera and Montijo, afterwards Spanish Admirals. In this year the Talayan Moros were proceeded against, the Spanish being aided by a force under datto Utto, son of the Sultan of Buhayan, but during the attack Utto joined the Talayan Moros and the expedition failed. A second expedition also failed, and the outlying fort at Bonga was abandoned.

In 1866, the Moros of Supangan and Simuay rose in rebellion, and the Governor of Mindanao with a force and four gun boats proceeded against the fortified towns of Supangan, Dulugan and Sanditan. The expedition was entirely successful with but slight loss. In 1870, a raid was made by Tawi-Tawi Moros on the east coast of Paragua. The town of Santa Monica, or Batacalan, was destroyed and all of its inhabitants carried away. Two years later a garrison of native troops was placed at Puerta Princesa.

In this year a naval blockade of Jolo was established, and in 1873, two German vessels were seized while carrying contraband of war to

the Jolo Moros. In 1874, this fleet did considerable damage to the Moros of the islands from Jolo to Tawi-Tawi. Towards the close of the same year, a large party of Moros attacked the garrison at Balabac, but was repulsed. In October, 1875, two gunboats in search of Moro pirates located their headquarters in the Bay of Areray, and sank one large prau.

These operations practically terminated the long term of piracy under which the colonies had suffered for three centuries. The mobility of the steam gunboats and the subsequent blockade against introduction of arms and ammunition had in a dozen years practically removed the menace, though occasionally raids appeared in the years to follow. Most of the trouble in the succeeding years, however, took the form of more or less extensive campaigns against the three large groups of Moros (Sulu, Rio Grande and Lanao) in the control of the fanatical running *amok*, called by the Spaniards "Juramentado."

CAMPAIGN OF 1876.

In 1873, Spain had largely re-organized her Philippine forces, and in 1876, the forces included seven native regiments of Infantry and one of Artillery, two regiments of the Civil Guard, and some force of Carbineers and Marines. There were also troops kept at Balabac, Isabela de Basilan, and Cavite.

The relations between the Government and Di Amirul, the Sultan of Jolo, had been becoming more and more tense and an extensive expedition was planned against the Sultan by the Captain General in 1876, in spite of Spain's political troubles at home and the depleted condition of the treasury. The projected expedition was received with great enthusiasm in the City of Manila and throughout Luzon, especially by the great religious orders. The fleet of ten steamers leaving Manila early in February, was re-inforced at Zamboanga, and proceeded with eleven additional transports and miscellaneous vessels under the escort of twelve gunboats to Bacungan, where anchorage was made on February 20th. The Captain General was in command, and was accompanied by the Admiral in command of Naval Forces. On the 22nd, a landing was made at Paticolo, about a league northeast of Jolo, the fleet silencing the ineffectual Moro resistance. Malcampo, the Captain General, ordered a half brigade to remain at Paticolo, with the engineer section and a mountain battery, with directions to march upon Jolo the following day in order to unite with the force which the Captain General would lead into the interior to flank the Moro stronghold. The plan proved nearly fatal to the turning column; it was lost in the thick woods and was unable, on a very hot day, to find water. The following afternoon, harassed by the Moros and nearly perishing from thirst, the

column reached the shore at Tandu, where it united with that left at the beach, which had not been molested in the least. The Captain General, loth to abandon his plan of attacking Jolo from the interior, finally decided to attack by the shore. The army advanced at daylight on the 29th, the fleet opening upon the forts at the same time. At nine a heavy rain came on and lasted an hour, at the end of which time a brigade advanced against the forts of the dattos Daniel and Ubico. The vanguard was led by the 1st regiment and the brigade commander was the first to set foot upon the enemy's works. After a sharp fight, the forts were captured by the Spaniards and the entire force advanced. The Moros in the forts of the Sultan and the datto Tanquan made a fierce resistance, and two colonels fell wounded, but the last works were carried by an assault of the Spanish Artillery Battalion; Jolo remaining in undisputed possession of the Spaniards.

On the following day, a half brigade with four naval guns took the fort of Panglima Arab situated in a wood about one kilometer from the shore.

The town of Liang was also burned and a small expedition destroyed eighty boats and burned ninety houses on Tapul Island, besides killing some Moros; and an expedition under General Sanchez destroyed the town of Lacul-Palac, three kilometers in the interior from Jolo. The "cotta" at Parang was taken and later Maibun was taken by a landing party from the fleet under Lieutenant Ordonez. A fort called Alphonso XII was erected on the site of the "cotta" of the datto Daniel, and a redoubt named "Princesa de Asturias" upon that of the "cotta" of Panglima Arab. Between the two, a camp was formed called "Our Lady of Victories." The fort of Alphonso XII was soon completed and two infantry regiments, one company Spanish Artillery, another of Engineers, the two disciplinary companies of Balabac and Puerta Princesa and the "prisoners' Brigade" were designated as the garrison of Jolo. Captain Pascual Cervera was made politico-military Governor of the Island.

General Malcampo was given the title of "Count of Jolo" and "Viscount of Mindanao," many decorations were given, and a medal was struck for each participant in the campaign.

The Moros made frequent attacks in a small way and resented the occupation of the capital. These attacks were repeated in greater force in April and May, but were repulsed in both cases. Fevers decimated the garrison, and even in September the sick numbered 340.

In 1876, there began a series of diplomatic negotiations between Spain on the one side, and Great Britain and the German Empire on the other, respecting Spanish sovereignty in Jolo and on the north coast of Borneo, which was not concluded until the protocol of Madrid on March 7, 1885, by which the sovereignty of Spain relinquished any

claim to the territories occupied by the British North Borneo Company. It is, however, of interest to note that the British North Borneo Company is the outgrowth of an American Company founded in August, 1865, under the name of "The American Trading Company of Borneo" under a concession from the Sultan of Brunei.

Among the most important documents of this period may be cited the Madrid protocol of March 11, 1877, between Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, giving free trade, and equal rights with Spaniards at Jolo, to British and German subjects; the treaty of the Sultan of Jolo and his dattos submitting to Spain, signed at Licup (Jolo) July 22, 1878; the letter of incorporation of the British North Borneo Company, dated London, Nov. 7, 1881; and the Anglo-German-Spanish protocol of 1885.

In September, 1877, a determined assault was made on the Jolo garrison by about 2,000 Moros. After three days of fighting in which they destroyed some property, they were driven off.

The treaty above mentioned, establishing Spanish sovereignty in the Sulu Archipelago was signed by the Sultan and Col. Martinez, the Governor, at Licup, Jolo, in 1878.

In this same year, the datto Uata Mama and his followers assassinated several Spaniards at Tamontaca, Mindanao, among them the Judge of the First Instance, an Army Surgeon, a Lieutenant and several soldiers. The act was treacherously carried out while the the Spaniards were holding a conference with the Moros. This crime was never punished, the datto dying of cholera in 1882.

In 1878, was also recorded the first case of "juramentado." The fanatic attacked and wounded six men in the Marine barracks at Jolo before he was despatched. This was the first of a long list of similar attacks at this station which are detailed briefly below to show the extent to which these outrages grew:

In 1878. One man in public square of Jolo killed seven and wounded six natives, and then escaped.

Six men made an attack injuring one Chinaman and two Moros; four were killed, two escaped.

Feb. 9th. One Moro wounded five men, and was killed.

Mar. 3rd. One Moro wounded three men, and was killed.

Sept. 16th. One Moro wounded two sentinels, and was killed.

Sept. 29th. Four Moros wounded two missionaries, and two were killed.

Nov. 25th. Thirteen Moros entered Jolo with arms concealed in bamboo water tubes; eleven were killed by the troops, but not until thirteen persons had been wounded.

In 1880. Mar. 30th. Forty Moros from Look attacked a Spanish party killing two soldiers and wounding eight. Twelve of the Moros were killed. This attack was punished by the Sultan, who was awarded the "Cross of Isabel" by the Spanish Government for the service.

In 1881. Feb. 16th. Two Moros were killed in the Jolo trenches after killing a native soldier.

Feb. 19th. Four Moros attacked the Jolo lines, wounding a Spanish ensign, and all were killed.

Mar. 26th—28th. Similar attacks were driven off without loss to the troops.

Aug. 29th. Three Moros lost their lives at an outpost, killing one soldier and wounding four.

Sept. 19th. Eight Moros killed one soldier, and wounded several near Jolo, themselves escaping.

In 1882. Sept. 12th. Three Juramentados in the Jolo market wounded eleven soldiers and a native, being killed by the troops.

Sept. 14th. Three Moros wounded a soldier and a native before being despatched.

Sept. 20th. A small band lost seven killed in a attack upon an outpost.

To suppress these outrages the settlements in which most of them originated, Look and Boal, were destroyed in October and November, 1882, by expeditions from Jolo and severe losses were inflicted on the Moros by the troops.

Nevertheless in July, 1883, three Juramentados in the square of Jolo killed two officers and a soldier and wounded an officer and two soldiers; two of them succeeded in escaping. Later twelve Moros attacked eight soldiers who were cutting wood near Jolo, and all but two escaped.

In addition to these assassinations a well organized attack on the garrison at Jolo was made in April, 1881, but it was successfully repulsed. On the death of the Sultan, a few days later, the attack was repeated with the same result.

The "juramentado" fanaticism was not confined to Jolo. The following cases are recorded among the Rio Grande Moros:

Nov. 1881. One Moro wounded one of the Mothers of the Moro Orphan Asylum at Tamontaca; he was later beheaded by the Moro Raja Muda.

June 8, 1882. During a religious parade at Cottabatto, a Juramentado beheaded a soldier and wounded another and two women before being despatched by the troops. Soon after, another killed two soldiers near the Taviran fort.

In 1882, Spanish detachments occupied the stations of Bongao, Siassi, and Tataan.

In 1884, a tour of the Southern Islands was made by the Governor General, de Jovellar,, and he reported as follows to the Colonial Minister: "The enterprise of occupation is completely paralyzed, and either on account of insufficient means or a badly followed system, twenty years have been lost. There is nothing, in effect, farther from signifying a proposition of permanence and improvements than the state of all our establishments; there hardly exist the ruins of the buildings formerly erected; at Pollok the old fort and barracks have both completely disappeared; the fort at Cottabato has also completely disappeared, not one stone remaining upon another; and the smaller forts of Libungan, Tumbao, Taviran and Tamontaca, upon one side or the other of the two arms of the river, could not be more temporary; the troops are badly quartered at all places, in buildings either honeycombed by the white ants or threatening to fall in ruins; in Cottabato, the ammunition has become useless on account of the lack of a magazine, and the ordnance supplies and commissaries of the Military Administration for the garrison are stored in a rented house: nothing exists in that part of Mindanao to indicate a fixed occupation or thought of permanency, except the continued renewal of the troops, each day under worse conditions." On Jan. 26, General Jovellar returned to Manila, and as a consequence of his representations, 100,000 pesos were authorized in the budget of 1885-86 for the construction of a fort for one company, a storehouse, a hospital and a magazine at Cottabato.

On February 22, 1884, Badurudin, the Sultan of Jolo, died at Maibun without issue. The Council at once divided on the succession, the factions favoring Raja Muda Amilol, a youth of fourteen, and Datto Aliubdin, respectively legitimate son and brother of Diamarol, the preceding Sultan. Each faction proclaimed its candidate Sultan, at the same time notifying General Parrado, Governor of Jolo. The latter preserved a neutral attitude, informing the Captain General of the condition. The proposition from the Captain General that Amilol should be Sultan, but under the regency of Aliubdin until his majority, was refused by both factions, and two Sultans reigned in Jolo; the boy Amilol, under his mother at Maibun; and his uncle, Aliubdin, at Paticolo. In April of the same year, a similar condition of affairs followed the death of the Sultan of Mindanao. Datto Utto having proclaimed his protegee Mamuku the new Sultan, the other dattos protested, favoring Mamucpun of Sibuguey, brother of the late Sultan's widow. Following the protest, the Spanish influence favored Mamucpun. In June of this year, a Royal order conferred on the Sultans of Jolo and of Mindanao the honors of a Lieutenant General without command, and the title of "Very Excellent," and salutes were decreed them upon visiting warships.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1886 AND 1887 AGAINST RIO GRANDE MOROS.

In Mindanao the datto Utto had gradually become the most powerful chief upon the Rio Grande. The dattos of the lower Rio Grande were harassed continually and Utto even appeared defiantly before Cottabato with 80 war canoes; an insult to which the garrison was obliged to submit in silence in compliance with a decree forbidding aggressions upon Moros except in self defense. Later some slaves of Utto escaped to Cottabato, and as they were not returned to him by the Spanish authorities, he sent one of his followers into the town to kill one of the fugitives, the order being carried out. The District Judge endeavored to secure Utto for trial, but the Governor was unable to bring the datto before the Court; and upon referring the matter to Manila, the Captain General desired the Audiencia to quash the case. When the Judge refused, he declared martial law and had the Judge ordered to Manila and later abolished the Judicial District of Cottabato. Utto became more inimical to, and defiant of, the Spanish power; and a small expedition was sent against him composed of disciplinarios and troops; the former by land and the latter by gunboats; but the result was unfavorable to the Spanish. Then the Moros burned the Jesuit mission house at Tamontaca, the town of Amadeo, the Infantry Barracks, the coal sheds of the Navy, and other buildings of the garrison of Cottabato, also other buildings on the Rio Grande. Notwithstanding these troubles, General Julian Serina, Governor of Mindanao, had an interview with Utto and made an effort to arrange matters peaceably with him; but without satisfactory result, although some escaped slaves were returned to him, and he was also paid for alleged losses sustained. Serina then decided to use force and cited Utto for an interview at Bacat; but receiving no answer, troops were ordered to Bacat and the place occupied.

The strategic position of Bacat, situated at the junction of the Bacat and Rio Grande rivers, was such that its permanent occupation would control the entire delta. A force was then formed to occupy the forest of Bohayen; small garrisons were left at Pollok and Tamontaca and 300 men at Cottabato. Two columns of about 300 men each were formed for the advance, moving up the river by steam vessels, no resistance being encountered except at ineffective long range. A landing was made near the wood of Kinodal where several "juramentado" attacks were made on the troops. A sharp fire being opened from the woods, the Spanish replied and in the resulting engagement lost one killed and seven wounded, the Moros losing fifty killed and wounded. The expedition returned to Bacat where the Moros attacked from the right bank of the river. A force crossed, and dispersed them, leaving a detachment

to protect the crossing. Moro houses in the vicinity of Bacat were destroyed; and leaving a garrison of 500 to hold Bacat, the remaining troops were withdrawn to Cottabato.

On March 30th, a small column left Cottabato and defeated the Moros at Tamontaca with a loss of 15 killed, and a few days later sank four Moro armed vessels in the backwater of Sapacan; ten others escaping, but leaving 20 dead, among them the datto Ladialam.

The approach of the rainy season made it impossible to carry out further operations, and Gen. Serina reported what had been accomplished to the Captain General. The latter, upon receiving the report, resolved upon an immediate campaign in person and so advised Serina, at the same time hiring several vessels, whose arrival at Zamboanga in the rainy season with troops, supplies, commissaries and forage filled the garrison with astonishment. Gen. Serina, seeing that the greater part of the supplies would be lost by the wet weather and that a campaign during the rainy season would only result in heavy losses for the Spanish forces, left Zamboanga late in September, 1886, for Manila, where he persuaded Gen. Terrero to wait until the end of January or the beginning of February before making an advance.

Upon his return to Zamboanga, Serina transferred his headquarters to Cottabato, where he arrived Nov. 14th. On the 15th he sailed in the "Bacolod" for a trip up the Rio Grande, preceded by a gunboat, 130 soldiers, and some 20 officers as guard. The steamers, joined by two gunboats, continued the voyage to Bacat. They were fired upon several times during the trip up, and once while returning. On the 20th it was learned that the datto Sanhuan, an ally of the Spaniards, had been assassinated by partisans of Utto, and that the latter was preparing forts and defenses against the threatened campaign. On Dec. 6th, 300 men reinforced Bacat. On the same day the followers of datto Ayunan revenged themselves at Talayan for the killing of his brother Sanhuan, killing seven of Utto's followers, two of whom were dattos. On Dec. 10th, 500 men reinforced Cottabato.

On January 1 1887, Tumbao was occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Mattos with about 300 men from Cottabato and a company of engineers from Libungan. A few days later Lieutenant Colonel Holguin followed with troops from Zamboanga and Cottabato, and two forts were constructed at a bend in the Rio Grande, ten miles from Tumbao and three from Bacat.

Meanwhile General Terrero had prepared his expedition, and early in January sailed from Manila with a force composed of five Infantry Regiments, three companies of Artillery, two squadrons of Cavalry, 300 disciplinarios, and eight field and two siege guns. After a short stop at Zamboanga, the expedition sailed for Pollok where several gun-

boats had been assembled. On the 14th, three transports were sent with troops to Forts Bacat, Liong, and Piramide without a single Moro being seen. On the 19th, the Cavalry, Marines, and some artillery were also taken to Bacat. To compose the expedition, ships and troops had been drawn from throughout the Archipelago, less than 1000 men remaining to guard Manila; and not a gunboat or a soldier, except of the Civil Guard, being left in the Visayas. In Jolo where hostilities were commencing, Colonel Arolas had but 320 men. Considerable discontent was apparent in Manila from this situation.

The field forces were organized into two columns, the first, under General Serina; and the second, under Colonel San Feliu. Serina's force numbered 1182 men with six field pieces and four siege guns; the column of San Feliu was 1129 strong with four field pieces; 1100 men were retained to garrison the ten forts or stations of Cottabato, Pollok, Libungan, Tumbao, Taviran, Tamontaca, Li-ong, Piramide, Bacat, and Kudaranga; a total of 3411 men in the Rio Grande region. On the 26th, two columns advanced along the "estero" of Bacat, one numbering 320 men and the other 330. The launch of the "Aragon" towing two boats filled with soldiers, steamed along the stream and many obstacles were removed from the channel. Like work was also done on the 27th and the 28th. On the afternoon of the 28th, General Terrero directed a force of 460 men with three guns, to bombard the forts of Saliling from the estero of Bohayen. The Moros replied with cannon, "lantacas," and rifles, but without effect. On the 29th, two columns opened a road for seven Whitworth guns, which opened fire on the forts on the 30th, the bombardment continuing on the 31st. On February 2nd, a general advance was made by three columns under General Terrero, and Colonels San Feliu and Mattos; that under the Captain General being composed almost entirely of Spaniards, the others being composed largely of native troops. These forces arrived within sight of the forts of Saliling almost without resistance from the enemy, but about 4 p. m. a torrential rain turned the camp into a swamp.

As the torrents of rain continued, the troops were obliged to take refuge at the camp of Reina Regente, the supplies being considerably damaged. A sand battery was built, guarded by two guns, and remained garrisoned by one company and twenty disciplinarios. Although up to this time the losses had been but one artilleryman killed and two wounded by the explosion of a guncharge, the hospitals were filled with sick owing to the exposure. On the 9th, the storm having ceased, the Captain General advanced and made his Headquarters at the wood of Kinodal, the front being covered by the column of Mattos and the left by that of San Feliu. Eleven cottas (forts) at Lintunkan impeded the march, and on the 11th were bombarded by five Krupp and four Plasencia guns; a general advance being made by daylight on the 12th.

The vanguard was formed of two companies and 120 disciplinarios under Major Villabrille; the left by General Serina, a column of three regiments and the sailors from the "Aragon"; the right by Colonel San Feliu's column of portions of two regiments and sailors from the gunboats; General Terrero's headquarters being escorted by a section of engineers and a squadron of Cavalry. The condition of the ground greatly retarded the column by delaying the Cavalry.

Upon arriving at the backwater or "estero" of Lintukan, 16 forts or "cottas" were discovered, but as the greater number were without defenders, they were occupied after a very slight resistance from a few forts. The Spanish loss was one killed, one drowned, and several native soldiers wounded in the feet by bamboo stakes.

On the 13th, the sacred grove was occupied, the troops wading to the waist in water the greater part of the time, and driving the Moros before them at the grove. The Spanish loss was six killed and 17 wounded. The forces returned to Camp Reina Regente. A white flag was hoisted on the first fort of the datto Kabalo, and after more than two weeks of negotiations, the datto Silungan, paternal uncle of Utto, presented himself to Terrero in the name of Utto, and on the 10th of March returned with the conditions of peace signed by Utto, his wife Radja Putri, the Sultan of Bacat, and others.

General Terrero then returned to Manila, arriving on March 21st, where he was received with great honors and congratulated by the Madrid Government. The expedition is said to have cost over one million pesos; part of the funds being taken from the fund of three million pesos set aside for the harbor works of Manila, which were greatly crippled thereby. The number of sick was very great, some 680 having been sent to Zamboanga or Manila.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1886—1887 AT JOLO.

The situation in regard to the Jolo Sultanate, previously described, was further complicated in January, 1885, by the application at Manila of the datto Harun of Paragua, Uncle of Amilol and cousin of Alinbdin, and the only living Moro signatory of the 1878 treaty, for support in his candidacy for the Sultanate. He was informed by the Governor General that his full and spontaneous election by the Council of Jolo dattos would be recognized, whereupon he returned to Paragua promising that it should be so. The early part of 1886 passed quietly at Jolo, Colonel Arolas having become Governor of that station. In September General Terrero resolved to intervene actively in the disputed Sultanate question and announced datto Hurun as the Sultan of Jolo at a reception at the Malacañan palace in Manila; the reasons given for this action being that Amilol, aided by his mother, was gaining the ascendancy

and that his accession had been rendered possible by his mother's crime of poisoning both her husband and the late Sultan Badarudin. In October, Harun sailed for Jolo, where he was received by Colonel Arolas. Not being supported by the Jolo dattos, it was necessary, under General Terrero's order, for the Spanish troops to give him active support. Accordingly an expedition of two hundred men with a gunboat escorted Harun to Parang where he was received as Sultan, but he soon retired to Jolo. Later it was learned that the Moros of the rancheria of Maibun were attacking those of Parang, and Arolas in company with Harun made another expedition to Parang on November 2nd, where several more dattos swore allegiance to him; but on December 18th, it became necessary to send a gunboat with 150 men against the rancheria of Bausang, which was taken by the troops, the Moro leader, Ambut, being killed in the fight. Tajil, a partisan of Harun, was relieved and the Fort of Bausang destroyed.

Early in January, 1887, an expedition was sent with a launch and 40 soldiers against Maibun where two Moros were killed; and against the settlements of Tamparan and Tuyat which were destroyed. In this same month, an expedition destroyed the settlement of Tumahan and Taudic Bunha. Both of these expeditions were accompanied by the new Sultan.

At Siassi, the Governor, Rossi, attacked and destroyed Datto Gran's fort, about three miles from Siassi on January 22nd; fourteen Moros were killed in this fight.

By the first of February, the Jolo situation was critical; more than half the garrison had been withdrawn for the Rio Grande expedition, leaving less than 300 men to garrison the town and Fort Alphonso XII.

The most important dattos had joined Amilol Quiram and about 3000 hostile Moros infested the neighborhood of Jolo, making it almost impossible for the garrison to rest day or night. During the first week in February, five nights were spent by the Spaniards in momentary expectation of an attack, and the situation became most critical. The Moros of Tawi-Tawi, Tatang, Bongao, and Tapul were also in arms, as well as those of Siassi. In the latter island the fort was attacked on the 10th and 12th, but the assailants were driven off with a loss in both cases. At Torre Resina, on the Island of Lapac, opposite Siassi, a small garrison of nine men was attacked by a large force of Moros on the 13th, one being killed and another wounded in the first attack; and later sustaining a siege of three days from 300 Moros, until relieved by a force of 56 men from Siassi under Capt. Fernandez. In the siege the Moros has lost 30 killed, the garrison one wounded.

The Mindanao campaign was terminated in March, and the Jolo garrison returned, and on March 12th the strength was about 400; a

further reinforcement arrived from Zamboanga in April. It was ordered that the troops should embark at midnight for an expedition; the artillery started with the expedition but a deep ravine made its return to Jolo necessary. At daybreak the Moros commenced to fire upon the troops, and in turn the Spaniards burned the houses along the trail, both in order to signal their advance to the fleet and to repress the activity of the Moros. At noon the expedition arrived in sight of Maibung, beyond which lay the Spanish fleet at anchor. The principal fort formed a quadrangle about 80 meters square; the north face, which was the one to be assailed, being of coral rock and two and one half meters in height. The south face fronted the sea and had been strengthened with a double parapet of tree trunks over four meters in height and five embrasures for cannon, each well protected. The east and west sides were protected fully by timber, swamp and river, and were weaker in construction, but an attack there was impracticable. In the interior of the fort was the Sultan's palace, a ten sided building upon high wooden pillars, and two smaller buildings. The Spanish advance formed in line at the river, some three hundred meters from the fort; two companies of the 2nd regiment, the rifle section, and 2nd company of disciplinarios, formed the head of the column, under Lieutenant Colonel Novella, and forded the river; the firing then became general. The Moro fort had an American Machine gun which inflicted some losses upon the assailants, but after a fierce resistance to the Spanish charge led by Colonel Arolas and Lieutenant Colonel Novella, the fort was captured. The Moro loss was about 130 killed (of which about one third were killed during the march); the Spanish lost 14 killed and 77 wounded. The Spanish casualties included Lieutenant Colonel Novella, wounded, while in the list of Moro killed were Naquid Pula, Governor of Maibun, the Panglima Timbul, and four dattos.

At the close of the fight, the fleet landed the Sultan Harun with 50 men, the town and the Chinese quarter were burned, and the fort destroyed. On the 17th, the expedition returned to Jolo.

On May 9th, Arolas embarked 800 men on the fleet, disembarked at Parang and marched upon the fort of Panglima Alimanaran, about four kilometers in the interior. Upon the approach of the troops, the chief hoisted the Spanish Flag and submitted to the Sultan Harun who had accompanied the expedition.

The Panglima Sayari, chief leader of Tapul Island, still remained hostile to Harun and on May 23rd, Arolas and the Sultan, with about 800 men, sailed for Tapul. At seven in the morning, the expeditionary forces disembarked, together with 100 men from the fleet; the gunboats then opened fire on the fort and also shelled the surrounding hills. A captain was sent with two companies of the disciplinarios to occupy the

settlement of the friendly datto Buluan; but either by the ignorance or the treachery of the Moro guide, he encountered a force of some 300 Moros in a well defended position, who were commanded by the Panglima Sayari in person. Arolas hurried to the scene, and realizing the danger of defeat, sent back for two more companies and four Plasencia guns. A heavy fire was opened upon the Moros, and their leader Sayari with great coolness, appeared from time to time upon the parapet encouraging his men to resist to the utmost. The fight lasted for four hours and a half and was only terminated by a desperate attack from the entire Spanish force led by Arolas in person; the Moro defense being taken in hand to hand fighting, the Paglima Sayari falling dead in the midst of the struggle, together with several of his chiefs. The total Moro dead numbered over 90, the Spanish loss being 13 killed and 115 wounded. The expedition returned to Jolo the following day.

As a result of these fights many dattos submitted to Harun, among them being Anislusin of Siassi and Janjari of Lati. Amilol Quiram and his mother had taken refuge at Talipao, while Aliubdin requested a conference. But the Panglima Sakilan who governed the northwestern part of the Island of Pata, situated south of Jolo, remained in a state of open hostility, and after an examination of the coasts of Pata in June, Arolas decided to lead an expedition to that island. For this purpose considerable re-inforcements, especially the artillery and engineers were sent to Jolo early in September where the expedition was formed. It numbered some 1500 men; the forces also had a battery of four Plasencia guns. The troops embarked on the gunboats on Sept. 19th, arriving off the "cotta" of Sakilan on the morning of the 20th. The forces were disembarked and advanced against the fort which was bombarded by the fleet and finally taken by assault between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. On the following day another encounter took place, resulting in the flight of the Moros. The Spanish losses were 21 wounded. Colonel Arolas was made a Brigadier General, but continued in command at Jolo.

On Dec. 2nd, the Sultan Harun was obliged to return to Jolo from the Island of Boal on account of the opposition of the inhabitants, and General Arolas found himself obliged to head a force of 700 of the 2nd Regiment and disciplinarios, which embarked at once with five gunboats. Arriving off Boal the troops disembarked and carried the Moro forts after a short action in which five men were wounded. The Moro loss was 45 killed, 32 of whom were at the fort and 13 "juramentados" who had attacked the first landing party. On the 4th the troops returned to Jolo.

The beginning of 1888 witnessed several expeditions and combats, the first being against the Moros of Sariol. At dawn on Feb. 19th, two

half brigades marched out of Jolo, the first under Lieutenant Colonel Novella; the second, under Captain Victor Diaz of the Artillery. The Headquarters and Sultan Harun also accompanied the forces. No opposition was encountered until the district of the datto Yulcone was entered, but at that time a general fire was opened against the entire column. After some sharp fighting, the Moros were driven off and the troops advanced. After a short interval the attack was renewed, an hour being consumed in gaining the plateau of Tambayang. After a short rest General Arolas decided to fall back to Jolo and the column retired, harassed by the Moros until the territory of the friendly datto Yau-Yali was reached. Jolo was re-entered at five in the afternoon, the troops having suffered a loss of two killed and 18 wounded, thirteen of the latter being disciplinarios. The Moro loss as reported was 7 killed and 16 wounded.

Another expedition to Paticolo on Feb. 24th, resulted in the death of some 11 Moros and the wounding of 60. The Spanish forces lost 1 officer and 19 men wounded, 15 from the disciplinarios.

On the 27th, four companies of artillery, a mountain section with two guns, a company of engineers, and 250 of the 4th Regiment, arrived at Jolo. On March 3rd at daylight, an expedition nearly 2000 strong left Jolo, under the command of Gen. Arolas, for a march through the little known district of Lati. On the afternoon of the same day, the settlement of the Panglima Arosa was taken and destroyed; the Spanish having seven wounded, the losses of the enemy being considerably greater.

On the 11th, another expedition numbering 1500 men left Jolo on seven war vessels in the harbor and disembarked at the point of Pandanan in the eastern part of the island. A vigorous campaign was then begun, the Moros being defeated at Paticolo, Porrión, Piquidapo and Piquidajo on the 15th, 16th, 19th, 22nd, 26th and 27th of March, the dead Moros amounting to the number of 56. The Spanish losses were 7 killed and 84 wounded in the several fights.

Notwithstanding the apparent supremacy of Sultan Harun, the Moros of Jolo persisted in their allegiance to Amilol Quiram, and the Spanish Government gave up the attempt to force Harun upon the people. Amilol Quiram was then recognized as the Sultan of Jolo.

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST MINDANAO MOROS.

On January 5, 1888, Lieutenant General Weyler became Captain General in succession to General Terrero. Upon his arrival the military forces of the Philippines numbered 12,800 men, of whom 1400 were Spaniards (of the Artillery regiment) and the balance natives. The years 1888 and 1889 were without important military operations, and in

the latter year the Infantry regiments were renumbered. The new names and numbers dating from Oct. 31, 1889, were as follows: 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd and 74th. The disciplinary battalion was also retained.

The fortified isthmus from Lintogup to Tucuran, begun by Terrero, was finished in 1890; the fort of Infanta Isabel being midway at Lubig. Posts were established at Parang-Parang, Tinancu and Macar, the latter on the bay of Sarangani. Relations with the Mindanao Moros, especially those of Lake Lanao, a region which had not been visited by Spanish forces since the days of Corcuera, two and a half centuries before, began to be strained through the establishment of those posts; and Weyler decided that operations were necessary against further aggressions. However, the outbreak in the Caroline Islands in June, 1890 made an expedition to that distant part of the colony necessary and delayed operations in Mindanao until April, 1891. On Oct. 15, 1890, a band of Moros surprised the settlement of Monticao near Iligan, killing 20 natives and carrying off 24; other attacks of a minor nature also took place. On April 16, 1891, General Weyler sailed for Mindanao, and on the 20th arrived at Parang-Parang where four companies of the Spanish Artillery Regiment, three companies of the 68th, three companies of the 72nd regiment, a section of cavalry, and two mountain guns, were assembled.

Two expeditionary columns were organized under Lieutenant Colonels Marina and Hernandez and took the field on the 23rd and 24th of April respectively. That of Marina, composed of the Spanish company and the three companies of the 68th, marched from Parang upon the rancheria of Lipauan on the 23rd, arriving at the place on the morning of the 24th, and discovered a fort garrisoned by 30 or 40 Moros. The place was attacked and captured, one Spaniard being severely wounded; and at eleven that night, the return march for Parang was taken up, the latter place being reached in a 16 hour march of great difficulty.

The column under Lieutenant Colonel Hernandez, composed of one Spanish Company and three companies of the 72nd regiment left Parang on the 24th against the rancheria of Buldung. The first day, six rivers had to be crossed, the column bivouacking, the march being resumed the next morning. The camp that night was beside the Rio Sumased, the advance being resumed at dawn on the 26th. At half past eight the column arrived before the cotta of Buldung, which was defended by about 200 Moros. The column immediately attacked and took the fort with a loss of two killed, three severely wounded and five slightly wounded, one of the latter being Lieutenant Colonel Hernandez. Six dead Moros were seen and many were wounded. The following day, the column returned to its base.

On the 28th, a force consisting of six companies left Parang for Baras where a fort was constructed with a capacity of 200 men. Expeditions were also sent out through the country between Parang and Tucuran and to the Lake called Lanao Chico by the Spaniards (now Dapao). The Lanao Moros, however, attacked the forces at Baras several times, in one of which attacks the Sultan of Bayat was wounded.

On April 30th, a column composed of eight companies, commanded by Colonel Hore of the Artillery, left Baras for Maladi where a body of Malanao Moros were reported to be fortified, and after a few hours' march, the vanguard under Lieutenant Colonel Hernandez discovered the Moros in a fort strongly protected. Upon seeing the Spanish force, many Moros attacked the column but Hernandez advanced and took the fort after a hard fight. No less than 85 dead Moros, including the Sultan Benidel and eleven dattos, were found within the fort, and 21 prisoners were taken. The Spanish loss was but two killed and three severely wounded. This fight is deemed to have been one of the most brilliant between the Spanish and Moros.

But just at this time all operations were stopped by an epidemic of "la gripe" which so affected the troops that on June 24th but 250 men were fit for duty, not one of whom was a Spaniard. At Parang 450 were sick, at Cottabato 150, at Zamboanga 600, and 190 at Isabela de Basilan.

General Weyler occupied Malabang in July, 1891, with eight companies and commenced the erection of Fort Corcuera, which occupied nearly the site of Corcuera's Sabanilla. A column under Captain Pintos was also sent toward Ganassi and took two cottas. The Moros attacked Malabang but were repulsed, and Weyler left for the Rio Grande where the construction of three forts was ordered. Communication was also opened with Cagayan de Misamis, the mail being sent by the Pulangi (Rio Grande) river to Catituan and then via land through Linabo to Cagayan. The politico-military government of Cottabato was also divided; that part of the river Nituan to Punta de Firchas being erected in the "Comandancia de la Bahia Illana."

General Weyler then decided to attack the Lanao Moros from the north. To divert the attention of those living on the southern part of the lake, he ordered the commanding officer on Illana Bay to make a demonstration towards Ganassi about August 17th, penetrating as far as possible into the enemy's territory. The troops for the main attack were organized into a "flying column" of 360 men under Captain Pintos; the "first column" of three hundred men under Colonel Castilla of the Artillery; the "second column" of 522 men under Lieutenant Colonel Cortijo. The "first" and "flying" columns were landed at Linamon, August 15, 1891, and marched up the left bank of the Agus River toward the Lake, while the "second" column marched out of Iligan on the 16th,

following the right bank of the Agus to the Lake. Another force was landed at Galan to prevent the Moros of the rancheria of Manay from aiding those of Marantao, while a body of 160 men occupied Balud. The various columns returned on the 23rd to their respective starting places, having severely punished the above mentioned rancherias, killed their dattos and the leader Amay Pac-Pac, together with many other Moros, and displayed the Spanish Flag where it had not been seen for 251 years. A fort was also erected near Momungan en route to Lake Lanao from Iligan, and another post was established on the river Liangan near the point of Binuni, which was named Almonte, after the Spanish General of that name who fought the Moros more than a hundred years before. The Illana Bay column, which left on August 17th under Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Moras, for Ganassi, defeated the Moros at Catalaluan near the Lake, killing seven and then returning to Malabang with a loss of one wounded. As a consequence of this march many chiefs and dattos including the Sultan of Ganassi, presented themselves at Malabang and recognized the suzerainty of Spain.

General Weyler was relieved as Captain General of the Philippine on November 17, 1891, being succeeded by Despujol, who on a visit to Momungan narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of a Moro datto, who killed several soldiers when he discovered his inability to find the Captain General. On May 4, 1891 Lieutenant General Ramon Blanco became Captain General. He conducted the last considerable Moro campaign in Mindanao.

Iligan was determined upon as the base of supplies and Blanco arrived there in March, 1894, by which time 3000 troops had been assembled there. The troops worked upon the road from Iligan to Momungan, and 250 convicts sent from Bilibid Prison, Manila, were added to the road force.

On April 11th, a band of about 100 Moros made an attack upon the cattle guard at Malabang, consisting of 35 men, but were repulsed with a loss of seven killed and several wounded. Upon hearing the firing, other troops came out, accompanied by Captain Manuel Prieto, the Politico-Military Governor of the district, who was attacked by some of the wounded Moros, whom he had ordered to be cared for, and wounded so badly that his left hand had to be amputated.

General Blanco left Iligan for Momungan, April 22nd. On the 23rd, the Moros attacked a detachment of wood-cutters at Cabasaran, wounding 23, including Lieutenant Salgado of the 74th. The Moros, however, were driven off, leaving 9 dead on the ground and many wounded. In May reinforcements of 350 arrived at Iligan.

In May, the Spanish advance lines were at Pantar where General Parrado and Colonel Novella also had their Headquarters; and Cabasaran

was occupied. The greatest difficulty was experienced in the transportation of supplies, the carabao becoming useless through fatigue, and the trail being too rough for the supplies to be taken in baskets on poles. On May 8th, a company of disciplinarios, was attacked at Pagua about two kilometers from Ulama by some 60 Moros, who wounded two men, one mortally. The Moros were repulsed with a loss of 8 killed and some 25 wounded.

On May 15th, General Blanco published a general order by which the field forces were organized into a Brigade under command of Brigadier General Julian Gonzales Parrado, the Politico-Military Governor of Mindanao, divided into two Demi-Brigades as follows: First Demi-Brigade, eleven companies, Colonel Frederico Novella, Commanding; Second Demi-Brigade, ten companies, Colonel Enrique Hore, commanding; Troops attached to General Headquarters about 750 men.

On May 22nd, Moros near Momungan attacked a convoy guarded by 250 men and killed four and wounded seven soldiers. They were driven off with a loss of four killed, one of whom was the datto Sampiano, who had tried to kill Despujol on his visit to Iligan and Momungan about two years before. On June 2nd, while a convoy was being escorted to Camp Ulama from Momungan, 15 Moros attacked the convoy killing four soldiers and wounding two, but were driven off with loss of 8 or 10 killed.

On the 3rd, Col. Novella with his demi-brigade made a reconnoissance. After much hard work in the jungle and crossing ravines, the height of Tomarmol was climbed about 10 a. m., the Moros offering slight resistance. In the afternoon, Pimba and Panco were taken without difficulty, and the column returned to camp. The Spanish loss was one killed and three wounded, that of the Moros being estimated at 16 killed and many wounded. On June 5th, Colonel Novella captured the "cotta" of Datto Noral Kakin at Mut Pu, with a loss of two wounded, the Moros retreating without much resistance; the column returned to camp.

In June, Blanco left Parrado in command of the operations in Mindanao, returning to Manila on the 19th.

On June 9th, a band of 500 Moros attacked the troops working on the road near Pantar, 41 Moros were killed and about 50 wounded. June 26th, the sick in Hospital at Iligan numbered 147 of whom 46 were Spaniards and 101 natives; malarial fever and dysentery prevailing among the former, and ulcers and intestinal catarrh prevailing among the latter. On July 9th, 400 Moros from various rancherias commanded by Juarna Mamasa Balabagan of Maguindanao attacked a road-working force under Captain Salazar who was killed, as were also several of his

men. After a hard fight the Moros were repulsed with a loss of 26 killed, 14 mortally and 46 other were wounded, among the latter being five dattos and a pandita (priest).

On July 24th, the advance arrived near the lake of Calaganan where more than 1,000 Moros under the datto Amani Pac Pac and the Sultans of Maciu, Ramain, and Tugaya had assembled. Here the Spaniards were attacked by more than 500 Moros, ambushed on each side of the road, and driven back in some confusion. A reinforcement of 200 arrived at this moment; an advance was ordered and the Moros were driven back, the Spanish loss being two killed and nine wounded, while that of the Moros was reported as about 250 killed and 300 arms left on the field.

In September, the Sultan Rumani, the reputed ruler of 18 towns on the lake, visited the Spanish commander at Ulama, to indicate his desire for peace with Spain. In October, the work of building the suspension bridge across the Agus was begun.

About Nov. 10th, General Blanco returned to the scene of operations for a short time only. The Agus river bridge was finished and opened on February 27, 1895; the bridge consisted of a suspension span forty meters long with approaches of 21 meters and 12 meters respectively, and was intended to bear the weight of railway trains.

In February, General Blanco again visited Iligan and on March 10th at noon, the "cotta" of Amani Pac Pac at Marahui was attacked by Spaniards. After a fight of four hours, the fort was taken and the Army gained the desired position on Lake Lanao; Generals Blanco, Parrado, and Aguirre were present and a cantonment was at once established.

On May 9th, some 40 Moros attacked Las Piedras, killing two and wounding three soldiers, but themselves losing nine killed. On July 12th, some 40 Moros from the rancherias of Tugaya and Putud, bearing a Spanish flag, approached a working party and attacked the soldiers, escaping with several rifles after killing 2 soldiers and wounding 38.

On August 18th, the launch "Lanao" was launched at Marahui, the others being nearly finished.

Many Moro dignitaries gave in their adhesion to Spain about this time, among them being the Raja Muda of Ganassi; the datto Prangarungan of Tugayas; and the datto Uregan of Maciu, said to have been the Councilor General of the Lake of Lanao.

In October, 1895, the Spanish forces were again re-organized, a division of two brigades being constituted. The Division was commanded by General Gonzales Parrado; the Northern Brigade by General de los Rios; and the Southern Brigade by General Luis Huertas.

Divisional Troops: Three companies Engineers, Mortar Battery, Cavalry squadron, and Troops of the Military Administration.

1st (Northern) Brigade: About ten companies of Infantry, two companies Disciplinarios, and one Mountain Battery.

2nd (Southern) Brigade: About ten companies of Infantry, two companies Disciplinarios, two companies of Engineers, one company of foot Artillery, one Mountain Battery.

The garrisons were as follows: Two companies of Infantry and one Company of Engineers at Iligan; one company of Infantry at Las Piedras; two companies of Infantry at Camp Maria Cristina; two companies of Infantry at Momungan; one half company of Infantry at Fort Tiradores; three and one-half companies of Infantry at Camp Victoria. At Fort Briones, one-half company Infantry; Fort Salazar, one company Engineers, one company Infantry; Fort Lumbayanegui, one-third company of Infantry; Fort Nuevo, one-half company of Infantry; Camp at Marahui, ten companies of Infantry, one Mountain Battery, one company Engineers, Mortar Battery, Naval Battery and Cavalry squadron.

For escort purposes each branch of the service was to furnish an eighth of its force, except the Cavalry, which was to furnish only a non-commissioned officer and four soldiers. Garrisons of forts mentioned above were exempted from furnishing escorts. Troops from Iligan were to convoy trains through to Marahui. Troops of the 73rd and 74th to return to Sungut and Victoria the following morning and while resting were only to be employed in instruction and rifle practice.

The "cargadores" (bearers) were not to be employed in any other labor whatever.

From the report of General Blanco, dated Marahui, October 19, 1895, to the Spanish Minister of War, the following is gleaned:

Both horses and carabao are unsuitable for work on the road; the former on account of lack of strength and the latter on account of slowness and inability to work without very frequent water or mud baths. In consequence half of the army was compelled to work at keeping the road in repair.

Material for thirty five kilometers of the railway was at Iligan, which was enough to complete the same to the suspension bridge of Alphonso XIII over the Agus.

The railway route would have to deviate from the road slightly to the west in the first ten or twelve kilometers from Iligan in order to ascend the passes of Tominubo and Nonucan; Fort Maria Cristina being 450 meters above the sea at the head of the Nonucan. From Maria Cristina to the bridge the railway could follow the wagon road. From Iligan to Fort de las Piedras was 11 kilometers; from the latter fort to the river Nonucan was 2 kilometers. The bridge over this river is commanded by Fort Maria Cristina, which also covers several trails leading to important Moro rancherias. From the river Nonucan to

the fort at Momungan on Agus river, which is of considerable width at this point, was four kilometers. From Momungan to Fort Tiradores at Banar three kilometers. This fort commanded the approaches to some rancherias, and also the ascent to the "cotta" of Bulut on the same hill, while four kilometers distant was the lake of Calaganan, near which were Fort Victoria and Fort Salgado, the latter near the wood of Balete. To this succeeds the plateau of Ulama, dominated by Fort Briones which is in sight of Fort Salazar, two kilometers distant. This latter fort, situated 40 meters above the bridge of Alphonso XIII across the Agus, together with the Fort of Sungut on the opposite bank, commanded the crossing and also guarded Linanan. For five kilometers beyond Sungut the country was rolling, open and cultivated, and protected by the small fort of Lumbayanaqui, which also guarded the nearby wood of Vito. Here the road ascended a precipitous hill to the extensive and elevated plateau in which Lake Lanao is situated at a level of about 800 meters above the sea. At the summit of the hill was Fort Nuevo, two kilometers from Marahui, the station on the Lake. Marahui was also flanked by the redoubts of Aranda and Allanegui which defended the landing place.

On Feb. 17, 1896, about a thousand re-inforcements arrived at Iligan from Manila. General Blanco and General Aguirre also visited Iligan on March 6th. The road was found in bad condition on account of eight days' rain. On March 12th, the Captain General arrived at Marahui. The water supply from Lake Lanao was found to be as satisfactory as that from a spring at Fort Nuevo.

Two Moros seized the rifles of two native soldiers; and on the night of the 12th, Fort Nuevo, garrisoned by 50 men, was attacked by the Moros who were repulsed with a loss of several killed.

The maximum temperature of Marahui is stated to have been 27 degrees C. and minimum 12 degrees C. (April and May).

On Feb. 25, Fort Reina Regente on the hills of Tinunkup in the Rio Grande Valley, 18 meters above the sea, was garrisoned. The commanding Officer, Colonel Ricarto Perez, is said to have been asked by Datto Utto if 10,000 men could take the fort; to which the Spanish officer replied, that all the Moros in Mindanao could not take it. At this time the most advanced post of the Spaniards was Fort Pikit, 34 miles above Reina Regente, but another at Catituan, eight leagues beyond Pikit was contemplated.

On March 20th, a company of disciplinarios under Captain Felipe Garde was attacked by number of Moros while clearing ground near

the new fort of Corcuera at Malabang, losing five rifles and having seven men wounded. Later these Moros were surprised at Baqui near old Fort Corcuera, eighteen being killed and twelve wounded. On March 30th, a detachment of Spanish troops together with 180 Moro allies left Corcuera for the source of the River Mataling in search of a hostile force from the rancherias of Pualas, Bacolod, Gadungan, Boras and Dinaposas, but without result.

In the latter part of March the gunboat "Panay" shelled some Moros at the mouth of the river Macklin.

On April 1st, General Blanco left Marahui for Iligan where he embarked for Zamboanga and the Rio Grande region. At this time the military organizations in Mindanao were as follows: The Division of Mindanao, with Headquarters at Zamboanga; 1st Brigade, General F. Castilla, comprising 2nd, 3rd, and 7th districts, Headquarters Iligan or Marahui; 2nd Brigade, Headquarters Parang-Parang, Col. C. Lasala, comprising 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th districts. Colonel Hereidla, Count of Torre Alta, was P. M. Governor of Lanao, the actual command, however, being under Col. del Real. General Luis Huerta was P. M. governor of Jolo, and General Diego de los Rios was P. M. Governor of Iloilo.

On April 12th, General Blanco arrived in Illana Bay and inspected the new fort of Malabang on the 13th. During his visit some Moros attacked the place but were repulsed leaving 22 dead on the field. On the following day, a Spanish force on a scout was attacked, General Aguirre and Lieutenant Colonel Soro being wounded. General Aguirre returned to Manila on May 10th, and General Blanco also returned after visiting the forts of Pollok and Cottabato.

In April, 1896, some piratical vessels robbed a boat on the coast of Occidental Negros, but pursuit of them was not effective.

On April 29th, the garrison of Marahui consisted of 1700 men with 40 sick.

Near Baras six miles west of Malabang, forty men under a Captain, away from the fort, were attacked by Moros, but after a sharp fight the latter were repulsed with a loss of five dattos and 11 others killed. The Spaniards had one soldier mortally, and three severely wounded.

On July 1, 1896, the City of Manila presented a sword of honor to General Blanco as a memorial of his campaign in Mindanao.

On July 9th, a "juramentado" killed a soldier at Cottabato and was himself killed by soldiers of the garrison.

On August 7th, the Sultan of Tugaya presented himself at Marahui with a request for peace.

On August 9th, a Moro attacked and wounded a lieutenant in the Lanao country, but was killed by the latter.

The outbreak of the Tagalog insurrection in August, 1896, evidently influenced the disciplinarios, of whom some 300, belonging to the 3rd and 4th companies, deserted late in September from the Lanao country, making for Misamis Province. They were pursued and defeated near Opol and Agusan in Misamis. A sergeant killed Lieutenant Bueno Espanosa at Lintogup on Sept. 16th. He was afterwards shot at Iligan.

On Nov. 12th, eighty Moros from a rancheria near Taraca attacked a convoy escorted by some marine infantry near Aparicolo, killing one soldier and wounding three. The Moros were driven off with a loss of three killed and 23 wounded.

On Nov. 19th, the lake gunboats "General Blanco" "Corcuera" and "Almonte" near Bayan were fired upon by the Moros. After returning the fire, the vessels returned to Marahui where two companies and some Marines embarked for Bayan which was bombarded, and a loss of 100 killed inflicted upon the Moros. Later the cotta of Bacolod was bombarded and destroyed; and three deserters from the disciplinarios were shot at Marahui.

In December, a so-called insurgent governor was captured and shot at Misamis. On Dec. 24th, a force of deserters were defeated near Cagayan Misamis and the leader, a former Corporal Bravo, was killed. On the same day, Major San Martin with 60 soldiers attacked and defeated another band of deserters who were in possession of the Church at Milagros Viejo (Butuan Valley), killing four and wounding many; while two soldiers (natives—Tagalogs) were executed at Iligan on the 29th for complicity in the uprising; and during January two corporals and five soldiers were shot at Tucuran and Cottabato for the same crime.

On April 11, 1897, a plot was discovered at Jolo implicating many of the deported Tagalog insurgents and some of the men of the 68th regiment; the plan being to overthrow the Spanish rule at Jolo. As a result of the plot, thirteen former insurgents were sentenced to death, together with three corporals of the 68th regiment.

General Polavieja was relieved on April 23, 1897, by General Primo de Rivera as Captain General of the Philippines.

On May 15th, 8 juramentados from the rancheria of Boal, Jolo, went to Bus-Bus, a suburb of Jolo, and attacked some soldiers of the 68th Regiment, who were landing in a small boat. The soldiers fired on them, killing six of the number in the water and two on shore.

During the spring of 1897, expeditions were made by the Lake gunboats from Marahui against the cottas of Bayan, Binadayan and Bacolod. Later operations were carried on against the rancherias of Sugut, Molundum and Lipo. On May 15th, two companies and the Lake launches attacked the settlements of Uato and Malaig near Marahui. In July, 1897, Fort Corcuera built by the Military Engineer, Galvez, was garrisoned by one company of Infantry; and Fort Baras by one company. There was also one company guarding the isthmus, with posts at Tucuran, Lubig, and Lintogup; Headquarters at Parang. The posts on Illana Bay were visited about every ten days by the gunboats "Panay" and "Mariveles," which had their headquarters at Pollok.

In July, other deserters from the disciplinarios were being pursued by troops from Iligan.

On August 7, 1897, the third squadron of 31st Cavalry left Manila for Iligan to relieve the Cavalry serving in that district.

In July, 1897, the forts on the Rio Grande de Mindanao were Cottabato, Reina Regente, Pikit, Kudarangan, Taviran, Tamontaca, and Labungan. The gunboats "Gardoqui" and "Urdanetta" were also in the vicinity.

In October, 1897, Moros attacked the Spanish fort near Las Piedras wounding two soldiers. One Moro was killed, and later the rancheria of the assailants was destroyed and three Moros killed.

On November 13th, nearly all the buildings at Marahui were destroyed by fire which the prevalence of a strong wind facilitated. Almost at the same time Iligan was inundated by the rivers at that place and much damage done.

On December 15th, a small force from Iligan, in pursuit of some escaped deported natives of Luzon, was attacked by Moros. Four Moros and four of the deported natives were killed in the fight, the Spaniards also losing one man killed.

On February 4 1898, General Buil directed four columns under Lieutenant Colonels Brandeis, Iturriaga, Torres-Ascarza and Ruiz Toledo from Marahui which, together with the three gunboats on Lake Lanao destroyed the rancherias of Bonto, Buayan, Ragayan, Minbalay and Maciu. The Moro losses were 32 killed, 80 wounded and 25 prisoners; Spanish losses not given.

General Primo de Rivera was succeeded in April by General Agustin; and the destruction of the fleet, on May 1st, cut off the Southern Islands from Manila until the middle of August, at which time General Jaudenes

represented the Spanish power at Manila and General de los Rios at Iloilo. In December, General de los Rios evacuated Iloilo; the Spanish troops being concentrated at Zamboanga from all parts of Mindanao under the command of General Montero. The last Spanish P. M. Governor of Iligan was probably Captain Ricardo Carnicero Sanchez, who was appointed to that position on November 1, 1898.

NOTE BY TRANSLATOR:—The four Spanish gunboats were scuttled in the deeper part of Lake Lanao. The post of Marahui was abandoned, and the Moros assert that the bridge over the Agus river was destroyed by the Spanish troops.

The dates of the occupation of the country by the American forces was as follows:

Sulu Archipelago.....	May, 1899	Surigao.....	March 29, 1900
Zamboanga	December 7, 1899	Cagayan.....	March 31, 1900
Cottabato.....	December 12, 1899	Iligan.....	April 1, 1900
Dayao.....	December 20, 1899	Misamis—Dapitan..	April 1, 1900
Pollok.....	December 21, 1899	Oroquieta.....	July 11, 1900
Matti.....	December 22, 1899	Camp Vicars.....	May 2, 1902
Parang.....	January 5, 1900	Nonuean.....	November, 1902
Pantar	March, 1903		

APPENDIX VII

THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION 1896-1898.

An account from Spanish sources principally, prepared by direction of Major General George W. Davis, U. S. Army, commanding the Division of the Philippines, by Major John S. Mallory, 1st U. S. Infantry.

The following account of the insurrection of natives of the Philippine Islands against the authority of Spain in 1896-97, and of its revival in 1898, including the operations of the insurgents against the Spaniards in the islands, outside the City of Manila, during the Spanish-American armistice arranged by the Protocol of August 12, 1898, follows in the main Spanish versions, particularly that portion descriptive of the Cavite campaign of 1897.

Below is a list of the publications, reports, etc., consulted in the preparation of this narrative.

JOHN S. MALLORY,
Major, 1st U. S. Infantry.

Manila, P. I., July 1, 1903.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, ETC., CONSULTED.

LA INSURRECCIÓN EN FILIPINAS Y GUERRA HISPANO-AMERICANA,
Manuel Sastron.

CAMPANA DE FILIPINAS.—LA DIVISIÓN LACHAMBRE, *Frederico de Monteverde, Teniente Coronel de Infanteria.*

THE INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, *Frederick H. Sawyer.*

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, *John Foreman.*

PAMPHLET, *Isabelo de los Reyes.*

Official Reports and Documents, Headquarters Division of the Philippines.

ORIGIN OF THE INSURRECTION.

All authorities agree in attributing the organization and prosecution of the insurrection, to the great Katipunan League or conspiracy, an association which some of the Spanish writers on the subject declare to have derived its inspiration from, and to have had its origin in, Freemasonry, while other authorities deny that the two had anything in common, except that the Katipunan copied, with variations, certain masonic emblems and details of organization, while adopting a creed and authorizing methods utterly at variance with the principles and practices of Masonry.

The "Liga Filipina" (Philippine League) of which Doctor José Rizal was the principal founder and its first president, was a different organization and appears to have had for its object the accomplishment of certain reforms by political agitation rather than by force of arms. It was based upon opposition to the friars and demanded their expulsion and the practical confiscation of their estates, together with participation by the Filipinos in the government of the island equally with the Spaniards, and greater economy in public expenditures. It was composed largely of the educated and wealthy classes among the mestizos and full blooded natives, who, however, were unwilling to risk their lives and fortunes by an appeal to arms. The League was dissolved in 1894.

On the other hand, the Katipunan was composed of the common people with only a sprinkling of the well-to-do, middle class. They believed in action, and in action of the most drastic character, having a contempt for mere political agitation not backed up by the rifle and the bolo, their platform being summed up by them as follows: "To redeem the Philippines from its tyrants, the friars, and to found a communistic republic." Andrés Bonifacio, an employé of a Manila mercantile firm was the President of the Society. He was assisted by a Treasurer, a Fiscal and a Council; the supreme authority, however, being placed eventually in the hands of Emilio Aguinaldo, who was appointed Generalissimo.

When the movement had become popular and seemed to stand a reasonable prospect of success, many men of wealth and education, who had hitherto held aloof from the Society, desired to identify themselves with it, but it was made a condition of admission that they must start at the bottom—in the ranks—and prove by acts rather than by mere professions their fitness to become leaders.

OUTBREAK OF THE INSURRECTION.

The insurrection broke out in the latter part of August, 1896, being preceded by wholesale arrests of natives who were implicated, or suspected of being implicated, in a plot to rise and massacre the Spaniards indiscriminately on the night of August 20th.

Although their plans were somewhat disconcerted by the discovery of the plot, the leaders of the Katipunan conspiracy, or league, soon threw off the mask and openly raised the standard of revolt in the suburbs of Manila. On August 26th, a horde of insurgents, only a few of whom were equipped with firearms, made an attack upon the town of Calocan, a few miles from the Capital, but were driven off by a small force of the Civil Guard.

Following this affair, insurgents began to assemble in considerable force and to make demonstrations to attack the city, via the Sampaloc and Tondo districts, their principal object being the liberation of the large number of prisoners confined in the Bilibid jail.

The garrison of Manila at this time consisted of about 300 Peninsular Artillery, and about 400 other European troops, principally Marine Infantry and detachments of sailors from the Squadron, and about 2,000 native troops of all kinds.

Measures were taken to strengthen this small garrison and as a first step, outlying detachments of the native Civil Guard were drawn in and posted within the city limits. The defense of the Capital was committed to the Segundo Cabo, the veteran General Bernardo Echaluze, who established without delay a defensive line extending from the Captain of the Port's to Sampaloc.

On the 29th of August, the Captain General, Ramon Blanco, who had previously advised the home government of the discovery of an extensive native conspiracy, but who later had been disposed not to admit the gravity of the situation, finally telegraphed to the Madrid government for re-enforcements of 1,000 men. The Government responded by ordering 2,000 men immediately to the scene of insurrection, consisting of a battalion of Marine Infantry and another of Cazadores, armed with Mausers and well equipped, and in addition 6,000 Remington rifles, Model of '89. Also the cruiser *Isla de Cuba* was ordered to sail for Manila immediately and the *Isla de Luzon* as soon as she could be made ready. The Government further approved of the organization of a battalion of Volunteers from the citizens of Spanish birth, resident in Manila, and encouraged the formation of similar organizations in the islands.

On August 30th at San Juan del Monte, in the suburbs of Manila, occurred the first action of any importance between the Spaniards and insurgents. The latter first attempted to capture the powder magazine situated on the left of the high road leading from Manila to San Juan del Monte, but being repulsed by the small Spanish force holding it, retreated and later concentrated in force at the "Casa Alegre", San Juan del Monte, where they were attacked by a small force of about 100 Spaniards led by the Segundo Cabo in person and routed completely, leaving about 90 dead on the field; their leader, Sancho Valenzuela, and several other chiefs being captured and later, publicly executed on the Paseo de la Luneta, Manila.

On the same day (August 30th) because of the rapid spread of the revolt, the Captain General issued a proclamation declaring a state of war to exist in the provinces of Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, La Laguna, Cavite and Batangas.

The total number of European troops scattered over the islands at the beginning of the insurrection was about 1,500, and there were in addition about 6,000 native troops.

It was necessary to leave 500 of the white troops in the Visayas, but the remaining 300 and such native troops as could be spared were withdrawn and hurried north to the scene of insurrection. These reinforcements enabled General Blanco to take steps to extinguish the foci of rebellion in the central provinces of Luzon. General Jaramillo, with the contingent from Mindanao, proceeded to the district south of Cavite province with a view of preventing the insurgents from occupying that section; a battalion was placed in the Cuartel of Santo Domingo, to the east of Cavite province, near the Laguna de Bay, with a view of preventing communication from that direction with the insurgent stronghold at Silang; while the gunboat Leyte patrolled the Manila Bay along the coast of Cavite with a view of preventing access to Bulacan and Manila.

THE INSURRECTION IN CAVITE PROVINCE.

Although the first manifestations of the insurrection occurred in the province of Manila (now Rizal), the movement appears to have had its origin in the province of Cavite, the home of the principal agitators and organizers of the Katipunan league, and this province soon became the centre of disaffection and revolution and the chosen theatre of operations of the insurgents.

On the 31st of August, Emilio Aguinaldo issued an appeal to arms simultaneously in his native town of Cautit (Cavite Viejo), Noveleta and San Francisco de Malabon, which was followed by uprisings of the populace throughout the province. The insurgents speedily possessed themselves of the entire province excepting the fortified town and arsenal of Cavite, the adjoining barrios of San Roque and Caridad, the isthmus connecting Cavite with the main land, and an adjoining strip of the latter where the Spaniards later established the intrenched camp of Dalahican. At Noveleta, Naic and Imus, many atrocities were committed by the insurgents upon the prisoners who fell into their hands, particularly in the case of the friars at Imus whose Estate-House, being surrounded by massive high walls, was practically a fortress and was only captured by the insurgents on September 1st, after being besieged by an overwhelming force.

The insurgents established their headquarters at Silang, threw up intrenchments everywhere to strengthen their positions and sent out foraging parties in all directions to gather supplies and compelled the entire population to commit themselves to the cause of the insurrection.

In the meantime the Governor General had remained passive, not thinking himself strong enough in troops to move against the rebels in Cavite province in spite of its proximity to Manila.

To obtain re-enforcements for Manila, pending the arrival of troops from Spain, the Governor General, had, as soon as he realized the dangerous character of the revolt, ordered troops to be concentrated in the Capital from Zamboanga and other southern stations, with the result that by the middle of September the garrison of Manila was swelled to 6,000 men. The small garrison at Cavite was re-enforced and some heavy artillery was sent over from Manila. General Diego de los Rios was appointed Military Governor of the province and of the city of Cavite, and was placed in command of the troops in the province. The Spaniards still delaying to take the offensive, the insurgents became daily more aggressive and threw up a mile and a half of intrenchments between their position at Noveleta and the peninsula of Cavite and thence made attacks upon the barrios of Cavite itself, which, however, were repulsed.

The Spaniards found it necessary, in order to better guard against such sorties, to establish an intrenched camp at Dalahican at the southern extremity of the peninsula, paralleling the insurgent works.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN OCTOBER, 1896.

On October 1st there arrived in Manila Bay, the transport *Cataluña*, bringing the first re-enforcements from Spain consisting of a battalion of Marine Infantry, 22 officers, and 895 men commanded by Colonel Juan Herrera.

England notified the Spanish Government that instructions had been given to the governors of her possessions in India and on the China coast to dispense with the services of Filipino laborers and in various ways showed a disposition to maintain the most friendly relations with Spain; the Governor of the Straits Settlements by two decrees prohibited the organization, etc. within the colony, of any expedition to assist the insurgent Filipinos and the exportation, for a period of three months from September 12th, of any war material.

The Spanish detachment guarding the powder magazine near Binacayan, Cavite province, repelled an insurgent attack with a loss to the latter of about 150 killed and wounded.

On the 6th of October, the second expedition arrived from Spain on the *Monserrat* consisting of 38 officers and 1040 men of Marine Infantry and Cazadores.

The Katipunan league made every exertion to extend the insurrection and even sent emissaries to Zamboanga, Paragua and other remote islands to incite the inhabitants and native troops to revolt.

On October 14th, the third expedition from Spain arrived on the Antonio Lopez, consisting of 27 officers and 785 men of the Marine Infantry, and on the 17th, the fourth expedition on the Isla de Luzon consisting of 66 officers and 1995 men, Cazadores.

On October 14th, 151 natives were deported to Fernando Po, via Cartagena, on the steamer Manila.

On the 18th, General Jaramillo at the head of a column composed of Civil Guard, native Infantry of the 70th and 73d regiments and of the 1st Battalion of Cazadores, and aided by the gunboats, Leyte and Bulusan, attacked and dislodged from the town of Nasugbu, Batangas, a large force of insurgents who had fortified themselves there, killing about 124 and wounding a large number, the Spaniards losing 2 killed and 28 wounded.

General Aguirre, commanding the Bañadero-Tanaúan line by great effort and vigilance prevented various parties of insurgents from getting through to Talisay and Silang where they were trying to rendezvous.

There were various minor combats and petty skirmishes in nearly all the provinces of Luzon, but none of sufficient importance to be noted.

In Mindanao the native soldiers composing the 3rd Disciplinary Company (Convicts) which garrisoned Fort Victoria (Iligan—Lanao road) revolted and attacked their officers who miraculously escaped with their lives, although covered with wounds.

The rebels then fled by way of Piedras to the Dengayen mountains but were pursued and dispersed near Cagayan, suffering considerable loss. The rest of the disciplinary force was disarmed.

A sergeant and a corporal belonging to the Tagalog Katipunan, a short time after joining the 68th native regiment garrisoning the Archipelago of Jolo, succeeded in making proselytes to their cause in Jolo, a conspiracy being formed to kill the white officers. The Governor of Jolo, General Huertas, however, discovered the plot in time. A summary court was convened and two sergeants, five corporals, a bugler and a private were shot and other conspirators sentenced to imprisonment for life.

During the latter part of October, General Echaluze, the Segundo Cabo, on account of failing health, returned to Spain and was succeeded as Segundo Cabo by Lieutenant General Camilo Polavieja y Castillo, who was at the time in Spain and who soon embarked for the Philippines, accompanied by Major Generals Zappino and Lachambre and Brigadier Generals Galbis and Cornel.

As a brief summary of the situation at the end of October it can be said that the insurgents with a large force were in possession of the whole of the province of Cavite, except the peninsula and town of

Cavite, and the insurrection had spread to all the central provinces of Luzon, the rebel forces, except in Cavite, being widely scattered and very deficient in organization and equipment, only a small portion having firearms of any description.

While the Spaniards had been materially strengthened by the arrival of troops from Spain, General Blanco did not yet feel justified in undertaking operations on a scale demanded by a plan of campaign having for its object the conquest of Cavite and the suppression of the insurrection in the other provinces. He therefore continued to pursue an offensive-defensive policy.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN NOVEMBER, 1896.

In the month of November, the insurgents were particularly active in the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga, immediately north of Manila.

They maintained two strongholds, one at Angat in Bulacan and the other in the mountains of San Mateo, Manila province. By means of a system of preconcerted signals, consisting of fires lighted at fixed points equally distant, or by captive balloons similarly displayed, they were able to concentrate their followers at appointed rendezvous to the number of 5,000 and thence made raids upon the railroad, upon convoys en route from Malinta to Novaliches via Quingua and attacked various pueblos in Bataan province, Caloocan near Manila, and other points, plundering, murdering and burning. They were under the leadership of a half caste named Llanera, who was assisted by other chiefs, notably Giraldez and Pedro Francisco. They styled themselves the "Avengers of their Brothers."

To oppose them the Spaniards organized a flying column of 500 men, commanded by Major Arteaga. Repeated encounters took place between this column and the insurgents and although the latter were usually driven off and dispersed, they reassembled in their strongholds at Angat and San Mateo from which the Spaniards were unable to dislodge them and whence they soon renewed their marauding expeditions.

On November 3d, the fifth expedition arrived from Spain on the Colon, consisting of a battalion of Cazadores, a Squadron of Cavalry and a battery of Artillery—55 officers and 1328 men.

General Blanco now decided to take the offensive in Cavite province and on November 8th, simultaneous attacks were made upon the entrenched positions of the insurgents at Binacayan and Noveleta.

The column to which was assigned the task of taking the insurgent works at Binacayan was composed of 1612 men of the Marine Infantry,

two companies of the 73rd native regiment, one company of Artillery and 60 men of the 6th Company of Engineers, and was commanded by Colonel José Marina (afterwards General).

Previous to the land attacks, the Spanish Squadron, comprising the Castilla, Reina Cristina, the gunboats Bulusan, Leyte, Villalobos and Cebu, took position in line of battle in the bay and together with the guns of the forts at Cavite opened fire on the rebel trenches at Bacoor, Binacayan, Cavite Viejo and Noveleta. A flotilla of armed launches and boats also took position close to shore opposite the Binacayan intrenchments and by their fire contributed to preparing the way for the assaulting column. The latter, which had been assembled at the Spanish powder magazines, near Binacayan, advanced along the beach to the attack as soon as the squadron ceased firing. The insurgent works at Binacayan and vicinity consisted of a long line of formidable intrenchments which could not be flanked, and at a considerable distance in front of this line, an earthwork, or cotta flanked by a trench and fortified houses. This latter position the Spaniards attacked vigorously and carried by assault after an hour and a half's severe fighting. In this affair the Spaniards lost over 70 killed and wounded including several officers. The insurgents' loss could not be ascertained.

Instead of advancing to attack the main position of the insurgents, the Spanish commander withdrew the greater part of his command at nightfall to his base at the powder magazines after reversing the front of the cotta and leaving there two companies to hold it, the latter being harassed throughout the night by the fire of the enemy.

The next morning the column returned to the cotta and thence advanced to attack the enemy's line of intrenchments. No opposition was developed until the advance arrived at the angle formed by the roads leading to Cavite Viejo and Imus, when it was almost overwhelmed by a rain of projectiles from a long line of intrenchments at short range. The main body deployed and attempted to take the works at the point of the bayonet but were met by a withering fire from lantacas, Mausers, Remingtons, shot-guns and even parlor rifles, which killed or wounded a third of the command and every officer from Colonel Marina down to the youngest Second Lieutenant. Unable to face this hail of bullets and demoralized by the loss of their officers, the Spaniards broke and retreated precipitately to the cotta taken the day before, under cover of which, they were rallied and their retreat arrested by the energetic efforts of Colonel Marina, who had been wounded three times. Thus terminated the attack upon the Binacayan intrenchments.

The troops designated for the attack upon the Noveleta intrenchments were formed in the intrenched camp on the borders of the

small lake of Dalahican near the town of Cavite. They consisted also of Marine Infantry, Peninsular Artillery, the 73rd Native Regiment and a section of Engineers the whole commanded by General Rios. The force was divided into two parts, one being left in the trenches at Dalahican to guard the base and the other, commanded by Colonel Diaz Matoni of the Marine Infantry, forming the column of attack.

The insurgent intrenchment at Noveleta extended almost to the beach on their left and across a deep estero on their right.

If an attempt were made to flank the position by the beach, the flanking force would be compelled to advance in column and as the estero was impassable between the Spaniards and the insurgents, the latter having destroyed the bridge, it was impracticable to turn the insurgent right without re-building the bridge, and as the lines were so close that the working parties would have been exposed to a continual fire at short range the Spaniards did not attempt this.

Nothing but a frontal attack was left and this the Spaniards attempted. The road from Dalahican to Noveleta is a raised causeway running through a mangrove swamp with deep mud on each side. Along this road the attacking column marched, its advance being covered by the fire of the gunboats in the bay. The Spaniards were unmolested in their advance until the head of the column had traversed the swamp and reached ground upon which it could deploy.

Barely had the two sections of the 73rd in advance deployed as skirmishers, when the insurgents, from concealed positions in front and from behind mangrove trees on the flanks, opened a terrific fire upon them and the head and flanks of the column at short range. The two deployed sections were reinforced by a section of Engineers and by the only section of the 73rd remaining in the advance guard. The main body of the Spaniards being in column on the causeway, were unable to take any active part in the fight and the troops deployed were withdrawn after suffering a loss of 100 men and were replaced by Peninsular (white) troops exclusively, two companies of Marine Infantry and two of Artillery, aided by two pieces of mountain artillery, but these met with no better success. The battle began at 10 o'clock in the morning (November 9th) and at 4 P.M. the order to retreat was given and the column returned to the trenches at Dalahican, suffering heavy losses during the retreat.

A Spanish authority places their loss in the two engagements at Binacayan and Noveleta at 500, but other authorities largely exceed this number in their estimates. The casualties were principally in the 73rd Regiment (native) which suffered severely in both engagements. A large quantity of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the insurgents, who were greatly elated by these victories.

In the meantime General Aguirre had left his headquarters at Calamba, on Laguna de Bay, with a view of conducting operations along the Suñgay line, between Cavite and Batangas provinces, and, while holding the insurgents in their positions at Amadeo and Mendez Nuñez, he succeeded on the 12th, in capturing the insurgent town of Talisay on the border of the Lake of Taal.

During this month there were numerous attacks by the insurgents upon towns in the provinces of Manila, Bulacan, La Laguna, Bataan and Zambales, most of which were repelled by their small garrisons, while the forces commanded by General Aguirre and the flying column of Arteaga repeatedly encountered the insurgents and gained minor successes. Arteaga was promoted to be Lieutenant Colonel for a successful action fought at San Rafael in Bulacan, when, according to Spanish accounts, 800 insurgents were killed.

On the 14th, the sixth expedition arrived from Spain in the Covadonga, consisting of 69 officers and 1930 men, Cazadores.

On November 19th, an insurgent force under Llanera wrecked a train on the Manila-Dagupan line about 20 miles from Manila, inflicting damage estimated at \$40,000. This was done as an act of retaliation, because the English officials of the road paid no attention to the insurgent demand that they desist from transporting Spanish forces.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN DECEMBER, 1896.

No military operations of any magnitude were undertaken in the month of December. The insurgents continued to strengthen their defenses in the province of Cavite and to receive daily accessions to their forces in this stronghold from adjoining provinces. The leaders of the Katipunan labored incessantly and with considerable success to establish new centres of insurrection and to raise the people throughout Luzon. On December 2nd, General Blanco issued a proclamation declaring the provinces of Bataan and Zambales to be in a state of war.

General Rios, having been appointed Commanding General of the Centre of Luzon, established his headquarters in Pampanga and addressed himself to the task of suppressing the insurrection in the important zone entrusted to him, directing his efforts particularly to the province of Bulacan where the insurgent cause had made great progress. Numerous minor combats were had with the guerilla forces of Llanera, the Spaniards usually being successful, particularly in the affair at Meycauyan, on the 16th.

The insurgents, however, nothing daunted, continued their raids, not only in General Rios' zone, but in the vicinity of Manila itself and along the borders of the Laguna de Bay, and began to make head to the north in Nueva Ecija.

On December 3d, the seventh expedition arrived from Spain on the Alphonso XII, consisting of 9 officers and 255 men of the Marine Infantry, and 26 officers and 651 men of the Cazadores, besides Lieutenant General Polavieja, Major General Zappino and Lachambre and Brigadier Generals Cornel and Galbis.

General Polavieja on his arrival entered upon his duties as Segundo Cabo and Military Governor of Manila, relieving General of Engineers Rizo, and a few days later was appointed Captain General, General in Chief of the Army of the Operations in the Philippines, and Governor General of the Archipelago. He assumed the supreme command December 13th, relieving General Blanco who embarked for Spain on the Leon XIII, December 20th.

General Zappino was appointed by the Madrid Government, Segundo Cabo of the Islands.

General Polavieja announced the following assignments:

Commanding General of the Division of Laguna, Batangas and Tayabas: Major General Lachambre.

Commanding General of the 1st (Laguna) Brigade of the Division: General Pedro Cornel.

Commanding General of the 2d (Batangas) Brigade of the Division: General Nicolas Jaramillo.

Commanding General of the Brigade of Morong, Pasig and Northern Manila: General Francisco Galbis.

Commanding General of the Brigade of the Centre of Luzon: General Diego de los Rios.

Chief of the General Staff of the Capitanía General: General Ernesto de Aguirre.

On December 6th, the prisoners of the Cavite jail rose, killed their jailer and attempted to escape. Of the 150 concerned, 60 were killed in the streets of the town and in the suburbs, and 21 who were captured were afterwards shot.

On December 30th, Doctor José Rizal, a learned Filipino, who by his writings had incurred the hostility of the friars and who had been convicted by a court martial of entertaining treasonable designs and of being an instigator of the rebellion, was publicly executed, being shot to death on the Paseo de la Luneta.

Beginning with the discovery of the Katipunan conspiracy, hundreds of Filipinos, among them some of the wealthiest and most prominent natives in the islands, were from time to time arrested, conveyed

to Manila and imprisoned. Of these a large number were shot and about 1,000 deported to various penal settlements, yet on the departure of General Blanco, several thousand still remained in prison awaiting trial, a permanent court martial having been organized for their trial.

The Volunteers, organized in Manila at the beginning of the insurrection, rendered good service in and about the defenses of Manila, supplementing the regular troops and also assisting in patrolling the Lake (Laguna de Bay) in armed launches from Manila, keeping the Lake district free from insurgents. They also took part in sorties and raids, but it is charged, not on Spanish authority, however, that they committed many excesses and outrages, particularly when making domiciliary visits in Manila.

Volunteers were also organized in other provinces from time to time, frequently largely composed of natives. The parish priests were very active in promoting the formation of volunteer organizations in their respective parishes, the clergy themselves at times joining the ranks to repel insurgent raids. The parish priest of San Rafael, Bulacan, on one occasion raised a company of volunteers and took command in person when his town was threatened with an attack by the enemy. On the other hand there were some desertions from the native regiments of regulars.

On December 10th, the 8th expedition arrived from Spain on the *Leon XIII*, consisting of 36 officers and 1733 men, *Cazadores*; and in the last of December arrived the 9th expedition on the *San Fernando*, consisting of 29 officers and 1903 men, *Marine Infantry*, 24 officers and 928 men, *Cazadores*.

December being the month in which municipal elections should occur, the Governor General suspended these elections in the provinces which had been placed under martial law; to wit, Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, La Laguna, Tarlac, Cavite, Bataan and Zambales.

PRINCIPAL EVENTS FROM JANUARY 1, 1897 TO THE END OF GENERAL POLAVIEJA'S RÉGIME.

By the end of December, re-inforcements to the number of 11,000 had been received from Spain since the outbreak of the insurrection, and these together with the 1,500 European and 6,000 native troops, that constituted the original Spanish force in the islands, gave General Polavieja, after allowing for desertions that had occurred from the native regiments and for losses in battle during preceding months, and subtracting the garrisons of the Visayas and Southern islands, an available force of over 12,000 to suppress the insurrection in Luzon. The dry season having set in, he therefore determined upon active

operations, his plan being first to pacify the zones separated from the province of Cavite, and then to make an offensive campaign against that province, which with the exception of the town and peninsula of Cavite, was in the possession of the insurgents.

Accordingly the month of January was a period of great activity and innumerable engagements and combats were fought in the centre of Luzon, the insurgents being vigorously and usually successfully attacked wherever they could be found. The most important success occurred at the place called Cacaron de Sile, in the centre of Bulacan province, a position having strong natural defenses and which had been greatly strengthened by insurgent works. The insurgents occupied this stronghold with over 3,000 men.

Five columns, averaging about 200 men each, attacked this position almost simultaneously from different directions and completely defeated the insurgents with a loss to them, according to Spanish accounts, of over 200 killed and 1,000 wounded.

The result of this engagement was very discouraging to the insurgents in Bulacan, and a number took advantage of an amnesty that was proclaimed about this time to present themselves; i.e., to surrender. General Rios, commanding the zone, planned this attack and it was skillfully carried out by the chiefs of the columns, Major Olaguer Feliu, Lieutenant Colonel Villalón, Major Sarthou, Lieutenant Colonel Arteaga and Captain Cundaro.

The insurgent leader in this zone, Llanera, threatened with death all who availed themselves of amnesty, but presentations continuing, Llanera transferred his activities temporarily to Nueva Ecija.

The Macabebe troops (native) distinguished themselves in several engagements about this time.

In General Cornel's district (Laguna,) in General Jaramillo's (Batangas) and in General Galbis' (Morong, Pasig and North Manila,) particularly in the latter three, were also numerous combats and minor engagements. These were so generally in favor of the Spaniards and so decisive that on January 22, General Jaramillo reported that no insurgent force could be found in all Batangas, and the same was reported from Bataan and Zambales.

CAVITE CAMPAIGN, 1897.

In the month of January, 1897, over 12,400 fresh troops arrived from Spain, making the total of 587 officers and 24, 875 men received from the mother country since the outbreak of the insurrection.

General Polavieja, the Captain General, determined to commence early in February his offensive campaign against Cavite Province. Preparatory to commencing operations, the Army of Luzon was re-organized as follows:

ORGANIZATION: ARMY OF LUZON

Division of Laguna, Batangas and Tayabas.

Commanding General, DON JOSE LACHAMBRE Y DOMINGUEZ,
Chief of General Staff, LT. COL. DON JENARO RUIZ JIMENEZ.

1ST BRIGADE.

Commander, BRIGADIER GENERAL DON PEDRO CORNEL.

FORCES.

1st Battalion Cazadores.....Complete.
2d Battalion Cazadores.....Complete.
74th Regiment of the Line.....Two Battalions.
Two mounted detachments.

2D BRIGADE.

Commander, BRIGADIER GENERAL DON JOSE MARINA VEGA.

FORCES.

4th Battalion Cazadores..... Four Companies.
6th Battalion Cazadores..... Complete.
11th Battalion Cazadores Four Companies.
15th Battalion Cazadores Complete.
73d Regiment of Line..... One Battalion.
Fortress Artillery..... One Battalion.

3D BRIGADE.

Commander, BRIGADIER GENERAL DON NICOLAS JARAMILLO.

FORCES.

8th Battalion Cazadores..... Two Companies.
13th Battalion Cazadores..... Complete
70th Regiment of Line..... One Company.
73d Regiment of Line..... Three Companies.
I Mounted Detachment
I Section Mountain Artillery
I Section of fifty men, Engineers.
I Movable Park Engineers.

ATTACHED TO DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.

CAVALRY.

Philippine Regiment..... One Squadron.
Mobilized Volunteers of Ilocos Norte..... One Squadron.
Mounted Guerrillas of Ilocos Sur..... 25 Horses.

ARTILLERY.

Two 15 cm. B. C. Howitzers.

Six pieces 9 cm. B. C. of the Mountain Battery.

Seven pieces of the Regiment of Mountain Artillery.

Four pieces Whitworth.

ENGINEERS.

One company of 150 men (for 1st and 2d Brigade.)

One Movable Park.

INFANTRY.

Abra Volunteers.....200 Men.

Ilocos Sur Volunteers.....300 Men.

Albay Volunteers.....500 Men.

FIELD HOSPITAL.

At Taal.....With 100 Beds.

At Calamba.....With 100 Beds.

At Biñan.....With 100 Beds.

BASES OF SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS.

Taal, Calamba, Cuartel de Santo Domingo and Biñan.

MEANS OF TRANSPORT.

Half Brigade and 600 Chinese with as many as can be collected from the territory occupied.

INDEPENDENT BRIGADE.

Commander, BRIGADIER GENERAL DON FRANCISCO GALBIS ABELLA.

FORCES.

3d Battalion Cazadores.....Complete.

5th Battalion Cazadores.....Four Companies.

7th Battalion Cazadores.....Complete.

11th Battalion Cazadores.....Four Companies.

14th Battalion Cazadores.....Complete.

Three Mounted Detachments.

CAVALRY.

One Peninsular Squadron.

ARTILLERY.

Two Mortars; Two Pieces B. C. 12 cm.

Two pieces B. C. 8 cm.; Four Pieces Mountain.

Two Pieces non regulation. Two Pieces Krup A. 8cm.

TRANSPORT.

HALF BRIGADE.

Commandancia General of the Centre of Luzon.*Commander*, BRIGADIER GENERAL, DON DIEGO DE LOS RIOS.

FORCES.

4th Battalion Cazadores	Four Companies.
5th Battalion Cazadores	Four Companies.
8th Battalion Cazadores	Six Companies.
9th Battalion Cazadores	Four Companies.
68th Regiment of Line.....	One Company.
70th Regiment of Line.....	Two Companies.
73d Regiment of Line.....	One Company.
2d Regiment Marine Infantry.....	Two Companies.
1 Mounted Detachment.	
1 Section of 40 men, Engineers.	

VOLUNTEER .

From Masbate..... 100 men.

THOSE FROM OTHER PLACES.

Manila Garrison.*Commander General of Division*, DON ENRIQUE ZAPPINO.

FORCES.

9th Battalion Cazadores.....	Four Companies.
10th Battalion Cazadores.....	Complete.
2d Battalion, 2d Regiment Marine Inftry...	Three Companies.
70th Regiment of Line.....	Three Companies.

ARTILLERY.

Regiment of Fortress Artillery Two Companies.

CAVALRY.

31st Philippine Regiment..... One Squadron.

VOLUNTEERS.

Battalion of Manila Infantry.

Squadron of Manila Cavalry.

In addition to the veteran civil guard, the Civil Guard of the two provinces and the Artillery had the resources of the Maestranza to draw on.

General Lachambre's Division was organized for the purpose of conducting the operations in Cavite and to its Commander, General Polavieja addressed the following letter of instructions:

"To His Excellency the Commanding General
of La Laguna, Batangas and Tayabas.

Appended to this letter will be found the new organization of the Division you so worthily command. I have found it necessary to increase the number of your battalions, to add three pieces of field artillery, to equip it with artillery of position, an engineer park, means of transportation and, above all, to reorganize the Division in a manner best adapted to the campaign you are about to begin against the province of Cavite.

The Infantry I place under your orders is divided into three Brigades, one with fewer battalions than the other two, because in the earlier period of the operations it will have a more limited sphere of action.

The Artillery, except the mountain section which General Jaramillo retains, is attached, as well as the Cavalry, to the Headquarters of the Division in order that you may distribute and employ each according to circumstances, that is, according to the necessities of the advance and engagement, the attack of positions, advance guard and flanking service and the necessities of rear guard service and the position of the line of communications and supply.

Also the Native Infantry Volunteers of the various provinces of Luzon, amounting to 1,000 men are attached to Division Headquarters in order that they may be instructed and employed on detachment duty and rear guard service, in combination with the Cazadores contingent, and in order that they may become familiar with the tactics of the insurgents, thus preparing them for the offensive movements they will later undertake against the latter.

Colonel of Engineers, Don Francisco de Castro, is placed under your orders in order that the Movable Park of Engineers may perform such service pertaining to their corps as he may recommend.

Your Excellency will have at your disposition the half transport Brigade for supplying the troops with ammunition and six hundred Chinese for transporting rations.

In order to provide rations and all other necessities for the soldiers you will utilize the resources of the territory under your command and of that you are about to occupy.

Your Excellency will find already established a field hospital with a hundred beds in Calamba, another in Biñan and another in Taal, as well as a depository of two hundred thousand rations and a million two hundred and twenty thousand rifle cartridges and eight hundred cannon cartridges in Calamba, of one hundred thousand rations, a million two hundred and twenty thousand cartridges and seven hundred artillery charges in Biñan, and in Taal one of a hundred thousand ra-

tions, a million cartridges and two hundred mountain artillery charges. Your Excellency will please establish another depository of such rations and ammunition as may be deemed suitable in the Cuartel of Santo Domingo for the operations against Silang.

For these operations, Your Excellency will please concentrate the Cornel and Marina Brigades with all the Artillery and Movable Park of Engineers and the Cavalry, the Volunteers and the transportation you may judge suitable, at the Cuartel of Santo Domingo, from which point Your Excellency will make a frontal march upon Silang, turning by the left flank the precipitous slopes and the intrenchments the rebels have upon them, in order, after having swept away such obstacles as may be encountered in your progress, to commence the attack upon Silang by Balete to the left of the Imus River, and to the right of the latter to the north of Iba, uniting both forces by a bridge over the said river.

After having taken Silang and leaving there a suitable garrison, Your Excellency will please take up the march in two columns towards Imus, the stronger by the road to Perez-Dasmariñas, and the other or weaker by that leading to the position of Paliparang.

Both columns will reconnoitre and beat the woods of the Fandaguera, and then, united or separately, the one from Perez-Dasmariñas and the other from the Paliparang position will march upon the Estate-House of Saltiran, which on account of its strong construction may have to be battered down by the 15 cm. howitzers.

The hacienda of Saltiran being occupied, Your Excellency will have it garrisoned and will resume your march upon Imus, in whose suburbs I will take command of all the forces which are to attack that point, Bacoor, Cavite Viejo and Noveleta.

In order that the rebels may not be able to concentrate all their forces upon those under your command, at Silang as well as when upon your advance upon Imus, I have ordered General Jaramillo to open fire upon the rebel intrenchments of Bayuyungan the evening before Your Excellency moves out from the Cuartel de Santo Domingo towards Silang, and next, by pressing them, to feign an attempt to ascend Sungay by its northern slope, not ceasing his demonstrations until Your Excellency is master of Silang, and then to continue by operating upon Talisay by the Lake to Taal with armored launches always covering the Pansipit and the interior of the zone he now occupies, in order to keep on distracting the rebel forces.

He will be opportunely re-enforced in order that he may occupy Alfonso and other places of the northern watershed of the Sungay Mt.

Also with the object of harassing the rebel forces and covering this place at the same time upon the same day Your Excellency begins the

movement upon Silang, General Galbis with his Brigade will encamp upon the right bank of the Zapote River threatening Bacoor and Imus by the lower river, while by the upper river his forces will threaten a turning movement, and march upon Paliparang.

These forces, if circumstances permit, will communicate with those of Your Excellency first in Paliparan, and then at the estate-house of Saltiran where Your Excellency will receive further instructions for the attack upon Imus.

I have placed under the orders of His Excellency, the Commanding General of Marine, the forces of Marine Infantry which are in Binacayan and Dalahican, together with two barges belonging to the Park Works, which I have placed subject to his orders and which are being armed at the Arsenal with two 12 cm. Hontoria cannon; also two lighters armed by the Compañía Transatlantica with two 9 cm. Hontoria pieces and rapid fire guns; another also armed by the same with two 7½ cm. Krupp pieces; also two others for disembarking, each accommodating a hundred men; another for an operating hospital, all three belonging to the same company, and with the Squadron under his orders His Excellency, the General aforesaid, will support the operations of Your Excellency against Silang and your advance upon Imus, by bombarding the rebel trenches on the coast from the mouth of the Zapote up to their position at Lictong and by simulating also a disembarkation between Santa Cruz and Naic.

In order that Your Excellency may not lack supplies in your march from Silang to Saltiran, the depository of rations and ammunition at Biñan has been established as well as a field hospital in which Your Excellency may leave such as are wounded on the march.

Permit me to inform Your Excellency that if the circumstances should require it, Your Excellency is authorized to act according to your judgment after taking Silang, reporting the same to me as well as the reasons which induce Your Excellency to decide upon your resolutions in order that the other land and sea forces may continue to act according to an harmonious plan.

The Marine Infantry of Dalahican will demonstrate towards Noveleta and that of Binacayan will keep up a fire on the rebel trenches while Your Excellency carries out the operations indicated.

With my Headquarters I will establish myself in Parañaque or Las Piñas to which point Your Excellency, while in front of Silang, will please direct telegrams and communications to me. From Paliparang Your Excellency can forward them via Carmona and Bifian.

I recommend that in conducting operations it be taken into account that the enemy may cut the dikes of the rivers as a means of defense. It is proper to warn Your Excellency in order that this obstacle may be overcome.

Your Excellency will please inform me of the disposition made of the forces and of the rear guard service of the columns in the provinces of La Laguna and Batangas following the rule of employing Companies of all the Battalions in garrison detachments and details in order that no single organization may be charged with all this second line service.

I know that no exhortation or appeal to the skill and valor of Your Excellency and to the skill and valor of the Generals, Commanders and officers under the orders of Your Excellency and to your brave troops is necessary, and that all will discharge their duty to the uttermost, responding with every kind of sacrifice to whatever the King and Country may expect of us.

I well know that the Generals, Commanders and Officers will take care that the soldiers be well fed and cared for and that the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery will know how to give such an account of themselves, each arm in its own sphere of action, as to produce the maximum results and that the same can be expected from the skill of the Engineers. Unless precipitate we will be able to inflict much damage while receiving but little.

Your Excellency will please acknowledge receipt of this communication, which only the Generals under your orders should see, to whom I beg you to transmit it, with a copy of the general organization of this Army.

May God preserve you many years.

Manila, February 7, 1897.

CAMILO G. DE POLAVIEJA."

General Lachambre acknowledged receipt of the foregoing as follows:

"Comandancia General of La Laguna,
Batangas and Tayabas.

Your Excellency:

In acknowledging receipt, as Your Excellency directed, of your esteemed communication, dated the 7th instant, I have the honor to express the profound gratitude with which this Division receives the flattering expressions which you address to each and all who compose it, and the firm conviction I entertain that the excellent spirit which animates all and makes them desire a post of honor and of danger and to consider as a disgrace an assignment to duty in the second line is a sure guarantee that they will expend all their energies in bringing to a happy

termination this campaign, fulfilling the sacred duty of sacrificing their lives for the high interests of King and Country, to whom they offer through me the protestation of their most loyal devotion.

God grant etc., Calamba, February 9, 1897.

JOSE LACHAMBRE.

To His Excellency the Marquis of Polavieja,
General in Chief of the Army of the Philippines."

The Headquarters of the 1st Brigade (Cornel's) was at Calamba and of the 2nd (Marina's) at Biñan.

These Brigades constituted the forces for the advance upon Silang, together with the troops attached to the Division. Detachments from them were left at Santa Cruz, Calamba, Santo Domingo, Tayabas, on the Tanauan-Banadero line, and at Biñan, amounting to 1,563 men, leaving a total of combatants in the two brigades and Divisional troops for the advance upon Silang of 9,277.

The 3rd Brigade (Jaramillo's) had its headquarters at Taal, Batangas province. To it was assigned the duty of cooperating in the attack upon Silang by acting as a containing force to prevent the insurgents in the South of Cavite from advancing to the relief of those in Silang and at the same time its commander was directed to make an offensive movement with a view of occupying Talisay and other positions on the Southern slope of Mount Sungay. It had detachments at Batangas, Lobooc, Calaca, Liang, Balayan, Point Santiago and on the line of the Pansipit River amounting to 1,563, leaving 1,645 for offensive operations.

The total of troops available for the offensive was therefore 9,277 and the total detached 2,658, making a total in the Division of 13,580.

The details of the composition and disposition of the troops in the Division is shown in the annexed table.

TABLE.

DETACHMENTS.

1ST & 2D BRIGADES.

	Men.
Santa Cruz	339
Calamba	147
Cuartel de Santo Domingo	122
Tayabas	189
Tanaúan-Bañadero Line	614
TOTAL	1311

3D BRIGADE.

Batanga, Lobooc, Calaca, Liang, Balayan, Point Santiago	450	
Pansipit Line	645	
TOTAL		1095

COMBATANT FORCES.

1st Brigade	4001	
2d Brigade	3913	
Attached to Division, 16 Guns	1363	
TOTAL FORCES IN ADVANCE ON SILANG		9277
Third Brigade	1645	
TOTAL COMBATANT FORCES		10922

RESUMÉ.

DETACHMENTS.

		Men.
1st and 2d Brigades	1,563	
3d Brigade	1,095	

COMBATANT FORCES.

ON SILANG.

1st Brigade	4,001
2d Brigade	3,913
Attached to the Division	1,363

ON THE SOUTHERN SLOPE OF SUNGAY.

3d Brigade	1,645
TOTAL FORCES IN THE DIVISION	13,580

In addition, a fourth brigade commanded by General Galbis, and operating under the direction of the Governor General was extended along the northern bank of the Zapote River. The Lakes of Bay and Bombon (Taal) were guarded by armed launches and other small crafts whilst the gunboats of the squadron patrolled the sea coast. The insurgent province was therefore invested on all sides.

Before proceeding to an account of the military operations in Cavite, some brief description of the theatre of operations, the military organizations, and defensive works of the insurgents in the province is necessary to a proper understanding of the campaign.

The province of Cavite is situated between $14^{\circ} 7' 30''$ and $14^{\circ} 30'$ north latitude and bounded on the north by the bay and province of

Manila (Rizal), on the south by the province of Batangas and separated from the latter by the lofty range of the Tagaytay; on the east by the same province and by that of La Laguna; and on the west by the Bay of Manila.

It contains a superficial area of about 1,800 square kilometers, being 50 kilometers in its greatest length from north to south and 44 from east to west.

Its population is about 141,250, distributed in 22 towns and 103 barrios, the principal being Cavite—a word derived from the Tagalo *Cavit*, which means a fish hook, called by the natives Tanguay, otherwise “land which projects into the sea”—which is the capital of the province and is situated, together with the towns of Caridad and San Roque, in the northwestern part upon a sandpit projecting easterly into the sea, and forms with the bay of Bacoor, the safe and sheltered anchorage of Cavite.

According to the census made by the Archbishop of Manila, the population of the three towns mentioned, amounts to 12,614 inhabitants. Near the sea and upon the same shore, are situated the adjoining coast towns of Bacoor, Cavite Viejo, Noveleta, Rosario, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Naic and Ternate, their population aggregating 48,859 inhabitants.

In the vicinity of the Bay of Manila are found Imus and San Francisco de Malabon, with populations of 14,338 and 8,337 respectively; to the southeast of both and bordering upon the province of La Laguna, Carmona with 3,548 inhabitants.

In the southern, or rather southwestern part of the province, near the Batangas border, are found Bailen with 4,425, Magallanes with 2,577, and Alfonso with 6,977 inhabitants. In the interior of the province in almost the same latitude as the former are found Perez-Dasmariñas towards the east containing 4,309, and to the west Maragondon with 7,234 inhabitants.

Finally Amadeo with 3,293, Mendez Nunez with 4,506, Indang with 13,602, and Silang with 7,081 inhabitants, occupy the most elevated points in the district on the northern watershed of the Tagaytay mountains.

The natural features of the province of Cavite render it a very difficult country for any but native troops to operate in. It abounds in rivers, the largest of which run from south to north parallel to each other at short distances and empty into Manila Bay, their beds being the bottoms of deep ravines, which present excellent positions for defense. The same is true of the smaller streams which flow to the northeast and empty into the Lake of Bay (Laguna de Bay).

Among the rivers emptying into Manila Bay the principal are the Imus or Tibagan; the San Cristobal; the Bambang or Bacoor; the Zapote, which forms the boundary between Cavite and Manila (Rizal) provinces and which receives the names of Salippit and Limbong in different parts of its course; the San Augustin or Hasaan, called Ilang-Ilang in its lower course and Casundit in its middle course; the Canas and the Tartaro.

Among those emptying into the Lake of Bay are the Alagao or Bitucang-Manoc, (Tripa de Gallina) which forms on the southeast the boundary between Cavite and La Laguna; the Tibay; the Lumbia; the Calabozo; the Munting-Ilog (Rio Pequeno); and the Malaquing-Ilog (Rio Grande).

These rivers all have their sources in the Tagaytay Cordillera, or range, which extends from the southeastern coast of Batangas along the northern shore of the Lake of Bombon (Taal) between Cavite and Batangas provinces, rising into the inaccessible Mount Sungay, north of Talisay and having numerous other peaks.

Across the narrow neck of land in Batangas between the Lake of Bombon and the Gulf of Balayan, runs the Pansipit River from the Lake to the Gulf. The line of this river was held by detachments from the 3rd (Jaramillo's) Brigade.

With the exception of the single badly paved highway from Los Piñas to Cavite, 20 kilometers in length, the province of Cavite has no paved roads. There are 13 roads practicable for carts and the other means of communication are simply horse trails and foot-paths. All are crossed at frequent intervals by streams and bordered by dense growths, which render military operations very difficult.

There were a number of well constructed bridges in the province, but on the approach of the Spaniards these were cut down and partially or wholly destroyed by the insurgents and had to be repaired or reconstructed by the Engineers.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE INSURGENTS.

The territory was divided into five parts, called Zones of War, each having a capital.

Each of these Zones was defended by an Army which was divided into active and volunteer forces, the former comprising all the fighting men, and the latter all those engaged outside of the ranks in works of a mechanical character.

The Active Army was organized into regiments, companies and batteries and performed duty in the trenches, towns and on the roads and also patrolled the territory to check desertions and defections.

In turn the companies were sub-divided into soldiers with fire arms and those without, the duty of the latter being, in proportion of five of them to each rifleman, to keep themselves close to the rear of the fighting line and to secure the guns of men who became disabled, it being required that such reserves should be provided with a spear or bolo (short machete) to attack with the riflemen, with cold steel, when the order was given to charge the Spaniards

To the Batteries were committed duties pertaining to the care and use of native cannon—lantacas—the firing of rude fougasses and mines and the preservation of the gunpowder.

The function of the Volunteer Army was the gathering and storing of food supplies and iron and copper instruments wherever they could be found, to which end sugar mills were destroyed, bathing establishments, and whatever contained a pipe or spindle, even to the extent of breaking up carts to get their tires and axles. Moreover, it was the duty of the volunteers to search the surface of the fields, etc. for projectiles which, fired by the Navy at towns and trenches on the coast, had failed to explode; to carry food to the troops on guard or on duty in the defenses; and with those of the Active Army and the women and children, since where works of this kind were concerned neither age, sex nor condition was exempt, to strengthen daily the defenses and to throw up others on suitable sites.

For the command of their forces they established the hierarchies of Generalissimo, Lieutenant General, Marshal, Brigadier, Colonel and Major, creating in addition the following officials:

A Minister of Marine, whose portfolio was taken by Marcelo de los Santos, Superintendent of the Nautical School of San Francisco de Malabon; a Military Chaplain Superior, who was the Coadjutor named Eladio Almeyda; an Intendant General of Revenue, who was Silvestre Aguinaldo, (Chief also of the Administrative Council) to whose office pertained the collection of contributions from each head of the barangay, the payment of the soldiers, who were allowed each ten centavos and a chupa of rice per day; a General of Artillery, who was Crispulo Aguinaldo, a cousin of Emilio; an Inspector of Cannon and Arms, projectiles and powder, factories for which were located in Silang, Imus and San Francisco; a General of Engineers, the office being filled by the Spanish mestizo Edilberto Evangelista, (of whom it was said that he had followed the career of a Civil Engineer in Belgium); Director of Defensive Works; and finally an Auditor General for War, who was Santos Nocon, a Manila Notary's clerk. All of these exalted personages were Lieutenant Generals.

Emilo Aguinaldo, ex-municipal Capitan of Cavite Viejo, exercised supreme authority over the civil and military hierarchies and was also principal chief of the insurrection, with the title of Generalissimo.

The Armies of the various Zones were commanded as follows: That of the 1st, or Silang Zone, by Victor Belarmino; that of the 2nd, or Imus Zone, by Andrés Bonifacio, who also exercised the functions of Inspector over all; that of the 3rd or Bacoor Zone, by Felix Cuenca; that of the 4th, or San Francisco de Malabon Zone, by Ramon Panagasi; that of the 5th, or Alfonso Zone, by Lazaro Quiamon.

Each town had its Marshal, charged with the defense of the same and of the people in the vicinity, and acting also as the second of the General of the Zone. These were Martin Medina of Silang; Juan Analdo of San Francisco de Malabon; Ariston Villanueva, alias Campuput, of Noveleta; Nicolas Estrella of Perez-Dasmarinas; Pascual Alvarez, alias Bagumbuhay, of Imus; Santiago Alvarez, alias Apuy of Cavite Viejo; Arcadio Arayata of Bacoor; Juan Pio of Naic; Julian Saigco, of Santa Cruz; Julian Parausa, of Indang; Miguel Barba, of Maragondon; Pedro Pacheco, of Ternate; Francisco Engracio, of Rosario; Artemio Ricarte, alias Vibora, of Mendez Nunez; Diego Bautista, of Amadeo; Juan Graput, of Bailen; Fausto Viera, of Magallanes; and Julian Cando, of Alfonso.

INSURGENT DEFENSES.

The combination of defensive works of the province of Cavite is worthy of consideration and study as giving evidence of some technical skill, which is explained by the fact that they were constructed under the direction of the mestizo Evangelista.

The territory occupied militarily by the insurgents formed a great entrenched camp, the towns, rivers, defiles and a multitude of positions and mountains in the interior, moreover, being fortified by works more or less united according to the strategic location of each point, an infinity of parapets and of every kind of obstacle being thrown up on the frontiers by means of which the roads of communication were rendered useless.

Two lines of trenches, one with intervals and one continuous, occupied the frontiers; the line with intervals began at the mountains of Tagaytay extending southeasterly and northerly to the head of the Zapote River; the continuous line began at the mouth of the Bacoor, skirted the beach, the esteros of Noveleta and Dalahican, as far as the town of the Santa Cruz, and continued thence with intervals to the towns of Naic and Ternate.

The line with intervals, in addition to shelter trenches, was constructed with parapets usually 8 feet high, made of earth, logs and stones, strengthened, on the exterior, with cylinders, heavy beams,

sheets of galvanized iron and even dried skins of carabaos, covered over and concealed by vegetation and thorny entanglements. Usually there was one tier of embrasures for lantacas and two tiers of loopholes.

As obstacles there were placed in the front and on the flanks chevaux de frises, crowsfeet, etc. and some had ditches with water utilized from a neighboring stream.

Such intrenchments were constructed on the banks of streams and at places where roads and defiles leading to the interior could be enfiladed, and usually there were several parallel lines of intrenchments, those in rear commanding those in their front.

Within these exterior lines the towns were also defended by intrenchments constructed at points commanding the roads leading to the towns, tenailles and even lunettes with very open gorges being placed at the principal entrances, round about which were placed pitfalls, etc., and occasionally bombs, as at Perez-Dasmariñas and Imus. At the same time the defensive possibilities of churches, convents, estate-houses and strongly built dwellings, were availed of and strengthened, and finally barricades were erected in the streets. In addition to the laborious works described, frequently interior roads, rivers and dikes were placed in a posture of defense, parapets being constructed across roads; rivers or mountains being flanked by traverses resting on precipices and bridges being fortified by bridge-heads more or less strong.

Finally sluices in the dams across rivers were so contrived as to produce inundations when desired, like those at Perez-Dasmariñas and San Francisco de Malabon.

The continuous line of intrenchments which extended along the entire length of the seashore was constructed of sand with a height of 6 feet 6 inches, and a thickness of about 20 feet, with revetments of bamboo fastened together with rattan.

A banquette ran the whole length of the parapet and at intervals were casemates where the defenders, sentinels and even the fishermen along the beach could take refuge when Spanish warships fired on the trenches.

The insurgents obtained such arms as they had, according to Spanish writers, from the small detachments of troops and posts of the Guardia Civil, which were surprised and overwhelmed at the beginning of the outbreak; from deserters from native Spanish regiments and by individual purchase. Moreover, a number of arms and equipments had been captured from the Spaniards at the battles of Noveleta and Binacayan. However they were obtained, it is estimated by Spanish writers that at the beginning of 1897 the insurgents had about 15,000 firearms of all descriptions, consisting of Mauser, old style Remington,

Freire-Bull, Winchester, Colt, Peabody, Minie, Berdan, breech loading and muzzle loading shotguns, and even parlor rifles and air guns, besides a great variety of revolvers.

They displayed considerable ingenuity in making cannon out of every kind of material available, using boiler-tubes, water pipes, etc., and casting some bronze cannon from church bells. They also utilized the iron cannon sunk into the beach as anchors for the cables of vessels, and those planted at the corners of plazas.

Two Chinese, one of them named Paua, directed the work of casting guns at the Imus foundry as well as the repair and refitting of arms.

They were assisted by sixteen operatives of the Manila Artillery Maestranza and Cavite Arsenal, who had gone over to the insurgents, taking with them in their flight a number of cannon tubes which when completed as cannons were designated as heavy guns.

At San Francisco de Malabon, where there was a considerable deposit of saltpetre, the insurgents established powder works, a cartridge factory, plants for reloading and for casting bullets. A large number of Chinese and natives were employed in labor of this kind and in the manufacture of lances, bolos and other kinds of cutting weapons, the insurgents having at the beginning of 1897, according to a very liberal Spanish estimate, about 90,000 men armed with weapons of this kind, in addition to 15,000 equipped with firearms, in the province of Cavite alone.

As the normal population of the province was estimated to be about 140,000, the estimate of 105,000 men under arms is explained by Spanish writers by the statement that many thousand natives from other provinces had managed to elude the vigilance of the Spaniards and had added themselves to the insurgent defenders of Cavite, and further, every boy capable of wielding a bolo had been pressed into the ranks or had voluntarily enlisted. Cavite was therefore a huge intrenched camp, the whole population and a considerable portion of that of other provinces being committed to its defense.

After the receipt of General Polavieja's plan of campaign, General Lachambre made his dispositions in accordance therewith and issued detailed instructions to his subordinates.

General Lachambre, having reported himself ready, he received on the 13th of February the following dispatch from General Polavieja at Manila:

"The General in Chief to General Lachambre,
Calamba.

I have ordered General Jaramillo to demonstrate against the rebel trenches at Bayuyungan to-morrow the 14th, and Your Excellency will

please march on the 15th with your forces on Silang, in accordance with the instructions already communicated. General Galbis with his command is to-day on the Piñas, Almansa, Muntinlupa line and on the 15th will be on the right bank of the Zapote river.

Polavieja.”

General Polavieja on the 14th established his headquarters at Parañaque and on the morning of the 15th, General Lachambre began the advance on Silang, the two brigades taking the different routes indicated and converging on Silang.

The march was attended with many difficulties and the heavier pieces of artillery were carried along only by the exercise of great effort and perseverance. The enemy disputed most vigorously the advance of each column and their positions at Munting-Ilog and Ma-laquing-Ilog were only carried after a most stubborn defense costing the Spaniards considerable loss in officers and men.

The two columns having fought their way to the outskirts of Silang, that formidable position was taken by a joint assault on the 19th of February after a preparatory bombardment in which the artillery fired 105 rounds of shell, the infantry expending 25,000 cartridges.

The insurgents lost about 500 killed and 1,500 wounded, the Spaniards losing 12 killed and 70 wounded, the action lasting four and half hours. The celebrated Tagal bishop was found lying dead across the parapet with a bullet through his heart. Nevertheless, the insurgents on the 22nd made a desperate attempt to retake the town but were repulsed with a loss of 400 killed and many wounded.

General Lachambre burned the greater part of the town as a punishment but reserved the church, convent and the best houses in their vicinity, utilizing them for a hospital, barracks and storehouses. Having established a post here, he garrisoned, fortified and connected it with the telegraph line.

Lachambre advanced from Silang, February 14th, his main body taking the direct route to Perez-Dasmariñas, parallel to the Casundit river, while a flanking force of three companies covered his left and a battalion and a half under Colonel Villalon, which had started an hour earlier on the road to Palimparan with the Rio Grande on its right, protected his right flank. Villalon encountered but slight opposition in his rapid advance and occupied Palimparan with trifling loss. At this place he bivouacked, being joined at sunset by a half brigade under Colonel Arizon, which General Galbis had detached from his force on the Zapote River.

In the meantime the main body arrived at the hamlet of Sampaloc three miles from Perez-Dasmariñas, and bivouacked there. The next

day after a short bombardment by the mountain batteries, Perez-Dasmariñas was attacked from the south and west and after several hours of hard fighting was carried by assault, many of the insurgents remaining in the trenches to die in a hand to hand fight. The rice fields to the east of the town had been flooded and were impassable, but Arizon's column, approaching the northern end of the town from the eastward, took the insurgents who fled, in flank.

400 insurgents were killed within the defenses of the city and a large number outside, the Spaniards losing 21 killed and 121 wounded.

Aguinaldo directed the earlier part of the defense but before the decisive attack was made he fled, turning over the command to Estrella, an ex-sergeant of the Civil Guard.

The insurgents undismayed by their defeat, soon rallied and on the 27th attacked a column which had been sent out to reconnoitre towards Palimparan, but were defeated with a loss of about 300, the Spanish losing 2 killed and 10 wounded, and their mountain guns firing 22 rounds, which were very effective, while the infantry expended 63,000 cartridges.

The church, convent and stone houses of the Plaza of Perez-Dasmariñas were put in a defensive condition and garrisoned by two companies of infantry.

The division, however, did not resume its advance until the 7th of March, owing to the difficulty of bringing up supplies.

On the latter date, the division took up the march for Imus, following the eastern road, whilst Arizon's half brigade marched on the right flank on a parallel road which intersected the route of the division at Salitran, a large stone Estate-House belonging to the Recoletos Order, which the insurgents had strongly intrenched and occupied. Arizon's command arrived first but the insurgents, although prepared to expect a Spanish advance from his direction, seeing also a large force approaching on their right flank abandoned their position, which Arizon immediately occupied. The division, however, being unaware of this, opened on the Estate-House with their guns and fired five rounds before they discovered the Spanish flag flying over it.

Soon the scouts reported the insurgents to be in force in an intrenchment a mile and a half long and only a mile north of the town.

This intrenchment covered both roads to Imus and each flank rested on a deep ravine, there being a redoubt at the eastern end and a flanking epaulement at the western. This formidable intrenchment was called by the Spaniards, Anabo II.

It being considered impracticable to make a flank attack, General Zabala made a front attack with a half brigade, advancing over the

perfectly open ground with no other cover than that afforded by the pilapiles of the rice fields. When the line had advanced to within 100 yards of the enemy, General Zabala waved his sword and gave the order for the assault but fell mortally wounded immediately after, a shot from a lantaca having pierced his breast. Two Captains also fell near him but the troops pressed on, leaped across the ditch and climbing the high parapet took the position with the bayonet. 200 insurgents lay dead on the field while the Spaniards lost 11 killed and 33 wounded.

Nevertheless, the insurgents on March 8th made two desperate attempts to re-take the position, in both attacks coming to close quarters. The Spaniards, firing deliberate volleys and hurling case shot into the insurgent masses, repulsed them with a loss estimated at 300, themselves losing 5 killed and 25 wounded.

On the 10th of March, the division took up the march for the Zapote river and after traversing a most difficult country, reached the river and effected contact with the 4th Brigade, now commanded by Barraquer and formerly by Galbis. When Press-Molino was reached, three companies of infantry were detached and left there as a garrison.

From the Zapote river, General Lachambre rode over and reported in person to General Polavieja at the latter's headquarters at Parañaque.

The troops encamped at San Nicolas, one brigade on each side of the river, and remained there for a number of days re-organizing and constructing roads and defensive works.

Although the camp sites on the Zapote river were presumably healthful, there was much sickness and suffering in the command, due to climatic causes, the effects of over exertion, sleeping on the ground and the lack of nourishing food. Their vitality was sapped by malarial fevers, dysentery, rheumatism, etc., while nostalgia depressed the spirits of many of the young soldiers. The division had lost since February 15th, 135 officers in killed, wounded and invalided, and a greater proportion of enlisted men.

There still remained, however, much to do. After the 4th Brigade was incorporated in the division, and two battalions added, one from the 3d Brigade and the other from the Independent Brigade, the total number of combatants in the division was brought up to about 12,000.

A practicable road had in the meantime been built to Salitran by way of Almansa, defended by redoubts. This work had been performed most skillfully by the native engineers and the native 74th Regiment, and, in passing, it is remarked that the services of Engineers and native troops are almost indispensable in the construction of works of this kind in the Philippines.

Imus was General Lachambre's next objective but he intended to make the attack from Salitran. General Polavieja's state of health did not permit of carrying out his previously announced intention of personally taking command of the operations against Imus, and the roads being finished, and the convoys of provisions having been sent forward with such transport as the country afforded, General Lachambre on March 22nd started out with his division to Salitran, arriving there the next day after encountering slight opposition en route.

The division set out for Imus early on the 24th, but it was necessary a second time to take the formidable intrenchments of Anabo, which restored, strengthened and with the ground in front now flooded, barred the way. Again General Lachambre was forced to make a frontal attack, but he detached bodies of troops to advance simultaneously on the flanks overlapping the ends of the intrenchment. The infantry deployed and the firing line advanced within 300 yards of the parapet before halting.

Then the mountain guns were brought up and breached the parapet. The troops rushed forward to within 150 yards of the parapet and General Marina, seeing the opportune moment had arrived, ordered the assault. As in the former attack, the troops charged with the utmost impetuosity and courage, but the Tagals again stood firm, and opposing bolo to bayonet, fought with desperate fury. In the end the Spaniards prevailed and the insurgents abandoned the works, leaving over 300 dead in and near the trenches, among them being Crispulo Aguinaldo, a brother of General Emilio Aguinaldo. The engagement lasted two and a half hours without cessation, the Spanish loss being 9 killed and 108 wounded. This engagement is known as the battle of Anabo 11.

The division after a short rest, resumed the march upon Imus, bivouacking after marching only two miles. On the 25th, the division resumed the march in deployed formation and very soon came within sight of an intrenchment over two miles long, 6 feet thick, protected by cane fences, one of them being placed about 100 yards in front of the parapet. The centre made a direct attack, the wings executing flanking movements. The insurgents retained their fire until the Spaniards arrived within 200 yards and then opened with *lantacas* and small arms. The Spaniards, however, took the works, the insurgents losing some six hundred men. The advance upon Imus was resumed, but as the Spanish lines came within sight of the town their appearance caused a panic among the mass of people assembled there for the defense of the town and they took to flight in spite of the exhortations and remonstrances of Aguinaldo and Andrés Bonifacio. The former to cover his retreat, ordered the mag-

azine blown up and the town burned. While the device delayed the Spanish centre, the wings continued their advance and pouring in flanking fires on the panic stricken mob of insurgents, killed over 800 of them.

When Lachambre entered the ruins of the town, he caused the colors of the 74th regiment of native infantry to be raised upon the church tower in recognition of their splendid services, the troops presenting arms and cheering.

Thus fell the citadel of the Katipunan with a cost to the Spaniards of only 25 killed and 119 wounded.

General Polavieja considering the time most opportune for extending amnesty, on the 26th of March, issued a proclamation offering pardon to all who had been in arms against the Royal authority or who had assisted the insurrection, on condition that they presented themselves before Palm Sunday, April 11th; leaders to present themselves with their forces and arms.

On March 26th, the division advanced towards Bacoor intending to take the defenses of that place in reverse, a garrison being left in Imus.

The insurgents, however, were so disheartened by the fall of Imus, and by the overwhelming force in which the Spaniards advanced, that they abandoned Bacoor precipitately and the division occupied it without meeting any resistance. It was far different, however, with Binacayan, for on March 28th, Marina's Brigade, while attempting a reconnoissance in force, met with such a warm reception that Lachambre found it advisable to return to Bacoor without pressing an attack, as his troops would have to advance over narrow causeways through swamps and the resultant sacrifice of life would be great.

At Bacoor provisions and ammunition were received from Manila by sea, after which General Lachambre marched his division back to Imus.

On March 31st, the division left Imus at daylight, marching across country in a southerly direction and fording in their advance numerous streams which run at the bottom of deep ravines, and many irrigating canals and ditches in addition. The advance had not proceeded far, when the insurgents opened fire on the right flank of the column, the fire increasing in volume as the division advanced. It being necessary to improve the approaches to the fords of the Julian and Batong Dalig rivers, the Engineers did the work under fire. The leading brigade took several intrenchments with slight opposition, but the rear brigade had to fight a rear guard action, repelling at the same time attacks on both flanks. The division having arrived at Bacao, from which it could threaten the insurgent towns of San Fran-

cisco, Santa Cruz, Rosario and Noveleta, all within a short distance, bivouacked there, having lost during the day 6 killed and 37 wounded, while 400 insurgent dead were counted in the open, many others doubtless having fallen in the thick brush. At night the insurgents undismayed engaged the outposts and surrounding the bivouac, fired repeated volleys.

The next day, April 1st, the division crossed the Ladron river taking up a position in the centre of a large tract of rice fields, Noveleta being on the north, San Francisco on the south, Rosario and Santa Cruz on the west and San Antonio on the east.

After breaching the parapet of San Antonio with mountain guns, this place was taken by assault, the defenders who were not killed taking refuge in Noveleta.

The situation was now as follows: Arizon's Brigade threatened Noveleta, Mariana's Brigade threatened Rosario and Sarralde's Brigade attacked Santa Cruz, the baggage being in the centre and out of fire.

At this moment a dense mass of the enemy issuing from San Francisco, made a desperate attack upon the Spaniards nearest to them.

The whole of the division with its twelve guns, was now in action and surrounded by the enemy, Lachambre in the centre keenly watching the fight. When he judged the right moment had arrived, he ordered Arizon's Brigade to storm Noveleta.

The Brigade greeted this order with thundering shouts of "Viva España," and with the pluck that has always distinguished the Spanish soldier when well led, carried the intrenchments at a run, and fought a hand to hand combat with the defenders, who were either killed or driven out, notwithstanding that these were the very best of the insurgent troops amongst them being many of Aguinaldo's Guards, wearing a special uniform, some of them having served in the native regiments. Here, again, the 74th Native Infantry distinguished themselves by their remarkable bravery, and once more their colors were displayed from the church tower as a recognition of their valuable and loyal service.

The capture of Noveleta placed the division in communication with the marines occupying the intrenchments of Dalahican.

In this action the division lost 11 killed and 58 wounded, but many hundreds of the insurgents were killed.

As a result of the fall of Noveleta the insurgents abandoned Cavite Viejo and Binacayan, which were occupied the following day without resistance.

Nevertheless, the insurgents, on the 4th and again on the 5th, attacked the troops in Noveleta and sustained the combat for some time killing 10 and wounding 33 Spaniards, but leaving 50 of their own dead on the ground.

On the 6th, the division marched from Noveleta, in which a garrison of marines was left, and took the direction of San Francisco, the advance guard in extended order across the same open ground upon which the engagement of April 1st was fought. The insurgent positions on the right flank were marked by lines of skirmishers with their supports and reserves. The Tagals, had, however, inundated the part of this plain immediately in front of the town, and the advance was made with great difficulty; the guns and ammunition boxes having to be carried by the gunners with the assistance of the infantry. With undaunted bravery, the troops struggled on under a heavy fire, but Lachambre, realizing the difficulty and the danger incurred, changed the direction of the advance. The right wing under Arizon inclined to the right, and the left, under Marina, bore away to the left. Half a brigade crossed the River Ladron, notwithstanding the opposition of the insurgents, and attacked the town from the east. Firmer ground was soon reached, the guns that had been taken up with so much difficulty were mounted, and a rain of shell soon fell amongst the insurgents. The infantry poured in steady volleys, advancing in the intervals of firing. The whole combined attack being within a proper distance for the final rush, Lachambre gave the word, and like greyhounds released, the Spanish and native infantry leaped to the assault. The parapet was high and the ditch deep, for the defenders had not spared their labor on it, and as the Spanish line reached the edge, the rebels boldly mounted the parapet and discharged their arms at close quarters. In this critical moment the moral superiority of the white man once more was manifest. The Spanish troops reached the parapet and a hand to hand combat took place, the bayonet against the spear or bolo. The less determined of the enemy fled, and in a few minutes 120 Tagals lay dead against the parapet, and five guns and eighty rifles remained as trophies to the victors. The companies reformed for the pursuit, but the enemy fired the thatched huts to interpose a curtain of flame between them and their pursuers; a measure which was only partially successful, for some of the troops, nimbly darting through the lances, shot down or bayoneted many of the fugitives, killing 400 in the pursuit besides those who died in the intrenchments. The Spanish loss was 25 killed and 125 wounded, including several officers. The fighting had lasted four hours over very difficult ground, and the troops were exhausted. Lachambre therefore camped in the town, which had many

fine edifices and a spacious church and convent. The insurgents were under the command of Andrés Bonifacio, the president of the formidable Katipunan. This terrible blow to the insurrection was followed by the occupation of the towns of Santa Cruz and Rosario, without firing a shot.

Many of the natives had joined the insurrection under compulsion, and had long desired to submit themselves. Now they came in by hundreds every day to claim the amnesty offered by General Polavieja.

The campaign had lasted fifty-two days, fifty-seven combats had taken place, and the total loss of the division was 1 general, 14 officers and 168 men killed, and 56 officers and 910 men wounded. Probably a far larger number died or were invalided from disease, induced by the fatigue, exposure and privations inseparable from such a campaign, especially as most of the men were mere youths.

General Lachambre more than maintained his high reputation as a skillful and enterprising general in this campaign, receiving loyal and able support from his Brigade Commanders.

The officers and men maintained throughout a high standard of morale and discipline in spite of discouraging circumstances of climate and country. General Polavieja's plan of campaign appears to have been well considered and skillfully directed by him, and the result added more lustre to the Spanish arms than all the operations of his predecessor and of his successor; previous blunders and reverses in the Province of Cavite being more than compensated by his uniform successes in this territory chosen by the insurgents as the theatre of their greatest operations of war.

OPERATIONS ON OTHER LINES.

While the operations in Cavite were being conducted, General Jaramillo's brigade (3rd) fought several successful actions of a minor character in and about Bayuyungan, driving the insurgents from their entrenched positions everywhere in Batangas.

Also at Paso de Blas, near the boundary between Manila and Bulacan provinces, the column of Olaguer Feliu completely defeated an insurgent force.

Presentations about this time were numerous in Bulacan and elsewhere, in Manila over 3,000 families taking advantage of the amnesty, and Llanera's secretary presenting himself at the head of over 500 insurgents in Bulacan.

Numerous parties of insurgents were destroyed in Nueva Ecija and adjoining provinces.

In the province of Capiz, in Panay, a fanatic named Castillo led an uprising of the people, the town of Calvo being the centre of the movement, but this attempt at insurrection was quickly suppressed.

By a General Order, dated the 12th of April, 1897, a new distribution and reorganization of the army was directed by General Polavieja, and new commands formed with districts as follows:

TAAL BRIGADE.

Commander: GENERAL JARAMILLO.

TANAÚAN—BAÑADERO LINE.

Commander: LIEUT. COL. OF THE 11th BATTALION OF CAZADORES.

SILANG BRIGADE.

Commander: GENERAL SARRALDE.

SAN FRANCISCO DE MALABON BRIGADE.

Commander: GENERAL SUERO.

IMUS BRIGADE.

Commander: GENERAL PASTOR.

MILITARY COMANDANCIA OF THE DISTRICT OF MANILA.

Commander: GENERAL NUNEZ LUCIO.

(Includes all the southern part of the province of Manila, which has for its northern boundary the arm of the river which empties at Paranaque.)

COMANDANCIA GENERAL OF MANILA AND MORONG.

Commander: GENERAL ZAPPINO.

COMANDANCIA GENERAL OF THE PROVINCES
OF THE CENTRE OF LUZON.

Commander: GENERAL RIOS.

General Polavieja having applied to be relieved on account of sickness, the Madrid government designated as his successor General Primo de Rivera, Marques de Estella, the victorious General Lachambre being designated to exercise the functions of Governor General, etc., in the interval between the departure of General Polavieja and the arrival of General Rivera.

General Polavieja embarked for Spain, April 15th, and General Rivera arrived at Manila, April 25th.

On the departure of General Polavieja the situation may be briefly summed up as follows:

In the provinces north of Manila, the insurrection had almost been extinguished as with the exception of a few hundred insurgents who had retreated to their mountain fastnesses all armed resistance had disappeared.

To the south in Batangas and Cavite, the eastern part had been pacified, but in the mountainous western part from the line of the Pansipit river to Ternate on Manila Bay, the insurgents still preserved an organization, and so terrified by their threats the inhabitants of the mountain towns that they were afraid to take advantage of the amnesty, although elsewhere in Cavite on the 13th of April alone, more than 24,000 had presented themselves.

Among the more important towns that still remained in the possession of the insurgents in Cavite were Ternate, Naic, Maragondon, Magallanes, Bailen, Alfonso, Mendez-Nunez, Amadeo and Indang.

Shortly after his arrival, General Primo de Rivera issued a proclamation of amnesty which was to run till May 17th, the King's birthday, and then with his headquarters proceeded to Cavite to take the field.

The details of his plan of campaign were not given out and no official copy is available.

As has been said, the brigades which were to operate against the insurgent positions in Cavite were four in number, the fourth brigade under Jaramillo operating in Batangas and being charged with preventing the insurgents, when attacked in Cavite, from crossing the precipitous slopes of the Sungay and Tagaytay mountains, and also their passing the Banadero and Pansipit lines.

On the first of May, operations were begun in concert by the three Cavite brigades. The General in Chief with his headquarters and the troops to the number of 1,000 attached to the same, and accompanied by General Castilla, took up the march from Cavite to Silang, having as one of his guides the mestizo Cailles, who at the beginning of the insurrection was a general in the insurgent army, but who accepted amnesty after the taking of San Francisco de Malabon. In the second period of the insurrection and after the return of Aguinaldo from Hong-kong, Cailles went over again to the insurgents, but could attain only the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Pastor's brigade from Imus accompanied the Commander in Chief.

Suero's brigade marching from San Francisco de Malabon on the 3d, proceeded to invest Naic and after a brilliant attack, lasting three hours, captured that stronghold the same afternoon with a loss of 8 officers and 91 men wounded, the enemy losing 400 killed, a large number wounded, and 200 prisoners, besides a quantity of arms and ammunition. The defense of Naic was directed by Aguinaldo in person, who after the action fled towards Maragondon.

In the meantime General Ruiz Sarralde occupied Amadeo and General Pastor the barrios of Buena Vista and Alalang, all of which places the enemy abandoned after making a slight resistance.

From Alalang, the column of General Primo de Rivera marched to the attack of Indang, fighting four minor engagements en route and on the 11th captured this place, General Castilla conducting the attack while General Ruiz Sarralde's brigade flanked the position on the south.

In this engagement and the preliminary one of the 10th, the insurgents lost 300 killed. 12,000 natives took advantage of the amnesty in Indang.

General Ruiz Sarralde next occupied Mendez Nunez with slight resistance and Alfonso was similarly occupied.

For the operations against Maragondon three columns of attack were formed, one commanded by General Castilla, one by General Suero and the third by General Cardenas. The latter column embarked in ships and proceeded to Ternate where it landed and moved against Maragondon in order to take it in the rear, but finding the only bridge down over a river it had to cross, was delayed so long that it did not arrive in time to assist in the capture of the town, nor to cut off the insurgents in their flight, which was the principal duty assigned to it. Maragondon was taken May 11th by the forces of General Castilla, those of General Suero cooperating and General Primo de Rivera being present and directing the attack.

The Spanish loss was 23 killed and 115 wounded; that of the insurgents was very heavy, more than 200 being killed.

Aguinaldo assisted by some of the most notable chiefs of the insurrection, among them being General Emiliano Riego de Dios and his son Mariano, conducted the defense.

After the fall of Maragondon, General Primo de Rivera returned to Manila.

Ternate, Bailen and Magallanes were occupied later with but slight resistance and the last intrenched position of the insurgents being thus taken, all active opposition ceased and the province was declared to be conquered and pacified.

Jaramillo's brigade having performed the duty assigned to it very effectively on the Pansipit-Banadero line, extended towards Calamba with a view of preventing the insurgents escaping by way of the mountains towards Santo Domingo.

Cavite being thus reclaimed, General Primo de Rivera drew up a plan by which troops were to be so stationed and such other measures taken as would prevent a recrudescence of the insurrection.

The plan was well conceived, but was never put into effective operation and the troops without having remained long enough in their stations to accomplish anything permanent in the way of tran-

quilizing their various districts, were withdrawn to Manila on the 18th of May, leaving a single battalion under the orders of the Political Military Governor.

The Governor General wished to construct military roads from the coast towns to the towns of the interior and insisted upon employing native troops of the 73rd and 74th regiments for this work, and a number of these soldiers, dissatisfied with the hard labor imposed upon them, deserted.

After the withdrawal of the troops, the province was left in a demoralized condition and the Katipunans, seeing the time opportune, renewed their activities and formed plans to revive the insurrection.

Many of the surrenders, or presentations of prominent leaders had been made with the approval of Aguinaldo, so Spanish writers claim. Andrés Bonifacio, the President of the Katipunan, had long regarded Aguinaldo as his rival and had constantly striven to weaken his influence and to foment discord among his followers. Aguinaldo made him a prisoner and tried him by court martial for various offences, chief among which, according to Spanish writers, was the assassination of certain Augustinian and Recoletos friars, especially the parochial priest of Talisay, Padre Cadenas, to whom Aguinaldo professed to be strongly attached. Bonifacio was sentenced to be shot and was executed accordingly.

Aguinaldo was thus left without a rival of any importance and his authority was everywhere recognized by the insurgents.

THE INSURRECTION IN OTHER PROVINCES.

Aguinaldo, conquered in Cavite, took refuge in the almost inaccessible mountains immediately to the south and gathered about him many of the insurgents who refused to avail themselves of the liberal amnesty proclaimed by the Governor General.

In the districts bordering on Cavite and Manila provinces, the insurrection instead of dying out began to raise its head again. In Bulacan particularly, many insurgents appeared in arms, and frequent encounters occurred between them and the Spanish columns which had kept moving incessantly.

There were also parties of insurgents in Zambales and La Laguna, in Batangas, Bataan and other provinces.

Many insurgents from Batangas, Cavite and from the towns of Taguig and Pateros, Manila province, all under the leadership of Malvar, took possession of the ruins of Talisay on the northern border of the Lake of Taal, fortifying themselves as well as they could.

The place was attacked and taken by several columns which converged on it, the armed launches on the lake coöperating, on the 30th

of May. The insurgents suffered a heavy loss. Other intrenched positions in the vicinity were previously taken by the Spaniards and thousands of insurgents fled to the mountains and towards Silang and Amadeo; Aguinaldo fleeing by way of Bayuyangan to the mountains of Sungay.

FROM THE CONQUEST OF CAVITE TO THE END OF THE INSURRECTION IN 1897.

In the month of June, 1897, thousands of insurgents, who after being vanquished in Cavite and Batangas, had fled to the mountains and the adjoining provinces of La Laguna and Tayabas, including, according to Spanish accounts, many who had accepted amnesty, abandoned the provinces named and after effecting a concentration in the mountains of San Mateo, invaded Bulacan, and strongly reinforced the guerrilla parties in that province.

On the 10th of June, Aguinaldo passed over to Bulacan. He went by Paliparan and passing between Almansa and Muntinlupa accompanied by 500 men, crossed the Pasig river at Malapadnabato, a place between Guadalupe and the river, at the same time that a larger force marched by La Laguna to the mountains of San Mateo.

Aguinaldo crossed San Juan del Monte district within sight and hearing of Manila, and proceeding via Montalban and Puray, went directly to Biac-na-bató; neither he nor Llanera was at Puray during the engagement which occurred soon after.

On June 14th, the Spaniards had a bloody engagement with a host of insurgents of Puray, where the latter were strongly intrenched. The Spaniards failed in their attempt to drive the insurgents from their position and retired to Montalban and San Mateo with heavy loss, owing to the failure of Lieutenant Colonel Dujols to delay the attack until the arrival of the cooperating column commanded by Major Primo de Rivera.

The Spanish casualties were largely increased by an act of deceit practised by the insurgents, a party of whom dressed in Spanish uniforms and calling out that they were Cazadores were mistaken by Dujols' force to belong to Rivera's column. The Spaniards while thrown off their guard were suddenly attacked and suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded.

While there were numerous minor engagements, attacks and raids by insurgents on the towns and barrios in various provinces, no important action except that at Puray was fought in the month of June.

From the mountain fastness, in which he was ensconced in Bulacan, Emilio Aguinaldo, now installed as President of the Revolutionary Government with the additional title of Generalissimo of the Army of Liberation, proceeded to perform various acts of supreme authority.

He deposed from their offices Mariano Alvarez, Ariston Villanueva and Diego Mojica. He appointed as Vice President, his ex-Secretary of Grace and Justice, Mariano Trias, who remained in Batangas and Cavite at the head of a small insurgent force, and appointed to the latter office the Chinese Mestizo, Severino Alas. About the same time the priest Dandan was elected President of the Katipunan.

In the month of July, no actions of importance were fought, with the exception of one between the insurgents in Batangas and General Jaramillo's force at the barrio San Augustin, although there were numerous combats in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija between the Spanish flying columns and raiding columns of insurgents.

Miguel Malvar, the Chieftain of Talisay and ex-Capitan Municipal of Santo Tomas, Batangas, exercised command over the Batangas insurgents, while Llanera was the principal guerrilla chief in the centre of Luzon.

In the month of August, parties of insurgents sprang up in Cavite province evidencing that the fires of insurrection in that province had only been temporarily smothered and not extinguished. They were beaten and dispersed by the troops under the command of General Ruiz Sarralde.

In this month the insurgent hosts of Aguinaldo and Llanera made repeated attacks upon the town of San Rafael, Bulacan, but were repulsed, while in Batangas the forces of General Jaramillo dislodged the enemy from their intrenched position near Calaca, between Taal and Balayan. In La Laguna the Spaniards had several successful minor engagements with the insurgents, particularly on the 29th, between Alaminos and Calanang. In this province numerous parties of insurgents recruited in Biñan and neighboring towns, well provided with Remington and Mauser rifles, went about attacking barrios and haciendas but were frequently overtaken and dispersed.

In the month of September, a new military organization was put into effect for the provinces of Central Luzon, Major General Francisco Castilla being appointed to the command and establishing his headquarters in Nueva Ecija. 8,000 troops were assigned to the Comandancia General of Luzon. They were divided into two brigades designated as the northern and southern respectively, and sub-divisions of these brigades were assigned to specified zones of operation.

The distinguished Lieutenant Colonel Olaguer Feliu of the General Staff was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Division.

The insurgents being desirous of possessing themselves of the extensive granaries of Nueva Ecija concentrated for an attack on Aliaga, held by a small garrison which occupied a fort called Nozaleda, constructed by the commanding officer Major Caballos. The insurgents to

the number of 4,000 or 5,000 gained possession of the town and besieged the fort which was heroically defended. Three separate columns under the command of General Nuñez, Colonel Monet and General Castilla hastened to the succor of the garrison from different points in Nueva Ecija. General Nuñez arriving first, attacked vigorously the numerous intrenchments which the insurgents had thrown up about the fort but was repulsed, and being severely wounded turned over the command to Major Navarro. At this junction the column of Colonel Monet arrived and the latter assuming command of the combined forces, drove the insurgents from the barrio of Bacot and early the next morning (September 4th) attacked and drove them from their position at Aliaga, the enemy making slight resistance as their ammunition was exhausted. As Monet's forces entered the town the advance guard of General Castilla's column entered from a different direction. In this affair the Spanish loss was 1 officer and 44 men wounded.

In Pampanga, Tayabas, La Laguna and Batangas there were minor engagements in the month of September in which the insurgents were usually defeated.

In September, Colonel of Infantry Niceto Mayoral was installed as Civil Governor of Manila with a view of suppressing the operations of a band of kidnapers who were terrorizing the inhabitants and of breaking up the nests of conspirators who were plotting an uprising in the capital. In a few days he had discovered the haunt of the kidnapers, captured them and destroyed the barrio in which they made their headquarters. A few days later he captured a band of about 80 armed conspirators in a house on Camba street, in the barrio of Binondo, and on the 15th, captured the entire personnel of a heliograph corps counted on by the insurgents to establish communication with the insurgents in Biac-na-bató.

In the month of October, there were numerous minor engagements in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija. Also, at San Pablo in the southern part of La Laguna, a column of General Jaramillo's troops, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hernandez, in cooperation with a column commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Navas, defeated a large force of insurgents that had their rendezvous in Mount Maquiling.

The insurgents also attacked in force the town of Norzagaray, in Bulacan, but were driven off. On the 5th of October, the town of Baler on the Pacific coast, the capital of Principe, revolted and attacked the small detachment stationed there, which fortified the church and convent. A naval detachment sent from Binangonan, together with a similar detachment from the cruiser *Cebu* went to the relief of the besieged and after a desperate fight, the insurgents were defeated and Baler was restored to Spanish sovereignty.

General Polavieja, after the conquest of Cavite, had requested the home government to send him reinforcements of twenty battalions, in order to suitably garrison the positions captured and to complete the pacification of all the disaffected provinces. These had been refused him and General Primo de Rivera in his reports had stated that he needed no reinforcements and had disbanded the volunteers who, according to non-Spanish authorities, had committed many outrages and cruelties on the natives. By October many of the troops sent from Spain in the first months of the insurrection had become enfeebled by sickness and hardships and the necessity of additional troops was apparent.

As General Primo de Rivera could not consistently ask for reinforcements from Spain, he was compelled to again resort to volunteers. These by decree of the 16th of October were called for from the provinces of Luzon, the Visayas and the districts of Zamboanga, Surigao and Cagayan de Misamis. The decree called for two classes of volunteers, local and mobilized. The local volunteers were to be employed in the defense of their own pueblos and for patrol service. When in service they were to receive the same pay and allowances as native troops. The mobilized volunteers were to be armed, equipped and fed by the government and were to act in combination with the regular troops. They were to receive slightly greater pay and allowances than the native troops and those who remained in the ranks for more than six months were to be entitled to certain privileges, including exemption for themselves and their first born sons from military service, exemption for themselves and sons from the payment of taxes in kind and the payment of cedula, etc. Also certain land bounties were provided for in the case of both classes of volunteers and medals to commemorate their service. The age limits were 18 and 50 years. This call for volunteers was everywhere responded to with enthusiasm.

In the month of November, although there were the usual encounters all over Luzon, there were no military operations of any importance, except the capture of Camansi, or Sinukuan as the natives called it, which was an almost impregnable position of the insurgents situated at the point of junction of the three provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Tarlac, being a small table land on the top of a mountain, the slopes of which were densely wooded and very precipitous. The Spaniards made seven separate assaults on this intrenched position, charging up the slopes at an angle of 45° before they succeeded in carrying it. The forces on each side were about equal, numbering some 1500 and the insurgents left 93 dead on the field. The Macabebe volunteers, under Colonel Eugenio Blanco, particularly distinguished themselves.

In the month of December, 1897, General Primo de Rivera assembled a force of 8,000 men with which he invested the insurgents' stronghold of Biac-na-bat6, a mountain fastness close to Angat in the province of Bulacan and about 60 miles from Manila.

In order to obtain this force of 8,000 regulars without leaving exposed other strategic positions, the Governor General replaced the regulars in the positions from which they were withdrawn by 30 companies of volunteers.

Archbishop Nozaleda cooperated in the investment of Biac-na-bat6 by placing at the disposal of General Primo de Rivera between 20,000 and 25,000 men to carry supplies to the besieging army.

These men were adherents of the Church and were led to offer their service by the exercise of the Archbishop's influence.

In Biac-na-bat6, besides the insurgent troops, were assembled Aguinaldo and many of the officials of his government in addition to the principal military chieftains.

As the insurgent position was considered almost impregnable, being accessible only by a narrow pass, General Primo de Rivera had to decide to take the place by assault, with the probable result of heavy loss to the Spaniards; to starve its garrison into surrender or to accomplish the same result by negotiations. The last named policy was adopted, Pedro A. Paterno, a prominent and wealthy Filipino who had resided for a number of years in Madrid and who was ambitious of obtaining titles and other rewards for his services, acting as intermediary. The result was what was known as the Compact of Biac-na-bat6, which was signed December 14, 1897, by Emilio Aguinaldo and others on the part of the insurgents and by Pedro A. Paterno as attorney for the Captain General, acting in the name of the Spanish Government on the other part.

No official copy of this Treaty has ever been made public, but it is known that it involved the delivery by the insurgents of all arms and ammunition and the evacuation everywhere of positions held by them, and an agreement on the part of the Spanish Government to pay the insurgents certain sums of money, subject to certain conditions.

Aguinaldo and 34 principal men of the insurgents were to leave the Philippines and not to return without permission of the Spanish Government.

The insurgents stipulated that Lieutenant Colonel Primo de Rivera, should accompany Aguinaldo and his party to HongKong and that Generals Tejeira and Monet should remain in Biac-na-bat6 until information was received of the arrival of Aguinaldo's party in Hong Kong. These three officers had visited Biac-na-bat6 in connection with the peace preliminaries.

The insurgents have contended that certain radical reforms in the government of the islands were promised them, but the Spanish Government has denied that the treaty, or compact, as finally ratified contained such promises.

As a result of this treaty, peace was brought about for the time being and Aguinaldo with his 34 followers established themselves in HongKong, where one installment of money was paid them.

Senor Sastron, the Spanish author whose history of the insurrection is largely followed in this narrative, criticises his Government and more particularly Governor General Primo de Rivera, for concluding the insurrection by negotiation, claiming that the insurrection was at the time on the verge of collapse and should have been given its death blow with the sword, alleging that a peace brought about in the way it was, was no peace at all, and that although an act of magnanimity on the part of the Spanish Government, it was bound to be interpreted by the insurgents as a proof of weakness.

SITUATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMPACT OF BIAC-NA-BATÓ. BRIGANDAGE AND REVOLTS.

Generals Tejeiro and Monet were charged with arranging the details relative to making inventories of, and receiving the arms and munitions of war, to be turned over to the Spaniards by the insurgents, in accordance with the Biac-na-bató compact.

Sastron affirms he was never able to obtain any official statement of the arms, etc., delivered and suggests that possibly the information was not given out lest it might diminish the importance, in the minds of the people generally, of the result of the Biac-na-bató negotiations. With regard to the Artillery surrendered, he contemptuously describes it as composed of lantacas, and so-called cannon made of wood strengthened with iron rings and covered at the rear with carabao hides.

In several provinces the insurgent chiefs showed an unwillingness to surrender the arms of their commands and as the payment of the installments of money after the first was made conditional upon the delivery of all arms and the disbandment of all the insurgent organizations, Aguinaldo designated other chiefs to take charge in such provinces of the delivery of arms and the disbandment of the troops; General Ricarte being charged with this duty in Cavite, General Paciano Rizal in La Laguna and General Miguel Malvar in Batangas, while the Chinese General Paua was to accomplish this task in the other provinces.

Generals Tejeiro and Monet were commissioned by the General in Chief to go to the provinces of Cavite and La Laguna to receive the arms to be delivered in those provinces. In Silang and Maragondon, General Tejeiro received the arms and the submission of the insurgents commanded by Riego de Dios and Guillermo Bayan and in Indang of the Insurgents under Diego Mojica.

In the same town he received from Baldomero Aguinaldo the decree of the ex-president of the revolutionary government for the fulfilment of that condition of the Biac-na bató compact, relative to the denunciations as traitors of all who, having taken part in the rebellion, refused to lay down their arms and give an unconditional adhesion to Spain. In this decree Aguinaldo asked the Captain General to treat with the greatest rigor every individual or faction that should continue in arms in the province of Cavite.

At the same time General Monet received in La Laguna similar proofs of adhesion and homage to the cause of Spain and declared that the public spirit there was excellent.

In the town of Pagsanhan he received the arms of all insurgents commanded by Paciano Rizal, Tiño and Falcon, and the submission of these leaders and their forces.

Miguel Malvar presented himself with 500 men, but with only one hundred rifles and two antiquated cannon.

There were numerous other presentations of leaders with their forces and deliveries of arms in the other provinces lately in rebellion, in the month of January, 1898.

The insurgents having surrendered and delivered up their arms, or the most of them, began to look for some tangible proofs that the political reforms and correction of abuses which they had been led by their leaders to believe were promised at Biac-na-bató by the representatives of the Spanish Government, particularly in connection with the friars, would be put in operation. As time wore on and no such reforms appeared to be forthcoming and the other installments of money were not paid, their dissatisfaction and restlessness increased and in the month of February, roving bands of robbers, called *tulisanes* or *ladrones*, began to commit depredations in the central provinces of Luzon.

About this time, General Primo de Rivera sent back to Spain Colonel Diaz Matoni and the Marine Infantry under his command, thus materially reducing the number of Peninsular troops in the Philippines.

At the same time all the sick and the time-expired men were also returned but no application was made for troops to replace them and the Marine Infantry.

REVOLT IN ZAMBALES.

In the month of March, practically the entire province of Zambales, part of Pangasinan and several towns in adjoining provinces revolted. A half crazy fanatic named Gabino, organized a religious sect with a numerous following among the more ignorant and superstitious people, especially in Zambales and Pangasinan, and the arrest

of some of these by the authorities caused his followers everywhere to rise in arms, with the result that many towns were attacked and pillaged and numerous small detachments of Spanish troops overwhelmed and practically destroyed. The friars were the special objects of their vengeance and a number of parish priests were barbarously assassinated. One of Aguinaldo's former chiefs, Yocson, was said to have been the moving spirit in this uprising.

Troops under General Monet were sent to the scene. The rebels were everywhere defeated and the revolt suppressed.

In Ilocos Sur there was also an attempt at revolt in March which was soon suppressed.

GRAVE CONDITIONS IN BULACAN.

In the province of Bulacan the situation in March was very serious.

The cabecillas, or ringleaders of this province who were in Hong Kong with Aguinaldo, had appointed deputies to exercise their authority and these proceeded to organize lodges of the Katipunan throughout the province, and to install officials who in every town terrorized the loyal natives, while marauding bands wandered about pillaging and assassinating.

The battalion of Rural Police, whose creation had been authorized, had not entered upon their duties and the small detachments of soldiers scattered throughout the province were not strong enough to take the offensive.

REVOLTS IN THE VISAYAS.

In the month of April, extensive revolts occurred in the Visayas inspired by Tagalogs, especially in the Island of Cebu. On the 3d, the natives of the capital, Cebu, arose in arms and compelled the Political Military Governor, General Montero, with his small force of 40 men and all the Europeans of the city to take refuge in the old fort, or cotta, where they were besieged.

General Montero managed to dispatch steamers to Iligan and Iloilo, to communicate thence with Manila, asking for reinforcements and supplies. Two companies were immediately dispatched from Iloilo and succeeded in adding themselves to the besieged, who, however, were still too weak to take the offensive. As soon as information of the revolt reached Manila, the Captain General dispatched to Cebu reinforcements consisting of 31 officers and 754 men under the command of General Tejeiro, who was well acquainted with the country, having formerly commanded there. They were transported on the steamer Churruca and the cruiser Don Juan de Austria.

The rebels made a stubborn defense but were finally completely routed and the city restored to Spanish control. In the meantime, however, the flames of revolt had spread to the whole island and General Tejeiro had to dispatch four columns to operate against the rebels. These succeeded in defeating the latter everywhere and in the latter part of April the island was declared pacified, although General Tejeiro found it advisable to leave a small flying column in each of the four zones, into which he had divided the territory. On the 22d of April he returned to Manila, having been designated as Chief of the General Staff of the Army in view of the approaching war with the United States. Before leaving Cebu he dispatched some troops to Iloilo on account of the threatening condition of affairs in Panay, and a company to Bohol in view of the incipient uprising in that Island.

In Panay the insurgents dominated Antique and Capiz provinces and it was found necessary to assemble in Iloilo, the capital, the parish priests and the civilians of Spanish birth.

On April 9th, Lieutenant General Basilio Augustin arrived in Manila Bay to assume the functions of Governor General of the Philippines and Commander in Chief of the Army.

On the 10th he assumed command, relieving General Primo de Rivera, who two days later embarked for Spain.

General Augustin was ignorant of the actual conditions prevailing in the islands and understanding that the insurrection was entirely ended he brought his family with him and permitted them, shortly after his arrival, to accept an invitation from the Blancos to visit them in the interior at Macabebe.

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR UNTIL THE RETURN OF AGUINALDO TO THE PHILIPPINES.

On April 22, 1898, news was received in Manila that a state of war between the United States and Spain existed since the 21st instant.

One of the immediate results of this information was that many of the principal Filipinos hastened to proffer their services to the cause of Spain, included among them being many of the late insurgent leaders, who had not accompanied Aguinaldo to HongKong, such as Mojica, Trias, Pio del Pilar, Riego de Dios and Ricarte.

What was of greater importance to the Spaniards, however, was that many parties of natives who, whether they were regarded as brigands or insurgents, had for some time been openly in arms, immediately laid aside their factious attitude and manifested a disposition to return to their allegiance in the hour of trouble of the mother country. In spite of the small number of Spanish troops and the deplorably weak defensive conditions of the islands, the Government

felt confident that with the people of the Philippines once more loyal, nothing was to be feared from a hostile invasion. Still there were many who mistrusted the sincerity of this new attitude of the Filipinos and when after the destruction of the Spanish squadron in Manila bay, and the surrender of the Arsenal of Cavite to the Americans, mobs of natives pillaged and sacked the latter place, possessing themselves of the arms stored there, this suspicion became almost a certainty.

When later the city of Cavite was evacuated by General Peña, who transferred his troops to San Francisco de Malabon, making that town the new capital of the province, armed mobs of natives invaded and pillaged Cavite, terrorizing such Spanish families as still remained there.

In the meantime the Governor General had assembled a "Council of Authorities" to devise measures for the public safety, among its members being Archbishop Nozaleda, the Provincials of the Religious Orders, the Civil Governor of Manila, the Alcalde of the City, the Assessor of the Army and the Captain of the Port, besides military officers of high rank.

After several sessions in which there was a radical difference of opinion as to the propriety of the measures, it was decided to recommend the creation of a "Consultive Assembly" in which prominent natives were to be representatives of the people, and also the creation of a Filipino militia, to supplement the regular troops.

The organization of native militia was what certain members of the Council of Authorities described as "playing their last card."

General Augustin concurred in these recommendations and on the 9th of May issued two decrees to carry them into effect.

The native members of the Consultive Assembly were announced to be the following:

Knight Grand Cross, His Excellency, Don Pedro A. Paterno, Don Cayetano Arellano, Don Isaac Fernando de los Rios, Don Joaquin Gonzalez, Don Maximino Paterno, Don Antonio Rianzares Bautista, Don F. H. Pardo de Tavera, Don Manuel Genato, Don Gregorio Araneta, Don Juan Rodriguez, Don Bonifacio Arevalo, Don Ariston Bautista, Don Jose Luna Novicio, Doctor Don Jose Lozada, Don Ricardo Esteban Barretto, Don Teodoro Gonzalez, Don Pantaleon Garcia and Don Pedro Serrano.

It was also intended to add later twenty more natives of the better class from the provinces.

The native militia were organized according to zones, each zone containing a certain number of companies, each company being composed of 3 sections of from 30 to 50 men each, the chiefs of the zones being natives with the rank of Field Officers. The organization and

arming of these native militia proved to be a grave error—"the last card played and lost"—for in a few days after the native commanders had sworn loyalty to Spain, these chiefs, with rare exceptions, went over to the insurgents carrying their troops with them.

FROM THE RETURN OF AGUINALDO TO THE PHILIPPINES TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE FILIPINO INSURRECTION AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES.

On May 19th Aguinaldo arrived in Manila bay on the U. S. dispatch boat McCullough. He shortly after landed at Cavite and issued a proclamation, dated May 20th, addressed to the "Revolutionary Chiefs of the Philippines", in which he exhorted them to bring about a general uprising of the Filipinos against the Spaniards, fixing noon May 31st, as the hour for the revolt to begin.

He also enjoined the seduction of the force of native Infantry from their loyalty.

This was shortly followed by other decrees in which he announced the formation of a Dictatorial Government with himself as Dictator, and provided rules for the conduct of the war, enjoining that the methods of civilized warfare be strictly followed, referred to the beneficent intentions of the United States and denounced the death penalty against all emissaries of the Spanish Government who should attempt to communicate with the insurgents, except formally under a flag of truce, etc.

According to Sastron, intelligence of these proclamations and of the proposed uprising did not reach the Spaniards generally until after the uprising was an accomplished fact, but Aguinaldo's return having been discovered May 27th, General Augustin, on Felipe Buencamino's suggestion, sent him to confer with Aguinaldo, the result being that Buencamino shortly went over to the insurgents.

SURRENDER OF GENERAL PEÑA AND HIS COMMAND TO THE INSURGENTS.

General Peña, on evacuating Cavite, retired to the coast towns of the province, occupying a line running through Bacoar, Cavite Viejo, Noveleta, Rosario and Naic his headquarters being at San Francisco de Malabon. The Naval forces of the Arsenal and the Marine Infantry were at Binacayan and Parañaque.

General Peña found it necessary to fortify his positions, but was unable to obtain any native laborers, although prepared to pay punctually. Having found it necessary to withdraw the Marine Infantry from the strategic position of Binacayan to reinforce other points, General Peña urgently requested from Manila reinforcements of 200 men for Binacayan, but they could not be spared.

Although Aguinaldo had indicated the 31st of May as the day for the general uprising, before that day attacks were made on Imus, Bacoor, Cavite Viejo, Binacayan and Los Pinas.

General Augustin attempted to throw a column of 500 men into Imus but they were unable to reach their destination, nor could the Captain General communicate with General Peña at San Francisco de Malabon. In the meanwhile insurgents were flocking into Cavite from the other provinces of Luzon.

On the last of May the general uprising appointed by Aguinaldo occurred. The positions held by General Peña's force were everywhere attacked by overwhelming forces and capitulated successively after making a stout resistance; General Peña and his entire command of 2,800 men becoming the prisoners of the insurgents, and the whole province of Cavite falling into their possession.

According to Sastron the insurgents gave their prisoners such scanty rations that many soldiers went about the streets begging, whilst others in order to secure better treatment performed domestic service for natives, who delighted to parade the streets followed by Peninsular Spaniards as servants.

This author also testifies that the surgeons of the American fleet were untiring in their attendance upon the sick and wounded Spaniards in the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, Cavite, and also that the commanders of the American ships, particularly Captain Coghlan, frequently visited them and kept them supplied abundantly with wines, biscuit, etc.

Aguinaldo's government finding the number of prisoners in Cavite province excessive, sent a large part of them to Bulacan, in which province the insurrection had made very rapid progress.

DEFECTION OF BUENCAMINO. REVOLT IN PAMPANGA.

The important line between Bacoor and the Zapote River was under the general command of Colonel Pintos of the Spanish regulars and temporarily on the 31st of May under that of Pio del Pilar and Buencamino, who commanded a force of the newly organized Filipino militia known as the "Anda Salazar" Tercio, Buencamino commanding the contingent at Bacoor. When the general uprising of May 31st occurred, Buencamino passed over to the insurgents carrying with him the three-fourths of the tercio commanded by him, and Pio del Pilar, who had in the affairs immediately preceding the 31st, fought valiantly for the Spaniards and who was under orders to take charge at Malibay and Pineda, also passed over to Aguinaldo. The Spanish contingent of regular troops retired to other points and the insurgents possessed themselves of the whole Bacoor-Zapote line. The loss of this important line was a

fatal blow to the Spanish prospects as was the defection of Pilar, who had an extensive acquaintance and great influence with the natives in the zone he defended, as well as in Santa Ana, Pasig and Taguig and also in Malibay and Pineda.

The Spaniards having lost the Bacoór-Zapote line it was an easy matter, while the American Squadron blockaded Manila by water, for the insurgents to closely invest the city by land, completely isolating it from the other provinces, and this they promptly proceeded to do.

On the first of June the town of Mexico in Pampanga, revolted, followed in a week by every town in the province except Macabebe, the home of the ever loyal battalion of that name. This town was enabled to withstand the insurgent attacks until the 3rd or 4th of July.

A column of Spanish troops under General Monet, which had for some time been operating in central Luzon, had about this time numerous encounters with the insurgents, particularly at Angeles and Bacolor.

Captain General Augustin attempted to concentrate in Manila Monet's column and the detachments of Spanish troops scattered over the central and northern provinces, but none of them were able to comply with the order.

General Monet fought his way to Macabebe with his 700 men with a view of rescuing from their peril the family of General Augustin, who were still in this besieged town.

He there placed the family of General Augustin and the wounded in the merchant steamer Mendez Nuñez, which, raising the Red Cross flag and aided by a fog, succeeded in reaching Manila without being discovered by the American Squadron. General Monet and the officers of the General Staff then embarked in a small boat and also succeeded in reaching Manila. Before leaving Macabebe he directed that the men be placed in cascoes and most of the officers on the gunboat Leyte and turned over the command to the next in rank. Lieutenant Colonel Dujiols remained with the troops in the cascoes which were towed by the Leyte.

When the American cruiser Concord was sighted, the cascoes were cut loose. The Leyte was seized by the Concord and all the Spanish officers on the former were made prisoners.

In the meantime the cascoes drifted helplessly about and Lieutenant Colonel Dujiols and one other got into a small open boat, which appears to have been with the cascoes, and leaving the latter made their way to Manila to report the condition of affairs, arriving there June 30th. In the meantime the cascoes containing the men were blown ashore near Hagonoy and Bulacan and all were made prisoners by the insurgents.

PROCLAMATIONS BY AGUINALDO.

On the 9th of June, Aguinaldo, as dictator, issued a decree announcing that on the 12th a proclamation would be issued from Cavite Viejo, declaring the Philippines to be independent, and followed it with other decrees prescribing the machinery of civil government. Military chieftains were not to intervene in the government and administration of the provinces, except under exceptional conditions of war.

Aguinaldo sought in every way to create the impression that all he did was with the approval of the Americans, and about this time Buencamino, now closely associated with Aguinaldo, addressed a letter to General Augustin in which occurs the following:

“Manila being hemmed in by sea and land, without hope of aid from any source, and Senor Aguinaldo being inclined to make use of the squadron to bombard the city, I do not know frankly of any other issue than death, since Your Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians frenzied by battle, drunk with triumph and blood, would produce a hecatomb from which would be spared neither women, children nor priests, especially the friars.”

In an extended postscript he added:

“We have then, at this date seven provinces with various seaports, such as Taal, Batangas, Balayan, Cavite, Subig and Mariveles, and three steamers with various launches and many vessels to keep up communications, aside from using the North American Squadron whenever we desire.”

Buencamino concluded this epistle by advising General Augustin to capitulate before he was reduced to the necessity of yielding himself to the Tagalogs, who completely surrounded the city.

On June 23rd, Aguinaldo issued a decree changing the designation of his government to “Revolutionary Government” and announced an intention to establish a “true republic”. He also provided for a Congress and organized a Cabinet.

THE LAST DEMANDS OF THE REFORMISTS.

By authority of the home government General Augustin had already implanted what he considered as two important reforms; viz. the Constitutive Assembly and the Filipino Militia. But the reformist party was by no means satisfied with these measures alone, and on the 13th of June when recent events had made the outlook for the Spaniards much gloomier, a commission of the most prominent Filipinos headed by Pedro Paterno and Jose Lozaga appeared at General Augustin's palace, the Ayuntamiento, and presented a demand for certain such radical reforms as to constitute practically autonomy.

In his extremity General Augustin agreed to grant whatever they desired on the sole condition that the commission should succeed in inducing the rebel Tagalogs to lay down their arms.

It was too late. Aguinaldo had met with such triumphant success that when the commission of reformists presented themselves before him, bearing the conditions upon which autonomy would be granted, he absolutely rejected them, and several of the commissioners considering that their duty was fulfilled when they presented the propositions in question, gave in their adherence to the cause of the insurrection.

ASSEMBLY OF THE SICK AND WOUNDED IN MANILA.

On June 18th, Aguinaldo sent a letter to General Augustin offering to deliver up to him the Spanish sick and wounded in the Cavite hospital. General Augustin made no reply to this letter but the next day sent a commission of military surgeons in vessels furnished by "Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas". This commission first called upon Admiral Dewey and afterwards on Aguinaldo, and the latter not withdrawing his offer, 185 sick and wounded were transferred from Cavite to Manila. The insurgents also permitted the sick and wounded to be taken from the Guadalupe hospital which had fallen into their hands, and as those from the San Pedro Macati hospital had already been gathered in, there were assembled in the Walled City more than 3,000 sick.

THE SPANISH PRISONERS OF ISLA GRANDE.

On July 7th the bark *Compania de Filipinas*, flying the insurgent flag, appeared in Manila Bay and equipped herself with cannon obtained from Cavite Arsenal.

This vessel had been directed by her owners to proceed from Cagayan, where she was, to Formosa to avoid capture by the American Squadron. In two hours after leaving Aparri the crew revolted under the leadership of the second engineer, a Cuban, and seized the ship, the Cuban becoming Captain of the ship and later styling himself Admiral of the Filipino Squadron, which in those days consisted of some steam launches, called *Taaleno*, *Balayan*, *Taal*, *Bulusan* and *Purísima Concepcion*, each of which had been equipped with one or two guns of 7 or 8 centimetres taken from the destroyed Spanish ships.

Aguinaldo directed the *Compania de Filipinas* to proceed with insurgent troops to Olongapo, and when she arrived, the naval garrison of that place, under the command of Captain Julio del Rio of the Navy, was found to be assembled on an Island, *Isla Grande*, or *Malakit*, in Subig Bay. The insurgents demanded their surrender and when this was refused, prepared to bombard them. At this juncture

the German warship Irene appeared in the bay and ordered the Compañia de Filipinas to lower her strange flag. The latter vessel without making any explanation left the bay and returned to Manila.

The Irene after leaving some supplies with the Spaniards, took off the women and children to Manila. Forty eight hours afterwards two American warships appeared in Subig bay and after demanding the surrender of the Spaniards on the island, which was refused, bombarded them. The Spaniards soon raised the white flag and surrendered. The Compañia de Filipinas shortly afterwards returned to Subig bay. The Spanish prisoners were placed on her and turned over to the insurgents on the beach of Olongapo. The insurgent commander of this zone sent most of the 635 Spanish prisoners thus received into the interior, leaving 52 at Olongapo. Among the 52 were a number of friars. These latter, according to Sastron, were made to act as carabaos by hauling carts loaded with rice.

INSURGENT ATTACKS ON MANILA.

The exterior line of Spanish defense of Manila extended from the small fort of San Antonio Abad, on the shore of Manila bay just south of Malate district, around to the Bocana de Vitas on the bay shore north of the Tondo district, and consisted of a line of blockhouses and small forts with connecting lines of intrenchments. It was held by a force of 6,750 men. There was also an interior line of defense held by about 1,000 men and in addition the batteries of the Walled City.

As soon as the insurgents possessed themselves of Cavite province and the Bacoor-Zapote line, they invested the city of Manila from shore to shore of the bay, throwing up a line of intrenchments paralleling the Spanish exterior line. They made repeated assaults upon points of the latter line and although repulsed with loss, they daily advanced their works nearer the Spanish line. These attacks continued at intervals for about eighty days, when on August 13th, Manila was captured by the land and naval forces of the United States, the insurgents being kept back and not being allowed to enter the Walled City; although, following the Americans closely, they succeeded in entering and occupying several points in the suburbs of the city.

It would appear that in the latter part of July the insurgents, becoming distrustful of the Americans, attempted to intrigue with the Spaniards, possibly it may have been simply an attempt to trick the latter. At any rate, according to Sastron, Captain Acevedo commanding an advance post which had been repeatedly attacked by Pio del Pilar, the insurgent general commanding in his front, received from the latter a note of which the following is a translation:

"Sr. D.F. Acevedo Macati, 30th of July, 1898.—My very dear friend: I inform you that yesterday I had a conference with my chief, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, who told me that on Monday, the 2d of August next, the attacks of the Americans against you will begin without fail.

Therefore my said chief charges me with saying to you and to all who shelter themselves under the Spanish flag, that you should have no fear and should not become disheartened, but that on the contrary you should fortify your hearts in your struggle and make yourselves strong and should not give way before their cannon.

Furthermore, if for example, you concentrate all your forces in Manila and abandon Santa Ana, and it be possible to cede it to me, I will establish myself there with my Army.

PIO DEL PILAR."

On the 5th of August, General Augustin, who had on July 25th, cabled the Madrid government that "There is no possibility of resisting without reinforcements" received a cablegram from Madrid directing him to turn over the supreme command to the Segundo Cabo, General Fermin Jaudenes and the latter was in command when the capitulation occurred.

INSURGENTS OBTAIN POSSESSION OF ALL LUZON EXCEPT MANILA.

PROVINCES OF CAVITE, LA LAGUNA, BATANGAS AND TAYABAS.

After the uprising in Cavite under Trias, the militia of this province and of the adjoining province of La Laguna went over to the cause of the revolution, those of La Laguna succeeding in seizing at the same time the Spanish Colonel Perlas, who commanded there.

The Spanish Commander, Colonel Naval, ordered the concentration of all the detachments at the capitals of the provinces of Batangas, La Laguna and Tayabas, but his plans were disconcerted by the desertion of the soldiers of the 73d regiment (native) carrying with them the Civil Guard and the Rural Guides. Colonel Navas arrived at Lipa en route to the city of Batangas to find that the last native troops faithful to the Spanish cause, had revolted and placed themselves under the Municipal Captain of Tanaúan. Also that the Spanish force of 500 men under Lieutenant Colonel Blazquez, which had gone to Batangas, had surrendered to the insurgents. Navas therefore intrenched himself in Lipa where he was soon besieged by thousands of insurgents, the latter having 4,000 rifles and two guns.

Finally his rations and ammunition being nearly exhausted and having 110 wounded and 80 sick, he capitulated with honors to the insurgent chief, Marasigan de Calasa.

In Morong, the capital of the Morong district of La Laguna province, 100 Spaniards bravely defended themselves from June 1st to August 19th against a host of insurgents, when their rations, ammunition and medicines being exhausted, they were compelled to surrender.

All the detachments in La Laguna, except a detachment of 60 at Calamba which surrendered to 400 Tagalogs under Paciano Rizal brother of the deceased Doctor José Rizal, succeeded in concentrating in Santa Cruz, the capital of La Laguna, to the number of 600 or 700 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Alberti of the 12th Cazadores, the Civil Governor, Don Antonio del Rio, cooperating in the defense.

The insurgents to the number of 10,000 under their leaders Tiño, Cortes, Talcon and others, General Paciano Rizal being in supreme command, besieged Santa Cruz from June 24th to August 30th, making repeated combined attacks but always being repelled. On the 30th of August, Manila having fallen 17 days before, and the outlook being desperate, the Spaniards accepted the favorable terms offered and capitulated, surrendering at the same time the gunboats Otalora and Oceania.

In Tayabas, the capital of the province of the same name, Major Joaquin Pacheco of the Infantry, Civil Governor and Military Chief of the province, with 443 men sustained a siege of 56 days making a most brilliant and heroic defense against overwhelming odds but finally being compelled to surrender unconditionally. Nevertheless the insurgents accorded them the honors of war, the insurgent general Malvar saying in an address to his troops that "the heroism of its (Tayabas) defenders was the admiration of the revolutionary army."

AMBOS CAMARINES AND SORSOGON.

In Nueva Caceres, the capital of North and South Camarines, the civil guard revolted, wounding their commander and assassinating Captain Andren, his wife and four of their eight children, and also Lieutenant Montiel and his wife. A few Spaniards escaped and the rest surrendered, but a large number of prisoners who had been confined in the prison being liberated, assassinated entire families of the Spaniards. The few who had escaped from Nueva Caceres, together with the fugitives from Sorsogon, succeeded in reaching Legaspi where they were permitted by the insurgent chief to depart for Manila in the steamer Santander.

NORTHERN PROVINCES OF LUZON.

In all the northern provinces of Luzon the small detachments of Spanish troops being attacked by overwhelming numbers of insurgents with no possibility of succor, were compelled to surrender, a considerable force under command of Major Argues, however, surrendering without much resistance at Bagui to the insurgents under Tiño, who commanded in Ilocos Norte.

The whole of Luzon, except Manila, therefore fell into the possession of the insurgents, soon after the capture of the capital of the Archipelago by the Americans.

A single exception, however, must be made. A small detachment of Cazadores of the 2d battalion, commanded by Captain Enrique de las Morenas, political military commander of the district, and Lieutenants Alonso and Martin, made a most tenacious and heroic defense of the post of Baler, on the Pacific in the district of Principe, for over a year after the fall of Manila and after the Spanish General Rios, by an arrangement with Aguinaldo's Government, had twice sent an officer to inform them of the uselessness of further resistance as Spanish sovereignty no longer existed in the Philippines, and ordering them to return to Manila. When finally convinced that General Rios had really sent such orders, the survivors yielded and returned to Manila to receive the plaudits of Spaniards and Americans alike.

INSURGENTS POSSESS THEMSELVES OF MINDORO.

The few Spanish troops in Mindoro concentrated in the capital, Calapan, but were compelled to surrender to an overwhelming force, the whole island falling into the control of the insurgents; and some civilians who had been unable to reach Calapan, being barbarously murdered.

INSURRECTION IN MINDANAO AND THE VISAYAS.

After the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, the government of the latter country cabled to General Diego de los Rios, at the time in charge of the Commandancia General of Mindanao, to take over the command of the Visayas, also investing him with the title and attributes of Governor General and Captain General, and later, on June 30th, enlarged his functions and authority, enjoining him to adopt such measures and reforms of a political or administrative character as would conduce to the welfare of these provinces and to the maintenance of the sovereignty of Spain and the defense of the integrity of the territory. These measures were necessary as General Augustin, shut up in Manila, could exercise no control over affairs in these distant islands.

As General Augustin had lost control of the cable he could not communicate direct from Manila to Spain. Therefore General Rios established and maintained for four months a cable service via Labuan, sending vessels there, which, eluding the vigilance of the American ships, transmitted thence his dispatches on the state of affairs to Spain and returned with replies.

General Rios was unable to strip Mindanao altogether of its garrison because of the ever turbulent condition of the Moros. He

therefore left there such detachments as he thought would suffice to keep in check the latter, and taking 100 European and 700 native troops of the Mindanao command, he proceeded to Iloilo, Panay, and established there the seat of government. He found in the Visayas 3,000 native troops and 250 European soldiers, most of the latter being sick.

With this force of 350 Spanish and 3,700 native troops he addressed himself to the performance of the task assigned him.

As the insurrection had already extended to the Visayas, General Rios, on assuming command, found it necessary to reduce revolted towns and to combat numerous parties in the field. The revolt was so general in the province of Capiz, Panay, that 15,000 insurgents had concentrated there in April.

General Rios entirely destroyed the town of Panay, Capiz, which had been taken by the insurgents and conducted such an energetic campaign that until the end of October insurgent uprisings were smothered as soon as initiated.

Until information was received by General Rios of the Peace Protocol of August 12, 1898, he daily anticipated the arrival of the American Squadron to take Iloilo. At this time he had in the capital, according to Sastron, only 2 pieces of mountain artillery, 300 Spanish soldiers and 2,500 native, many of the latter being disposed to desert at the first opportunity. This author relates that General Rios, in view of his scanty means of defense, determined to burn the city as soon as the enemy should attempt its capture. He therefore stored a large quantity of petroleum in the four principal points of the city and putting a military engineer in charge of each depository instructed them to fire the city at each point as soon as the enemy's troops attempted to disembark or his ships to bombard the place. The inhabitants having previously abandoned the city, the troops after crossing the bridges were to destroy them and take up a defensive position on the left bank of the river.

It did not become necessary for the Spaniards to thus burn the town but the insurgents later did, using, according to Sastron, the Spanish deposits of petroleum, just as General Rios planned to.

Soon after entering upon his duties as Governor General, General Rios attempted certain measures of a political character in the hope of retaining the loyalty of the natives by promising them reforms. He therefore convened a Junta, or Assembly, of the principal Europeans and natives in order to make use of their influence with the natives at large, among them being Romero Salas, Gay, Melliza, Castillo, Mapa and others. He issued an appeal to the natives offering to submit to the Spanish Government all the reforms which were con-

ceived to be necessary for the development of the resources of the country and for the welfare of the people. He also appealed to the authorities of every class, urging them to conduct themselves in their public and private capacities with strictest regard to justice and morality.

It was too late.

After the capture of Manila, the insurrection in the Visayas developed rapidly. The greater part of the native troops of the Visayas and Mindanao had to be disarmed and discharged very rapidly, after about 117 had been shot to death for being implicated in conspiracies which were opportunely discovered in Cottabato, Malabang, Iligan, Iloilo and Cebu.

This energetic proceeding greatly restrained the insurrectionary movement and resulted in saving the lives of many Europeans scattered in small groups throughout the Visayan provinces and in the districts of Mindanao. It became necessary to assemble all the troops considered loyal, as well as all the Europeans, in the Visayas, in the two cities of Iloilo and Cebu.

At Iloilo General Rios had only 1200 soldiers and three small gunboats. With earth works connected with intrenched houses, General Rios constructed a line of defense from the sea where that flank was supported by the gunboats, round by the Iloilo river to beyond Molo. This line, rendered stronger each day by new defensive works and established at a distance of from 5 to 6 kilometres from Iloilo, rendered the city secure from insurgent attacks, and although myriads of insurgents, having among them approximately 10,000 rifles, repeatedly attacked the line, they were always repulsed with heavy loss.

Iloilo was held by the Spaniards until December 24, 1898, on which date General Rios, in compliance with cable instructions sent from the Spanish Government, December 20th, evacuated the city; and the Iloilo command, troops at Cebu, and the public functionaries and Spanish private citizens of both these cities, were all concentrated at Zamboanga, Mindanao, preparatory to their return to Spain.

The Spaniards had previously offered to allow United States troops to occupy Iloilo, relieving the Spanish garrison, and about December 13th a petition was received at Manila by Major General Otis, the United States Military Governor, signed by business men and firms in Iloilo, asking for American protection.

There was some delay in obtaining from Washington authority to send troops to Iloilo to preserve peace and protect life and property, and when the troops sent arrived in Iloilo bay, December 28th, the insurgents were found in possession of the city.

General Rios' instructions from Madrid required him to send back to Spain all the Spanish troops under his command, but he did not at this time think himself authorized to withdraw the garrison from Jolo in the Jolo Archipelago, under the command of General Huertas, because of some considerations of international law, so Sastron explains.

In the month of March, 1899, the Spanish authorities, according to General Otis' report for the year 1899, advertised the sale of thirteen gunboats at the Naval Station of Isabela, on Basilan Island, a short distance south of Zamboanga.

These gunboats had been used by the Spaniards in policing the coasts of the southern islands. The gunboats were purchased by a syndicate of private individuals with the understanding that it would deliver them to the United States authorities in the harbor of Manila, the agent of the syndicate being promised escort by the U. S. Navy after he had obtained possession of the vessels. After the transfer from the Spanish authorities to this agent was effected, he steamed out of Isabella harbor and awaited near Zamboanga the arrival of his escort. There was for some reason a delay in the arrival of the latter, and twenty four hours before the United States warship did arrive, the insurgents of Mindanao seized the vessels and after stripping them of about one half of their armament abandoned them.

By this seizure the insurgents came into possession of a few pieces of Artillery, 11 quick firing guns, 375 rifles and a considerable amount of ammunition for all guns and rifles.

With these guns and arms the insurgents later, during the absence of General Rios, who had gone to Manila to complete arrangements with the United States authorities for the repatriation of all Peninsular Spaniards, attacked the Spanish troops in Zamboanga, and although repulsed, mortally wounded the General in command, Montero, besides killing and wounding a number of others.

On May 19, 1899, in virtue of an agreement between the United States and Spanish authorities, United States troops arrived at Jolo and relieved the Spanish garrison there, under General Huertas, which then proceeded to Zamboanga, from which point all the troops which had recently garrisoned the Visayas, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, returned to Spain.

SPANISH PRISONERS OF THE INSURGENTS.

At the end of the year 1898, the insurgents had in their possession approximately 11,000 Spanish prisoners, about 9,000 of whom were officers and soldiers and the remainder civil officials and employees with their families, and a number of friars. Most of these prisoners were kept in the remote mountain districts of Northern Luzon, although there were small contingents in Southern Luzon.

General Rios after superintending the embarkation for Spain of his troops at Zamboanga, proceeded to Manila to arrange, if possible, for the liberation of these prisoners but was unable to make any progress in the matter, although various Spanish organizations and individuals, especially the Spanish Consul in Manila, Don Luis Marinas, assisted him in every possible way.

Finally General Nicolas Jaramillo, president of the "Commission for Selection and Transportation of War Material," undertook serious negotiations with the so-called Filipino Government, and sent, with the approval and assistance of the United States authorities, several commissions to treat with Aguinaldo for the liberation of these prisoners. They were all unsuccessful, principally on account of the impracticable conditions insisted on by Aguinaldo's government.

General Jaramillo succeeded in inducing the insurgent General Trias to release unconditionally about 197 officers and soldiers detained in Tayabas and the Camarines, but the great majority of the prisoners owed their final liberation to the rapid advance of the United States troops in northern Luzon, the insurgents being compelled in their hasty flight to abandon their prisoners. A large number also owed their liberation to similar operations of United States troops in southern Luzon.

It is a matter of dispute as to whether these prisoners received as humane treatment at the hands of the insurgents as was practicable to accord them. While some were well treated, many undoubtedly were subjected to great hardship and suffering and many hundreds died as a result.

Sastron affirms that 115 were deliberately killed with machetes in the Camarines.



APPENDIX VIII.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH ON THE WALLS OF MANILA, P. I. AND SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THE ENGLISH IN 1762.

Compiled and written under direction of Major General GEORGE W. DAVIS, U. S. Army, by Major JAMES C. BUSH, Artillery Corps, and Captain A. C. MACOMB, 5th U. S. Cavalry.

PART I.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE WALLS OF MANILA.

In May, 1570, Captain Juan Salcedo, the grandson of Legaspi the conqueror, was despatched from Cebú to the Island of Luzon to reconnoitre the territory and bring it under Spanish dominion.

It appears that a few soldiers under Martin de Goiti, who afterward over-ran the Pampanga country, accompanied Salcedo to the north. Goiti was killed as *Maestre de Campo* during the attack of the Chinese in 1574.

They were well received by the native chiefs Lacondola, Rajah of Tondo, and his nephew, the young Rajah Soliman of Manila.

The sight of a body of European troops armed as was the custom in the 16th century, must have profoundly impressed these chieftains; otherwise it seems hardly credible that they should have consented, without attempt at resistance or protest, to give over their land, yield their independence, and become the subjects of an invading foreigner.

A treaty of peace was signed, and ratified by an exchange of drops of blood; promises of rewards made to the Lacondola family, under oath; together with a remission of tribute in perpetuity.

Legaspi being advised of what had occurred in Luzon, proceeded to Manila, took formal possession of the surrounding territory, declared Manila to be the capital of the Archipelago, and proclaimed the sovereignty of the King of Spain over the whole group of islands.

Gaspar de San Agustin, writing of this period says: "Legaspi ordered the natives to finish the building of the fort in construction at

the mouth of the Pasig so that His Majesty's artillery might be mounted therein for the defense of the port and town. Also he ordered them to build a large house inside the battlement walls for Legaspi's own residence, and another large house and church for the priests, etc. Besides these two large houses he told them to erect 150 dwellings of moderate size for the remainder of the Spaniards to live in. All this they promptly promised to do, but they did not obey, for the Spaniards were themselves obliged to complete the work of the fortification."*

The City Council of Manila was constituted on the 24th day of June, 1571. 1570 would, therefore, appear to be the date of the inception of Fort Santiago and the walls of Manila. These primitive works were built of timber. The first stone walls raised on the enceinte owed their origin, it is believed, to the efforts of the Governor, Santiago de Vera. Perez Dasmariñas, who arrived in 1590, continued and improved these walls and also completed the erection of the stone Fort Santiago.†

These erections were probably hastened by the events of 1574, the period when the possession of the Islands was unsuccessfully disputed by a rival expedition under command of a Chinese, Li-ma-hong. His fleet consisted of 62 war junks, having on board 2,000 sailors, 2,000 soldiers, a number of artisans, and all that could be carried with which to gain and organize a kingdom.

*There exists a tradition, the main elements of which seem sufficiently well authenticated, that a palisaded fort, or cota, had been built on the river side some time before the Spaniards came, and that this fort was armed with bronze guns, the art of casting having been derived from the Japanese or Chinese with whom the Tagalos had considerable intercourse.

Padre Juan de la Concepcion writing in 1788 says (page 398, chap. IV, part II, vol. 1, History of the Philippines) "The Maestre de Campo, Goiti, made a landing with 80 men, after turning over to Captain Salcedo the command of the fleet and the rest of the forces. He then attacked a palisaded fort situated on the river bank and armed with twelve good pieces, which were being excellently handled by the Moros of the fort. He directed his men to take careful aim at the men working the guns, and so well was this done that the chief gunner, who seemed to be a European, together with others, fell dead. The Moros abandoned their artillery and Goiti was able to engage in a hand to hand fight with the enemy. Both sides fought with desperate valor but the heavy mortality finally caused the enemy to show their backs, and flee, closely pursued by our men who were at their heels. In the meantime the Indians who were friendly to the fleet had set fire to the town of Manila; though it is also said that this was done by the inhabitants for the purpose of destroying the spoil, believed to have been considerable, which would have fallen into the hands of the Spaniards but for this circumstance. During the entire fight the house of the old Rajah bore a little white flag in proof of his pacific intentions and that he not only kept out of the fight himself, but that he had not consented to any of his partisans engaging therein."

(This fight occurred May, 1570. Montero y Vidal, page 36, vol. 1, says the chief gunner was a Portuguese and that the old Rajah was Lacandola.)

The use of the word "Moro" and the designations Rajah and Soliman indicated a condition, also sufficiently established; namely, that certain of the Malays, professing the Mohammedan religion had formed a settlement at or near Manila; and that this religion had obtained a hold upon the people.

Most of the natives of these islands are of Malay origin and certain of them as in Mindanao to-day, are of this religion. J. C. B.

† Montero y Vidal states, Vol. 1, p. 100, that these works were constructed under the supervision of the engineer Leonardo Iturriano between the years 1590-1593.

On the 29th of November, 1574, the squadron arrived in the Bay of Manila, and Li-ma-hong sent forward his Lieutenant—Sioco, a Japanese—at the head of 600 men to demand the surrender of the Spaniards; who, refusing to give credence to reports and alarms, found the Chinese within their gates before resistance could be offered.

By daybreak, December 3rd, Li-ma-hong disembarked 1,500 men who advanced in three divisions under the leadership of Sioco. The city was set on fire, and the enemy moved upon the fort while the fleet supported the attack.

Sioco at length entered Santiago, and a hand-to-hand fight ensued. For a time the issue seemed doubtful, but Salcedo finally gained the victory and pursued the Chinese, who, harassed on all sides, fled in disorder to their ships.

By royal decree, King Philip later directed that the City of Manila be fortified in a manner to ensure it against all further attack and uprisings.

Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, the next Governor, brought with him from Spain the Royal Instructions to carry into effect the above decree. Hence the work began in 1590, and continued under many Governors till 1872. As this construction was carried on during different periods, often far apart, the building was not executed, therefore, according to any uniform plan. Evidence of this is clearly apparent not only in the character of material employed, but in the varied and various systems of fortification represented, thus rendering the enceinte a most interesting study. Earth, brick, and volcanic tufa appear to be the materials used; brick for facing embrasures and parapets, earth and tufa for walls.

By this same decree the number of European troops in the colony was fixed at 400 men-at-arms, divided into six companies, each under a captain, a sub-lieutenant, a sergeant, and two corporals.

Recruits from Mexico were not to enlist under the age of 15 years.

The Captain-General was allowed a body guard of 24 halberdiers under the immediate command of a captain, the whole forming a strange force for so large an undertaking.

History records that in the year 1603, two Chinese Mandarins came to Manila as Ambassadors from the Emperor to the Governor-General of the Philippines. These officials shortly returned to their own country. But the greatest anxiety prevailed in Manila where rumors circulated that another Chinese invasion was in preparation. The natives openly avowed to the Chinese, who had entered the country in large numbers, that whenever they saw the first signs of a hostile fleet arriving they would murder them all. The Chinese were accused of secreting arms; the cry was falsely raised that the Spaniards had fixed a day for their extermination; they daily saw weapons being cleaned and put in order.

There was, in short, every circumstantial evidence that the fight for their existence would ere long be forced upon them. In this extremity they were constrained to act on the offensive, and finally on the eve of St. Francis' day, the Chinese openly declared hostilities and threatened the city. They totally defeated the Spanish force sent against them, killed ex-Governor Dasmariñas, and encouraged by this first victory, besieged the city. After a prolonged struggle they were defeated, and obliged to yield. It is estimated that 24,000 Chinese were slain or taken prisoners in this revolt.

Further wall building followed.

Juan de Silva executed certain work on the fortifications in 1609; which was improved by Juan Nino de Tabora in 1626; and again improved by Diego Fajardo in 1644, the erection of the San Diego bastion being completed in that year. This bastion formerly called *Fundición* or *Foundry*, and situated at the extreme southern angle of the enceinte—facing bay and land—appears to have been the first of the large bastions added to the encircling walls; then of no great height nor of finished construction.

Buzeta, writing in 1851, declares Diego to have been the only fort existing on this part of the line for some time after its construction. In trace it appears to exemplify the method of Errard de Bar-le-Duc, the engineer of Henry of Navarre (about 1606). The shape of the bastion very much resembles that of an ace of spades; its orillons or curved corners (ears) masking small pieces of ordnance placed on the drawn-in flanks; and sometimes on the ears themselves, to defend the ditch.

One marked characteristic of this earlier work, as regards trace, results from placing the flanks of bastions perpendicular to the curtain—the portion of wall joining two bastions.

Previous to 1645, when Count de Pagan of France published his treatise; which contained the development of a system that in a short time entirely superseded those of his predecessors, all bastion flanks were placed either perpendicular to the faces of the bastions themselves or to the curtain wall. This last condition is exemplified in all the work on the Manila enceinte built before 1739.

Pagan made the flank perpendicular to the line of defense—the line joining the curtain angle of one bastion with the salient of the next—in order as much as possible to cover the face of the opposite bastion.

Vauban, 1633-1707, "followed up the principles suggested by Pagan and employed them extensively, with consummate skill and judgment." An example of his first method appears upon the walls later on.

Jose Torralba erected another flanking element close to the Almacenes gate on the Pasig river side (1715). This flank defense fell

about 1796 to make way for the new front of that date; and the Almacenes gate and the curtain wall on Calle de la Maestranza have very recently, 1903, been demolished to afford more room near the Muelle de Almacenes (storehouse wharf).

In 1729, Governor-General Fernando Váldez y Tamón restored the walls, which were afterward heightened by Juan Arrechedera in 1745. The inscription over the portal inside Fort Santiago clearly proves that Váldez y Tamón had made certain additions to this fort, and the walls in general, during the restoration in question. And it seems equally certain that Fort Santiago and the curtain walls on the west, or bay side, and the east, or land side, remain to-day every much as Tamón and Arrechedera left them.

Certain detached redoubts and one modern bastion have been added to these two fronts, but the scarp remains otherwise practically unchanged. (See photograph of map.)

The work of Váldez y Tamón and Arrechedera completes the wall construction under old school methods; the methods of the Italian masters; of Errard; and the "Compound System" of de Ville (1629), which united the methods of the Italian and Spanish schools. An examination of the wall at the end of this period cannot be without interest and the map of Váldez y Tamón (photo. map) affords a clear idea of its condition.

La Real Fuerza de Santiago (The Royal Stronghold of Santiago) as Dasmariñas left it, consisted of a castellated structure, without towers, trapezoidal in trace, its straight, grey front projecting into the river mouth. Arches supported an open gun platform above, called battery Santa Barbara—the patron saint of all good artillerymen. These arches formed casemates which afforded a lower tier of fire thro' embrasures. Curtain walls of simplest character, without counter forts or interior buttresses, extended the flanks to a fourth front facing the city.

Váldez y Tamón seems to have added, at a lower level, a large semi-circular gun-platform to the front, and another of lesser dimensions to the river flank. The casemates were then filled in, and embrasures closed. He also changed the curtain facing city-ward to a bastion front on a system prior to that of Vauban. A lower parapet bordering the interior moat connects the bastion salients.*

* FORT SANTIAGO, MANILA. Montero's "Historia de Filipinas," Vol. II, page 29, footnote 2, gives a description of this Citadel of the former Spanish power in the Orient, the same being an extract from the voluminous final report of the Governor and Captain General of the Philippines, Don Fernando Valdés y Tamón, rendered to the King of Spain in the year 1739, when the Governor being about to conclude his occupancy of the office, was no doubt preparing to return to Spain.

The original report makes reference to various plans and maps which accompanied it. Unfortunately these interesting papers are not at hand; though it is

Appended is a photograph of the quaint 16th century gateway, recently restored, opening upon the exterior Plaza de le Fuerza.

Leaving this plaza, whose ramparts have been changed since 1739 to form a sort of extension of Fort Santiago, we come upon a line of wall facing the bay, without interior buttresses, and of the same simple construction as the curtain in the fort.

The tracing shows a cross section of the rampart, moat, and covered-way recently taken at the west end of Calle Aduana. Neither this moat nor covered-way existed in 1739, but the curtain wall remains essentially

believed that the Map of the City of Manila which was drawn up during Governor Tamón's term of office and is referred to in this report, is identical with the Map of Manila carried to England by General Draper after his successful siege of Manila in 1762.

This copy of Tamón's map is now deposited in the British Museum in London; it has been photographed on a reduced scale, and Mr. Pardo de Tavera has brought to Manila one of the photographic copies.

The date of execution of the original map is not included in the legend it bears, but it is considered safe to assume that this date was 1739, such being the date of the report which no doubt this map accompanied:

"Report rendered by order of His Catholic Majesty (God guard him) giving the fortress, citadels, forts, and penitentiaries under Royal charge in the provinces of the Philippine Islands, with plans of the same, and exact information as to armaments, garrisons, pay, rations, and stores for their maintenance; gross expenses for the year and gross income, together with the sources from which obtained. Together with a description of all the provinces, with notes as to important and curious matters, and a review of what they produce for the Royal Treasury.

"There is also herewith an account of the expense of holding and maintaining the same, made by Field Marshal D. Fernando Valdés y Tamón, in whose charge is the government of these islands, year 1739.

* * * * *

"The fort has a perimeter of 2,030 feet and it is of a nearly triangular form, The south front which looks towards the city is a curtain with a terreplein, flanked by two demi-bastions; having also a lower and a more advanced rampart with a ditch connecting with the river; near the beginning of the north face there has been built instead of a bastion, a cavalier with three faces of batteries, one looking seawards over the anchorage place, one facing the entrance, and the third looking upon the river. The latter is united with a tower of the same height as the walls, through which there is a descent to the water battery placed upon a semi-circular platform; thus completing the triangular form of the fort.

"The walls are pierced for the necessary communications; the principal entrance being in the south wall and facing the city, the communication with the river and the sea being by a postern gate.

"The foregoing description can be better understood by reference to the plan which also gives the guard stations together with the barracks of the troops of the garrison and quarters of the warden and his subalterns.

"The reduced scale of the plan prevents the showing with clearness other constructions, such as the chapel, various storehouses, the powder magazine, the bombproof, the sentry towers, the cisterns, etc.

"ARTILLERY, MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED WITH THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT
FOR THEIR USE.

4 Bronze	2 pounder.	1 Iron	3 pounder.
2 "	4 "	1 "	4 "
1 "	6 "	1 "	5 "
3 "	8 "	1 "	6 "
1 "	10 "	2 "	16 "
3 "	16 "	2 "	25 "
8 "	18 "	4 "	32 "
3 "	20 "		
4 "	25 "		

Total 29

Total 12

the same. The masonry simply forms a retaining wall for a terrace of earth in the rear—a rampart without other parapet than a breast-height wall, one and one-half feet in thickness. This same general construction obtains, with certain exceptions, throughout its length from Calle Aduana to San Diego bastion. Four small bastions of ancient work, evidently added to the original wall, still exist on this front. Of these, two have the northern flank, and one, near Santiago, the southern flank half again as long as the other, thus producing a curtain line *en crenailere*.

That these bastions were not a part of this particular wall as at first built can hardly be doubted. They differ in construction and it is certain that the old north front possessed no bastion prior to the one erected by Torralba in 1715. The same condition unquestionably obtained on the western side where the indentations (*en crenailere*)

MUNITIONS.

1534	Cannon balls (iron) for guns listed above;
1	Mortar (bronze) using a ball of 300 pounds;
95	Muskets;
85	Carbines, matchlock short;
3414	Musket balls for use with same;
161	Grenades;
80	Bar-shot;
118	Cutlasses, boarding pikes, daggers, crowbars, handspikes and shot-tongs;
80	Linternas (lanterns?) with arrangement for making fire;
200	Arrobas (5000 lbs) powder.

"The authorized garrison of the fort is composed of one company of Spanish Infantry commanded by the warden, who, by His Majesty's order has one lieutenant, one adjutant, one ensign, one sergeant, and five minor officers, being an orderly, a flag bearer, fifer and two drummers, with sixty soldiers, and one gunner, with twelve artillery-men. The laborers are native Pampangos and are organized as a company of infantry, with a captain, ensign, sergeant, and the three minor offices of standard bearer, fifer and drummer, and ninety soldiers of whom three are in receipt of good conduct pay.

"The pay and rations of the regular garrison are distributed monthly and are as follows:

OFFICERS.

Warden.....	66½ pesos (net.)
Lieutenant.....	15 "
Adjutant.....	5½ "
Ensign.....	4 "
Sergeant.....	3 "
Constable of Artillery.....	4 "
Captain of Pampangos.....	6 "
Ensign.....	2½ "
Sergeant.....	2½ "

SOLDIERS.

The sixty Spanish soldiers the twelve artillerymen, standard bearer, fifer and drummers.....	2 pesos.
The Pampangos soldiers and those in minor office....	1½ "

"The total annual pay of the garrison amounts to 4,595 pesos in money and 1,219.5 fanegas (1,824.3 bu.) of rice, with which all are rationed, all of which is paid from the Royal Treasury and storehouses of Manila."

* * * * *

This description of Fort Santiago and its armament in 1739 is of interest in connection with the accounts of the British Siege of Manila which took place some twenty-three years later, as it is believed the armament was practically the same at both periods.—A. C. M.

afforded the only flank defense until Silva and Tabora executed their projects 1609-1626, by adding bastions at these points.

Differing entirely from the others, the primitive character of this front points to considerable age, which idea is confirmed by the size and shape of its bastions. Small and narrow in plan, with flanks considerably longer than the faces, and standing perpendicular to the curtains, they answer in description to that of the old bastions of the Italian masters, of which those by Micheli on the enceinte of Verona, 1523, are supposed to be the oldest extant. Micheli's bastions are small, with narrow gorges and short faces, and are placed at great distances apart; it being the invariable practice when they were built, and for a considerable time afterward, to attack the curtains, and not the faces of the bastions.

On the east front bastion building slowly progressed, and before 1739, two others appeared, San Andrés and San Lorenzo, similar in plan to San Diego, evidently a part of Fajardo's project (1644).

A fourth bastion with perpendicular, straight flanks joined itself to the north-east angle. This also still exists but greatly changed by subsequent engineers.

Neither the west nor land rampart affords other than a single tier of fire from open batteries.

Of the original north front little remains, this work having been entirely remodeled at the end of the 18th century. It consisted of a simple wall on an indented trace, without bastion till 1715.

Tartaglia, an Italian master, first described the covered-way in 1554, so that it must have been used at a much earlier epoch of Italian fortification.

It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that so little work of this character appears on the map of Váldez y Tamón.

An estuary limited the city on the east and south-east, and this appears to have been excavated, in part, forming a rude moat; beyond which a low wall, constituting a line of redans, with a place of arms opposite the old Real gate, extended from San Diego bastion to San Andrés. A short line of similar construction was built opposite San Gabriel bastion, north-east angle. To further develop the land front and prevent approach by the beach, a low battery, San Gregorio, had been built to the south of San Diego. This, however, played no particular part in the siege by the British (1762), and has since been demolished; the statue to Legaspi and Urdaneta now occupies its site.

The first regular military organization in these Islands was formed in the time of Pedro de Arándia (1754), who established one regiment composed of five companies of native soldiers, together with four companies which had arrived with the Governor from Mexico. Each

company numbered three officers and 106 men. This corps, afterward known as the King's Regiment (Regimiento del Rey), was divided into two battalions, each being increased to ten companies as troops returned from the provinces. During May, 1755, four artillery brigades were added to the establishment.*

There were 16 fortified outposts in the Provinces, including Zamboanga, besides the Camp of Manila, Fort Santiago, and Cavite Arsenal and Fort (1757).

This fairly represents the military situation at the time the British laid siege to the city in 1762.

As a result of the "Family Compact" and the consequent effort to diminish the power and prestige of Great Britain, war was declared by this power against France and Spain.

The British were successful everywhere. In the West Indies, the Caribbean Islands and Havana were captured with great booty by Rodney and Moncton, whilst a British fleet was dispatched to the Philippine Islands with orders to take Manila.

The evening of September 22, 1762, a British squadron of 13 ships under command of Admiral Cornish, entered the bay. Brigadier General Draper disembarked his troops next day at Fort San Antonio Abad, a bridge head about $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles south of Manila. His demand for surrender being refused, the British advanced through Malate and Ermita, the Spaniards retiring within the Walled City. The force available for attack consisted of 1500 European troops (one regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery) about the same number of sepoys, together with 700 sailors and 300 marines from the fleet. The defense could dispose of about 600 men of the King's regiment and 80 pieces of artillery with a few artillerymen, 300 Spanish militia and an unlimited supply of undisciplined natives.

The English frankly disregarded the strict rules of attack as understood in those days, and advanced to within about 250 yards of the walls where were two churches which they seized and fortified.

One, San Juan de Bagumbayan, formerly stood near the present site of the headquarters Post of Manila and the other called Santiago, not far

* Field Marshall Pedro Manuel de Arándia y Santestaban was Governor and Captain General of the Philippines from July, 1754, until his sudden death, May 31, 1759.

He was active and intelligent, doing much to organize the military forces in the islands, especially at Manila, and generally improving the city. It is particularly worthy of note that Governor Arándia was aware of the imperiling of the defense of Manila by the existence of various convents and churches outside of, but within close cannon shot of, the encircling walls of the fortress. He issued orders for the demolition of these structures, but from the bitter controversy this brought on with certain religious orders, the removal of the edifices was delayed until the sudden death of the Governor on the night of May 31, 1759. His successor does not seem to have pushed the point of the removal of these buildings, and so they remained; and by the counter defense they afforded the English in their attack upon Manila in 1762, the fortress was breached near the San Diego Bastion and taken by assault.

from the north band-stand on the Luneta. Behind and near this latter edifice were placed the mortar and breaching batteries. (24 pdrs.)*

The Spanish batteries on San Diego and San Andrés opened fire the 24th but with little effect. Sorties proved unsuccessful. The admiral placed his flagship opposite San Diego and stationed others off the mouth of the Pasig to fire on Santiago and the town. The breach in San Diego wall widened day by day and the defense grew hopeless. Matters reached a crisis when the natives refused to repair the fortifications, a hard labor the Europeans were unable to endure in this climate, under the circumstances. On the morning of October 6th, the breach having been reconnoitered and found practicable, a storming party of 400 men led by Major Fell found the breach unguarded and were able to advance unopposed up Calle Real, the street now known as Palacio. The Archbishop-Governor signed the capitulation the same day.†‡

* Referring to the photograph of Váldez Tamón's map: at "a" was the Carranza Battery, sometimes called San Gregorio; at "m" were placed the 24 pdr. breaching guns; at "b" was Santiago Church; while San Juan de Bagumbayan Church stood at the corner in front of the Real Gate; marked "S. Juan" on map; "d. d." indicates a line of stone houses fortified by British.

A reading glass brings out the word "breached," written by some one of General Draper's command, opposite the salient of San Diego. Just below "m" on the map is other writing in English indicating position of guns.

This map bears the stamp of the British Museum; shown in photograph just below Fort Santiago.

It is believed that General Draper made the map a part of his report and that his was a copy of the one which accompanied the report of Mariscal de Campo D. Fernando Váldez Tamón to the King in 1739.

‡ For a detailed account of this siege see translation of the Chapter of Ayerbe's work devoted to this subject; appended hereto. This of course represents the Spanish side.

The author of this monograph has taken his material from both Spanish and English sources.—*J. C. B.*

‡ England declared war against Spain, January 2, 1762, and Charles III, King of Spain, in due course made similar announcement.

The Philippines being at that time governed through the larger Colony of Spain or Mexico, all official news and practically all business was conducted through that country, following the route Madrid, Cadiz, Vera Cruz, Mexico, Acapulco to Manila. This in the days of slow sailing vessels required a voyage of some five months, and in case of unpropitious winds the time might extend to seven. Had due diligence been observed in notifying Manila of the existence of war between Spain and England, the warning should have reached its destination by the end of June, 1762.

Spain's naval force in the Pacific was then, as always, weak, and it is altogether probable that at the time in question there was no ship at Acapulco that could be spared to carry dispatches. Probably too, no particular heed was given to the Philippines as they were a source of expense, and possession of them had been retained principally on account of the influence of the various religious orders who had made extensive and permanent establishments there. But it is difficult to believe that unofficial notice of the coming of the English had not reached Manila in the summer of 1762. In fact Montero in his "General History of the Philippines," Vol. II, page 12, speaking of this time, says: "Some Armenian merchants who had come from Madras informed the Archbishop (of Manila) of the preparation at that point of an expedition for the purpose of taking Manila. A Christian had also received by letter the same notice, and the Agustinian Friar, Cuadrado, had received a letter speaking of the declaration of war between England and Spain.

The improbability of any relief being sent to Manila in case of need, should alone have kept its armament and forces at a strength to discourage any attack which it would be profitable to send against it. A constant preparedness for war was indicated for Manila, Spain's most westward possession, in a century when

The Treaty of Paris (January, 1763) took no account of the Philippine situation, and Spain found herself again in possession; and again the walls received the attention of her monarch.

The bastions, San Diego and San Andrés, with the curtain rampart, had received considerable damage during the siege, which had also developed certain weaknesses in plan.

Accordingly we find the engineer, Miguel Antonio Gomez, submitting a project for the required repairs and innovations; certain of which were approved by the royal order of November, 1766.

The Real or Royal Gateway then opened at the south end of what is now called Calle Palacio. It was the gate leading to the palace, and through which the old Governors and Archbishops made their state entries into the city. The bombardment had injured it, and for military reasons it was transferred to the middle of the curtain between San

war was more common than peace; and at a time when England, never really friendly to Spain, had, by vanquishing the French in India, placed her flag over that country in undisputed possession. And in truth Manila, even so far back as 1739, was prepared to withstand an attack. At that date the distinguished soldier who was governor of the Philippines, Field Marshal Valdés y Tamón, had completed Manila's walls and placed upon them a number of cannon sufficiently strong for the period.

The walls of his time were but little changed when the assault came some twenty-three years later. A distinguished successor of his, Field Marshal Arándia, became governor of the Philippines in July, 1754; he seems to have examined carefully the defenses of Manila and approved of them; but not considering the garrison of the fortress sufficiently strong nor sufficiently well paid, he applied himself with energy to the organization of a suitable force. By December of that year, he had formed the "Regiment of the King," consisting of two battalions of ten companies each; each company consisting of one hundred men and three officers. This force was formed from five companies that the General found scattered through the islands, and from four companies he had brought with him from New Spain or Mexico; the additional material being Spaniards found in the islands, and natives of undoubted loyalty.

He also organized four detachments of artillery of some thirty odd men each, with station in Manila; and established a school for instruction and exercises in the use of the cannon and mortars. The entire force was in an excellent condition by May, 1755, and though not always concentrated in Manila was never further away than Zamboanga.

The walls of Manila (see map of Manila, herewith appended) form a figure that may be roughly described as an acute triangle, the base being to the south and extending east and west perpendicular to the shore of Manila Bay; and the point occupied by the Citadel, Fort Santiago, being to the north in the angle formed by the junction of the Pasig River with the Bay. The west face being nearly on the Bay shore, offered no foothold for a hostile landing, and was protected from a heavy concentrated fire from a fleet by the shallowness of the bay within good cannon shot of the wall. The northerly and eastern side was protected very well by the Pasig River and a wide muddy estero, or slough, that followed along the walls. The southern face was the line of danger, and no natural obstacle protected it. The wall here was reasonably strong and occupied a line some 500 yards long, between the bastion of San Diego at the west and San Andrés at the east.

A hostile expedition would naturally land south of the city of Manila where plenty of ground is available for camping purposes; and the march towards the city would be unimpeded by any natural obstacle such as hills or rivers. Both the English expedition of 1762, and the American expedition of 1898 landed here.

In considering the defenses of the city of Manila in 1757 and 1758, General Arándia noted the existence of several religious edifices outside of, but within close cannon shot of the walls. Two of these establishments were near the south wall, and were an evident danger to the defense of Manila as their construction was massive, as was customary with the churches and convents throughout the Spanish Colonies.

One of these was the church of Santiago, distant some 230 yards southeast of the San Diego bastion; the other was the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan,

Diego and San Andrés, where it now stands. A demi-lune redoubt, under which the present roadway inconveniently runs, protects the entrance, and is undoubtedly the work of Gomez, as are the other detached redoubts on this front.

The new Real gate was built so narrow as to render it unsuitable for further formal entries, and these were made thereafter through the Parian gate; the street from thence being renamed Real which it still retains.

The Parian redoubt seems unquestionably the work of Gomez, as was certainly the reconstruction of the right face and flank of the San

about equally distant from the San Andrés bastion, in a direction a little east of south, and approximately some 400 yards from the San Diego bastion. Governor Arándia decided that these two establishments were, from their position, a constant menace to the city's defense, and he therefore ordered their demolition. The order brought on a bitter controversy with the religious orders; and while the dispute was still in progress and the Governor had only succeeded in having a number of the trees near these institutions removed, he died on the night of May 31, 1759.

His death was a loss to Spain, and the controversy with the Church authorities had been so bitter, that it seems to have been decided to leave the control of the islands in the hands of the Church dignitaries; and with this view no governor and captain general was appointed until after the English had captured the city. Under the rule of the Archbishops, the question of destroying any Church buildings was abandoned; and both the church of Santiago and that of San Juan remained to furnish the English strong emplacements for their batteries, and protected points from which to breach Manila's wall. During the rule of the victors, which lasted from their taking of the city in October, 1762, until they sailed away in the early part of 1764, both of the offending churches were removed. The English rightly deemed their continuance a danger; especially when their own forces by the departure of part of the fleet, and from sickness, death, and desertion had become reduced.

Under the rule of the Church officials, the garrison of Manila fell off materially in numbers and apparently in quality; while the fixed armament of the walls fell into ineffectiveness. When the time of trial came, there was no military chief to build up a force to use the munitions of war prepared by the preceding governors; such force as existed in Manila was disorganized, and apparently without the knowledge to use effectively the numerous guns of position.

From these causes and the continued existence of the churches near Manila's south line, the enemy was enabled to concentrate his fire upon the San Diego bastion from the absurdly short distance of 280 yards; and at his leisure batter it into powder with his 24-pounders.

The English expedition appears to have been in the nature of a bargain with the East India Company; and the attack on Manila was no doubt urged by that grasping Corporation in hopes of large booty, and future commercial advantages. The plan seems to have been for England to employ her fleet already in Indian waters; and the Company to furnish the greater part of the land forces.

As ordered from the English War Office, the Expedition was to consist of six ships-of-the-line, five frigates, and four troop ships, with some five thousand men for land service to be picked up in Madras. Brigadier General William Draper, R.A., was sent out from England to command the land forces, while Admiral Samuel Cornish, already commanding the fleet in Indian waters, was to retain command of the fleet.

The troops gathered at Madras consisted of one regiment of infantry, and two companies of artillery—all Europeans, with some 800 to 1000 Sepoy riflemen and an equal number of Sepoy laborers; part of the expedition consisted of men from the French troops recently vanquished in India and disbanded. Spanish historians state that there were 350 men of this description with the English, and that their presence was hardly a strength, as they were looking for an opportunity to desert to the enemy—that is the Spaniards—during the attack on Manila.

It is regretted that no English publication treating on events of the year 1762 is at hand. But it is apparent that the English, from the weakness of the defense, due principally to the absence of any military chief or organizer, had no difficulty in storming Manila's walls in 1762. During the siege of Manila, General Draper intimated to the Archbishop that he would have difficulty in

Gabriel bastion, which limits the land front on the north; the new work being still plainly visible (completed 1787). Here also appears for the first time evidence of the influence of newer methods in fortification. This San Gabriel flank is made perpendicular to the line of defense instead of the curtain. It seems probable also that Gomez began the work on the present moat and covered-way.

By royal order of December 16, 1796, the Governor of the Islands was authorized to carry on the fortification works described in the project presented by Francisco Sabatini, Chief of Engineers; owing to which, the rampart front, facing the Pasig, was greatly modified,—changed in fact to a bastioned front, resembling one by Vauban's first method but without outworks.

From the salient of San Gabriel bastion to La Maestranza, where a demi-bastion was added, the entire character of the wall submitted to complete alteration. The resulting construction is clearly indicated in the appended photograph, taken at the cross-cut made in widening the road-way at the point where the Santo Domingo gate formerly stood in the flank of the Aduana bastion. (Center of this front).

This front is the only one affording a double tier of fire, and it is not easily understood from our present data why so elaborate a work should have been added here, when the siege of 1762 had so clearly indicated the need of further strengthening the most exposed flank. That this need was appreciated seems plainly indicated by the construction of the Luneta redoubt, authorized at the end of the 18th century, and ordered by Governor Enrile in 1835. This work stands directly in front of the Real redoubt, and beyond the glacis and advance moat. It is of very weak construction, even for that day, and poorly answers the purpose for which it was intended.

restraining a part of his forces,—presumably referring to the Sepoy contingent, and perhaps including the Frenchmen who were rendering compulsory service. The conduct of many of the troops after entering Manila seems to have more than borne out General Draper's doubt. They seemed, according to Spanish historians, to have acted most outrageously. But war though cruel today, was more so in 1762, and the sacking of an enemy's city was a recognized right of the successful belligerent.

General Draper was some years later knighted by the English Government for his services at Manila, and in due course became a lieutenant general.

It may be noted in this account as well as in others of the Siege of Manila that the English made no determined effort to blockade the place; and consequently reinforcements and supplies were brought in unhindered from the country to the north, crossing the Pasig River by boats or by the bridge now known as the Bridge of Spain.

It is not believed that the besiegers would have found any great difficulty in destroying this bridge, which at that period was a pontoon construction; or in completely severing the communications of the garrison by the Pasig.

No doubt the progress of the siege on the south line was, from its commencement so satisfactory, that additional offensive measures were not deemed necessary. The failure to sever the city's communications is but an additional proof of the feebleness of the defense.

In conclusion it may be stated that Manila's walls failed to keep out the enemy, not from inherent weakness or faulty construction; but from the absence of a disciplined garrison which by bold sallies and counter blows would have rendered the near approach of an enemy most hazardous.—A. C. M.

Sabatini continued the moat and covered-way, which was probably completed by the engineer, Rafael Aguilar, who constructed the Carlos VI battery, a short distance from Balete, and about 500 yards northeast of the Headquarters Post of Manila. This was comprised in several defensive works by this engineer, who probably erected the Plano bastion, and the outworks San Francisco, and San Pedro on the bay side. He appears also to have completed the moat and covered-way. The building of this moat presented the problem of constructing a ditch in wet and rather unstable soil, close to the foot of a heavy wall, without disturbing the foundations. This appears to have been accomplished by making a long slope at the foot of the scarp, low enough to be under water, and extended to the bottom of the moat, thus presenting the section shown in tracing. (West end of Calle Aduana.)*

A Royal order of April 23, 1872, approved the last proposed changes in the Manila fortifications; but none were carried into effect. Thus the walls and covered-ways stand to-day essentially as Rafael Aguilar left them.

Too weak to stand even so modest a siege as that of the British in 1762, unless manned by superior force, these ramparts have still answered their purpose for the Spaniards.

They were undoubtedly a great safeguard against the frequent threats of the Mindanao and Sulu pirates who ventured into the bay up to within sixty years ago. Also for more than a century, the Spaniards were any day subject to hostilities from the Portuguese; whilst the aggressive foreign policy of the Mother Country, during the 17th century, exposed them to reprisals by the Dutch fleets, which in 1643, threatened the City of Manila. To this must be added the ever present danger of uprising by the natives themselves.

The old ramparts have afforded a point of support and secure base, but for which these islands could hardly have been held so long; and in certain respects, their worth has not yet entirely disappeared; for no man is wise enough to say that they may not be needed again should foreign complications create an opportunity for revolt.

Manila, intramuros, is situated at the mouth and on the left bank of the Pasig River, Lat. north $14^{\circ} 46'$, Lon. E. $120^{\circ} 57'$. Its encircling walls measured $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles before recent demolitions destroyed their continuity. It is a dull city, with narrow streets, bearing a heavy, sombre, monastic appearance. It has six principal gates, three on the river side, named in order from the west, Almacenes, Santo Domingo and Isabel II; the other three on the land fronts, called Parian, Real and Santa Lucia, a seventh ranked as a postern in Spanish times—Postigo.

* Further examination shows evidence of underpinning in addition to the slope mentioned.—*J. C. B.*

Formerly, the drawbridges were raised and the city was closed and under sentinels from eleven o'clock at night until four in the morning. It continued so until 1852, when, in consequence of the earthquake of that year, it was decreed that the gates should thenceforth remain open night and day.

There exist seven bastions, Tenerias Aduana, San Gabriel, San Lorenzo, San Andrés, San Diego, and Plano; and five redoubts, Parian, Recoletos, Real, San Pedro, and San Francisco; besides the four small bastions mentioned.

From direct examination of the walls and of maps, it would appear that there existed on the ramparts of Manila and outworks, emplacements for 370 guns of all natures requiring a theoretical war force of from 2600 to 5200 artillery to fully man; depending upon the number of reliefs per gun. The corresponding garrison of infantry according to modern estimates would number about 10,000.

We need hardly add that no such numbers, either of men or guns, ever did actually constitute the defensive force of this fortress. This statement refers of course, only to the garrison intramuros, and does not include the field forces.

Appended is a table showing the numbers and natures of guns found on the walls at the date of United States occupation. This table is copied from one inscribed upon a plan of the Manila walls furnished by the United States Engineer Office.

ARMAMENT OF MANILA FORTIFICATIONS, 1898.

Name of Battery.	Rifled Cannon No. Cal.	Smooth Bore No. Cal.	Field Guns R. S. B. No. Cal.	Mortar No. Cal.	Kind.
Plata y Formabaja		3 10cm			M. L. Bron.
Same alta		3 10cm			" "
Bateria Sta. Barbara	5 16cm			4	" "
Bateria Sn. Francisco		4 10cm			" "
Same Sn. Miguel		2 10cm			" "
Bateria Sn. Francisco		22 15cm			" "
Rev'n. de Same	2 16cm				" "
Puerta del Postigo		2 10cm			" "
Bateria del Plana Sn. I.				5 21cm	Rifle Ir.
Puerta Sta. Lucia		2 10cm			M. L. Bron
Bateria de Sn. Jose					
Rev'n de Sn. Pedro					
Bateria de Sn. Diego	9 16cm	1 15cm			M. L. Bron.
		2 12cm	2		" "
Bateria Sn. Andrés		6 15cm			
		2 10cm	4		
Bateria Sn. Lorenzo		4 10cm	4		
Puerto del Parian		2 10cm			M. L. Bron.
Rev'n del Parian		2 10cm			" "
Bateria de Sn. Gabriel		5 15cm			" "
Puerta de Isabel, 2º		2 10cm			" "
Bateria de Herries		1 10cm			" "
Bateria de Sn. Domingo		6 12cm			" "
Bateria de la Compuerto	1 24cm				Steel BL.
Pza. de Armas del Postigo				2 10cm	
Same de Sta. Lucia				4 10cm	S. B. Bron.
Camino Cubierto	2 15cm				B. L. Siege
Bateria de Sta. Pedro	1 24cm				B. L. Steel
Bateria del		2 21cm	3		M. L.
Pastal				4 21cm	" Rifled
Camino Cubierto	4 14cm				Convert'd
Bateria de la Luneta	2 24cm				
Bat. del Malecon del Sur	2 16cm	4 15cm	2 12cm	1 32cm	
Total	28	77	24	20	

AUTHORITIES.

"PHILIPPINE ISLANDS," *Foreman*, 1898.

*"MILITARY LEGISLATION," *Salinas*, m. s., 1879.

*"HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS," *Buzeta*, m. s., 1851.

"SUCESSOS DE LAS FILIPINAS," *Morga*, Mexico, 1609.

Extracts translated by Captain Macomb, Intelligence Bureau.

Map, Lieut. Col. C. E. L. B. Davis, Corps of Engineers.

Map, surveys, Photographs, Lieut. E. M. Adams, Corps of Engineers.

"ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA."

"ANNALS OF A FORTRESS," *Viollet-le-Duc*.

*(Furnished by Señor Yeiarte, Chief of Bureau of Archives.)

Respectfully submitted,

J. C. BUSH,

Major, Artillery Corps, U. S. A.

MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS:

- 1 General Plan Manila, intramuros, 1898.
- 2 Map of Governor Váldez y Tamón, showing condition of walls after restoration (about 1735). Original in British Museum.
- 3 New (artificial) river mouth.
- 4 La Real Fuerza de Santiago, The Royal Stronghold of Santiago. Old river mouth opened here.
- 5 Road leading east from Santo Domingo gate. Gate demolished 1902. Curtain of Sabatini's bastioned front on right, ordered built in 1795. Isabel II gate to right. San Gabriel bastion in background.
- 6 Road leading to Parian gate under Parian redoubt. Parian gate in distance. Covered-way to left.
- 7 Parian gate from within the redoubt.
- 8 New Real gate from within the redoubt, ordered after siege by British, 1762.
- 9 Monument to Legaspi and Urdaneta, erected by General Davis from Spanish material found in Manila. San Diego bastion in background, breached by British, 1762.
- 10 View of moat from within the covered-way, looking southeast toward San Pedro redoubt in distance.
- 11 Santa Lucia gate, Archbishop's Palace, and Malecon Drive.
- 12 San Francisco redoubt with bastion and wall in rear, taken from within the covered-way opposite Plaza de la Fuerza.
- 13 Gateway at Fort Santiago; cut recently made in low parapet bordering interior moat.
- 14 Inscription over portal within Fort Santiago.
- 15 Cut recently made through flank of Aduana bastion where Santo Domingo gate formerly stood.

- 16 An Errard bastion of 1606 (French) joined to an old wall. Bastion walls of similar shape on Manila walls have same height as curtain wall.
- 17 Cross section of wall, moat and covered-way taken at west end of Calle Aduana. (West, not south, front).
- 18 View of moat looking west towards Real Redoubt.
- 19 East face of Aduana Bastion. (River front).
- 20 Almacenes Gate. (demolished 1903).
- 21 Interior moat and bastion front of Fort Santiago facing city. San Fernando Bastion of the fort on right of picture (river side). Lower parapet bordering moat at end of bridge.
- 22 Interior moat and bastion front of Fort Santiago facing city. San Miguel Bastion of the fort on left of picture (bay side). Lower parapet bordering moat at end of bridge.
- 23 La Plaza de la Fuerza, looking north.
- 24 Postigo Gate from within the walls.
- 25 The salient of San Andrés.
- 26 Where the old Real Gate stood in 1762. South end of Calle Palacio (within the walls).
- 27 Santa Lucia Gate from within.
- 28 San Antonio Abad. Bridge head where British landed in 1762. (land side).
- 29 Map showing relative positions of the two churches, Santiago and San Juan de Bagumbayan.
- 30 New entrance to Division Headquarters at Fort Santiago, constructed in 1903.
- 31 West Front of Fort Santiago, showing improvements made in 1903.

SANTIAGO.

Legend over entrance to office of Commanding Officer, Fort Santiago:

Reynando en las Espanas y en las Indias L.C.Y.R.M. Del Rey N.S. que Dios gu.e

D. Phelipe V.

Siendo Gov.or Cap.n Gen.l y Press.te de la R.l Aud.a de estas Islas Philip.s el M.Y.tte Sr. D. Fernando Valdes Tamon Brigadier de los R.s Eersitos de su M. G. Cavallero del Hquito de S.n Tia.o Serredifico este Cast.llo el ano de 1731. Siendo Cast.no del por su M. G. el Capitan D. Carlos de Abarca y Valdes.

FREE TRANSLATION.—The Catholic and Royal Majesty of the King, our Lord (whom God guard), Philip V, reigning in Spain and the Indies, the Very Illustrious Don Fernando Váldez Tamón, Brigadier of the Royal Armies of His Gracious Majesty, Knight of the Order of Santiago, being Governor, Captain-General and President of the Royal Audiencia of these Philippine Islands, this fort was rebuilt in the year 1731, Captain Carlos de Abarca y Valdez being Commandant thereof for His, Gracious Majesty.

(NOTE. Philip V., King of Spain from 1700 until 1746. Fernando Váldez Tamón, Captain General of the Philippines from August 14, 1729, until 1739.)

SAN ANDRÉS.

Legend on wooden slab over sheltered doorway to magazine of Bastion San Andrés. The recess prepared for the Escudo of Spain above this legend is vacant:

REINANDO LAS ESPAÑAS LA CATHOLICA Y RL. M. G. DL INVICTISIMO MONARCA D.P.V.NRO. SR. Q.Ds. GDE. Y GOBERNANDO EN SU RL. NE. ESTAS ISLAS PHILIPINAS EL MY. ILVS. SR. DN. FERNANDO VES. TAMN. CAVRO. DEL ORDEN SANTIAGO DEL CONZO. DE SU RL. M. G. SU GOBEROR. EL CAPITAN GL. DE ESTAS DICHAS ISLAS Y PRESSTE. DE LA AVDA. RL. CHNSILA. SE FABRO. ESTE ALMAZN. O CASAMATA PARA EL SEGVRO I CVSTODIA DL POLBRA. A DISPOSISION Y ORDEN DE DICHO SEÑOR. AÑO DE 1733.

Legend incised in wood just under the foregoing:

REYNANDO LA SRA. DA. ISABEL 2da. Y CON MOTIVO DE HABER PASADO REVISTA DE INSPECCION AL CUERPO NACIONAL DE YNGENIEROS EL EXCMO. SOR. GRAL. 2.º CABO DN. RAMON MONTERO, SE RESTAURO DE ORDEN DE S. E. LA ANTERIOR ANTIGUA YNSCRIPCION EN ENERO DE 1855.

TRANSLATION FIRST LEGEND.—The Catholic and Royal Gracious Majesty of the ever victorious Monarch Philip V, our Lord (whom God guard), reigning over Spain; and in his Royal name governing these Islands the Very Illustrious Don Fernando Váldez Tamón, Knight of the Order of Santiago, of the Council of His Gracious Majesty, his Governor and Captain-General of these said Islands, and President of the Royal Audiencia Chancellery, this magazine or casement was built by direction and command of the said King in the year 1733 for the security and safeguarding of the powder.

TRANSLATION SECOND LEGEND.—Doña Isabel II reigning, and pursuant to the inspection of the National Corps of Engineers by the Most Excellent General, Second in Command, Don Ramon Montero, the preceding old inscription was restored in January, 1855.

LEGEND OVER PARIAN GATE.

—
PUERTA DEL PARIAN.

AÑO 1782.

TRANSLATION.

—
PARIAN GATE.

YEAR 1782.

NOTE. This year José de Basco y Vargas was Captain General and Governor of the Philippine Islands and showed much activity in repairing the fortifications of Manila. The word "Parian" indicates a public market for the sale of small manufactured articles. The word might be translated as "bazaar."

PART II.

Siege and Capture of Manila by the English in 1762; being a translation of the second chapter of the Monograph by Marquis de Ayerbe, Zaragoza, 1897; by Captain A. C. Macomb, 5th U. S. Cavalry.

PREFACE.

The author, the Marquis de Ayerbe, has prepared this study from the usual histories and reports treating of the period in review, assisted by the manuscript diary of Don Alfonso Rodriguez de Ovalle, an officer of the Spanish Navy, who carried from Manila to Mexico the official "Notifications of peace", together with "Instructions relating to the Evacuation of Manila by the English."

Ovalle sailed from Acapulco on the Spanish frigate "Santa Rosa," December 23, 1763, and reached Manila after a voyage of eighty-three days on March 15, 1764. Having delivered his dispatches and attended to other business he went aboard the "Santa Rosa" and sailed for Acapulco on June 27, 1764.

Ovalle, during his stay in Manila, drew up a narrative of events occurring during, and after the English capture and occupation of Manila; and seems to have been diligent in seeking out the truth. These notes together with an explanatory map he sent to his friend, the Marqués de Cruillas.

The manuscript has not been published, and it is now in the library of the author of this work, he being a descendant of the Marqués de Cruillas.

It is to be regretted that the map accompanying Ovalle's notes was not reproduced with this present publication.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MANILA BY THE ENGLISH IN 1762.

Early on the morning of September 14, 1762, rumors commenced to spread through the City of Manila that a vessel had anchored the evening of the preceding day beyond the Island of Mariveles. As the galleon "Filipino" was expected daily from Acapulco, the Archbishop, who

was Acting Governor General, believed it to be this vessel, and sent out messengers with orders for its officers; together with letters from private citizens. The despatch bearers were surprised to find that the captain of the ship would not allow them to approach the vessel, nor would he hold communication with any one; only asking of some native boatmen "whether the galleon 'Trinidad' had left for Acapulco, and if the 'Filipino' had arrived in Cavite from that port." Without further incident the stranger raised anchor on the afternoon of the 17th, and sailed away on an unknown course.

The visit of this vessel gave rise to many conjectures in Manila; among others, one that war might have been declared between Spain and England, and, if this were true, of the probability of the arrival in a short time of an English fleet, with the intent of committing depredations upon these islands.

In view of this, the latest advices from Batavia were scanned; and they confirmed to some extent the fears. Immediately, committees, representing the city and the commercial interests, were formed and the port officers were notified to arm two or three vessels and send them to await the "Filipino" at the mouth of San Bernardino Strait. This last order was suspended on the 21st, when it was learned that the strange vessel, supposed to be English, had not taken that course.

Suddenly, on the 22nd, at 5:30 p. m., an English fleet of fifteen vessels entered Manila Bay, and ran before the wind to Point Sangley where it formed in line facing the province of Pampanga, within cannon shot of the forts.

The Governor immediately gave instructions for the withdrawal of the powder from the fort of San Anton where it was manufactured; and ordered the construction of gun carriages and other necessary military supplies, as well as the concentration in the city of people and rations from the nearest provinces; it is impossible to describe the confusion which all of this caused in the city.

As the garrison of Manila consisted of scarcely five hundred men, four militia companies of Spaniards were organized, which added about three hundred more; although notwithstanding the great necessity for men, they did not call upon the thousands of Sangleyes (Chinese traders) and natives, who perhaps might have rendered good service.

The Governor commissioned Lieutenant Don Fernando de Arcaya, of the Pay Department, to deliver to the chief of the English fleet a letter in which he stated the surprise and perplexity which the presence of the fleet had caused in Manila, as well as his desire to be informed of the reason for its coming; he also requested the fleet commander to inform him whether he was in need of anything. This letter was delivered on the morning of the 23rd, but was not answered through the

same channel; at about 11:00 o'clock, two English officers arrived at the palace of the Governor and handed him a letter from Admiral Cornisk (sic) and Brigadier General Draper. It read as follows: "The King of Spain having declared war against England, a fleet of that nation has now come to the Philippines to conquer the Fortress of Manila and the Philippine Islands; and if the Spaniards do not desire to experience the rigors of war, they should immediately capitulate, as we have resolved to convince them that even the most far off dominions of the King of Spain are not safe from the British forces." The Governor answered him that same day "that no notice had been received in Manila of the breaking out of hostilities and that, protesting against whatever harm might ensue, the faithful subjects and natives were determined to shed their blood for the sake of their King, as they had no authority from His Majesty for the delivery of the city; and furthermore that his forces were not inferior to those of the fleet, as would be proven by a vigorous defense."

It was then considered whether it was better to explode the fort of San Anton together with the magazine and offices, after removing the powder; or to temporarily defend it, placing a few cannon in the same to impede the landing of the enemy. The latter plan was resolved upon, it having been recommended by Don Gabriel de Magallanes, Major of Artillery, though against the opinion of the commanding officer of the forces, the Marquis of Villamediana. For this purpose ten arrobas (250 lbs.) of powder were reserved, and two eight-pounder guns were selected to defend the fort which was armed only with small one-pounders. But the dispatch of these munitions having been delayed, they had succeeded in covering but half of the road to their destination when, learning that a great part of the English troops had made a landing and taken possession of the fort, they returned to the city.

At nightfall two companies of fifty men of the regular troops went out to garrison the fort; but on approaching it and hearing a few shots coming from the enemy, they, including the officers, fell back in disorder, with the exception of some fifteen or twenty who remained under the command of Captain Don Balasar Cosar; this detachment, after fighting with courage the greater part of the night, was compelled to retreat.

The enemy lost no time, as they promptly took possession of the convent of the Augustinian friars called Malate, which was nearer to the city. The Governor ordered the miraculous image of San Francisco to be brought to his oratory; and sent a circular to the priests informing them "that it was time for them to leave their cloisters (convents) and assist in the defense of the city," which met with cheerful compliance.

On the 24th, the English chiefs addressed to the natives and half-castes the following proclamation:

"We, Samuel Cornisk (sic), Esquire and Chief Admiral of H.B.M. fleet in the Oriental Indies, and William Draper, Esquire, Brigadier General and Commander in Chief of his land forces against the Spaniards, Hereby inform all the native and half-caste inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that they are to apprehend no damage from our arms, provided they do not join the Spaniards, our enemies, nor aid or abet them in any way; on the contrary we shall in this case extend to them our protection; relieve them from the taxes imposed upon them, so onerous to their interests; we shall preserve their country from ruin, and see that violence is not done to their wives and daughters; we shall always pay them good prices for the provisions and other supplies which they may bring to our camp; and we shall guarantee them full right to return unmolested to their homes.

"We further promise them the free practice of the Roman Catholic Religion. But if they do not accept our friendly terms they may expect from us the most severe punishment, which will fall most heavily upon those who may dare to offer resistance to our arms. Given aboard H.B.M. vessel "Norfolk."

"September 24, 1762.

CORNISK (*sic*),

That same day, and in greater numbers the following day, the English could be seen scattered in the streets of the town of Santiago, especially in the vicinity of the church called Ermita, somewhat nearer Manila. Here they were attacked by some Spanish volunteers who left the city for that purpose; D. José del Busto distinguished himself in pursuing them in all directions; and with the few men who accompanied him, gave them no rest, forcing them to retreat to Ermita, where they had established their headquarters; he dislodged them from the town of Santiago, causing them three deaths; this encouraged the Spaniards who proceeded to imitate the example given by Busto.

The English captured that day a sampan (Chinese boat) of Sangleyes (Chinese traders) loaded with provisions; and as a galley was noticed entering the bay, the commander of the fleet ordered a frigate to go in pursuit of it. The galley then changed its course and ran aground on the bank of Vinoanga, which being observed by the captain of the frigate, he sent two boats and a launch after it; and captured it together with thirty thousand pesos and other articles of value, all of which were taken to the flagship of the fleet. A nephew of the Archbishop, (the Acting Governor General) with Captain D. José Cerezo, a sub-lieutenant and his boatswain, were taken prisoners; the rest of the crew escaped by jumping overboard.

This galley was one of the two which the Governor had sent out after the "Filipino" that was found in the port of Palapag, near the Cape of Espiritu Santo; and when captured was conveying to Manila the nephew of the Archbishop with despatches for that official.

The forts of Manila fired a few rounds at the church of Santiago, which accomplished little on account of the solid construction of that edifice.

On the 25th, the English established themselves in front of this church, and in some stone houses which they fortified; here they attacked all persons who happened in that vicinity; and although artillery fire from the bastions was turned upon them they sustained no damage.

The Governing Archbishop without delay despatched D. Ignacio de Berrueta to the port of Palapag with orders for the commander of the "Filipino" to send the treasure in his charge to a place of safety, and to protect the same with artillery and men from the vessel in case of an emergency.

General Draper granted the Governing Archbishop's nephew permission to go to the city; but the latter absolutely refused to avail himself of the privilege until directed to do so by his uncle; who, after giving the necessary direction, sent a letter to the English general thanking him for his consideration.

The Spaniards were able to fire a few shots with the culverins from Fort Santiago, but with little success; notwithstanding that they had availed themselves of two hours when the English, having suspended their firing, were sending one of their vessels to the sand bank at the mouth of the Pasig river and placing two others in front of the bastion of the garrison (San Diego).

In the evening, the English commenced the bombardment with three small mortars, placed by them in the church of Santiago; this could have been avoided by the destruction of the church on the preceding day by the Spaniards, as should have been done, as it offered a stronghold for artillery in that vicinity. The number of bombs which fell in the city and vicinity was about one hundred and sixty.

That night D. Cesar Fallet, a Swiss subject residing in the city, and D. José del Busto, left Manila with two companies of fifty Spaniards and over two hundred natives and mestizos (half castes), with spears, guns, and two eight-pound cannon, with orders from the Governor to drive the enemy from his position at all hazards.

On arriving at the church of San Juan, Fallet was left there with the greater part of his men, and Busto was detached to take position at the side of the Santiago church; but having himself stumbled into an ambush prepared by the enemy, a heavy fire was brought on which finally obliged the English to retreat to Ermita. Although Busto desired to attack the defenders of Santiago he was not able to do so; for Fallet, believing that the enemy was cutting off his retreat, directed him to join his forces; Busto complied with this order and fell back to the church of San Juan. The firing continued during the whole night without material result to either side.

On the 26th, the flagship opened fire at daybreak against the bastion of the *fundición* (foundry) with twelve four-pound guns; but as she could

not come close in on account of the shoal water near the shore, her distance from the city was too great to permit much damage, except that effected by some elevated shot which fell on the roofs of the churches.

A few bombs were fired which caused some casualties, and compelled the small number of soldiers and natives who had left the city to return.

D. Pedro Iriarte, with two companies and fifteen hundred natives, left the city the next day for the purpose of protecting Fallet; but without being able to accomplish this as the latter had already retreated; he then joined Busto, and while waiting for the reinforcement of a company under the command of D. Fernando de Arcaya, they did their utmost to take possession of the stone houses from whence the English were pouring upon them a heavy fire; but this effort did not meet with success.

Busto succeeded in driving off the enemy after a heavy engagement, but the latter having fired a few rounds of grapeshot, the natives became panic stricken and fled, leaving him alone with the small number of Spanish soldiers. The English upon noticing this, attacked with greater vigor driving them back to San Juan church; Busto made his retreat without ceasing to fire, and paused to pick up two abandoned cannon; with danger of being captured himself, as he was suffering from a severe bruise which he had received by falling with his horse, which had been killed. There were several casualties on both sides. General Draper sent a letter by one of his officers, under a flag of truce, to the Governor stating: "As you see the advantage gained already by my troops, it will be better to surrender the city, and other strong places of the islands, before experiencing further the sufferings of war, and the brutalities of a portion of my forces that can with difficulty be restrained."

The Governor summoned the Judges of the Supreme Court, the commanding officer of the forces and the field officers of the garrison, the Marquis of Monte Castro who was a major of the militia, and other persons of prominence from among the city officers and merchants; the contents of General Draper's communication being read to them the majority decided not to accede to its demand, urging that means of defense still existed, and that not only were a large number of native reinforcements expected to arrive soon, but that provisions were obtainable as well as means of bringing them in. As the commander of the forces and three others alone did not favor these views, the meeting finally resolved to continued the defense and this course was approved by the Governor.

On the morning of the 29th, some five hundred natives under the command of the Governing Archbishop, the judges of the Supreme Court, and several residents, sallied forth from the city; but the English poured such a heavy fire upon them from the church of Santiago that

they fled hurriedly, without the chief being able to restrain them, and returned in disorder to the city.

An unfortunate incident took place soon after. When General Draper sent the nephew of the Archbishop to the city, he sent one of his officers under a white flag to accompany him to his uncle; but the few scattering natives who had remained in the vicinity, upon seeing them, assaulted both, killing and mutilating the English officer, and fatally wounding the Archbishop's nephew.

General Draper complained bitterly to the Governor on account of this; and demanded that the aggressors be delivered to him; stating that if they were not he would hang the officers of the captured galley; the Governor offered to deliver them as soon as found.

During the night some of the mortars from the fortifications were used, and a few grenades were thrown into the fleet without result, other than the latter rectified its position so as to prepare itself, assisted by the batteries in the church of Santiago, to inflict greater damage on the morrow.

Two thousand natives arrived to defend the city, and the walls were crowded with people at night. The Archbishop ordered the religious communities to furnish all men they had suited for soldiers; and succeeded in gaining a number of recruits in response to his patriotic call.

On the 27th and 28th, the firing from both the fleet and the forts was continued without any damages or casualties on either side; a number of natives arrived from the province of Pampanga, and were quartered in San Fernando. (Outside the Fortress.)

The same day, a raging wind blew, which impeded the customary daily landing of war supplies by the English; and also sunk some of their lighters, drowning one officer and a great number of sailors; and causing the loss in the sea of one of the great mortars, which they were bringing ashore.

Some of those who were able to save themselves from being drowned, including the deserting Malabar natives, begged, upon approaching the ditch wall of the Fortress, to be allowed to enter the city; but being answered by shots, and three of them being killed, the rest decamped.

The high wind continued with greater violence on the 30th, sinking two barks with fifty men, as well as the captured sampan. During the night one of the vessels of the fleet was driven on the beach; and although they lightened it, unloading the ordnance and heavy articles they were not able to float it. D. José Eslava, assisted by some natives, picked up a large quantity of masts and spars which the waves brought ashore.

The English continued throwing bombs into the city, and placed more mortars behind the Santiago church, which did great damage to the buildings.

One thousand natives from Pampanga arrived in the evening of this day, and on October 1st various orders were issued to supply them with arrows, spears, and other arms. On the 2nd, the English continued the firing and did not neglect to add more cannon, in such manner and to such an extent that they succeeded in opening a breach in the bastion of the *fundición* (foundry), sweeping the face which looked towards Santiago; and damaging the Royal gate as well as the bastion of the Recoletan friars; they also threw an occasional bomb into the fortifications facing toward the sea.

A short time afterward they used nine cannons, recently placed in battery; destroying the parapets of the foundry bastion, and so sweeping the wall, that it had to be abandoned by its defenders who were unable to find a place of safety on it.

The two vessels which had been anchored near the city poured in a fire as heavy as that of this battery; while the troops in the tower of the Santiago church kept up a vigilant fire on everyone who appeared above the walls or the bastions.

In the city, affairs were, unfortunately, in dispute and confusion; everyone wished to give orders, although few obeyed even those of the Governor; who, nevertheless, continued to issue them daily, upon the advice of some who pretended to assist in the defense of the city.

On October 3rd, with a view of surprising the enemy's camp, over three thousand Pampanga natives, and two hundred soldiers left the city, at two o'clock in the morning, under the leadership of D. Francisco Rodriguez, a major from Cavite, who had come to the city upon the Governor's call, and D. Santiago de Orendain, a lawyer of Manila.

To accomplish its purpose, the force was divided into three sections; one going to San Lazaro where it was awaited by D. Pedro Busto, who had recovered from the fall from his horse and was to take charge of the column; the other sections going, respectively, to San Juan de Bagumbayan and Ermita.

The plan was not badly arranged; but following their custom the natives commenced beating drums and uttering loud cries, thus warning the enemy and enabling them to prepare for the struggle. Otherwise the English might have been driven from their position, as the attack was made with such vigor and courage that a hand to hand engagement took place. The enemy regained strength upon noticing the poor discipline of the natives and the inferiority of their arms, which consisted, principally, of spears and short swords. (Probably bolos—*Tr.*). The attackers were finally beaten back in hurried retreat by the heavy fire, leaving over four hundred dead on the field. The enemy then drove out of the San Juan church the natives who had dislodged the small

English guard and ascended the tower to ring the bells, promptly hanging the few who were captured alive.

In the evening, the Governor met in conference the Judges of the Supreme Court, the commanding officer of the forces, the Marquis of Monte Castro, the various field officers of the forces in the city, the major from Cavite, the engineer, together with the prelates of the convents and many of the friars.

The Governor stated the object of the meeting was to obtain their opinion as to the advisability of capitulating, or continuing the defense.

The engineer set forth the bad condition of the fortifications, and the practical impossibility of making embrasures, traverses, and counterworks, without an abundance of gabions, bags, and brushwood, which were not on hand; he stated that if the breach was now impassable it would not be so long, dominated as it was by the fire of the enemy's batteries; he also indicated that the guns in the Carranza bastion would soon be dismounted, when the assault would be easy.

The Governor stated that he was of the opinion that further defense was unwarranted, especially now after having heard the opinion of the engineer; and he deemed it proper to propose the surrender of the city. The majority of those present were of his opinion but there were a few who, having small confidence in the knowledge and science of the engineer, believed that further resistance was practicable; this party insisted upon the building of the traverse and counterworks to impede the assault; and upon the barricading of the streets; claiming further should the breach be opened, they could then assemble their forces and capitulate.

It was finally resolved to continue the defense, and the Marquis of Monte Castro was placed in charge of the construction; he ordered certain of the friars (*religioses*) to take some natives to the foundry and make the necessary tools for building the traverse; but nothing was accomplished, although Padre Pascual Feranadez, of the company of Jesus, professor of mathematics, as well as the rest of the friars, worked with the greatest of zeal.

In the same meeting, the major from Cavite recommended that the Governor have all the women, children, and aged people leave Manila, taking with them their wealth. One of the judges of the Supreme Court proposed that an officer be appointed to remain in the city with full power to continue the defense or to effect a capitulation; while the Governor and the court officers and a great part of the residents should leave.

The prosecuting attorney, who was in charge of matters relating to food, insisted that a scale of prices for the same be determined; and represented the pressing necessity for an arrangement for the distribu-

tian and expenditure of rations; as well as the advisability of paying the natives (presumably referring to the natives serving as soldiers in the defense—*Tr.*). But the meeting accomplished little or nothing, and adjourned amidst disputes and controversies.

It was only determined to exhort the religious orders to continue their care of the natives assisting in the defense of the walls; and to leave the direction of all matters in the hands of the Governor as before, with authority to capitulate in case that he concluded that the Fortress was no longer defensible. Before accomplishing this the guns were to be spiked to prevent their use by the enemy. But even this measure was not carried out when the hour came, though the nails for the purpose had been set aside.

The enemy, on his part, did not stop the firing, and opened a breach in the bastion of the *fundición* (foundry) which silenced the fire from that point, as one cannon had fallen inside the ditch, while others were dismantled, and the one or two that were still serviceable were so exposed to the rifle fire of the enemy from the Santiago church that it was practically impossible to reload them.

In spite of the deadly danger, D. Martin Goycoa, assisted by D. Eusebio de Soto and two friars, succeeded, under orders of the Governor, in withdrawing the guns near the ditch that would otherwise have fallen into the same.

On the 4th, more natives arrived in the city from the provinces, and the friars who spoke their dialects harangued them by the orders of the Governor.

The enemy threw bombs of a larger caliber, but they only damaged one house; they perceived also from the tower of Santiago the abandoned state of the foundry bastion, and cannonaded from their batteries the breach already made. This breach was not further visited by the engineer of the defense; nor was there anyone who gave heed to it thereafter.

The Governor continued issuing new orders to which no attention was paid; and the commander of the forces contented himself with directing the friars not to let the natives climb the bastions; from the lack of discipline, great disorder and confusion reigned in the city. It was resolved, in order to prevent the Islands being left without any one to rule them in the name of His Majesty, to appoint as lieutenant to the Acting Governor and Captain General, Judge D. Simon de Anda y Salazar, who left the city this same day, October 4th, with a commission to visit the provinces.

On the 5th, before the dawn, the English delivered a heavier fire than on any of the preceding days with the purpose of completely destroying the bastions of the *fundición*.

After they succeeded in making the breach practicable, a French-adventurer entered the same, followed by some fifteen or twenty Englishmen, who, finding no obstruction, nor even any one to offer them resistance, signalled to their companions, and about four hundred men who had been held in reserve at the camp entered the city.*

The garrison and some of the citizens and natives on duty at the Royal Gate offered the greatest resistance, but the English finally overcame them, killing forty men of the garrison; and also killing some of the wounded, among them being the major of the regiment, D. Martin de Goycoa, whom we have already mentioned.

The enemy only lost four men, among them a sergeant who received an arrow shot in the forehead.

It is indeed a sorrowful thing to be said, but Major D. Miguel Valdez, commanding the regiment, shamefully fled on this occasion, and his bad example was followed by some of the residents and soldiers, and a great part of the natives.†

An Irish pilot named Raymond Kelly, made a very notable defense of the bastion of Carranza where he was killed.

At the Parian Gate, some resistance was made at first, but the defenders soon fled, leaving five of their number, and seventeen of the enemy dead. The enemy then proceeded without opposition until near Fort Santiago.

The column which occupied the walls at the left side of the foundry, took possession of the defenses as far as the bastion of the gate of Santa Lucia, losing in the movement the majority of its men; the gate of Santiago was the only one left free.

It occurred that the columns following down the walls, the English under command of General Draper, and the Spanish under Colonel Monzon, came face to face in the Plaza del Palacio but did not attack each other.

As soon as the Archbishop, Acting Governor, learned the above occurrences, he retired to Fort Santiago with the judges, some of the officers, many residents and a part of the natives, without leaving any instructions or orders for the guards of the Palace, which, consisting of only fifty men, immediately surrendered.

He only ordered an officer to go under a flag of truce to General Draper, and state to him his desire for the cessation of hostilities; and

*Five hundred marines, dressed, armed and uniformed like the regular English troops also entered the city this day, and committed all kinds of depredations in the convents, churches, and residences. (Ovalle. Siege of Manila, 1763. Manuscript).

†Rodriguez Ovalle.

further, that he could safely enter the town, there being none to offer resistance.

The officer complied with his mission and accompanied General Draper upon his entrance, which was accomplished without further incident other than the firing of a few shots by our men from the Cabildo (City Hall), killing one soldier and wounding an officer; which gave Draper cause to threaten those present that if this were repeated he would put to the sword everyone found in the streets. The threat calmed the bolder spirits.

The Governor, from Fort Santiago, ordered the Swiss, Cesar Fallet, to ask for terms of capitulation; but two English officers coming at the same time to ask, in the name of their chief, for the surrender of the city, his services were not required.

The Governor, and the commanding officers of the forces, with the pretext of going personally to interview these officers, left the fort; whereupon the natives and the officers with them, believing themselves abandoned, jumped from the walls into the river where several were drowned, and others killed by the fire which the English immediately directed upon them from the walls.

The English without delay took possession of the fort, and sent to the palace the judges of the Supreme Court and other personages whom they found there, stating that their presence with the Governor was necessary in order to negotiate the capitulation.

The terms of the same were drawn by these individuals, and were to the effect that the residents were to remain subjects of His Catholic Majesty, free in the practice of their religion; with their lives and property guaranteed; that the forms of government both ecclesiastic and civil were to remain as then existing; that the persons who had left the city during the siege were not to be molested if they wished to return; that the exterior and interior commerce of the residents should be freely permitted, and allowed to enter and depart from the city when necessary in the way of business. They further asked for the garrison the honors of war, and the settlement of their pay which was in arrears; stating that His Catholic Majesty would be responsible for such sum as the English might advance for this purpose.

Besides this, one million dollars were to be paid to the English for the expenses of their navy, and to save the city from plunder.

To these propositions, which the Governor considered would be accepted without hesitation, the British chiefs replied, "that the city would be respected, as well as its inhabitants, and that no looting should take place; that the people were to be respected in their

national religion, but they would be under the government of His Britannic Majesty with the following terms which we herewith exactly transcribe:

- 1st. The officers will be considered as prisoners of war under their word of honor, and will be granted the use of their swords.
- 2nd. The ordnance and war supplies will be turned over to the Commissary of His Britannic Majesty.
- 3rd. The port of Cavite shall be surrendered, as well as all the forts existing in the islands.
- 4th. All the conditions submitted by the Governor which are not contrary to these will be guaranteed by the payment of four million pesos, to be delivered one half in cash and the other half secured by the necessary guarantees for its collection.

Furthermore they gave the Governor and other prominent persons (*personajes*) of the city to understand that if the port of Cavite was not immediately surrendered, and the four million of pesos delivered, that they would be put to the sword; and the English, in fact, placed their soldiers under arms to enforce the threat.

Some commissioners from the governing Archbishop went immediately to interview General Draper, and offered to deliver to him the port of Cavite, and all the money of the "obras pias" (pious savings), together with the entire treasure which was to be brought by the galleon "Trinidad"; binding themselves, in case these amounts did not make the sum asked, to issue an order for the payment of the remainder against the Treasury of His Catholic Majesty. The proposition of the commissioners was accepted with the condition that if before or on that day, the 7th of October, the vessel "Trinidad" had been captured by the English fleet, which had gone to look for it, the treasure brought by the said vessel was not to be included in the four million pesos. The Governor immediately issued an order for the Governor of Cavite to deliver the said port; and another addressed to the commander of the "Trinidad" to deliver the treasure to the English captains.

In spite of the promises made by General Draper to the Governing Archbishop and other prominent persons (*personajes*) of the city, including the merchants, no sooner had the English troops entered the city than they commenced to plunder.

They left nothing that was of any value in the private residences; and rendered useless whatever they did not want to carry with them; they committed thousand of atrocities, and abused many women. In the

convent of Santo Domingo, they cut off the head of the image of our Lady of the Rosary and threw it on the floor.

They took all the chalices from the churches, the patines, and the ornaments; and wore the latter to show their contempt; and tied to the tails of the horses the priestly robes. The archives from the Supreme Court, the Secretary's office and the Royal Treasury, as well as many others from private residences, were burned; they being zealously assisted in their evil work by a large part of the house servants of the Spaniards and by all the natives who came to defend the city.

General Draper pretended not to be aware of all this; and gave orders to have guards placed in the convents and houses for the purpose of protecting them from plunder; he ordered the hanging of two Sangleyes for robbery, and caused to be returned many articles of clothing that showed use, together with other articles of little value; but no one recovered any object that was of any value, while many boxes of silver plate (*plata labrada*) were sent aboard the English vessels.

Draper also published on the 8th, a proclamation stating to the natives that "he had come to lighten their work and that the war was only made against the Spaniards."*

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*Rodriguez Ovalle.

NOTE.—The Carranza bastion mentioned in this article on pages 11 and 14 does not appear on any map, but it is believed to have been a small outwork of the San Diego bastion erected a short distance south of it.

San Eugenio bastion or battery was on the wall fronting the bay, and a short distance north of the San Diego bastion; it was no doubt injured by the fire of the fleet which was directed on this part of the wall. (*Tr.*)





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